THE SENATE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF JUDGE THOMAS PORTEOUS : A TIME AND CALL FOR SENATE NULLIFICATION

LAURACK D. BRAY, ESQ.
FEDERAL ATTORNEY
P.O. BOX 611432
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
TEL: (805) 901-2693


December 6, 2010

TO: THE U.S. SENATE AS A JURY

RE: THE SENATE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL
OF G. THOMAS PORTEOUS

V.

CALIFORNIA’S JUDICIAL SEVEN

A TIME AND CALL
FOR
SENATE NULLIFICATION

This is a Petition to the government ( in this case, the U.S. Senate as a jury) for redress ( in this case, for Senate (jury) nullification) in the impeachment trial of G. Thomas Porteous. This Petition is submitted for two reasons: (1) to help secure fundamental fairness for judge Porteous regarding his Senate impeachment trial; and (2) to uncover and/or expose the criminal conduct of various California judges, state and federal, whom the U.S. Justice Department has refused to prosecute, notwithstanding sufficient and probable cause evidence with which to do so, and, in particular, regarding fairness to judge Porteous, a specific federal judge, who has committed criminal and impeachable conduct, yet, has not been prosecuted or impeached.

I am a Black or African American civil rights and appellate lawyer, practicing federal law only, mostly appeals, here in California. However, I began my practice in the District of Columbia, and nearly my entire legal career, after law school, has been spent in private practice as a sole practitioner. My background includes a B.A. , M.S., and M.P.A. from California State University, Long Beach, Ca., and a law degree from Howard University in Washington, D.C. I have also served in the military, during the Vietnam War Era, receiving an honorable discharge from the U.S. Army. During the course of my legal career, I have been appellate counsel of record in several cases which have resulted in published opinions. The three most important ones are Miller v. Smith, 99 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 1996)(reversal of the denial of free transcripts to an indigent appellant) (reversed by Miller v. Smith, en banc, 115 F.3d 1136 (4th Cir. 1997); Jackson v. Guirbino, 364 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2004)(reversal of a murder conviction based on Miranda); and In the Matter of Crammond, 23 I & N Dec. 9 (BIA 2001), en banc (reversal of a deportation order), vacated on other grounds, In the Matter of Crammond , 23 I & N Dec. 448 (BIA 2002). Finally, while this factor was not decisive in my decision to submit this Petition, I was born in New Orleans, La., and lived there my first twelve years before moving to Los Angeles with my family.

I do not know judge Porteous, either personally or professionally. I have never met judge Porteous, nor have I met any of his lawyers who represent him at the impeachment proceedings. I only became aware of judge Porteous through news reports initially, and thereafter, through C-Span’s coverage of the Articles of impeachment and the Senate impeachment trial.

In June, 2007, I, together with two clients of mine, Harold James Griffith and Jeanette Andrews (both white), filed a criminal complaint, supported by evidence (including trial transcript evidence), in and with the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Los Angeles, CA. The Complaint charged multiple acts of criminal conduct, including racial discrimination, conspiracy to commit racial discrimination, obstruction of justice, false statements, and fraud, by multiple individuals, i.e., state and federal judges and a Clerk of Court. The Complaint evolved from conduct by the accused in basically four civil cases : (1) Nguyen v. Bray, Civ. 221162, Ventura County(CA) Superior Court (unlawful detainer case); (2) Bray v. Hintz, 04-4495, U.S.D.C., Central Dist. of Cal.(racial discrimination case); (3) Andrews v. Johnson (Navy) , 03-3628DT, U.S.D.C., Cent. Dist. of Cal.(disability discrimination case); and (4) Griffith v. SHHS, CV-91-4108, U.S.D.C., Cent. Dist. of Cal.(social security disability case). And these cases subsequently evolved into appellate cases, which were litigated in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. To put it succinctly, the misconduct, which at the core was racial discrimination, began at the Superior Court of California, continued through the United States District Court for the Central District of California and ended with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The federal criminal complaint followed a federal misconduct complaint (involving the same federal judges) filed with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, whereby and during which one of the criminally-accused federal judges, faced with probable removal from office, retired ( to avoid Ninth Circuit Judicial Council proceedings—with the assistance of another assigned chief judge).

Within a day and a week, respectively, after we filed the criminal complaint, two state judges named in the complaint retired from the Superior Court of Ventura County, California bench, Steven Hintz and Barry Klopfer. Later, a federal district judge, Terry Hatter, Jr., retired (and retained senior judge status), and, finally, an ex-Clerk of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Cathy Catterson, resigned her position as Clerk. Two of the federal district judges, William Schwarzer (senior judge) and Dickran Tevrizian, were already retired at the time the complaint was filed. Thereafter, another criminal complaint was filed against additional “Defendants” (for ease of understanding). Following this complaint, another defendant resigned, former United States Attorney for Los Angeles, Thomas P. O’Brien. Together these seven individuals comprised what I designated the “Judicial Seven”, for those individuals charged in our criminal complaints who the U.S. Justice Department and the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Los Angeles forced (based on sufficient probable cause evidence of a crime for an arrest) to retire (if not already retired), and thereafter, allowed to retire or resign , sometimes with benefits, without suffering any real penalty, i.e., fine, restitution, suspension, imprisonment, etc.


I.

WHAT IS SENATE NULLIFICATION ?

Senate nullification is simply the counterpart of jury nullification, when the Senate acts as a jury for impeachment purposes. However, the Senate jury is unique :

Sen. Clair McCaskill, Chairman, Senate Impeachment Trial Committee :

“WE ARE TALKING ABOUT DIFFERENT STANDARDS. WE ARE TALKING ABOUT DIFFERENT KINDS OF PROCEDURES. THIS IS NOT A TYPICAL JURY SITTING UP HERE. THESE ARE PROPLE THAT ARE GOING TO BE ABLE TO WEIGH THE VARIOUS INFORMATION THAT COMES IN FRONT OF THIS COMMITTEE AND THE RECORD THAT DEVELOPS, AND DECIDE WHICH PART OF THAT INFORMATION THAT IS RELEVANT TO THEIR PERSONAL DECISION IN REGARDS TO A CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL ON THE IMPEACHMENT.”

While there are several definitions of jury nullification, in submitting this petition, I will rely on that definition set forth by Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition:

A jury’s knowing and deliberate rejection of the evidence or refusal to apply the law either because the jury wants to send a message about some social issue that is larger than the case itself or because the result dictated by law is contrary to the jury’s sense of justice, morality, or fairness.

Here, I believe the Senate should nullify for both reasons: (1) to send a message about some social issue that is larger than the case itself and (2) because the result dictated by law, I believe, is contrary to the Senate’s sense of justice, morality, or fairness. I will more fully expound upon these reasons at or near the end of this petition, after I have more fully provided the basis for the reasons.



II.

THE IMPEACHMENT OF JUDGE PORTEOUS, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WOULD DENY HIM FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS AND VIOLATE HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.

I believe that the Senate cannot impeach judge Porteous, with knowledge of some of the information that I will provide, without denying him fundamental fairness, justice, and equal protection of the law.

A. BECAUSE I HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF AND PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE HERETOFORE INFORMATION AND MATTERS THAT I WILL SUBMIT, AND BECAUSE I AM AN OUTSIDE OBSERVER, I AM UNIQUELY QUALIFIED AND SITUATED TO PRESENT THIS PETITION TO THE SENATE.

This Petition would not be brought by the House Managers because it would concede their case and their efforts before the Senate; and it probably was not and would not be brought by judge Porteous’ lawyers because it would tend to give the impression that they believed that they had a weak case or defense on the merits (of the evidence and the law) and therefore, they had to resort to a procedural or “outside” defense in order to prevail. Thus, if an argument of this nature is to be made in this case at all, it must be made by a third party or person, hopefully detached from the two main parties involved in the impeachment controversy. I am that person.


B. JUDGE PORTEOUS HAS BEEN DENIED FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN THE “IMPEACHMENT PROCESS” BECAUSE HE HAS BEEN TREATED DISPARATELY DIFFERENT THAN OTHER SIMILARLY-SITUATED FEDERAL JUDGES, BEGINNING WITH THE DECISION TO INITIATE THE IMPEACHMENT PROCESS AGAINST HIM.

Judge Porteous has received fundamental unfair treatment by both the U.S. Department of Justice and the House of Representatives through the House Judiciary Committee (which includes the House Impeachment Task Force, House Managers, and House Counsel)(hereinafter “House”). The unfair treatment began with the U.S. Justice Department and continued with the House. In order to illustrate the disparate treatment by the Justice Department, I will utilize and compare the cases of the California “Judicial Seven”, who, as alluded to earlier, are seven judges (both state and federal) and other officials whom the Justice Department “caused” and/or “allowed” to retire, rather than be prosecuted for crimes, after the individuals were faced with probable arrest and/or possible grand jury investigation and/or indictment, based on probable cause evidence against them . For the House’s unfair treatment, I will also rely on the Judicial Seven, but necessarily, I will restrict my reliance to the applicable federal judges only.

I intend to demonstrate that regardless of the “high crimes and misdemeanors” that judge Porteous is accused of committing, he was not provided fair and equal treatment in the government’s prosecution of him for those crimes. I intend to show that at least in part, judge Porteous was subjected to vindictive prosecution and disparate treatment by the Justice Department, and at least selective prosecution by the House.

Finally, in entertaining this Petition, the Senate should keep in mind that the Constitution does not designate nor identify a particular number or type of “high crime or misdemeanor” necessary for impeachment; therefore, only one high crime or misdemeanor of any type (e.g., perjury, racial discrimination, or theft) is sufficient. So, the House cannot justify impeaching judge Porteous because he purportedly committed certain types of crimes (e.g., bribery or “kickbacks”) or a certain number of crimes (e.g., four articles of impeachment), while not impeaching another federal judge who has committed only one crime of only one type (e.g., racial discrimination or conspiracy). The Constitution does not provide support for treating the two classes differently.






III.

PARTICULARLY, WHEN VIEWED WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE JUDICIAL SEVEN, THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S PURSUANCE OF JUDGE PORTEOUS WAS A “VINDICTIVE PROSECUTION”.

Even standing alone, there is sufficient evidence for a colorable claim of vindictive prosecution by the Justice Department, but, when buttressed with the Justice Department’s treatment of the Judicial Seven, it seems clear that the Department filing a misconduct complaint with the Fifth Circuit was a result of personal and focused pursuance. This is a good time and place to admit that my factual assertions regarding judge Porteous’ impeachment derive from the internet, C-Span trial coverage, and news accounts and coverage. So, if I assert a material incorrect fact that goes to support my argument, you, the reader, may disregard the argument. This Petition, necessarily, will not be as thorough a Petition as it could be for financial reasons .

