November 27, 2013
(Current date)
November 8, 2011
(Original date)
*(Denotes new information added to original blog)
**UPDATE (Denotes "NEW" information added to blog after publishing of original blog)
Yesterday (November 7, 2011), Dr. Conrad Murray, a black physician, and the physician acting as Michael Jackson's personal physician at the time of Michael's death, was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter by a nearly all-white jury and a white judge. As a result of the defense lawyers' main defense and the trial judge presiding over the trial, the outcome was predictable.
The defense's main defense has to be attributed to the lead defense attorney, Ed Chernoff, and/or Murray himself. That defense was that Michael Jackson ultimately killed himself by injecting himself with an overdose of propofol. As I have stated in another blog, see "Judge Michael Pastor and Dr. Conrad Murray: Murray's only hope is a fair jury and that is not assured", January 26, 2011 (updated), this was a poor and dangerous defense at the outset. It was poor because of the poor physical state that Michael Jackson was in at the time of his death and because he had hired Dr. Murray specifically to care for him, therefore, it would be quite questionable that Michael Jackson would turn around and give himself propofol while being cared for by Dr. Murray. And, the defense was speculative, with no real evidence of Michael injecting himself. It was a dangerous defense because even if it was true that Michael Jackson had somehow given himself propofol and caused his own death, if there were any Michael Jackson fans on the jury, they would not want to believe it (even if it was true). Therefore, they would view such a defense with disgust. And, this is what made the defense "dangerous"(because perhaps a fair and openminded juror would treat the defense fairly based on the evidence and find that indeed Michael had caused his own death; but, on the other hand, a Michael Jackson fan, even if he or she believed the evidence and the evidence supported a finding that Michael had killed himself, would not want to accept the evidence and would choose to believe otherwise). It is my understanding from HLN television that at least six of the jurors were Michael Jackson fans. Once Chernoff propounded that defense in his closing statement, I knew Murray would be found guilty, even though I hoped that he would not be (because I do not believe that under the circumstances, Dr. Murray committed a crime or is a criminal---and, as I have stated before, I am a Michael Jackson fan, always have been and always will be, even after Michael's death). And, once the jury was selected, after going through voir dire, Chernoff should have known the makeup of the jury (with the Michael Jackson fans--if HLN knew, Chernoff should have known also) and how to approach the trial and defense based on that jury. It was a fatal mistake to use the Michael Jackson killed himself defense.
The other reason Dr. Murray was convicted was because of judge Michael Pastor. He was clearly a biased and prejudiced judge who exercised racial discrimination against Dr. Murray and who prevented Murray from receiving a fair trial. Even if Murray had been acquitted, he would not have had received and did not receive a fair trial. And, if the racial discrimination and unfair treatment wasn't conclusively demonstrated by Pastor before, it was certainly demonstrated after the jury's finding of guilt, when Pastor ordered Murray to be remanded into custody pending sentencing. This was clearly invidious conduct under the circumstances based on Pastor's identified reasons for the remand. I could list some of the reasons why Murray was denied a fair trial by Pastor, but time restrictions do not permit me to do so at this time. I will do so later.
In an update of this blog, I will comment further on Murray's lawyers,judge Pastor, and my opinion as to Murray's relationship to Michael Jackson's death.
Update : Dr. Murray has now been sentenced to the maximum sentence possible, four (4) years in prison, by judge Pastor (although it is probable, because of new legislation, that he will serve his prison term in the county jail).
Update : Dr. Murray has now filed an appeal of his conviction.
On Murray's lawyers: While the following comments are not meant to be a condemnation of Murray's lawyers, because in several respects, they provided good advocacy for Murray, the comments are meant to show that they made crucial and dispositive, and objective, errors that contributed to Murray's conviction. I will confine my comments to two matters: (1) judge Pastor's bias and recusal prospect and (2)the defense's closing argument . Judge Pastor clearly exercised bias and prejudiced against Murray during pre-trial proceedings and Murray's lawyers knew it. When Pastor suspended Murray's medical license, without a hearing or a trial, instead of moving for Pastor's recusal or removal for Murray's trial, Murray's lawyers simply called Pastor's actions exercising the "nuclear option", and did not even appeal his ruling. This was simply a cowardly act in refusing to challenge Pastor and protect their client's constitutional rights. They even appealed Pastor's denial of a sequestration order (for the jury)(because that was a safe, but futile, challenge), but not his suspension order. This was a crucial error for Murray, because now Murray can't appeal the matter, because it was not preserved for appeal in the lower court. The defense also failed to present a crucial defense in its closing argument to the jury. Initially, I intended to identify that defense here, but, Murray has now appealed his conviction, and may entertain habeas corpus actions thereafter, so I will not identify that defense here and now, but its a crucial and clearly identifiable one that could have even swayed Michael Jackson fan jurors.
On judge Pastor : Pastor expressed prejudiced against Murray in a lot of ways, and I'm not going to try and rehash all of them here. Some of the ways involved preventing Murray from producing evidence and/or witnesses, but other ways were more subtle, such as at one point, Pastor told a defense witness not to turn and talk to the jury, when he had allowed any prosecution witness who had chosed to, to turn and talk to the jury. But, Pastor's greatest prejudice was his pretrial suspension of Murray's medical license, which was an attempt to cripple murray's defense and well-being, not to mention the indifference and effect on Murray's patients.
On my opinion of the Dr. Murray-Michael Jackson relationship and death: I believe that when Michael hired and/or retained Dr. Murray as his personal physician, he hired him as a physician and a friend. I believe that Dr. Murray accepted the position as a personal physician and a friend. As far as the salary is concerned, I think Dr. Murray (realizing that perhaps for the first time in his career as a doctor, he had a client that could afford to pay him as a Black doctor what white doctors garnered from their wealthy clients all the time) bargained for a good salary and was successful in obtaining a salary of $150,000.00 a month. For many white doctors who work for wealthy white and black clients, this is chicken-feed. But for a black doctor who is used to having working class and poor clients, this was a great salary. Only the racially prejudiced or racist people out there would make a big deal out of a black doctor making 150,000.00 a month from a client who can afford to pay it. And the reason they make a big deal out it is because they do not want a black doctor making that kind of money or salary. It's supposed to be only for a white doctor. Moving on, after Murray had bargained for his salary, he began to treat Michael, as a physician and a friend. It was the friend part that got him in trouble. Murray, as a physician, probably realized that he should not have continued to give Propofol to Michael, but Michael felt and believed that propofol was the only medication that caused and allowed him to sleep, and he needed to sleep to properly prepare for the concert tour. Dr. Murray as a physician probably tried to convince Michael that he should not depend on propofol, but to no avail. So, as a friend, to try and help Michael accomplish his goal of putting on and engaging in the concert tour, Dr. Murray decided that if Michael wanted the propofol and believed that it was the only thing that made him sleep, that he would try and administer it to him as safe as he could out of the public's eye (again, he realized that Michael shouldn't be taking the drug consistently, but, he also realized Michael's goal, and how important this goal was to Michael). Murray, in his statement to the police, stated that he had given Michael propofol for two months prior to Michael's death, and there had not been any contrary reaction, and Michael did fine. Michael probably relied on his friendship with Murray in hiring Murray, knowing that he would be asking Murray to give him propofol (and knowing that most non-friend doctors would not do it). I do not believe that Murray would have placed his license and career on the line for a non-friend, even for the money that was offered. But, I could be wrong about that. And, yes, I do believe the money mattered to Murray. The amount of money offered certainly helped motivate him to assist Michael, knowing the risk he was taking in doing so.
Finally, I believe that Dr. Murray in giving Michael the final dose, the dose that killed Michael, either gave him too much, or more than he thought he had given him, or that he gave him the usual dose that he had been giving him, but, in combination with the other drugs that Michael had been given, or taken, it caused Michael's death. In other words, I believe that Dr. Murray clearly made mistakes, and maybe committed malpractice, but, he did not commit a crime, and he should not have been charged or convicted of a crime. He did what he did to help Michael sleep, because Michael felt that propofol was the only medicine that helped him sleep. And Michael needed to sleep. If Michael would have lived, I don't think that he would have wanted Murray charged with a crime, and I do not think that Michael would have even brought malpractice charges against him, because he knew that Murray did what he did on his (Michael's) behalf. It's the same as two good friends going out drinking (alcohol). The driving friend drinks and is celebrating his birthday. The non-driving friend do not drink alcohol, but drinks non-alcoholic beverages to accommodate his friend. The two have been best friends for years. Because its the drinking friend's birthday, the non-drinking friend buys the drinking friend drinks all night. After a while, the non-drinking friend realizes that the drinking friend has had too much to drink. But, the drinking friend, after the non-drinking friend refuses to buy him more drinks, proceeds to buy his own drinks. So, the non-drinking friend gives in and continues to buy the drinks for the drinking friend, because the non-drinking friend wants to pay (as part of the celebration). Finally, the two leave the club or bar. On the way home, the drinking friend crashes the car into a pole and is killed. Can the non-drinking friend be charged with manslaughter? Probably. Should he be charged with manslaughter? Probably not. If the drinking friend had lived, would he want the non-drinking friend charged with manslaughter? *or another crime related to his injury or death? Probably not. Dr. Murray should not have been charged with manslaughter. And, with a fair trial and a good lawyer, he would not have been convicted of manslaughter.
UPDATE--May 21, 2013
Dr. Murray has now filed his appellate brief for his appeal, and one of the issues raised is "bias" by Pastor against Murray. I certainly and clearly raised this issue prior to trial, during, and after trial, but, I don't believe Murray's lawyers ever raised the issue; in part, I believe, because they were cowards, and simply didn't want to challenge Pastor as to a bias contention. And, Murray must carry some of the blame himself, because he could have directed his lawyers to raise the issue, but, apparently, from my knowledge of the record, he didn't do so.
Therefore, it will probably be too late to raise the issue on appeal; and the appellate court will not review the issue. But, we will see. I may be surprised.
UPDATE--May 24, 2013
The L.A. Times, in reporting on the current Michael Jackson wrongful death trial, continues to report Conrad Murray's conviction of involuntary manslaughter as if Murray received a fair trial and a fair conviction. He didn't. Although he certainly was convicted of manslaughter, it was a wrongful conviction that he likely could get overturned in a habeas corpus proceeding. It's doubtful that the California appellate courts are going to overturn it, but again, I may be surprised.
UPDATE--October 30, 2013
Conrad Murray has now been released from jail, having served his sentence (with good time credits). He says that he wants to get his license back in Texas. I didn't hear any mention of California or Nevada. But he's on his own now.
UPDATE--November 27, 2013
Murray has now made public statements about Michael. I perceive these statements as being derogatory; and being a Michael Jackson fan, I am offended by Murray's statements, especially since Michael is not here to defend himself. I now no longer respect Murray, and I regret writing the blogs that I wrote on his behalf.
I imagine Murray is responding and/or retaliating for Mrs. Jackson's (Michael's mother) comments and litigation holding Murray responsible for Michael's death. But, her position is just that of a broken-hearted, loving and despondent mother who feel the need to hold someone responsible for her son's death, and since Murray played a major role in Michael's death, she, as a mother, pointed the finger at Murray.
But Murray, as a professional, and I thought, a friend of Michael's, should have placed himself above the fray and not turn to retaliatory behavior. I am particularly bothered by what I believe is confidential information that Murray purportedly revealed (according to the news). The information related to Michael's children. Although I could rightfully publish the information here since it has been made public, I won't, to try and protect the confidentiality of the information. However, although I am a lawyer and not a doctor, I believe that Murray may have violated a doctor's code of professional responsibility by revealing the information.
In addition to the confidential information that Murray revealed, he also charges Michael with being an addict, and again, following his lawyers lead, charges Michael with giving himself propofol and causing his own death. Even if this really is true, and I continue to question that it is, out of respect (and since the trial is over), he should not be making these statements now.
Remember, it was Michael who was going to pay Murray a salary that Murray had never phantom making before, probably because Michael considered Murray a friend and Michael was trying to help a friend (knowing that Murray wasn't making much money through his practice). And Michael went out of his way to help Murray with the salary. AEG didn't really want to pay Murray the salary, but Michael was insistent, on Murray's behalf. And now Murray, after Michael's death (which he caused--although, I believe it was a matter of negligence rather than criminality), wants to bad mouth Michael. I think it's despicable. I think Murray only hurts himself through his revelations, because his conduct only detracts from his professionalism.
Finally, I generally stayed out of the civil action brought by Mrs. Jackson (i.e., I didn't comment through blogs), because I viewed it as strictly a money suit, i.e., deep pockets. But, now, with Murray's revelations, I will comment briefly.
I believe that Mrs. Jackson, through her lawyers, after going ahead with the lawsuit, should have filed a post-trial motion, i,e., JNOV, because the jury never reached the issue of negligent supervision. It only addressed the issue of negligent hiring. Even if it (the jury) found that Murray wasn't negligently hired, it necessarily, had to continue with the remaining questions to address the supervision portion of the complaint, and it didn't *(from what I gathered from news reports).
I have now learned that Mrs. Jackson has appealed. I think the negligent supervision claim is colorable. Again, the jury never reached that issue, and it should have.
**UPDATE--January 28, 2014
Murray's conviction has now been affirmed on appeal. Good riddence! And, although it was stated that Murray's lawyer raised the issue of bias on appeal. The appeals court did not address the issue of bias in its unpublished decision. And it did not cite bias as one of the points raised by Murray on appeal. So what happened to the bias issue? It doesn't matter, even if it had been raised by Murray, the court probably wouldn't have addressed it, for not being raised below.
Tuesday, November 8, 2011
Wednesday, August 3, 2011
The Murder of Oscar Grant and Judge Robert Perry: The Epitomy of Underground Racism and The Justice Department's Neglect of Black Males
August 27, 2013
(current date)
**UPDATE (Denotes NEW information added to the original blog)
***Change/correction in blog information
August 3, 2011
(original date)
When President Obama was elected, many people, mostly white, began a discussion of a so-called post-racial society, as if Obama's election as a Black man had signaled some change in the landscape of racism or racial discrimination in the United States. It did not. We, as a country, have a long, long ways to go before we achieve a "post-racial" society. We probably won't reach it in my lifetime, if we achieve it at all. But, I could be wrong (I was wrong with my prediction that I would not see a black President in my lifetime), and I hope that I am; but, I don't think I will be with this prediction, based on the occurrences today, e.g., the herein Oscar Grant murder and other discrimination and the continuous and enormous number of discrimination cases filed with the EEOC (most of which are meritorious). Even with Obama's election, the level of racism and/or discrimination has not changed in this country. The only difference between today's racism and the racism of the 50's, and 60's, is that the racism has gone "underground", rather than remaining out in the open and obvious, i.e., the "white only" and "colored only" signs, the blatant and obvious segregation of restaurants and other facilities, where black people had to enter and be served in the rear, etc. Now, the racism and discrimination is expressed in less obvious ways, e.g., the employment arena and the courts. In most cases, there will not be the beneficiary or helpful use of the word "nigger" in order to help identify the racism or discrimination, so the actions, on the surface, will appear to be neutral. And, in most cases, without the blatant racial descriptions, it will require some degree of sophistication to detect the racism. Such is the case with the murder of the black Oscar Grant by the white Johannes Mehserle and the treatment of the murder by the judicial system, and, in particular, the white judge, Robert Perry, with respect to his rulings favoring and "freeing" Mehserle of responsibility for Grant's death, notwithstanding videotape, eyewitnesses, and other evidence showing that Mehserle killed Grant intentionally, and that at least the "nigger" word or language was used in the context of the killing. To all of the citizens who did not attend the trial (and for some who did), and relied on the broadcast or print media to relay to them the racial connotations of the judicial proceedings, they were probably, in most cases, miseducated or not educated at all. For example, as to the effect of judge Perry's post-trial rulings, which , in essence, allowed Mehserle to "walk" for the murder of Oscar Grant, notwithstanding the involuntary manslaughter conviction; and, for another example, that the jury was basically, based on my understanding, "all white", that is, there were no African Americans on the jury ***(my understanding is hereby corrected, my new understanding is that there was one African American man on the jury). It is reminiscent of the black Emmett Till murder case, except in this case, the actions were caught on tape (and Till's murder was premeditated and first degree, while Grant's murder was second degree). This is part of the underground racism that I am referring to (generally out of sight and out of mind unless it is brought to the attention of the public, and even then, in many cases, such as Oscar Grant's, justice is not served for the racism--Mehserle has literally gotten away with murder, as did the Emmett Till murderers). Moreover, even after the Justice Department has been made aware of some of this information, it has, thusfar, not saw fit to bring a federal prosecution either for Mehserle or judge Perry, so there is no reason why one wouldn't expect it to happen again.