According to Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed., a vindictive prosecution is “a prosecution in which a person is singled out under a law or regulation because the person has exercised a constitutionally protected right” (emphasis added); moreover, even though “(i)n the U.S. justice system, prosecutors have broad discretion in deciding whether to charge someone with a crime and, if they do, to decide what and how many crimes they will be charged with(,) (p)rosecutorial discretion is not. . . unlimited. As a law review article notes, courts ‘protect individuals from prosecutorial decisions that are based on unconstitutional motives or executed in bad faith. Prosecutors may not engage in selective prosecution, which denies equal protection of the law, or vindictive prosecution, which violates due process rights.’ 38 Prosecutorial Discretion, Georgetown Law Journal Annual Review of Criminal Procedure 219, 222 (2009)” (as cited in CYB3RCRIM3 blog, “Vindictive Prosecution”, September 22, 2009)(emphasis here and in the original). The Justice Department, after declining to prosecute judge Porteous (after FBI and grand jury investigation), provided as one of its reasons, that some of the allegations against judge Porteous had run outside the statute of limitations period. But, judge Porteous challenged this asserted reason for not prosecuting him ( likely believing that there was insufficient evidence of a crime because he did not commit the crimes that he was accused of), and he agreed to toll or waive the statute of limitations. And so, even in view of the tolling agreements, the Justice Department could not find sufficient evidence to prosecute judge Porteous on the “statute of limitation-based” allegations. Therefore, it had to continue to decline prosecution, displaying to others that the statute of limitations excuse for not prosecuting judge Porteous was just that, an “excuse”, and what eventually proved to be, an invalid one. That “in your face” and successful challenge could not have pleased the Justice Department; and it likely created some disgust, i.e., having to close the case without an indictment, where it believed judge Porteous should have been indicted). Thus, Justice decided to go beyond its own responsibility and criminal jurisdiction to submit a letter-complaint of judicial misconduct to the Fifth Circuit, to see if that body could find a way to punish judge Porteous for his investigated acts, even if Justice could not. I doubt if Justice was required to complain to the Fifth Circuit, therefore, it was a discretionary act, and judge Porteous was “singled out” for use of that discretion.

When viewed in the context of the California Judicial Seven, it becomes clearer that judge Porteous was singled out for prosecution. The Justice Department submitted its misconduct complaint to the 5th Circuit in May, 2007. However, on June 25, 2007, as alluded to earlier, my clients and I filed a criminal complaint in the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Los Angeles against the Judicial Seven and others. Within a week of the filing, two California Superior Court judges, Steven Hintz and Barry Klopfer were “caused” (or forced) to retire by the Justice Department (through FBI agents). Hintz retired on or about the same day the complaint was filed, and Klopfer, about a week later. Klopfer was a member of a three-judge appellate panel that reviewed and affirmed Hintz’s judgment. The other two panel members were David Long and Ken Riley, and they were also named in the complaint. Klopfer, Long, and Riley all signed the fraudulent appellate decision, but the Justice Department only forced Klopfer to retire (likely because he actually wrote the decision that was endorsed by the others---nevertheless, because they all signed the decision, they are all equally liable).

All four judges were charged in the complaint with conspiracy to deny civil and constitutional rights under color of law and based on race, or racial discrimination. Since Justice did not force Long and Riley to retire, like Klopfer, we can assume that it found there was insufficient evidence for an arrest or to bring charges. Nonetheless, unlike with judge Porteous, where Justice also found insufficient evidence to bring charges, the Justice Department did not refer judges Long and Riley to the California judicial misconduct Commission; and clearly, there was a basis for doing so, since they had signed and adopted the same decision that formed the basis for Klopfer’s forced retirement. So why did Justice refer judge Porteous to a misconduct body, but not judges Long and Riley? It seems clear, whatever the reasons, that they were unconstitutional or “executed in bad faith”, e.g., retaliatory for judge Porteous waiving the statute of limitations and further exposing an invalid excuse and a lack of evidence against him or the Justice Department placing a greater premium on “kickback” or self-help money crimes than on racial discrimination crimes.

Judge Porteous was also subjected to disparate treatment by the Justice Department regarding retirement. While the Justice Department forced and allowed Hintz to retire with benefits, after having found sufficient probable cause evidence to arrest and likely indict him, it pursued a course of deprivation of benefits for judge Porteous, even though it found insufficient evidence of a crime to pursue an arrest or prosecution against him, and even though judge Porteous voluntarily wants to retire next year (he could fight impeachment without an expression of retirement; and if he won, he would simply return to the bench and continue judging). This was disparate treatment by the Justice Department.


IV.

THE HOUSE EXERCISED SELECTIVE PROSECUTION OR IMPEACHMENT OF JUDGE PORTEOUS, DENYING HIM EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW

According to Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed., selective prosecution is :

The practice or an instance of a criminal prosecution (or, in this instance, an impeachment) brought at the discretion of a prosecutor rather than one brought as a matter of course in the normal functioning of the prosecuting authority’s office. Selective prosecution violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (in this case, it would be the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which contains an equal protection component) if a defendant is singled out for prosecution when others similarly-situated have not been prosecuted and the prosecutor’s reasons for doing so are impermissible . (Emphasis added).

The House selectively prosecuted judge Porteous because at the time that it decided it would “inquire whether the House should impeach judge Porteous”, there were several similarly-situated federal judges whom the House could have inquired about, but chose not to. Therefore, judge Porteous was singled out for impeachment by the House. Here, the similarly-situated characteristics primarily are : (1) federal judges, (2) accused of impeachable crimes or offenses, (3) who have or had a federal misconduct complaint filed against them, but who have not undergone a criminal trial, and (4) who could have been investigated for impeachment at the time judge Porteous was.

While there are several judges that meet the similarly-situated requirements, I will rely on one judge in particular for the similarly-situated examination : ex-district judge Dickran Tevrizian of the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Judge Tevrizian’s impeachable conduct was outlined and/or depicted in both a federal misconduct complaint and a federal criminal complaint. Overall and primarily, Tevrizian was “charged” (by the misconduct complaint and the criminal complaint complainants---the same for both complaints) with conspiracy to deny civil and constitutional rights under color of law and based on race, or racial discrimination. All other acts of misconduct or criminal conduct were done in perpetuation of the racial discrimination. Some of the other acts were : (1) Tevrizian arbitrarily denied a request to re-assign a race discrimination case to another judge at the beginning of the case, in violation of a court rule, dictate, or provision directing that cases were to be randomly assigned---the case was not randomly assigned to Tevrizian---and, in view of the fact that the black plaintiff-lawyer had filed a writ of mandamus against Tevrizian on behalf of a client in another case, Andrews (and the writ was granted by the Ninth Circuit). Compare: judge Porteous denial of a recusal motion in the Lifemark v. Liljeberg case and the impeachment Article I. (2) Tevrizian arbitrarily denied a motion for a temporary restraining order (which was directed at re-gaining possession of a home-law office and law practice by a black lawyer) without a hearing; (3) he arbitrarily and capriciously denied a preliminary injunction (directed at the same relief as the TRO) without a hearing, and (4) in violation of a local court rule requiring that a preliminary injunction hearing date be set at the time a TRO is denied; (5) he intentionally and unlawfully transferred a race discrimination case to another judge, Christina Snyder (who had previously denied relief to the black lawyer-plaintiff in another case), with the intent to deny the black lawyer his constitutional rights to a due process fair trial before a fair and impartial judge. Compare : judge Porteous’ purported unlawful actions to expunge the convictions of individuals, particularly the Senate trial witness Aubrey Wallace (to enhance rights---not deny rights) ; (6) he ignored or disregarded a local rule affecting a disability discrimination plaintiff’s right to counsel, and , thereafter, denied the plaintiff her right to counsel without a hearing; (7) he denied a black lawyer’s motion to represent a client pro hac vice, without a hearing, after the client’s first lawyer (white) had to withdraw because of a directive from the California State Bar, and even though the black lawyer acted as “of counsel” in the case before the white lawyer’s withdrawal; (8) he refused to obey federal default law (the Navy had defaulted), requiring a plaintiff, through counsel, to seek and obtain a writ of mandamus from the Ninth Circuit (writ granted) to force him to do so; (9) he ignored default set aside law in order to set aside a default that had been entered against the Navy; (10) he unlawfully continued district court proceedings and granted the Navy summary judgment against a pro se Plaintiff (in her absence), when he lacked jurisdiction to do so (the case was being appealed). Compare : judge Porteous’ purported unlawful expungement of convictions (to provide for greater opportunities in life for the individuals) ; (11) he conspired with the assigned chief judge, Harry Pregerson, to retire rather than face discipline by the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council; (12) he conspired with Pregerson to commit fraud on the Judicial Council and the Judicial Conference of the United States regarding the processing of his misconduct complaint; and (13) he conspired to obstruct and impede an official proceeding, i.e., the Ninth Circuit disciplinary proceeding. Again, there are several other federal judges that are similarly-situated with judge Porteous; but I chose judge Tevrizian to emphasize the point, based on the nature of his misconduct. Tevrizian did not compile a sufficient misconduct record before the Ninth Circuit, unlike judge Porteous with the Fifth Circuit, because the Ninth Circuit assigned chief judge, Pregerson, acted criminally to force and allow Tevrizian to “retire”, rather than face discipline, which likely would have ultimately been removal from office. We also charged Pregerson in a criminal complaint with obstruction of justice (and it probably would include conspiracy to obstruct justice, fraud, and mail fraud).

Finally, in comparing Porteous to Tevrizian, most of judge Porteous offenses were “personal”, self-enhancement offenses, away from the bench, and not intended to harm litigants or lawyers that appeared before him. Indeed, from the Senate Committee trial testimony, all indications were that judge Porteous was a “very fair and impartial judge” (testimony of Aubrey Wallace, a black House witness); “Judge Porteous gave everybody a fair trial” and “Mr. Mole, at every stage of the proceeding, has said that judge Porteous gave him a fair trial” (Donald Gardner, a Porteous witness); he “kind of went out of his way to feel for the common folk” (Jacob Amato, a House witness); and for the relevant black community, judge Porteous was “special”. Black criminal defendants in the community knew that with judge Porteous they at least had a “chance” (Aubrey Wallace) of obtaining a fair bond regarding a charged offense. With most other judges, they were usually given a very high bond (or denied bond altogether). If judge Porteous did violate the law while on the bench, even if he had some other selfish motive, it appears that it was usually done to help someone better his or her life (e.g., expungement of conviction for Aubrey Wallace), rather than cause harm. To the contrary, most of judge Tevrizian’s offenses were committed while he was on the bench, i.e., made rulings or took actions, and his actions were intended to cause harm and did cause harm to litigants and a lawyer appearing before him. And, in my case, they were done with malice aforethought . Judge Tevrizian’s actions ruined my personal life and my professional life as a lawyer. I have yet to recover.

Yet, the House impeached judge Porteous, but did not impeach judge Tevrizian.

“On September 17, 2008, the House of Representatives of the 110th Congress passed House Resolution 1448, which provided that the Judiciary Committee shall inquire whether the House should impeach Judge Porteous.” Porteous Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, U.S.D.C., D.C.

On the same said date, September 17, 2008, the Judiciary Committee could also have inquired “whether the House should impeach” judge Tevrizian. The Committee certainly had sufficient notice of judge Tevrizian’s possible impeachment conduct (sufficient to conduct an inquiry) :

1. On June 6, 2007, I, along with the aforementioned two clients , submitted a petition for redress and a recommendation for impeachment to the U.S. Congress and specifically to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, where I specifically recommended judge Tevrizian, among others, for impeachment. See Exhibit #1 (selected pages only).
2. On June 30, 2007, I wrote a letter to Rep. Carolyn C. Kilpatrick , “as Chairwoman of the Congressional Black Caucus, as well as your position as a member of the House of Representatives.” I informed Rep. Kilpatrick that I had filed a criminal complaint against judge Tevrizian, among others. See Exhibit #2 .
3. On January 19, 2008, I (and on behalf of my clients) petitioned the Judicial Conference of the United States for review of the Ninth Circuit’s Judicial Council’s decision on our misconduct complaint. I specifically identified judge Tevrizian for discipline. See Exhibit #3.
4. On March 26, 2008, I wrote to Rep. Hank Johnson, who is now a manager prosecuting judge Porteous’ impeachment trial. Again, I specifically identified judge Tevrizian as one of the judges allowed to retire rather than face discipline. You may view this letter on my website at laurackdbray.blogspot.com, under the title “Judicial Misconduct” April, (2008).