The following is a federal criminal-civil rights Complaint that I filed with the U.S. Atorney's Office in Los Angeles on July 26, 2011 addressing the discrimination against Black males by the Superior Court of California (and Los Angeles and Ventura Counties) and the U.S. Justice Department, through neglect or non-action:
COMPLAINT REPORT
Method of Responding: I , Laurack D. Bray, and on behalf of other similarly-
situated black males participating in the judicial process in the Superior Court of California, in either a civil or criminal proceeding and as either a plaintiff or defendant, or as a victim, unless they would choose otherwise, including Conrad Murray and Oscar Grant, will generally respond to this report by addressing item-question Nos. 1. and 2. of the original page of the report regarding the named individuals or entity . That is, I will name or identify the individual or entity and, thereafter, will address item-questions 1. and 2. of the Complaint Report.
1. Name of the individual or entity that we believe committed a federal crime .
Superior Court of California and the respective Counties in question (i.e., Los Angeles and Ventura).
Question #1. What federal crime do you believe has been committed?
ANS: I believe the crimes of conspiracy against rights, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. sec. 241, and more specifically, deprivation of rights under color of law, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. sec. 242 were committed by the Superior Court of California, together with former judge Steven Hintz of the Superior Court of California, Ventura County and judges Michael Pastor and Robert Perry of Los Angeles County, either directly or indirectly through or by the Superior Court allowing its judges to violate the constitutional rights of black males participating in judicial proceedings in its courts through a pattern of misconduct surrounding at least three known cases (it would be interesting and valuable to study whether any other cases between 2003 and 2009 have involved similar conduct involving black males and Superior Court judges, who, thusfar, have been white) that have been or are being litigated in the Superior Court of California. Those three cases are Nguyen v. Bray, NO. 221162, Ventura County ; People v. Conrad Murray, M.D., NO. SA073164, Los Angeles County; and People v. Johannes Mehserle, NO. 161210, Alameda County.
I believe the primary violations are the denial of constitutional due process under color of law with respect to the respective judicial proceedings participated in by the Black males; here, specifically, Laurack D. Bray, Complainant herein, an attorney presently and an attorney at the time of the violation; Dr. Conrad Murray, a medical doctor presently and a medical doctor at the time of the violation, and Oscar Grant, deceased, and upon information and belief, a former butcher. The violation of Mr. Grant’s rights (which was represented by the People of California at the criminal trial of Johannes Mehserle) by the Superior Court involved Mr. Grant as a victim, as opposed to a plaintiff or defendant. But Mr. Grant’s family felt the impact of the constitutional violations no less than Mr. Grant himself. Moreover, as to the due process violations by the Superior Court, and its judges, there is a demonstrated connection or pattern shown among the cases (and again these are merely known cases).
For example, the connection between the Bray case and the Murray case is the two trial judges’ action in causing the deprivation of a right or property , and thereafter, arbitrarily denying a stay of execution of the deprivation (that is, without a hearing on the stay ); and, for another example, the connection between the Bray case and the Mehserle case is the two judges’ usurping the province or domain of the jury and substituting their judgment and decision for that of the jury. In essence, providing the Black males with a bench trial instead of a jury trial which was demanded and/or required. In all cases, the trial judges were white and the respective males were Black. NOTE: In both the Bray and Murray cases, I provided evidentiary exhibits to support the Complaint, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office has those Complaints and exhibits, so I will not repeat them here. As for the Mehserle case and judge Perry, I will be attaching additional exhibits here.
#2. Explain in detail what you know about the crime, including when and where it occurred, what you have heard and observed and when you heard and observed it, what others told you (include their names) and what other evidence may exist.
I know that there are at least three cases whereby white Superior Court judges have acted to deny the constitutional rights of black male litigants. I know that thusfar no action has been taken by the Superior Court of California to discipline or otherwise correct the misconduct of the judges or to provide relief to the black males. I know the Bray case occurred in 2003 in Ventura County; the Murray case is on-going (and the trial has not taken place yet, but judge Pastor remains the trial judge) and will take place in Los Angeles County; and the Mehserle case has been tried and a notice of appeal filed. The Mehserle case was initially brought in Alameda County, California, but later was transferred to Los Angeles County (where the unconstitutional actions occurred).
I observed the Bray case through participation. I was the object of the trial judge’s action in the Bray case. I observed the Murray and Mehserle cases through review of the court records, news broadcasts and newspapers. In the Bray case, I observed, among other things, the trial judge, Steven Hintz, in a demanded jury trial, intentionally answering a jury question that was required to be answered by the jury, which resulted in an eviction judgment and the loss and/or deprivation of a home and law office and practice. Thereafter, I observed the same trial judge, Hintz, state in open court, without being asked, that he was not going to grant the black male (myself) a stay of execution of the judgment. And, he didn’t, even after he was, informally, ordered to hold a hearing by a state appellate court. Finally, I observed that I was unlawfully evicted from my home-law office in violation of my due process rights, and my office has not been returned; and neither has the Superior Court taken any action against the trial judge .
As previously mentioned, I observed the Murray case through media reports and a review of the court record for the case, i.e., the preliminary hearing record, including the state’s motion for suspension of Murray’s license, and especially the Minute Orders. I observed that the trial judge, Michael Pastor, upon a motion from the Medical Board of California, suspended the medical license of Dr. Conrad Murray in the State of California until the end of Murray’s criminal manslaughter trial, without a due process hearing or trial. I observed that Pastor attempted to have Murray’s license suspended in the other jurisdictions where Murray practices as well. But, it doesn’t appear that the other jurisdictions followed Pastor’s lead, as well they should not, in respect of Murray’s constitutional rights. Finally, I observed that the suspension of Murray’s license remains intact as Murray’s trial approaches, and I know that if the other jurisdictions that have licensed Murray followed Pastor’s Order, that Murray and his patients in those jurisdictions would have suffered irreparable harm. Pastor’s conduct has not been corrected by the Superior Court, even to the extent of providing Murray another judge for his trial.