Finally, “On January 13, 2009,the House of Representatives of the 111th Congress passed House Resolution 15, which continued the authority of House Resolution 1448 of the 110th Congress, in order to permit the work of the Impeachment Task Force to continue.” U.S.D.C., D.C., Porteous Complt. For Declr. Judg. & Injunct. Relief.

On January 12, 2010, my clients and I submitted a Supplemental Memorandum to Special Prosecutor John Durham and we copied (“cc”) to the House Impeachment Task Force. In the memorandum, at p.6, we specifically stated, “as to one federal judge, retired judge Dickran Tevrizian. . . , there is ample evidence that would support a charge of ‘aggravated judicial and racial abuse’, so as to make the sexual abuse charges in judge Kent’s case applicable as well.” So, the House could have impeached judge Tevrizian the same time that it impeached judge Porteous. It simply chose not to. You may view this Supplemental Memo on my website as well, laurackdbray.blogspot.com, under the title “Supplemental Memorandum to John Durham” February, (2010).

In sum, judge Porteous was denied equal protection of the law not only because he was selectively prosecuted or impeached by the House, but also because both the Justice Department and the House allowed various individuals, including federal judges (who had been forced to retire because of criminal conduct and evidence supporting that conduct), to retire and/or retire with benefits, while not allowing judge Porteous to retire with benefits, after he was cleared of criminal charges and voluntarily agree to retire.







V.

THE ONLY FAIR OR EQUITABLE REMEDY FOR JUDGE PORTEOUS IS SENATE (JURY) NULLIFICATION; THE SENATE MUST SEND A MESSAGE TO BOTH THE HOUSE AND THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT.

If the Senate finds that the Constitutional rights of judge Porteous were violated before and during the course of the House’s prosecution of his impeachment, then the only remedy is to acquit or refuse to impeach him, regardless of any colorable evidence of “high crimes and misdemeanors”, because judge Porteous’s constitutional rights to a fair process supersedes the charges in the impeachment articles. This is dictated by both the Constitution itself (because it guarantees due process and equal protection of the law) and by the Senate jury’s oath regarding impeachment. Pursuant to that oath, the senators solemnly swore :

THAT IN ALL THINGS APPERTAINING TO THE TRIAL OF THE IMPEACHMENT OF G. THOMAS PORTEOUS, DISTRICT JUDGE OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA, NOW PENDING, THAT (THEY) WILL DO IMPARTIAL JUSTICE ACCCORDING TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS SO HELP (THEM) GOD.

The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause (which contains an equal protection component) is a part of the Constitution. And, the Constitution, through the Fourteenth Amendment, states that no person shall be denied equal protection of the law. Therefore, if the Senate believes, from the face of this Petition, that a colorable showing has been made that judge Porteous has been denied equal protection of the law with respect to the initiation of the impeachment proceeding against him, the Senate must refuse to impeach him and vote to acquit.

But also, the Senate’s own sense of justice and fairness should dictate the same result. How can the Senate, in good conscience, allow one federal judge, Tevrizian, to continue to collect retirement benefits, where he was forced to retire to avoid proper discipline by the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council (which likely would have resulted in his ultimate removal from office); where he conspired with another federal judge to arrange the forced retirement and escape from discipline; and where the federal criminal complaint against him charging racial discrimination has not been dismissed for a lack of evidence (still pending); while denying another federal judge, Porteous, the same retirement benefits, where he (Porteous) was cleared of federal criminal charges (based on a lack of evidence---even after waiver of the statute of limitations) by the Justice Department; where he was disciplined by the Judicial Conference of the United States for any transgressions he had committed (a two year suspension from the bench), and where he fully intends to retire from the bench next year anyway ?

Lastly, in nullifying, there are several messages that the Senate should send to the House and the Justice Department :

1. THE SENATE WILL NOT ALLOW THE HOUSE NOR THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT TO PROSECUTE FEDERAL JUDGES IN THE SOUTH , BUT NOT PROSECUTE THOSE IN THE WEST.

The last four judges impeached by the House have been from the South, i.e., Alcee Hastings from Florida, Walter Nixon from Mississippi, Samuel Kent from Texas, and now Thomas Porteous from Louisiana. And, just recently, on November 19, 2010, or thereabouts, another federal judge from the South, Senior U.S. District Judge Jack Camp Jr. of Georgia, after being charged by the Justice Department with drug and illegal weapons charges, pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the possession of drugs by a convicted felon. Prior to that, a Texas State judge, Manuel Barraza, in February of this year, was convicted (after being charged by the Justice Department) of wire fraud and making false statements. Comparatively, one would think judges in the West are pure. But that’s certainly not the case. Multiple judges, both state and federal, in the West have committed federal felonies. The Justice Department and the U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles simply refuse to prosecute judges in the Los Angeles area, or in California for that matter. And the press or media, in support of the judges’ escape from discipline, refuse to print anything about their criminal conduct; thereby, giving the impression that no California judges are corrupt. However, some of them are. But probably, except for murder, California judges can commit nearly any crime and the most that the U.S. Attorney and the Justice Department will do is force them to retire, often with benefits. And, together with the press and media’s skewed coverage, the retirements are made to appear to be “voluntary” retirements, i.e., a coverup of the criminal conduct. Further, unlike Louisiana, where the Justice Department arrested and charged several state judges with federal crimes, no such prosecutions have been brought in California, and it certainly hasn’t been because no state judges have committed any federal crimes in California. I don’t know about the “money” crimes, e.g., bribery or kickbacks, etc., but I certainly know about obstruction of justice, false statements, racial discrimination or other civil rights violations, voting rights violations, etc.. The Justice Department simply do not prosecute California judges.

2. THE SENATE WILL NOT ALLOW THE HOUSE TO PROSECUTE FEDERAL JUDGES IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, AND ESPECIALLY THE JUDGES’ RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.

Clearly, the House’s prosecution or impeachment of judge Porteous was done without consideration of his equal protection rights.

3. THE SENATE WILL NOT ALLOW THE HOUSE TO PICK AND CHOOSE WHO TO PROSECUTE OR IMPEACH AMONG SIMILARLY-SITUATED FEDERAL JUDGES, BASED ON THE HOUSE’S PERSONAL BIAS, E.G., A PREFERENCE FOR “KICKBACK” OR BRIBERY CASES AS OPPOSED TO RACIAL DISCRIMINATION OR OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE CASES.

If the House was satisfied with impeaching a federal judge for the violation of only one or two high crimes or misdemeanors of any nature, which it could rightfully do, judge Porteous clearly would have plenty of company on impeachment row. While the House may use other criteria for determining who to impeach, personal bias should not be one of them. I believe the House chose to impeach judge Porteous because he is accused of a “kickback” crime. Conversely, I believe that the House chose not to prosecute judge Tevrizian because he is “merely” accused of a racial discrimination crime (although that crime deprived a black lawyer of (personal) life experience, liberty (the pursuit of his profession as a lawyer, including the loss of his home-law office and law practice), and the pursuit of happiness (including a family and a retirement fund); and one of his client’s of her personal independence.


CONCLUSION


In conclusion, even if judge Porteous exhibited unethical conduct and committed certain crimes, the Constitution requires that the House in a constitutional manner proves he did so. One such requirement is that judge Porteous be provided equal protection of the law. He was not provided that protection by the House, and the portrait of similarly-situated judge Dickran Tevrizian is just one illustration of that fact. Moreover, if the Senate reaches down to the Justice Department’s treatment of judge Porteous, it will find that he was denied both due process and equal protection of the law in the processing of his impeachment. And, if the Senate has a sense of compassion, it will find that judge Porteous’ loss of his home from Hurricane Katrina and the loss of his wife shortly thereafter should factor into the equation.

But , probably, the most important reason why the Senate should exercise jury nullification is because, putting aside ethical considerations based on friendship and gifts and the criminal implications of distressful bankruptcy proceedings and asking friends for money, judge Porteous was shown to be a “very fair and impartial judge” from the bench, that is, to litigants and lawyers that appeared before him. He showed “compassion” for litigants, and for black litigants, it was a “special” compassion, because it was not shown by most other judges in his district. And, the most significant characteristic and qualification that any judge can have is the ability to be “fair” and impartial; it is not easily attained. It is rare. So, I urge the Senate, as a jury, to exercise jury nullification and acquit judge Porteous, and allow him to retire with benefits.



___________________ _________________________
Date LAURACK D. BRAY, ESQ.


cc : Members of the U.S. Senate as a jury, for the Senate impeachment trial of G. Thomas
Porteous .

#12(Rd 12) INDICTABLE CRIMINAL ROSTER (ICR) : THE FIRST INDICTEE OF THE "NEW" PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED

LAURACK D. BRAY, ESQ., M.S., M.P.A., J.D.
FEDERAL ATTORNEY
P.O. BOX 611432
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
TEL: (805) 901-2693

March 8, 2011


WHO WILL BE THE FIRST PUBLIC OFFICIAL CHARGED OR REFERRED TO A GRAND JURY FOR INDICTMENT BY THE “NEW” PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE IN LOS ANGELES ?

WILL IT BE A JUDGE ? (WHEN IS THE LAST TIME A JUDGE, STATE OR FEDERAL, WAS REFERRED TO A GRAND JURY FOR INDICTMENT BY THE U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE IN LOS ANGELES ?)

WILL THE “NEW” PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION HAVE THE COURAGE TO PRESENT A STATE OR FEDERAL JUDGE TO A GRAND JURY FOR INDICTMENT, WHERE THERE IS CLEARLY SUFFICIENT AND PROBABLE CAUSE EVIDENCE TO DO SO ?

INDICTABLE CRIMINAL ROSTER (ICR) FOR THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE IN LOS ANGELES

This Round, Round 12, concludes the above-entitled blog because, apparently, the Public Integrity Section of the U.S. Attorney's Office has produced its first public official indictee. It appears to be John Pomierski, the ex-mayor of Upland, Califronia. According to the L.A. Times, "A federal grand jury has indicted former Upland Mayor John Pomierski on extortion and bribery charges in an alleged scheme to extort money and campaign contributions from two businesses seeking city permits and other governments approvals. . . ." Therefore, the question posed by this blog, "Who will be the first public official charged or otherwise prosecuted or indicted by the "new" public integrity section of the U.S. Atty's office?" has been answered.

However, the other two questions have also been answered: (1) Will it be a judge? The answer is no. And, (2) Will the "new" public integrity section have the courage to present a state or federal judge to a grand jury for indictment, where there is clearly sufficient and probable cause evidence to do so? Clearly, the answer to this question is "no" as well. Consequently, my forecast has matured. That is, I stated that I did not think that the first public official indicted would be a judge (e.g., "it will be even more interesting to see if the first indictment will be that of a judge. . . ."), even though "there are so many qualified judicial candidates with cases (or complaints) now pending in the U.S. Attorney's Office."