Last, like the Murray case, I observed the Mehserle case through media reports and the court record, including motions and Minute Orders. I observed the trial judge in the case, Robert J. Perry, pursuant to a defense motion for a new trial, usurp the domain of the jury (which had found defendant Johannes Mehserle personally used a firearm in the commission of involuntary manslaughter of Oscar Grant) and substitute his judgment for the jury’s and found that “there was insufficient evidence at trial to sustain the jury’s finding on gun allegation enhancement.” See Exhibit #1 (Minute Order). He also usurped the jury’s domain a second time by dismissing the gun allegation pursuant to Penal Code 1385 “for insufficiency of the evidence.” Id. And, I observed that thusfar the Superior Court of California and Los Angeles County have not taken any action against judge Perry for his conduct.
2. Name of individual that I believe committed a crime.
Judge Robert J. Perry ( Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County)
Question #1. What federal crime do you believe have been committed?
I believe the crime of deprivation of rights under color of law pursuant to 18 U.S.C. sec. 242, primarily, and at least indirectly if not directly, Section 241, conspiracy against rights, were committed by judge Perry, together with the Superior Court of California and Los Angeles County. I believe that section 242 was violated by the judge willfully subjecting the People of California, including the deceased Oscar Grant and his family members, to the deprivation of due process and trial by jury rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, as well as “to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant(s’). . . color. . . or race. . . .” In this case, the different punishments, pains, or penalties were based on both Oscar Grant’s “race or color” as an African American or black man, but also on Johannes Mehserle’s “race or color” as a Caucasian or white man. That is, the judge tended to de-value Grant’s life as a black man in overturning the jury verdict on the gun enhancement and over-value Mehserle’s life as a white man in not only vacating the greater sentence provided for by the sentence enhancement, but also in attempting to prevent Mehserle from being tried again on the gun enhancement charge, notwithstanding the fact that Mehserle himself moved for a new trial and not a judgment of acquittal.
And, of course, judge Perry acted “under color of law” by acting as a Superior Court judge and depriving the People, including Oscar Grant, of its constitutional rights to due process and trial by jury.
#2. Explain in detail what you know about the crime, including when and where it occurred, what you have heard and observed and when you heard and observed it, what others have told you (include their names) and what other evidence may exist.
My knowledge about the Section 242 and 241 crimes in the Mehserle case, specifically pertaining to judge Perry’s crimes, are based on media coverage (including newspaper reports and television broadcasts), my personal involvement in an aspect of the case, i.e., pattern of discrimination against black males by some Superior Court judges and therefore, the Superior Court itself, parts of the Mehserle court records, e.g., motions, jury instructions, published portions of the trial transcript, etc., my personal legal research, and my personal experience as a civil rights lawyer.
I know at least the following about the crime or crimes by judge Perry in the Mehserle case :
I know that on July 8, 2010, the jury, in the Mehserle criminal involuntary manslaughter case, through verdict, found Johannes Mehserle guilty of the crime of involuntary manslaughter of Oscar Grant; and further, found Mehserle guilty of the allegation of personally using a firearm, namely a handgun “in the commission and attempted commission of” the crime of involuntary manslaughter of Oscar Grant. See Exhibit #2 (Verdict Form). And, I know that on November 5, 2010, through Minute Order, that judge Perry found that “there was insufficient evidence at trial to sustain the jury’s finding on gun allegation enhancement and motion for new trial for insufficient evidence on gun allegation is . . . granted.” See Exh. #1, supra. And, he dismissed “the gun allegation pursuant to Penal Code 1385 for insufficiency of the evidence.” Id.
I know that prior to the jury convicting Mehserle on the gun allegation that it had been instructed by judge Perry that “If you find the defendant guilty of the crime of. . . involuntary manslaughter, you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant personally used a firearm during the commission of that crime. Someone personally uses a firearm if he intentionally does any of the following: . . . 3. Fires the weapon. The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.” See Exhibit #3 (Jury Instructions, part). I know that after the jury was so instructed, it found the gun allegation to be true. See Exh.#2, supra. And, I know that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. And, while the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in a criminal case is held and exercised by the accused, once the right is exercised, the guarantee and protection of a jury trial and decision runs to the People (including Oscar Grant, in absentia) as well.
With the above in mind, I know that Oscar Grant was shot in the back while face down on the ground and killed by Johannes Mehserle, a BART police officer, with a handgun. The Alameda County District Attorney’s Office, by complaint, charged Mehserle with one count of murder. The complaint also charged “that during the Commission of the crime defendant personally used a firearm.” The “Defendant pleaded not guilty and denied the allegation.” The D.A.’s Office then filed an information containing the same charge and allegation . Mehserle then moved to dismiss the indictment, and that motion was denied by an Alameda County judge. Subsequently, Mehserle was tried by jury on the murder charge in Los Angeles County, and the jury found Mehserle guilty of involuntary manslaughter and that the gun-use allegation was true. Judge Perry then, pursuant to Mehserle’s motion for a new trial on both the involuntary manslaughter conviction and the gun allegation, purportedly granted Mehserle a new trial on the gun allegation (while denying the motion for the involuntary manslaughter charge). Perry also dismissed the gun allegation for insufficiency of the evidence. Thereafter, he sentenced Mehserle to two years imprisonment for the involuntary manslaughter conviction, but because of mandated custody credits, Perry found that Mehserle had to be released on June 13, 2011, and he (Mehserle) was.
THE SECTION 242 VIOLATIONS
I. JUDGE PERRY WILLFULLY USURPED THE DOMAIN OF THE JURY, SUBSTITUTING HIS JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE JURY, VIOLATING THE PEOPLE’S, INCLUDING OSCAR GRANT’S , CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND A JURY TRIAL.
When judge Perry purportedly granted a new trial and dismissed the gun allegation for insufficient evidence, after the jury had decided otherwise, he willfully substituted his judgment for that of the jury, and , in essence, transformed the jury trial into a bench trial. This action without more violated the People’s and Oscar Grant’s constitutional rights to due process and a jury trial (the rule permitting the grant of a new trial “ensures that the People, like the defendant, have the charges resolved by a jury”, Porter v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 4th 125 (2009))(just recently, in the perjury trial of Roger Clemens, USDC, DC judge Reggie Walton, after declaring a mistrial, informed the jurors “Unfortunately, there are rules we play by and those rules are designed to insure that both parties receive a fair trial”, according to the L.A. Times, “Clemens trial gets quick hook”, July 15, 2011). The fact that Perry based his decision on insufficient evidence does nothing, in this case, to overcome the constitutional violation, because as discussed infra, there was more than sufficient evidence for the gun allegation finding and the involuntary manslaughter charge and conviction.
Further, the judge , in substituting his judgment for the jury’s , violated his own instruction to the jury. In his instruction to the jury, the judge stated, “It is not my role to tell you what your verdict should be.” See Exhibit #4 (Jury Instruction). But that is exactly what he did when he dismissed the gun allegation after the jury had determined the allegation to be true.
II. JUDGE PERRY’S FINDING THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL TO SUSTAIN THE JURY’S FINDING ON THE GUN ALLEGATION ENHANCEMENT IS OUTRAGEOUS.
First of all, Mehserle, himself, through his Motion for a new trial, stated, “There is truly only one meaningful item of evidence in this record that Mehserle intended to draw and shoot his gun at Oscar Grant; and that, of course, is the fact that Mehserle drew and shot his gun at Oscar Grant.” (Emphasis added). Within that statement, Mehserle admits that it is a proven fact that he drew and shot his gun at Oscar Grant, and that this fact was a meaningful item of evidence in the trial record to prove that he intended to draw and shoot his gun at Oscar Grant. Even if one was to accept Mehserle’s position that this was “truly” the only meaningful item of evidence in the record to prove that Mehserle intended to shoot Oscar Grant with his gun, it was evidence, and significant evidence, because it was objective and direct evidence . This was enough evidence alone for the jury to find that Mehserle personally used a firearm or handgun to commit involuntary manslaughter, especially if it did not believe that the shooting was an accident, which it did not. The jury convicted Mehserle of involuntary manslaughter. See the Court’s jury instruction at Exhibit #5 herein, which states in part: The defendant is not guilty of murder or the lesser crimes of voluntary manslaughter or involuntary manslaughter if he killed someone as a result of accident. Such a killing is excused, and therefore not unlawful, if : 1. The defendant was a peace officer and was doing a lawful act in a lawful way; . . . AND 3. The defendant was acting without any unlawful intent. (Emphasis added).
The defendant is not guilty of involuntary manslaughter if he acted accidentally without criminal negligence. You may not find the defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter unless you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with criminal negligence. . . . (Emphasis added)
The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not excused. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of murder and the lesser included crimes of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. (End)
Again, with this instruction in mind, the jury convicted Mehserle of involuntary manslaughter.
In addition to the above-identified evidence, and more specifically :
1. There was videotape evidence of the shooting—objective evidence—showing the gun being removed from the holster, being pointed at Grant, and being fired into Grant’s back. “Video of the shooting shows that at the time of the shot Mehserle was standing directly over Grant pointing the gun straight downward.” Mehserle’s New Trial Motion.
2. There was eyewitness testimony of the shooting—objective evidence. “The angle of the bullet through the body and the positioning of Mehserle standing over Grant comports with the witness testimony and the video.” Id.
3. There was evidence that “the taser is completely different from the firearm in weight and appearance : it is bright yellow, made of plastic, and considerably lighter than the firearm.” People’s Response to Motion for a new trial. This was evidence that Mehserle should have known that he held a handgun and not a taser when he shot Grant.
4. There was evidence that “Defendant wore his taser on the opposite side of his belt from his firearm,” Id., which made it much more difficult for one to “accidentally” reach for the gun rather than the taser; as would be the case when both weapons were on the same side.
5. There was evidence that “the firearm was secured in Defendant’s holster and could not be removed until after defendant specifically released the holster’s two separate retention devices.” Id.
6. There was evidence that “Defendant had withdrawn his Taser, then returned it to its normal spot on his belt only moments before he withdrew his firearm and shot the victim.” Id.
7. There was evidence presented that “defendant’s immediate and often repeated explanation was that he thought the victim was reaching for a gun,” Id., and that fact would account for Mehserle believing he had to act swiftly in meeting deadly force with deadly force, and therefore intentionally reaching for the handgun. Mehserle told a fellow Officer Pirone, “Tony, I thought he was going for a gun.” People’s Sentencing Memorandum. Again, this indicates that Mehserle intended to meet deadly force with deadly force, i.e., a handgun not a taser. An Officer Foreman stated, “Yes, he (Mehserle) said he thought the guy had a gun.” Id.
8. There was evidence that “At no time did defendant ever say anything about intending to pull his taser or that the shooting was an accident.” Id.
9. There was evidence that “It wasn’t until the defendant chose to testify on his own behalf that we heard him say, for the first time, that the shooting was an accident. Prior to that time, defendant continuously tried to justify the shooting by saying that he believed Mr. Grant was ‘going for a gun.’ ” Id.
10. Finally, there was evidence presented at trial that there was no need for Mehserle to use deadly force or even a taser, to restrain Mr. Grant, because Grant was being restrained by two heavy officers with his face being pushed to the ground. “The most critical moments were those just before defendant pulled his gun. During this time, Officer Pirone was holding Mr. Grant down with his hands and his knees. Officer Pirone can be seen in the video with both knees on Mr. Grant’s back and his left hand on the back of Mr. Grant’s head pushing Mr. Grant’s face into the platform.” Id. “Officer Pirone using all of his 250 pounds to push down on the back of 170-pound Mr. Grant who, at the time was laying over the left leg of Carlos Reyes.” Id. Mehserle “maintained that Mr. Grant’s hand was in his pocket and that he refused to remove it, this while two officers, each weighing 250 pounds were on top of him pushing him against the platform.” Id. “Even if Grant resisted arrest, there could be no doubt Mehserle had no right to use lethal force.” Mehserle’s Motion for a New Trial, at p.2.
This was far more than sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the gun allegation was true (as it did); especially after the jury had previously found that the shooting and killing was not an accident.
According to the L.A. Times, “EX –BART COP’S RELEASE DRAWS PROTEST”, Sunday, June 12, 2011, see Exhibit #6 herein, judge Perry stated that “the evidence was insufficient to show that the officer used his firearm deliberately.” (Emphasis added). This finding is equally outrageous. For the only evidence going to prove that Mehserle’s use of the firearm was not deliberate was Mehserle’s subjective testimony (and the evidence in support of that testimony, e.g., evidence of other cases where guns were “accidentally” used instead of tasers). All of the other and remaining objective evidence point to a deliberate use of the handgun by Mehserle. See the evidence cited above. If this statement was in fact made by judge Perry , it should be the central focus and basis for the Justice Department bringing a Section 242 action against the judge. Without Mehserle’s testimony of an “accident” (which the jury rejected), most reasonable people, e.g., the jury, would conclude that the shooting was deliberate.
III. THE ONLY WAY FOR JUDGE PERRY TO FIND INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR THE GUN ALLEGATION WAS FOR HIM TO ACCEPT MEHSERLE’S SUBJECTIVE DEFENSE AND TESTIMONY OF AN ACCIDENT (WHICH THE JURY REJECTED) AND DISREGARD ALL OF THE OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE POINTING TO AN INTENTIONAL AND DELIBERATE SHOOTING AND KILLING.
And this deliberate disregard of the evidence provides a separate and independent
violation and denial of due process under color of law. Moreover, the due process violation is exacerbated by the fact that the judge accepted the subjective theory and evidence of a white police officer claiming an accident in the shooting of an innocent and unarmed black man in the back, while disregarding evidence that a black man’s life was deliberately and unnecessarily taken. This scenario projects the race factor.
IV. JUDGE PERRY, WITHOUT AUTHORITY, AND UNDER THE GUISE OF A NEW TRIAL ORDER, EFFECTIVELY GRANTED MEHSERLE A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL FOR BOTH THE GUN ALLEGATION DIRECTLY, AND THE INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER CONVICTION INDIRECTLY.
This was another separate and independent due process violation under color of law.
Even though judge Perry purportedly granted Mehserle a new trial on the gun allegation, in response to a new trial motion, he, in essence, and effectively, granted Mehserle a judgment of acquittal, with the specific intent to do so. Further, with the acquittal on the gun charge, Mehserle was effectively acquitted of the involuntary manslaughter charge, because the gun allegation is inextricably intertwined with the manslaughter charge. Since the jury found that the killing of Oscar Grant was not an accident, it had to find the gun allegation to be true (as it did) to convict Mehserle of involuntary manslaughter. Therefore, an acquittal of one or the other is an acquittal of both.
However, “a court has no authority to grant an acquittal in connection with an 1181 motion (motion for a new trial).” Porter, supra. And, the People pointed this out to the judge in its response to Mehserle’s new trial motion. But the judge entered the acquittals nonetheless. Clearly, judge Perry intended to issue Mehserle a judgment of acquittal, because of the language he chose to describe the judgment. If he truly intended to grant Mehserle a “new trial”, and not an acquittal, the ground and language had to be “contrary to the evidence”. Even if he concluded that there was “insufficient evidence” to prove a charge beyond a reasonable doubt, if the motion before him was for a “new trial”, he could only grant the motion based on the jury’s verdict being “contrary to the evidence”. “Insufficient evidence” is the typical language and ground used for an acquittal judgment. “A motion under section 1118.1 seeks a judgment of acquittal for insufficient evidence.” Porter. So, while the judge was entertaining a new trial motion, i.e., an 1181 (6) motion, he issued a judgment of acquittal decision, i.e., an 1118.1 motion. I will explain below why it was intentional and how it aided Mehserle in more ways than one.