Thus, we must conclude at this point that U.S. Attorney Andre Birotte is no different from his predecessor Thomas P. O'Brien, "notwithstanding the resurrection of the public integrity section". See September 16, 2010 blog, "Who will be the first Public Official charged or otherwise prosecuted or indicted by the "new" Public Integrity section of the U.S. Atty's Office?" Of course, Birotte can still try and demonstrate a difference by prosecuting "civil rights cases" and judges who have violated federal civil rights laws. Those were the two areas that Birotte said the public integrity section were going to prosecute: (1) public corruption and (2) civil rights cases. He has demonstrated that he will not prosecute judges for public corruption, now we must wait and see if he will prosecute them for civil rights violations. That will be the topic of a new blog that I will start next week: "Will the first public official charged or referred to a grand jury for indictment for a civil rights violation by the "new" public integrity section of the U.S. Attorney's Office in Los Angeles be a judge?"

This concludes Round 12 and this blog, entitled "Indictable Criminal Roster (ICR) for the First Indictee of the "new" public integrity section of the U.S. Attorney's Office in Los Angeles".

A letter to A.J. Duffy Re: Demanding Fair Reporting from the L.A. Times

LAURACK D. BRAY, ESQ.
FEDERAL ATTORNEY
P.O. BOX 611432
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
TEL: (805) 901-2693

September 28, 2010

Mr. (A.J.) Duffy: Stay the Course, Do Not Allow the L.A. Times’ Brown-Nosing to Stop You from Demanding Impartial and Fair Reporting from the Times

A.J. Duffy, President of the United Teachers Los Angeles, announced that he was organizing a boycott of the L.A. Times, apparently by both his constituency and other labor groups, asking the groups to cancel subscriptions to the Times. His dissatisfaction and disgust was directed at the Times “publishing a series of articles that uses student test scores to estimate the effectiveness of district teachers.” L.A. Times, “Union urges Times boycott”, August 16, 2010. “Based on test score data covering seven years, the Times analyzed the effects of more than 6,000 elementary school teachers on their students’ learning. Among other things, it found huge disparities among teachers, some of whom work just down the hall from one another.” Id. “Students often backslid significantly in the classrooms of ineffective teachers, and thousands of students in the study had two or more ineffective teachers in a row.” Id.

Mr. Duffy’s views were that test scores could be useful “as feedback for teachers” (so that teachers could gauge the progress of students), but that the test scores should not be used to evaluate teachers or their expertise with students. Mr. Duffy is quoted as saying, referring to the Times teacher-student database, that it was “an irresponsible, offensive intrusion into your professional life that will do nothing to improve student learning.” Id. Moreover, he “attacked the reliability of standardized tests in general. . . .” Id. And I, for one, certainly agree with his attack, having confronted a multitude of standardized tests during the course of my educational career, i.e., H.S.D., A.A., B.A. , M.S., M.P.A., and J.D. A standardized test should only be an indicator (among other indicators) and never a decider (in and of itself) of either a student’s ability to perform or succeed, or a teacher’s expertise or effectiveness . The Times have now published the database, including the teacher names, online, and it has limited availability to the public . Mr. Duffy stated, “This is part of the continuing attack on our profession (teachers), and we must continue to fight back on all fronts.” Id.

He kept his word about the boycott, and then some.

On Tuesday, September 14, 2010, the Union organized and staged a protest of teachers against the L.A. Times, in front of the Times building in downtown Los Angeles. The demonstrators protested against “unfair reporting” and carried and “waved placards that said: “Shame on the L.A. Times” and “We Demand Fair Reporting”. L.A. Times, “Union Stages Protest against the Times”, September 15, 2010. The crux of the protest was the teachers “protesting what they said was unfair reporting in recent articles that used a statistical analysis to rank the performance of thousands of instructors.” Id. Mr. Duffy, a leader and organizer of the protest is said to have stated, “Teachers. . . are more than a test score.”

What happened after the protest is the focus of this blog; that is, the Times, through reporter Steve Lopez, “Sitting down with A.J. Duffy,” L.A. Times, September 19, 2010. Let me first give credit where credit is due. I give credit to the L.A. Times for providing coverage of the protest (and boycott)(in front of its office), which appeared to be successful. The Times did not have to do that, but it did. And, I’m sure a lot of Angelenoes and other citizens, statewide, would not have known of the protest , but for the Times’ coverage.

Nevertheless, I believe the UTLA’s and Mr. Duffy’s protest and boycott of the Times is legitimate and necessary or needed. Especially when it comes to unfair or biased reporting. And, I think the quality of the legitimacy is recognized by the Times, thus, the “sit-down with Mr. Duffy.” Regardless of any good-faith purpose for the “sit-down”, on the street, that’s called “brown-nosing”. An attempt to garner favor from Mr. Duffy after a successful (i.e., impactful) protest and/or boycott of the Times, or to convince him to change his course of protest (and boycott) against the Times’ unfair reporting without addressing the unfair reporting directly. “(T)ell the Old Bear that if he comes around on the subscription, I will personally deliver the paper to your door for a week.” Id.

And so, through this blog, I urge Mr. Duffy and the UTLA to stay its course in reference to its protest and stance against unfair reporting by the Times. Because, regardless of the legitimacy of the Times’ concerns for L.A.U.S.D.’s students or parents, its widespread and detailed investigation and reporting of teacher ineffectiveness is clearly and intentionally biased and/or partial against teachers (and other largely minority professions in Los Angeles, e.g., nurses, social services workers, etc.). If this is not true or not the case, then why isn’t the Times doing or conducting the same type of investigation of largely white high-ranking professionals, e.g., judges. I am intentionally using judges as an example because the Times’ investigation has been of public teachers and other professions (and the judges are public employees), and because I know, from personal experience, that there is a sufficient enough study sample of ineffective and effective judges for an investigation of judges similar to that of teachers (of course there would have to be the proper substitution of appropriate concerns, i.e., for teachers—student improvement, and for judges—litigant or lawyer satisfaction or harm caused or rights denied by the judges’ actions or other). And, the rationale for the Times’ teacher investigation and evaluation would apply equally to an investigation of judges. According to the Times, and its vice-president of communications, Nancy Sullivan, “The newspaper published the (teacher) database. . . ‘because it bears directly on the performance of public employees(such as judges) who provide an important service, and in the belief that parents and the public have a right to judge the data for themselves.” L.A. Times, “Teacher’s suicide shocks school”, September 28, 2010 .

I urge Mr. Duffy and the UTLA to stay the course regarding its protest and boycott efforts against the L.A. Times, and to continue to demand fair and impartial reporting from the Times, and to inform the Times that the best objective evidence that it intends to be fair and impartial in its reporting is to either initiate an investigation of judges, state and/or federal, in the same areas as the teachers, i.e., the greater Los Angeles area, or to remove the teacher database information from the internet or print until it does conduct such an investigation. I understand that Mr. Duffy would likely prefer the removal of the teacher database information regardless , and he has good reason for taking such a position. But, my position here is on behalf of fairness and justice for all, and especially for minority professionals, who appear to be receiving the brunt of the Times’ unfair and biased reporting of teacher effectiveness.

cc: A.J. Duffy, President, UTLA

INDICTABLE CANDIDATE ROSTER (ICR) FOR THE FIRST INDICTEE OF THE "NEW" PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE IN LOS ANGELES

October 6, 2010


WHO WILL BE THE FIRST PUBLIC OFFICIAL CHARGED OR REFERRED TO A GRAND JURY FOR INDICTMENT BY THE “NEW” PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE IN LOS ANGELES ?

WILL IT BE A JUDGE ? (WHEN IS THE LAST TIME A JUDGE, STATE OR FEDERAL, WAS REFERRED TO A GRAND JURY FOR INDICTMENT BY THE U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE IN LOS ANGELES ?)

WILL THE “NEW” PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION HAVE THE COURAGE TO PRESENT A STATE OR FEDERAL JUDGE TO A GRAND JURY FOR INDICTMENT, WHERE THERE IS CLEARLY SUFFICIENT AND PROBABLE CAUSE EVIDENCE TO DO SO ?

INDICTABLE CANDIDATE ROSTER (ICR) FOR THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE IN LOS ANGELES

The following, from the ICR, are the final three candidates for indictment on the ICR, which are submitted for:

The Week of October 3, 2010

19. Richard Paez, judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: Paez is charged with obstruction of justice, conspiracy to obstruct justice, denial of equal protection of the law, and fraud.

20. Ventura County Election Officials (including Monica Terrones), at the Ventura County Government Center : the Ventura County Election officials are charged with voting rights violations.

21. Molly C. Dwyer, current Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit : Dwyer is charged with making a material false or fraudulent statement or representation and/or making or using a false writing or document knowing the same to contain a materially false statement or entry in violation of federal law.

This concludes Round 1.


Prior identified candidates for indictment are :

16. M. Margaret McKeown, judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit : McKeown is charged with making or using a false or fraudulent statement or writing in violation of federal law and obstruction of justice.

17. N. Randy Smith, judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit : Smith is charged with making or using a false statement or document in violation of federal law and obstruction of justice.

18. Pamela Rymer, judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: Rymer is charged with obstruction of justice, conspiracy to obstruct justice, and denial of equal protection of the law and fraud.


Prior identified candidates for indictment are:

11. Ken Riley, judge of the Superior Court of California, Ventura County (while acting as an appellate judge) : Riley was charged with conspiring with other Superior Court judges to deny the civil and constitutional rights of a black lawyer and for filing a false statement during a judicial proceeding.

12. Richard Tallman, judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: Tallman was charged with obstruction of justice, conspiracy to obstruct justice, and the intentional denial of constitutional and civil rights under color of law.

13. Ronald Gould, judge of the United States of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: Gould was charged with obstruction of justice, conspiracy to obstruct justice, violation of civil and constitutional rights under color of law, and violation of statute providing for relief benefits (and denial of benefits based on race), and violation of statute prohibiting racial discrimination.

14. Unnamed Assistant U.S. Attorneys of the Citizen Complaint Unit in March, 2008, AUSAs of the U.S. Attorney's Office in Los Angeles : the AUSAs were charged, along with the U.S. Attorney's Office, with submitting a false and fraudulent statement during an executive proceeding and for obstruction of justice.

15. James B. Becker, Assistant County Clerk, Ventura County : Becker was charged with voting rights violations and obstruction of justice, conspiracy to defraud, and conspiracy to deny constitutional and civil rights under color of law.


Prior identified indictable candidates are listed below:

1. Steven Hintz, ex-judge of the Superior Court of California, Ventura County, who is now running for treasurer-tax collector of Ventura County: Hintz has been charged with intentionally acting to deny the civil and constitutional rights of a black lawyer (myself), based on race (or racial discrimination), and with conspiring with other Superior Court judges to do the same. He is also charged with committing election and/or voter fraud in the primary election of this year. Hintz’s actions caused my unlawful eviction from my home-law office and the shutdown of my law practice in Ventura, California. Hintz is a member of the Judicial Seven.
2. Barry Klopfer, ex-judge of the Superior Court of California, Ventura County: Klopfer , while serving as an appellate judge, was charged with obstruction of justice and conspiracy to deny civil and constitutional rights under color of law and based on race (or racial discrimination). He was also charged with making a false statement during a judicial proceeding. Klopfer is a member of the Judicial Seven.
3. Dickran Tevrizian, an ex-judge of the United States District Court for the Central District of California: Tevrizian is charged with obstruction of justice and conspiracy to deny constitutional and statutory rights under color of law, and based on race (or racial discrimination). He committed multiple acts of misconduct. He committed acts against both my female client and myself. Tevrizian is a member of the Judicial Seven.