V. JUDGE PERRY’S ACQUITTAL DECISION ON THE GUN CHARGE (THROUGH THE NEW TRIAL ORDER AND THE DISMISSAL ORDER) PROVIDED MEHSERLE WITH MULTIPLE BENEFITS , INCLUDING DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROTECTION.
It is clear that when judge Perry issued his “new trial” and dismissal orders based on
insufficient evidence, that he intended to do so, with specific purposes in mind. One of those purposes was double jeopardy protection for Mehserle. Judge Perry’s dismissal Order was a sua sponte order, or without a request from Mehserle for the order.(***I believe this is incorrect or wrong, based on information that I have now ascertained from a news article, I believe Mehserle, through his attorneys, did in fact request, through a motion, the dismissal. I stand corrected--but, my argument against the dismissal remains the same). Mehserle only asked for a new trial, based on a new trial standard, i.e., “Sitting as a thirteenth juror, the Court should find that the prosecution offered inadequate evidence that Mehserle intentionally used his firearm (emphasis in original), and thus grant a new trial on enhancement.” (emphasis added). Mehserle’s Motion for a New Trial. (Even though Mehserle may have “believed” that there was “insufficient evidence” to sustain the enhancement, he didn’t request an “insufficient evidence” finding). But, before I reach the double jeopardy benefit, I will identify some other benefits Mehserle received :
1. For the murder (and even though involuntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder, it is still murder in the generic sense) of an innocent, unarmed, and defenseless black man, Mehserle served less than a year of incarceration.
2. The gun allegation charge is treated as if it never happened, i.e., Mehserle didn’t personally fire a bullet into Oscar Grant’s back, killing him.
3. Although Mehserle was , technically, merely granted a new trial, he will never undergo a new trial. Why? See #5 below.
4. Although Mehserle , technically, is convicted of involuntary manslaughter, he can argue to future employers that in fact he was acquitted, based on Perry’s “insufficient evidence” rulings. So, he probably won’t have a problem getting another job, even as a police officer.
5. Perry provided Mehserle with double jeopardy protection with his (Perry’s) “insufficient evidence” rulings. And, this is the clearest evidence that Perry intended to use acquittal language and purpose in his “new trial” order. While ordinarily a defendant is not protected from re-trial of a sentencing allegation found faulty after conviction, the Supreme Court of California in Porter, supra, found that there is an exception to this double jeopardy rule, and that is when a court, usually a court of appeals, finds the evidence was “insufficient” with respect to the sentence allegation. More specifically, the Court stated, “the double jeopardy prohibition barred retrial of the ‘willful, deliberate, and premeditated’ allegation in an attempted murder case after the Court of Appeal’s determination that evidence was insufficient with respect to ‘premeditation and deliberation’ ” (citing People v. Seel, 34 Cal. 4th 535 (2004). And, since the district attorney’s office did not appeal Perry’s decisions, Perry’s decisions are the last word or in lieu of a court of appeals.
Finally, while this Complaint is not centered on the federal prosecution of Mehserle, there is clearly support under Section 242 in which to prosecute Mehserle in federal court (or, in other words , to bring a federal prosecution). There is enough evidence of an intentional killing involving race or color to try the matter in federal court with hopefully a fair judge (and because of Perry’s post-trial rulings, it is clear that he was not a fair judge, although some of his post-trial rulings gave that appearance) and fair jury, in federal court, in or near Alameda County. Here are a few specific reasons why Mehserle should be prosecuted and tried in federal court pursuant to Section 242:
1. He deprived Oscar Grant of his life without due process of law, by shooting and killing
Grant when there was no need to do so in order to subdue or restrain him; and there was no need to restrain him because he had not broken any laws. Indeed, the government did not have probable cause to arrest him, and there is serious question whether there was reasonable suspicion to stop him at all. Again, “Even if Grant resisted arrest, there could be no doubt Mehserle had no right to use lethal force.” Mehserle’s Motion for a New Trial.
Further, even if Mehserle mistakenly thought the gun was a taser when he pulled it from its holster, since Grant was being subdued by another “250 pound” officer, Mehserle had time to check the weapon before he fired it, to make sure he was firing a taser rather than a gun. There was no circumstance of immediacy to fire a gun or a taser unless Mehserle believed Grant was going for a gun (which would be evidence that Mehserle intended to use the gun rather than the taser, and that he intended to kill or cause great bodily harm to Grant). Therefore, even if Mehserle’s pulling of the gun from the holster was “accidental” (and the jury found it was not), it still was “reckless” because he had time to make sure it was a taser before firing it into the back of Grant. And, a reckless use of the gun is sufficient for a murder conviction and for a violation of due process under color of law conviction.
2. The jury found Grant’s killing was not an accident.
3. Even after the jury only convicted Mehserle of involuntary manslaughter, judge
Perry disqualified that verdict by unlawfully and unconstitutionally finding insufficient evidence of the gun allegation.
4. Because Perry acquitted Mehserle of the gun allegation, Mehserle served less than a
year of incarceration for intentionally taking a life.
5. The Alameda County District Attorney’s Office could have and should have appealed
Perry’s rulings, both the new trial grant and the dismissal order, but did not do so. And,
because the D.A. did not appeal, Perry’s rulings will be the last word, and Mehserle will be protected by double jeopardy from a re-trial of the gun allegation and the involuntary manslaughter charge. That’s a violation of Oscar Grant’s due process rights.
6. Without confirmation, it is my understanding that the Mehserle jury did not include
any African Americans ***(as I stated above, I believe this understanding is incorrect; I now understand that there was one African American male juror on the jury), ***however, with America’s racial history, it was basically an “all white” jury.
Cc : Alameda County District Attorney’s Office/David R. Stein, Dep. District Attorney
Cephus Johnson
John L. Burris (on behalf of Oscar Grant’s family)
End
UPDATE --May 23, 2012
It is my understanding in speaking with Oscar Grant's uncle, C. Johnson, that Merserle has now had oral argument on his appeal of his conviction. Again, it was held in cognito, i.e., without any press coverage, e.g., newspaper or television, or public coverage, so that the public, if they did not continuously contact the Court of Appeals, was not aware of the oral argument hearing time and date. So that if the public wanted to attend, they did not because they did not know about the oral argument. Even Oscar Grant's uncle did not know about the argument, and , according to him, he was only informed by the District Attorney's Office after the argument had taken place. According to Mr. Johnson, the DA's office said that they forgot to tell him. How can the DA's office forget to tell a murdered deceased's family member about an appeal argument going to whether a convicted murderer (or manslaughterer) will be freed from his conviction ? It's preposterous, and likely a continuous perpetuation of the racist treatment of Merserle's case, with the intention of ultimately and legally freeing Merserle of his racially motivated murder.
Now we await the outcome of his appeal, of the minor count he was *convicted of for the murder of a black man.
*Denotes a change in the wording.