4. Terry Hatter, Jr., senior (and reired) judge, United States District Court for the Central District of California: Hatter was charged with
obstruction of justice and conspiracy to deny constitutional rights. Hatter is a member of the Judicial Seven.
5. Thomas P. O’Brien, ex-United States Attorney for Los Angeles : O’Brien and his Office are charged with making a false and fraudulent statement during an executive proceeding and with obstruction of justice. He was subsequently charged with committing mail fraud . O’Brien is also a member of the Judicial Seven.
6. Cathy Catterson, ex-Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: Catterson was charged with, among other things, making and using a false and fraudulent document in violation of federal criminal law. Catterson was charged with the same or similar allegations of misconduct as those for Mary Schroeder (when she was Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit). Catterson is a member of the Judicial Seven.
7. William Schwarzer, senior (and retired) judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of California : Schwarzer, while already retired and serving as a visiting member of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and on a three-judge panel, was charged with obstruction of justice , conspiring to obstruct justice, violation of civil and constitutional rights under color of law, and for violation of a federal statute providing relief for the denial of relief benefits, e.g., social security disability benefits , based on race (I relied on my race in relation to a white client). Schwarzer is a member of the Judicial Seven.
8. Harry Pregerson, judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit : Pregerson was charged with obstruction of justice and making a false statement in a judicial proceeding.
9. David Long, judge of the Superior Court of California, Ventura County : Long, while serving as an appellate judge, was charged with a conspiracy to deny civil and constitutional rights under color of law and based on race (or racial discrimination). He was also charged with making a false statement during a judicial proceeding.
10. Mary M. Schroeder, ex-Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (the conduct charged against Schroeder occurred when she was Chief Judge of the Court) : Schroeder was charged with obstruction of justice and conspiracy to obstruct justice.

See laurackdbray.blogspot.com for updates

WHO WILL BE THE FIRST PUBLIC OFFICIAL CHARGED OR OTHERWISE PROSECUTED OR INDICTED BY THE "NEW" PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION OF THE U.S. ATTY'S OFFICE?

LAURACK D. BRAY, ESQ.
FEDERAL ATTORNEY
P.O. BOX 611432
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
TEL: 805) 901-2693


Febuary 8, 2011
(renewed date)
(see Round 1 of ICR)

September 16, 2010
(original date)

WHO WILL BE THE FIRST PUBLIC OFFICIAL CHARGED OR REFERRED TO A GRAND JURY FOR INDICTMENT BY THE “NEW” PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE IN LOS ANGELES ?

WILL IT BE A JUDGE ? (WHEN IS THE LAST TIME A JUDGE, STATE OR FEDERAL, WAS REFERRED TO A GRAND JURY FOR INDICTMENT BY THE U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE IN LOS ANGELES ?)

WILL THE “NEW” PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION HAVE THE COURAGE TO PRESENT A STATE OR FEDERAL JUDGE TO A GRAND JURY FOR INDICTMENT, WHERE THERE IS CLEARLY SUFFICIENT AND PROBABLE CAUSE EVIDENCE TO DO SO ?


THE U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE IN LOS ANGELES HAS A CASELOAD OR ROSTER OF OBVIOUS CANDIDATES (JUDICIAL AND OTHER) AWAITING AN INDICTMENT DECISION.

On June 12, 2010, according to the L.A. Times, “U.S. Atty. Andre Birotte Jr. announced Friday that he was creating a specialized unit to prosecute public corruption and civil rights cases, such as those involving politicians or police officers accused of crimes. The move effectively restores a similar unit that was disbanded by Birotte’s predecessor, Thomas P. O’Brien, two years ago.” (Emphasis added). Will “new” U.S. Attorney Birotte really and truly be any different from his predecessor, O’Brien, notwithstanding the resurrection of the public integrity section? Especially when it comes to the enforcement of civil rights laws? We will see. This is an opportunity for him to show that he will be. “Its mission, he (Birotte) wrote, will be ‘to bring to justice those public officials and public employees who violate the public’s trust.’ ” Id. I interpret “public officials” to mean judges as well, because , clearly, judges are public officials. If Mr. Birotte prosecutes (charges or presents to a grand jury for indictment, or requires to pay restitution) at least one judge, state or federal,
or other federal official, he will clearly show that he is different from O’Brien, with respect to both courage and fairness. **

To that end, it will be interesting to see who will be the first public official charged or referred to a grand jury by the “new” public integrity section of the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Los Angeles. Moreover, it will be even more interesting to see if the first indictment will be that of a judge, especially since there are so many qualified judicial candidates with cases now pending in the U.S. Attorney’s office.


Beginning this week, in conjunction with and in support of the objective or mission of the new unit, I will identify, by name and charges, some of the public officials that I am aware of (because complaints were filed by my clients and I---and in several cases, action based on the complaints was taken, either directly or indirectly, by the FBI or the Department of Justice, which attaches some credibility to the complaints) with cases or complaints pending in the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Los Angeles. They are obvious candidates because the complaints against them were supported by evidence (and, in most, if not all, cases, it was probable cause evidence). I will call this the Indictable Candidate Roster (ICR), if you will. That is, this roster will represent those individuals who have had federal criminal complaints lodged against them and whose victims’ complaints are still pending in the U.S. Attorney’s office (and where there has been virtually no response to the victims whatsoever from the U.S. Attorney’s Office regarding the complaints).

I will identify ten candidates (or less) a week until all individuals from the roster have been identified. Once the roster, or list, has been exhausted, I will recycle the list again. And, the roster will continue to be recycled until there has been some resolution and/or disposition of the complaints (some of which have been pending for years now) based on the evidence (either clear the individuals---if they can be cleared, some cannot be because of action taken---or indict them ), by the special prosecutor, John Durham, or the U.S. Attorney’s Office. Further, as the new names are added each week, the old names and charges will remain on the list as well. However, in round 2, after the first completed list of names, the identified names will be accompanied by both charges and some of the facts supporting the charges.

As an attempt at injecting some modicum of fairness into the disclosure process, I will begin , in the initial listing, disclosing the names of most of those individuals who have the strongest evidence against them, e.g.,
probable cause evidence, and I will end with most of the individuals with the least strongest evidence. In that way, if the U.S. Attorney’s Office decide to prosecute one or more of the individuals with the strongest evidence against them (or to take any other appropriate action, e.g., require the payment of restitution--- as should have been done for several of the accused--- by those accused that the U.S. Attorney’s Office has decided and/or agreed not to prosecute (the so-called “NPA”, non-prosecution agreement), it may prompt me to discontinue the disclosure of the remaining candidates with the less strong evidence (but Note : none of the complaints was bare allegations alone).

While this disclosure is undertaken primarily to promote and urge the disposition of the identified pending complaints in the U.S. Attorney’s Office, or, where applicable, the payment of restitution (where a deal has been made without the required payment of restitution), it is also undertaken as a means of piercing through the veil of “secrecy” and “selectivity” with respect to the criminal conduct of certain members of society, i.e., certain public officials (yet, exposing the conduct of others) and as a means of promoting the accountability of certain public servants (e.g., state and federal judges) for their actions, especially as it pertains to the payment of restitution for the damage caused by their criminal acts.

“Secrecy deflects accountability. It allows judges to err. Children to die. Information is its antidote.” L.A. Times, August 26, 2010, “Truly ‘Public’ Servants.” “And, yes, accountability can strike those on its receiving end as unfair: It’s no fun for the teacher whose students fail year after year to read about it in the Sunday paper; it’s frightening for the police officer who has shot someone to have that fact known to anyone who watches the evening news.” Id. Such applies to state and federal judges who have criminally denied United States citizens their constitutional and statutory rights, sometimes based on race. And, in many instances, the secrecy surrounding the violation of the law often leads to the violation of other laws. “(T)he county’s insistence on hushing up these matters has led it to break the law: In contravention of the state law that requires board members to hold their meetings in public, the supervisors initially discussed the leak investigation in closed session. They tried to remedy that this week by at least debating in public, but secrecy is corroding this issue at every step.” L.A. Times, “Leaks don’t kill kids,” August 21, 2010. And, in this case, the secrecy surrounding ex-judge Steven Hintz’s forced retirement from the Superior Court of California, Ventura County bench lead Hintz to violate California
election regulatory law dealing with ballot designations and to commit fraud on Ventura County voters in the primary election.

All of the individuals identified in my roster of Public Integrity Section candidates are, or were, public officials, and therefore, are open to public scrutiny . “Maybe in the private sector there’s some expectation of privacy. But if you’re in the public sector and supported by taxpayers, the people have a right to know.” L.A. Times, “Parents have the Right to know,” August 23, 2010 (quoting Bonnie Reiss, Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger’s education advisor). Regarding the publishing of teachers names (and the names of judges and other public officials here) in regard to the Times investigation and revelations of teacher competency in the L.A.U.S.D., Times reporter George Skelton states, “Publishing the teachers’ names will make some of them uncomfortable. . . . But most important, it will make the public more informed.” Id. “I think the taxpayer is entitled to have that information” (quoting former Gov. Gray Davis). Id. “Many of the teachers and school administrators aren’t happy. They feel ambushed and unfairly exposed because the newspaper pushed on to the front page, and on to an online database, information that had been held confidentially by the school district for years.” L.A. Times, “Hard Lessons for Teachers”, September 4, 2010. “The Times has taken a lot of heat. . . but it’s also been praised by. . . parents, who say they have a right to know what impact teachers appear to be having on students.” Id. “I’m told that supervisors all the way up to Editor Russ Stanton reviewed the stories and considered whether they needed to single out teachers by name. Would the stories tell enough, some at the paper wondered, if they rated teachers only by school and grade level, but did not name them as individuals?” . . . (W)ithout singling out any of them for disdain.” Id. “ ‘I think that if we had just took the analysis to the grade level (here, to the pending criminal complaints against judges or public officials) without naming specific teachers (here, judges and others), a lot of parents (here, the public, and especially litigants and lawyers) would have been justifiably angry with us for withholding data from them’, David Lauter, the Times’ metropolitan editor, told me. ‘That is public information that I think people do have a right to know’ ” (Emphasis added) Id. “ ‘We have the opportunity to shine a spotlight not just on ineffective teachers but also on very effective teachers (here, judges with no criminal complaints against them plus high praise by litigants and lawyers for their competency and fairness),’ he added . ‘Not doing that would be a copout.’ ” Id.

“The Times could have. . . singled out schools, not teachers. . . . Instead, the newspaper took the road less traveled. There might be a few more accidents along that way. But it also appears to provide a shorter route to
something we all want---a better way to figure out who is good at teaching (here, judging) and who is not.” Id.


And, according to the Times, Education Secretary Arne Duncan states “The truth is always hard to swallow, but it can only make us better, stronger and smarter,” L.A. Times, “U.S. schools chief to push disclosure,” August 25, 2010. “That’s what accountability is all about---facing the truth and taking responsibility.” Id.