UPDATE --June 16, 2012
On Thursday, I discovered that the California Court of Appeals has upheld Mehserle's involuntary manslaughter conviction. The decision was produced on June 8th, or thereabout. So why am I just writing about this now? Because I did not know about the decision before Thursday. And, to my knowledge, the mainstream media, including the L.A. Times and the local television stations did not publish anything about it, which is why I didn't know and probably the rest of the majority public did not know (and still don't know) about it. It's disgraceful(and supportive of the racist handling of the Mehserle case). As for the Court's decision, I am neither surprised nor moved. I am satisfied that the Court did what should have been done, but I'm disappointed that the Court did not take the opportunity to specifically find that there was sufficient evidence to support the gun enhancement allegation, and to reverse Judge Perry's decision regarding the same. With its review of the evidence concerning the gun, it could rightfully have rendered a decision on the gun enhancement decision as well. Once Mehserle decided to exercise his right of appeal, he could not prevent the appellate court from deciding any issues directly evolving from the matter he was appealing. That is, since Mehserle was appealing the jury's decision regarding the manslaughter conviction and the gun (and,necessarily, the gun allegation, which was the basis of the manslaughter conviction)and because the two were directly a part of the jury's decision, the Court of Appeals could have directly commented on and decided the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence for the gun allegation, but it chose not to. The government, in its opposition to the appeal, could also have raised the issue. But, it also chose not to (as it did when it chose not to appeal judge Perry's decision dismissing the gun enhancement finding by the jury). So, Mehserle is being supported by the courts (whether directly or indirectly), the government (through its non-actions), and his own counsel (which is expected). So who is helping Oscar Grant? No one. So, Mehserle will continue to walk for the murder of an unarmed, shot in the back, black man. But, there's still hope. Mehserle's counsel has indicated that he will appeal to the California Supreme Court. If so, that will be a final opportunity for the government and the courts to try and render a fair and just decision in the criminal justice system for the murder of Oscar Grant.
UPDATE--April 18, 2013
This update is specifically done for a spelling error that I noticed.
UPDATE--July 26, 2013
This update is specifically being written on behalf of Trayvon Martin of the George Zimmerman/Trayvon Martin criminal murder trial. In an earlier passage written above, I stated, "Moreover, even after the Justice Department has been made aware of some of this information, it has thusfar, not saw fit to bring a federal prosecution either for (Johannes) Mehserle or Judge Perry, so there is no reason why one wouldn't expect it to happen again".
Well, my forecast has proven true. It has happened again! George Zimmerman and judge Debra Nelson. We are now awaiting another decision by the Justice Department as to whether to prosecute George Zimmerman for a civil rights violation. I believe there is a direct link between the two cases, i.e., Oscar Grant and Trayvon Martin, especially the fact that both Grant and Martin are Black male victims and both were shot and killed without adequate justification. Grant was murdered by an actual policeman and Martin was murdered by a "would be or wanna-be" policeman. In both cases, murder charges were brought (and in both cases there were sufficient evidence to support murder charges being brought) and in both cases, the defendant was white or non-black (I believe Zimmerman would be considered a white Hispanic. So that would make him white too). In both cases, the defendant's escape from a murder charge or a more serious charge was assisted by the rulings of a white judge. And, in both cases, the jury was all white or nearly all white (in both cases, only one juror was non-white). I will discuss more fully what role judge Nelson played in the Trayvon Martin case when I discuss why the Justice Department must prosecute George Zimmerman for a civil rights or hate crime violation, in a separate blog.
But the important thing to note here is that I warned the Justice Department that a similar circumstance, especially with a white judge making rulings that assist a white (or non-black) defendant escape guilt for murder, might occur again without the Justice Department pursuing civil rights charges against both the white defendant (Mehserle), where warranted, and the white judge (Perry), where warranted. I believe charges against both were warranted in the Oscar Grant case and might have prohibited the behavior in the Martin case. Here, again, in the Martin case, I believe the Justice Department has a valid basis for pursuing civil rights charges against both Zimmerman and judge Nelson. While judge Nelson certainly would have a stronger defense against the civil rights charges than Zimmerman because her violations occurred during the course of criminal proceedings and she was exercising judicial authority, there is clearly a colorable case of civil rights violations by her.
Again, I will discuss judge Nelson's violations more fully in a separate blog. Look for it.
**UPDATE--August 27, 2013
I have now written a separate blog discussing the actions of judge Debra Nelson more fully and also argued why I believe the Justice Department should prosecute both George Zimmerman and Johannes Mehserle. I also discussed white racism and white justice. Finally, I suggested that the Justice Department should make an accelerated decision as to whether it will prosecute either one or both of the men.
See the blog, entitled, "The Murder of Trayvon Martin and Judge Debra Nelson: Another case of white racism and white justice. . . ."
(current date)
**UPDATE (Denotes NEW information added to the original blog)
***Change/correction in blog information
August 3, 2011
(original date)
When President Obama was elected, many people, mostly white, began a discussion of a so-called post-racial society, as if Obama's election as a Black man had signaled some change in the landscape of racism or racial discrimination in the United States. It did not. We, as a country, have a long, long ways to go before we achieve a "post-racial" society. We probably won't reach it in my lifetime, if we achieve it at all. But, I could be wrong (I was wrong with my prediction that I would not see a black President in my lifetime), and I hope that I am; but, I don't think I will be with this prediction, based on the occurrences today, e.g., the herein Oscar Grant murder and other discrimination and the continuous and enormous number of discrimination cases filed with the EEOC (most of which are meritorious). Even with Obama's election, the level of racism and/or discrimination has not changed in this country. The only difference between today's racism and the racism of the 50's, and 60's, is that the racism has gone "underground", rather than remaining out in the open and obvious, i.e., the "white only" and "colored only" signs, the blatant and obvious segregation of restaurants and other facilities, where black people had to enter and be served in the rear, etc. Now, the racism and discrimination is expressed in less obvious ways, e.g., the employment arena and the courts. In most cases, there will not be the beneficiary or helpful use of the word "nigger" in order to help identify the racism or discrimination, so the actions, on the surface, will appear to be neutral. And, in most cases, without the blatant racial descriptions, it will require some degree of sophistication to detect the racism. Such is the case with the murder of the black Oscar Grant by the white Johannes Mehserle and the treatment of the murder by the judicial system, and, in particular, the white judge, Robert Perry, with respect to his rulings favoring and "freeing" Mehserle of responsibility for Grant's death, notwithstanding videotape, eyewitnesses, and other evidence showing that Mehserle killed Grant intentionally, and that at least the "nigger" word or language was used in the context of the killing. To all of the citizens who did not attend the trial (and for some who did), and relied on the broadcast or print media to relay to them the racial connotations of the judicial proceedings, they were probably, in most cases, miseducated or not educated at all. For example, as to the effect of judge Perry's post-trial rulings, which , in essence, allowed Mehserle to "walk" for the murder of Oscar Grant, notwithstanding the involuntary manslaughter conviction; and, for another example, that the jury was basically, based on my understanding, "all white", that is, there were no African Americans on the jury ***(my understanding is hereby corrected, my new understanding is that there was one African American man on the jury). It is reminiscent of the black Emmett Till murder case, except in this case, the actions were caught on tape (and Till's murder was premeditated and first degree, while Grant's murder was second degree). This is part of the underground racism that I am referring to (generally out of sight and out of mind unless it is brought to the attention of the public, and even then, in many cases, such as Oscar Grant's, justice is not served for the racism--Mehserle has literally gotten away with murder, as did the Emmett Till murderers). Moreover, even after the Justice Department has been made aware of some of this information, it has, thusfar, not saw fit to bring a federal prosecution either for Mehserle or judge Perry, so there is no reason why one wouldn't expect it to happen again.
The following is a federal criminal-civil rights Complaint that I filed with the U.S. Atorney's Office in Los Angeles on July 26, 2011 addressing the discrimination against Black males by the Superior Court of California (and Los Angeles and Ventura Counties) and the U.S. Justice Department, through neglect or non-action:
COMPLAINT REPORT
Method of Responding: I , Laurack D. Bray, and on behalf of other similarly-
situated black males participating in the judicial process in the Superior Court of California, in either a civil or criminal proceeding and as either a plaintiff or defendant, or as a victim, unless they would choose otherwise, including Conrad Murray and Oscar Grant, will generally respond to this report by addressing item-question Nos. 1. and 2. of the original page of the report regarding the named individuals or entity . That is, I will name or identify the individual or entity and, thereafter, will address item-questions 1. and 2. of the Complaint Report.