Finally, regarding the professional baseball player, Roger Clemens, after Clemens had been indicted by a Washington, D.C. grand jury on charges of making a false statement, perjury, and obstruction of justice, the L.A. Times, through reporter Bill Dwyre, stated, “the government, having warned Clemens, had no alternative but to recommend a longer look. That was done by a group of citizens making up a grand jury. They, too, are aware of the current strain of government spending on the economy, but they said indict. Now Clemens will go to trial. He can plea-bargain out anytime, but he would have to admit things and show remorse.” “This is the people’s business” (emphasis in original), August 24, 2010. “Justice now needs to be played out, not swept under the rug because of costs.” “Congress has gone ahead because it serves all people in this country. . . .” (Emphasis added) Id.

All of the above principles are applicable to the herein-identified candidates for Public Integrity indictment, particularly the need for a “longer look. . . by a group of citizens making up a grand jury.” I purposely cited and relied on L.A. Times articles and rationale for this blog, not only to support my position regarding disclosure, but also to pose the question : Why hasn’t the L.A. Times conducted an investigative report on the ICR candidates as it has for teachers, police officers, social services workers, probation officers, nurses, municipal workers and officers, e.g., the City of Bell, etc. ? And, yes, the Times is aware of many of them, at least enough of them to have conducted an investigative report.

There is a group of candidates, which I have designated the “Judicial Seven”, because they were caused to retire (one was already retired) or resign by the FBI or other pursuant to either a misconduct complaint or criminal complaint filed against them (by myself and the two aforementioned clients; and, while I happen to be black, my two clients
were (are) white —at one point, two years or more ago, we , together with other supporters, demonstrated in front of the federal courthouse in downtown Los Angeles against the “judicial seven” and for required restitution based on their non-prosecution), i.e., secret retirements or resignations. None of the judicial seven suffered any penalty (which includes a payment or other type of restitution) for their criminal acts, even after the FBI had found sufficient probable cause evidence to persuade them to retire (rather than face arrest and/or probable indictment), and in some cases, they collect(ed) pension benefits. The Judicial Seven are on the ICR and will be among the first candidates to be identified.

With the above in mind, the first ten candidates are (when the term “charged” is used here, it means what the complainants complained about in their complaints) :

The week of September 12, 2010

1. Steven Hintz, ex-judge of the Superior Court of California, Ventura County, who is now running for treasurer-tax collector of Ventura County: Hintz has been charged with intentionally acting to deny the civil and constitutional rights of a black lawyer (myself), based on race (or racial discrimination), and with conspiring with other Superior Court judges to do the same. He is also charged with committing election and/or voter fraud in the primary election of this year. Hintz’s actions caused my unlawful eviction from my home-law office and the shutdown of my law practice in Ventura, California. Hintz is a member of the Judicial Seven.
2. Barry Klopfer, ex-judge of the Superior Court of California, Ventura County: Klopfer , while serving as an appellate judge, was charged with obstruction of justice and conspiracy to deny civil and constitutional rights under color of law and based on race (or racial discrimination). He was also charged with making a false statement during a judicial proceeding. Klopfer is a member of the Judicial Seven.
3. Dickran Tevrizian, an ex-judge of the United States District Court for the Central District of California: Tevrizian is charged with obstruction of justice and conspiracy to deny constitutional and statutory rights under color of law, and based on race (or racial discrimination). He committed multiple acts of misconduct. He committed acts against both my female client and myself. Tevrizian is a member of the Judicial Seven.
4. Terry Hatter, Jr., senior (and reired) judge, United States District Court for the Central District of California: Hatter was charged with
obstruction of justice and conspiracy to deny constitutional rights. Hatter is a member of the Judicial Seven.
5. Thomas P. O’Brien, ex-United States Attorney for Los Angeles : O’Brien and his Office are charged with making a false and fraudulent statement during an executive proceeding and with obstruction of justice. He was subsequently charged with committing mail fraud . O’Brien is also a member of the Judicial Seven.
6. Cathy Catterson, ex-Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: Catterson was charged with, among other things, making and using a false and fraudulent document in violation of federal criminal law. Catterson was charged with the same or similar allegations of misconduct as those for Mary Schroeder (when she was Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit). Catterson is a member of the Judicial Seven.
7. William Schwarzer, senior (and retired) judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of California : Schwarzer, while already retired and serving as a visiting member of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and on a three-judge panel, was charged with obstruction of justice , conspiring to obstruct justice, violation of civil and constitutional rights under color of law, and for violation of a federal statute providing relief for the denial of relief benefits, e.g., social security disability benefits , based on race (I relied on my race in relation to a white client). Schwarzer is a member of the Judicial Seven.
8. Harry Pregerson, judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit : Pregerson was charged with obstruction of justice and making a false statement in a judicial proceeding.
9. David Long, judge of the Superior Court of California, Ventura County : Long, while serving as an appellate judge, was charged with a conspiracy to deny civil and constitutional rights under color of law and based on race (or racial discrimination). He was also charged with making a false statement during a judicial proceeding.
10. Mary M. Schroeder, ex-Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (the conduct charged against Schroeder occurred when she was Chief Judge of the Court) : Schroeder was charged with obstruction of justice and conspiracy to obstruct justice.

**Thusfar, Birotte has not demonstrated that he is any different from O'Brien. In over a year now since the resurrection of the "new" Public Integrity Section, not one public official has been prosecuted for a civil rights violation (of a citizen). It's the "same-old", "same-old". Lots of talk and no action. (Update)



cc : United States Attorney Andre Birotte
A.J. Duffy, President, United Teachers Los Angeles
L.A. Times
The general public

Indictment, Richard Alarcon and Steven Hintz: Why has City Councilman Richard Alarcon been Indicted, but Ex-Judge Steven Hintz hasn't ?

LAURACK D. BRAY, ESQ.
FEDERAL ATTORNEY
P.O. BOX 611432
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
TEL: (805) 901-2693

August 19, 2010


Indictment, Richard Alarcon and Steven Hintz : Why has City Councilman Richard Alarcon been Indicted , but Ex-Judge Steven Hintz hasn’t ?

Steven Hintz, the corrupt, former Ventura County Superior Court judge, who has since “retired”, is now running for treasurer-tax collector of Ventura County. Such action is surprising, at least, since the basic requirement for the position is or should be “honesty” (since the treasurer will be handling or administering the public’s money). And, clearly, Hintz has not displayed much of that in his declaration of candidacy papers (e.g., ballot designation worksheet) or in his previous “retirement” situation.

First, Hintz’s retirement from the Superior Court bench was not “voluntary”, rather, it was involuntary, and the result of FBI persuasion, after Hintz was faced with the options of either being arrested and undergoing a likely grand jury indictment (based on probable cause evidence of a criminal felony, e.g., racial discrimination) or retiring from the Superior Court bench. Hintz chose to retire. (The events leading to the criminal matter centered on an unlawful detainer jury trial presided over by Hintz. I was the defendant. I am Black. Hintz’s misconduct caused my unlawful eviction from my home-law office and the shutdown of my law practice in Ventura, California) . So, immediately after his retirement, Hintz knew that the retirement was not voluntary, that is, freely undertaken without pressure, persuasion, or threat . Therefore, his first act of dishonesty regarding his retirement was not informing the public, including court personnel, and the Ventura County Star newspaper of the real reason for his retirement (and, if he did so, not requiring or demanding the Star to inform Ventura County citizens of the real reason for his retirement (either before or after the paper published the first story about his retirement (implying that it was voluntary).

Hintz’s second act of dishonesty was designating his ballot profession as “retired judge”, knowing, or should be knowing, when he wrote it down, that it was misleading and a violation of California state regulations; further, a third act of dishonesty was to campaign as a “retired judge”, armed with the same aforementioned knowledge, and, finally, a fourth and most significant act of dishonesty was allowing Ventura County voters to vote for him without his disclosing the aforementioned information to them (and he amassed the most votes of all treasurer-tax collector candidates). Therefore, these acts of dishonesty alone should preclude his selection and election as treasurer-tax collector of Ventura County, California.

But, these acts of dishonesty are not the only reasons that he should not be treasurer-tax collector. The other reason is that he has simply displayed bad character. Were it not for the FBI and the former U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles, Thomas P. O’Brien(who himself is currently under criminal investigation), allowing him to retire from the bench, with retirement benefits, Hintz would likely be a convicted felon, who would be disqualified from running for elected office (that is, there was sufficient probable cause evidence supporting a criminal complaint against him for his arrest , indictment, and conviction). This brings me to the issue of indictment , and, in particular, the indictment of councilman Richard Alarcon and his wife.

Why has Alarcon and his wife been indicted for committing perjury and voter fraud, allegedly for lying about the address of Alarcon’s proper home for district representation and voting purposes, while Hintz has not been indicted for committing racial discrimination and voter fraud ? I purposefully has not attached the term “allegedly” to Hintz’s acts because he has not entered the criminal justice “system” officially (which cloaks a defendant with a “presumption of innocence until proven guilty”); on the other hand, Alarcon and his wife have---with the indictment. As far as the victim (the undersigned) is concerned, Hintz has committed the crimes he is charged with in the criminal complaint (based on probable cause evidence) until he enters the criminal justice system and process and it is proven otherwise. A most illustrative hypothetical example of this point is a woman who is physically robbed of her purse by gunpoint on the street by a man (or woman) whose face is not covered and who has descriptive scars on his face . Once the robbery is done, to the victim who has recognized the robber and experienced the robbery, the man has committed the crime of robbery. He has robbed her of her purse. So, until the man is arrested (which cloaks him with the presumption of innocent until proven guilty), he is a criminal, as a matter of fact and law; and the victim, especially, need not use the “allegedly” description .

According to news accounts regarding Alarcon, “Prosecutors said they launched their investigation after receiving a written complaint that Alarcon was living outside his district. . . .” And, Jane Robison, L.A. County D.A. Steve Cooley’s spokeswoman stated, “We don’t pick targets.” “We respond to complaints from citizens in their community.” Well, Hintz had two separate written complaints filed against him by a member of the community, charging racial discrimination and election and voter fraud. Yet, even in view of probable cause evidence, he has not been indicted, nor has his case even been submitted to a grand jury. Instead of indicting him, the former U.S. Attorney allowed him to secretly retire, with benefits (while not secretly returning the victim’s home-law office).

Alarcon has been indicted for voter fraud. Hintz was charged (by complainant) with voter fraud and election fraud, yet, his case has not been submitted to a grand jury (and clearly there was sufficient evidence for the discrimination charge, while violation of California voting regulations would buttress support for the voting fraud charges). There is also evidence of Hintz committing perjury in relation to his ballot designation worksheet-declaration of candidacy statements.

Alarcon has been indicted for felony charges, e.g., perjury, associated with his candidacy filings for his council office, i.e., declaration of candidacy form. Hintz was charged with a felony associated with his candidacy filings ,i.e., ballot designation worksheet and declaration of candidacy forms, and Hintz has clearly violated California election regulatory laws, yet, he has not been indicted.


Lastly, Hintz, as alluded to earlier, unlike Alarcon, has been charged with racial discrimination, with the discrimination charge supported by probable cause evidence. Yet, Hintz has not been indicted, nor has his case been submitted to a grand jury. And, it makes no difference that Alarcon has been indicted through efforts of the L.A. District Attorney rather than the U.S. Attorney. If the U.S. Attorney or the Ventura County District Attorney wanted to submit Hintz’s case to a grand jury for investigation and indictment, either one could have. The U.S. Attorney could easily have referred the matter to the Ventura County D.A. if it felt the matter would be better handled by a county D.A. , or, the Ventura County D.A., regarding the voter fraud allegations, could initiate an investigation on its own accord, for it has at least, I believe, some limited knowledge of those allegations. But, thusfar, there has been no investigation that I am aware of.

So, why has Richard Alarcon been indicted, but Steven Hintz hasn’t?

Could it be race ? Alarcon and his wife are Hispanic, while Hintz is white . And, it makes no difference that there is separate counties. Both Los Angeles and Ventura are counties of the state of California, and they both operate under the same principles and rely on the same standard of evidence to seek an indictment. That’s why there is such a thing as “change of venue”, which provides that a defendant can be tried in a different county of the same state for certain reasons. Implicit in the “change of venue” concept is the notion that all counties of the same state operate under the same standards for criminal prosecutions. So, if Hintz has the same or greater evidence against him than Alarcon has against himself, Hintz should be indicted, regardless of the county, if the county district attorneys are truly and fairly seeking justice.

Could it be because Hintz is a former judge and/or a former deputy district attorney? Both appear to be strong and influential factors. Upon my information and belief, Alarcon is neither one.

Or, could it be simple selective prosecution, where the Counties are simply choosing to prosecute Alarcon and not prosecute Hintz ? But, even if its selective prosecution, there has to be a reason for making the selection. And, the most obvious reason is race. But, even if race is not the reason, whatever reason it is, it’s unlawful. Even if the County DAs and/or the U.S. Attorney’s Office attempt to argue simple prosecutorial discretion, that argument fails as well, because it would be an abuse of discretion if Hintz has as much or more evidence against him than Alarcon, or, at least, probable cause evidence to arrest, yet, an indictment is not sought. And, an abuse of discretion is unlawful. I believe the decision to not prosecute Hintz is based on a reason other than prosecutorial discretion, with the strongest ones being race and/or Hintz’s former judicial and prosecutorial background.
The real question is : How can the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Los Angeles, in good conscience, watch a man like Alarcon (who has dedicated much of his legislative career to fighting poverty) be indicted for charges associated with the alleged use of a false address for one of his homes for voting purposes, while allowing a man like Hintz (who the FBI found enough evidence of racial discrimination against him to persuade him to retire, or face arrest and likely indictment) to avoid indictment altogether ?

Nonetheless, whatever the reason for the disparate treatment between Alarcon and Hintz, the L.A. County and Ventura County public will never know about it through the major print media because the L.A. Times and the Ventura County Star (which has endorsed Hintz for treasurer-tax collector) newspapers have exercised disparate treatment of their own against Alarcon by publishing stories about Alarcon’s indictment in their papers, while not mentioning anything about Hintz’s criminal conduct. And, both papers have at least some minimum knowledge about Hintz’s criminal conduct; certainly enough knowledge to have conducted an investigation to gather further information. Further, the L.A. Times, at least, cannot rest its decision to not print any criminal information about Hintz on the fact that Hintz’s case has not reached the stage of indictment. See “Bell City Councilman Owns a Home in Chino”, L.A. Times, August 12, 2010, where the paper writes a criminal investigatory article about a Bell councilman who the Times apparently believes possibly could be using a false address regarding one of his two homes for his district’s council seat. This individual, Luis A. Artiga, who appears to be Hispanic, has not been indicted or arrested for using a false address, as the paper itself points out, “there is currently no investigation into Artiga’s residency status” (as reportedly stated by David Demerjian, head of the district attorney’s public intergrity section); nevertheless, the fact of no indictment did not prevent the Times from writing an investigatory story about Artiga. Thus, the Times decision to not write anything about Hintz’s criminal background and history has nothing to do with Hintz not being indicted. It is simply disparate treatment as to Alarcon, and , along with the story regarding Artiga, that disparate treatment appears to be based on race.

Cc: L.A. Councilman Richard Alarcon
Friends of Councilman Alarcon
Bell Councilman Luis A. Artiga
L.A. Times and Ventura County Star
The general public

Bell, CA Officials, the L.A. Times, and the Unindicted Jurists of the U.S. Attorney's Office in L.A.

By now Californians and the nation are aware of the enormous salaries of the City of Bell, CA officials, and the aftermath reactions by Bell residents and others. Much of the reaction, as well as the knowledge of the salaries, is due to the investigation and publication of the L.A. Times. There is no dispute that the information should have been provided, especially to Bell city residents, because its clear that they were unaware of the salaries, and they should have been aware. And, the L.A. Times have conducted other investigations on middle class minorities(for the most part)(the majority of the Bell officials in question is minority), such as nurses (especially the Martin Luther King,Jr. Hospital nurses),union officials, probation workers, etc.. But, the question is: why doesn't the L.A. Times perform investigative reports on state and federal judges(who are public officials, by the way), and other federal officials suspected of criminal conduct (with supportive evidence), and even, in some instances,where the suspected conduct has been corroborated by action by the FBI? Could it be because the judges are white? Or, perhaps because they are judges? Or, maybe both (because they are white judges)? Or, is there some other "mutual interests", or other reasons why their conduct is not reported? The judges certainly, as mentioned, are public officials, like the Bell officials (and thusfar, the Bell officials have not been accused of misconduct or criminal conduct (although a fishing expedition has now begun) --- and certainly negotiating for and ultimately obtaining a high salary, alone, is not misconduct or criminal conduct---merely receiving high salaries)), and their conduct, like the Bell officials, is at least suspect; and there are more than one judge or other official (or several). I would be interested in the L.A. Times response. The judges I'm referring to are those with pending cases in the U.S. Attorney's Office in Los Angeles, such as Steven Hintz, Dickran Tevrizian, William Schwarzer, Cathy Catterson, etc.. I'm sure if the Times did reporting on these individuals, it would garner the same public response and outrage as the Bell officials reporting did, and for the same reason, i.e., outrageous conduct by public officials. And, the Bell officials did not commit or cause any direct harm to Bell citizens (only unintentional indirect harm, in the sense that perhaps the excess salaries could have gone to other public programs or salaries,e.g. laid-off workers ). On the other hand, the judges and other officials referred to here caused intentional direct harm,e.g., racial discrimination, fraud, false statement, and obstruction of justice, to citizens, but their conduct is not investigated or reported. Strange, very strange, don't you think?

Moreover, the result of the L.A. Times investigating and reporting on minority public officials is minority on minority in-fighting, i.e., minority Bell citizens calling for the ouster of minority public officials, while the white majority, including the L.A. Times, sit back and watch the fallout (including, now, the firing of a minority city attorney for Downey, who was city attorney for Bell when the salaries were assigned). It was similar with the M.L.K., Jr. minority nurses being pitted against the minority Watts community (but, the major uproar came not from the minority community, but the white press, print and broadcast). Of course, if questioned, the L.A. Times would likely state that its reporting had nothing to do with the fact that Bell is a minority city, rather, it was simply a happenstance of such an important nature that the American "public" (not just Bell residents) should be informed about it. Sure! Then why not investigate and report the outrageous conduct of some of the white judges?

Bell residents should be thankful to be informed of the outrageous salaries(and there is no question that the salaries, for public officials, are outrageous) of the various Bell officials in question, but they should be apprehensive about believing that it was done just for their benefit. It was done because it is a sensational newsstory that will sell newspapers for the Times now and in the future; and, because it did not involve white officials (the Times is careful not to state, from my reading of their stories, that Bell officials are the "highest" paid officials in their positions in the country, merely "among" the highest, which means that there are other officials in the country, and perhaps California, making as much or more than the Bell officials, and are probably white--and they have not been reported by the Times. But, yes, this is speculation. I could be wrong. So, L.A. Times, prove me wrong. Continue your investigation and provide some of the other high salaries at other California municipalities and nationwide and provide the race or color of those making those high salaries. Then I, and other members of the public, will be able to see if the Times reporting was biased or not.

In the end, this piece is not written so much to condemn the L.A. Times, although it should be condemned if its reporting is biased or racist, as much as to call for "fairness" in reporting. If the Times is going to report on the outrageous conduct of minority public officials, then it should also report on on-going or simultaneous outrageous conduct of white officials, especially the aforementioned judges and other officials with pending complaints against them in the U.S. Attorney's Office in Los Angeles; otherwise, it is clearly biased or racist reporting.

ROMAN POLANSKI AND THE UNINDICTED JURISTS OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE IN LOS ANGELES, CA .

LAURACK D. BRAY, ESQ.
FEDERAL ATTORNEY
P.O. BOX 611432
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
TEL: (805) 901-2693

July 21, 2010



ROMAN POLANSKI AND THE UNINDICTED JURISTS OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE IN LOS ANGELES, CA : WHY SWISS JUSTICE MINISTER EVELINE WIDMER-SCHLUMPF’S DECISION WAS NOT ONLY CORRECT, BUT ALSO NECESSARY.

When the Swiss Justice Ministry decided not to extradite Roman Polanski back to the United States, its decision was correct because : (1) Polanski had pleaded guilty for having sex with a minor (a charged crime) and he had served the sentence that the judge, California judge Laurence J. Rittenband, had ordered (a 90-day psychiatric study prison sentence at Chino, CA)(being released by prison authorities after serving 42 days). Polanski did not try to escape punishment for his crime, and he served his time; (2) the real victim, Samantha Geimer, has publicly forgiven Polanski for his criminal acts and no longer seeks his further prosecution; (3) the U.S. government refused to turn over evidence that likely would have demonstrated that Polanski had been convicted and served his sentence; and (4) the U.S. government refused to turn over some of the same evidence (i.e., a prosecutor’s testimony of a “secret” meeting among the trial judge, prosecutors, and Polanski’s attorneys, where it is alleged that judge Rittenband intended to re-sentence Polanski and force his deportation) that would likely demonstrate judicial misconduct with the intention to violate Polanski’s due process and equal protection of the law rights (the judge intended to force Polanski’s deportation through threat of a longer sentence—de facto deportation of course, because, legally, deportation would be a federal matter and would have to have been dealt with by the old INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service)(so Rittenband lacked authority to legally deport Polanski) and the purported de facto deportation was based on Polanski’s status as a non-citizen---generally, only a non-citizen can be deported; therefore, judge Rittenband was going to treat Polanski disparately different based on his citizenship status)). As it turned out, part of judge Rittenband’s intended and unconstitutional acts occurred anyway, that is, the forced deportation of Polanski. When Polanski fled and returned to France, he voluntarily deported himself to avoid the second part of judge Rittenband’s intended acts, i.e., re-sentencing with a longer sentence. I will discuss this second part of the intended acts ahead, infra.

Roman Polanski did not flee from punishment or sentencing, he fled from the anticipated and intended misconduct of a judge (in contract law and language, he contemplated an “anticipatory breach” of the plea agreement by the judge plus additional misconduct, i.e., knowing and intentional violation of his constitutional rights) and the likelihood that the United States government would not correct or overturn the judge’s actions. That brings us to why Swiss Justice Minister Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf’s decision was necessary.

The Swiss Justice Ministry’s decision not to extradite Polanski to the United States was necessary because : (1) if the Swiss government extradited Polanski back to the U.S., it would contribute to and support the second part of judge Rittenband’s intended and unconstitutional acts, that is, re-sentencing Polanski to a longer sentence, after he had already served his sentence (and although judge Rittenband has passed, it is likely that his replacement would, in some way, give effect to judge Rittenband’s decision), and (2) if the Swiss government did not act to correct the misconduct of the trial judge, Rittenband, by, in effect, enforcing Polanski’s original and served sentence, it is very unlikely that the United States government would do so, were Polanski and his case extradited back to the United States. Why? Because the United States has a pattern and history of not disciplining its judges, both state and federal. It is rare when the United States discipline its judges, state or federal, and usually it is done in “secret” (and usually the “secret discipline” is early retirement or resignation, with no relief to the victim of the judge’s actions). Of course, the United States can point to specific cases of judicial discipline through prosecution and/or impeachment, e.g., federal district court judges Alcee Hastings , Samuel Kent, and currently pending, Thomas Porteous, and the misconduct proceedings of Ca Central District judge Manuel Real, but, in the mix of things, with the likely numerous number of judges that actually commit misconduct or criminal conduct, government discipline of these judges is rare. And, this is so, even when the judges cause serious and/or significant harm (meaning their actions ruin lives and careers—and, as a matter of full disclosure, my life and legal career were ruined by the misconduct/ criminal conduct of bad or corrupt judges) to its own citizens, not to mention non-citizens or foreigners.

It is very likely that the Swiss government knew of America’s history of dealing with its judges, perhaps in some way through Polanski’s attorneys, and it had a lack of confidence that the United States would correct judge Rittenband’s misconduct if the case was extradited. And, after the Swiss requested the information that they believed would shade some light on the judge’s misconduct, and the United States refused to provide this information (which “created ‘persisting doubts concerning the presentation of the facts of the case’ ”, L.A. Times, July 13, 2010, “Director freed on legal technicalities”), it probably only served to reinforce the Swiss government’s lack of confidence that the U.S. would discipline the judge (and reverse or prohibit his intended actions), so it decided it would be fairer to Polanski to not risk his being treated unfairly by a government with a tendency not to correct or discipline its judges for their misconduct, and, consequently, to not send him back to the United States. “In these circumstances, it is not possible to exclude with the necessary certainty that Roman Polanski has already served the sentence he was condemned to at the time”, a statement by the Swiss justice ministry , according to the L.A. Times, Id. This brings me to the U.S. Attorney’s office in Los Angeles.

If the Swiss government wanted any evidence that the U.S. does not penalize or reverse the vast majority of its judges for their misconduct, it need only review the Complaint file of the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Los Angeles regarding state and federal judges. The following are just a few of the cases that I am personally aware of, which are still pending in the U.S. Attorney’s Office (and have been pending since June, 2007). In none of the cases have the U.S. Attorney’s Office responded to the victims of the charged crimes (except a lone telephone call made after a month-long demonstration in front of the federal courthouse in downtown Los Angeles and a fraudulent letter sent to the victims claiming that the U.S. Attorney could not pursue the complaint) or penalized any of the judges (with the only action of any kind being “secret” and persuasive early retirement or resignation, and at least several with retirement benefits). When the term “charged” is used in the examples or information below, it means what the complainants “complained” about or “charged” in their complaint.

1. Steven Hintz, Ventura County Superior Court judge : charged with conspiratorial racial discrimination causing my unlawful and unconstitutional eviction from my home-law office and causing the unlawful shutdown of my law practice. I submitted evidence showing, among other things, that Hintz prejudicially determined the outcome of an unlawful detainer jury trial by answering a jury question that was required to be answered by the jury itself; that he prejudicially forecast, in open court, that he would not grant me (a black lawyer) a stay of legal proceedings, without me even asking for one; and finally, that Hintz prejudicially and unlawfully kept his word and denied a stay (after being ordered to hold a hearing by an appellate court). The totality of these actions caused the loss of my home and law practice.

RESULTS OF U.S. ACTION : NO PENALTY for Hintz (but early retirement with pension benefits). His rulings or actions have NOT BEEN REVERSED (after nearly 7 years of litigation since the actions). Hintz is now running for another government office, Treasurer-tax collector, and, in doing so, has committed election fraud and voting rights violations. And, there has been NO RELIEF for the victim of his actions or crimes. My home-law office has not been returned, nor have I been compensated for the loss of my law practice.


2. Barry Klopfer, Ken Riley, and David Long, Ventura County Superior Court judges (acting as appellate judges) : charged with racial discrimination and/or conspiracy to deny constitutional rights based on race and for filing a false statement in an appellate opinion, in violation of federal criminal law, for the purpose of supporting a racially discriminatory judgment (Hintz’s).

RESULTS OF U.S. ACTION : NO PENALTY for any of the judges (but early retirement for Klopfer). Judges Long and Riley continue to sit on the bench in Ventura County. Long has recently run unopposed for his judgeship (but Ventura County voters know nothing about the criminal complaint or the facts of the case because the local media refused to inform them). Their actions have NOT BEEN REVERSED . And, there has been NO RELIEF for the victim.

3. Dickran Tevrizian, U.S.District Court judge, Cent. Dist.of CA : charged with multiple actions amounting to the denial of constitutional rights based on race or racial discrimination (again, I, as a black lawyer, was one of the victims of Tevrizian’s actions; the other was my white client, Jeanette Andrews), e.g., denial of a TRO and a preliminary injunction without a hearing for either and in violation of a local district court rule; denial of counsel to my white plaintiff client without a hearing; denial of a pro hac vice motion, without a hearing, by a black lawyer after a white counsel of record had to withdraw because of dictates by the state bar of California; ignoring the law in order to set aside a default by the government (the Navy); and, entering a summary judgment for the Navy without jurisdiction or authority to do so.

RESULTS OF U.S. ACTION : NO PENALTY for Tevrizian (but early retirement and benefits). There has been NO REVERSAL of Tevrizian’s rulings or actions, and there has been NO RELIEF for the victims (no compensation for Jeanette Andrews, even though the Navy defaulted, based on their counsel’s actions, and my law office has not been returned).


4. Terry Hatter, Jr., U.S. District Court judge, Cent. Dist. Of CA : charged with ignoring the law for the purpose of denying an individual, Harold James Griffith, social security disability benefits, after the person had been unlawfully denied benefits for over 20 years .

RESULTS OF U.S. ACTION : NO PENALTY for judge Hatter (but early retirement to senior judge status). There has been NO REVERSAL of Hatter’s decision to deny social security disability benefits to Griffith. And, there has been NO RELIEF for the victim.


5. William Schwarzer, U.S. District Court judge, Northern Dist. of CA (acting as an appellate judge of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals): charged with, among other things, ignoring the proper or correct standard for determining an aspect of a social security disability case; making up a false standard for the same matter; and violating a federal statute directed at prohibiting the denial of government benefits based on race ( I relied on my race in representing a white client).


RESULTS OF U.S. ACTION : NO PENALTY for Schwarzer (he was already retired—senior status). His judgment was NOT REVERSED , and there was NO RELIEF for the victim, Harold J. Griffith. He was not granted past or present social security benefits, even though an administrative law judge had found him to be disabled, as a matter of medical evidence and social security disability law, and ordered benefits be paid.

These are just a few of the cases that I am aware of, and there are more, and it doesn’t include any cases that I am not aware of .

So Swiss Justice Minister Widmer-Schlumpf’s decision to deny extradition to the United States was correct for the above-stated reasons, and the decision was necessary : (1) because the Swiss Ministry likely had no confidence that the U.S. government would correct the misconduct of judge Rittenband, thereby leaving Minister Widmer-Schlumpf with no choice (especially after the U.S. government refused to produce documents or testimony that might help enhance the Swiss’s confidence---which is further proof of the U.S. government’s protection of the misconduct of its judges) but to deny extradition ; and (2) to assure that Roman Polanski receive fundamental fairness regarding his American proceedings and to assure that his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law are protected.

Furthermore, Polanski will likely be able to travel worldwide (although he may not choose to), including Europe, Africa, and Asia, because even for other countries with extradition treaties with the U.S., the Swiss decision will likely represent precedent for most of those countries, and they will likely require the same information that the Swiss required in order to extradite Polanski (and Polanski’s attorneys will help assure that this happens) . And, of course, the U.S. will refuse to provide it. Thus, no extradition. The only country that Polanski will not be able to travel to is Israel , and that’s because of the “special” relationship between the U.S. and Israel . Perhaps a hint to the future resistance of the international community to the extradition of Polanski might be found in a recent extradition request by the United States, see the L.A. Times, “U.S. extradition request rejected”, July 17, 2010, where “A panel of international judges decided not to extradite a Kosovo terrorism suspect to the United States and then set him free, a European Union official said.” “Nicholas Hawton of the EU said the U.S. request to extradite ethnic Albanian Bajram Asllani, 29, did not demonstrate “well-grounded suspicions” that he plotted terrorist attacks.” Id.

Moreover, it is my understanding that Polanski’s attorneys will seek to have a third or independent party to investigate the misconduct of judge Rittenband. Well, to that notion, I say “Good Luck”! I, on behalf of myself and two clients, have requested the appointment of a U.S. Special Prosecutor, John Durham, to act as an independent special prosecutor to investigate the above-described cases-complaints of judicial misconduct/criminal conduct and other pending cases-complaints in the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Los Angeles . I have yet to receive a response from Mr. Durham or the new U.S. Attorney for Los Angeles, or the Attorney General, Eric Holder, which further evidences the U.S. government’s continued shielding of its judges’ misconduct and/or criminal conduct. Google John Durham and review my letter to him.

The Los Angeles Times, in an editorial, “Pandering to Polanski”, July 13, 2010, states “Switzerland’s refusal to extradite the director appears to be a case of ‘celebrity justice.’ ” I would suggest that if anyone received “celebrity justice”, it was judge Rittenband (whom the L.A. Times do not name in its editorial piece). And, the celebrity justice was provided by the U.S. government. The same celebrity justice that the government provides most of its judges. Does anyone believe that if there were misconduct or criminal conduct by Polanski’s attorneys, or prosecutors for that matter, affecting the outcome of the U.S. extradition request for Polanski , that the U.S. would not have readily turned over evidence of that conduct to the Swiss government, if requested, in order to have Polanski extradited? The only reason the U.S. refused to turn over that “secret” information is because it incriminated judge Rittenband as to judicial misconduct. Again, the Swiss did the right thing, and it had nothing to do with Polanski’s celebrity . It had everything to do with protecting Polanski’s constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law.

Finally, the newly appointed U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles, Andre Birotte (who is Black), according to the Los Angeles Times, is “creating a specialized unit to prosecute public corruption and civil rights cases, such as those involving politicians or police officers accused of crimes.” And, the mission of the unit will be “to bring to justice those public officials and public employees who violate the public’s trust.” Well, he has a caseload of complaints, supported by probable cause evidence, sitting and waiting for his mission in the U.S. Attorney’s office in Los Angeles presently. Let’s see what happens. Let’s see if he will keep his word, or will he be the same as the removed Thomas P. O’Brien. I’m looking forward to seeing the first case brought by the “new” public integrity section. I bet it won’t be a judge! If Birotte does begin to prosecute just some of the judges (and other officials) whose cases are pending in the Los Angeles office of the U.S. Attorney, it will go a long ways towards changing the United States’ image, both at home and abroad.