1. Name of the individual or entity that we believe committed a federal crime .
Superior Court of California and the respective Counties in question (i.e., Los Angeles and Ventura).
Question #1. What federal crime do you believe has been committed?
ANS: I believe the crimes of conspiracy against rights, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. sec. 241, and more specifically, deprivation of rights under color of law, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. sec. 242 were committed by the Superior Court of California, together with former judge Steven Hintz of the Superior Court of California, Ventura County and judges Michael Pastor and Robert Perry of Los Angeles County, either directly or indirectly through or by the Superior Court allowing its judges to violate the constitutional rights of black males participating in judicial proceedings in its courts through a pattern of misconduct surrounding at least three known cases (it would be interesting and valuable to study whether any other cases between 2003 and 2009 have involved similar conduct involving black males and Superior Court judges, who, thusfar, have been white) that have been or are being litigated in the Superior Court of California. Those three cases are Nguyen v. Bray, NO. 221162, Ventura County ; People v. Conrad Murray, M.D., NO. SA073164, Los Angeles County; and People v. Johannes Mehserle, NO. 161210, Alameda County.
I believe the primary violations are the denial of constitutional due process under color of law with respect to the respective judicial proceedings participated in by the Black males; here, specifically, Laurack D. Bray, Complainant herein, an attorney presently and an attorney at the time of the violation; Dr. Conrad Murray, a medical doctor presently and a medical doctor at the time of the violation, and Oscar Grant, deceased, and upon information and belief, a former butcher. The violation of Mr. Grant’s rights (which was represented by the People of California at the criminal trial of Johannes Mehserle) by the Superior Court involved Mr. Grant as a victim, as opposed to a plaintiff or defendant. But Mr. Grant’s family felt the impact of the constitutional violations no less than Mr. Grant himself. Moreover, as to the due process violations by the Superior Court, and its judges, there is a demonstrated connection or pattern shown among the cases (and again these are merely known cases).
For example, the connection between the Bray case and the Murray case is the two trial judges’ action in causing the deprivation of a right or property , and thereafter, arbitrarily denying a stay of execution of the deprivation (that is, without a hearing on the stay ); and, for another example, the connection between the Bray case and the Mehserle case is the two judges’ usurping the province or domain of the jury and substituting their judgment and decision for that of the jury. In essence, providing the Black males with a bench trial instead of a jury trial which was demanded and/or required. In all cases, the trial judges were white and the respective males were Black. NOTE: In both the Bray and Murray cases, I provided evidentiary exhibits to support the Complaint, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office has those Complaints and exhibits, so I will not repeat them here. As for the Mehserle case and judge Perry, I will be attaching additional exhibits here.
#2. Explain in detail what you know about the crime, including when and where it occurred, what you have heard and observed and when you heard and observed it, what others told you (include their names) and what other evidence may exist.
I know that there are at least three cases whereby white Superior Court judges have acted to deny the constitutional rights of black male litigants. I know that thusfar no action has been taken by the Superior Court of California to discipline or otherwise correct the misconduct of the judges or to provide relief to the black males. I know the Bray case occurred in 2003 in Ventura County; the Murray case is on-going (and the trial has not taken place yet, but judge Pastor remains the trial judge) and will take place in Los Angeles County; and the Mehserle case has been tried and a notice of appeal filed. The Mehserle case was initially brought in Alameda County, California, but later was transferred to Los Angeles County (where the unconstitutional actions occurred).
I observed the Bray case through participation. I was the object of the trial judge’s action in the Bray case. I observed the Murray and Mehserle cases through review of the court records, news broadcasts and newspapers. In the Bray case, I observed, among other things, the trial judge, Steven Hintz, in a demanded jury trial, intentionally answering a jury question that was required to be answered by the jury, which resulted in an eviction judgment and the loss and/or deprivation of a home and law office and practice. Thereafter, I observed the same trial judge, Hintz, state in open court, without being asked, that he was not going to grant the black male (myself) a stay of execution of the judgment. And, he didn’t, even after he was, informally, ordered to hold a hearing by a state appellate court. Finally, I observed that I was unlawfully evicted from my home-law office in violation of my due process rights, and my office has not been returned; and neither has the Superior Court taken any action against the trial judge .
As previously mentioned, I observed the Murray case through media reports and a review of the court record for the case, i.e., the preliminary hearing record, including the state’s motion for suspension of Murray’s license, and especially the Minute Orders. I observed that the trial judge, Michael Pastor, upon a motion from the Medical Board of California, suspended the medical license of Dr. Conrad Murray in the State of California until the end of Murray’s criminal manslaughter trial, without a due process hearing or trial. I observed that Pastor attempted to have Murray’s license suspended in the other jurisdictions where Murray practices as well. But, it doesn’t appear that the other jurisdictions followed Pastor’s lead, as well they should not, in respect of Murray’s constitutional rights. Finally, I observed that the suspension of Murray’s license remains intact as Murray’s trial approaches, and I know that if the other jurisdictions that have licensed Murray followed Pastor’s Order, that Murray and his patients in those jurisdictions would have suffered irreparable harm. Pastor’s conduct has not been corrected by the Superior Court, even to the extent of providing Murray another judge for his trial.
Last, like the Murray case, I observed the Mehserle case through media reports and the court record, including motions and Minute Orders. I observed the trial judge in the case, Robert J. Perry, pursuant to a defense motion for a new trial, usurp the domain of the jury (which had found defendant Johannes Mehserle personally used a firearm in the commission of involuntary manslaughter of Oscar Grant) and substitute his judgment for the jury’s and found that “there was insufficient evidence at trial to sustain the jury’s finding on gun allegation enhancement.” See Exhibit #1 (Minute Order). He also usurped the jury’s domain a second time by dismissing the gun allegation pursuant to Penal Code 1385 “for insufficiency of the evidence.” Id. And, I observed that thusfar the Superior Court of California and Los Angeles County have not taken any action against judge Perry for his conduct.
2. Name of individual that I believe committed a crime.
Judge Robert J. Perry ( Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County)
Question #1. What federal crime do you believe have been committed?
I believe the crime of deprivation of rights under color of law pursuant to 18 U.S.C. sec. 242, primarily, and at least indirectly if not directly, Section 241, conspiracy against rights, were committed by judge Perry, together with the Superior Court of California and Los Angeles County. I believe that section 242 was violated by the judge willfully subjecting the People of California, including the deceased Oscar Grant and his family members, to the deprivation of due process and trial by jury rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, as well as “to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant(s’). . . color. . . or race. . . .” In this case, the different punishments, pains, or penalties were based on both Oscar Grant’s “race or color” as an African American or black man, but also on Johannes Mehserle’s “race or color” as a Caucasian or white man. That is, the judge tended to de-value Grant’s life as a black man in overturning the jury verdict on the gun enhancement and over-value Mehserle’s life as a white man in not only vacating the greater sentence provided for by the sentence enhancement, but also in attempting to prevent Mehserle from being tried again on the gun enhancement charge, notwithstanding the fact that Mehserle himself moved for a new trial and not a judgment of acquittal.
And, of course, judge Perry acted “under color of law” by acting as a Superior Court judge and depriving the People, including Oscar Grant, of its constitutional rights to due process and trial by jury.
#2. Explain in detail what you know about the crime, including when and where it occurred, what you have heard and observed and when you heard and observed it, what others have told you (include their names) and what other evidence may exist.
My knowledge about the Section 242 and 241 crimes in the Mehserle case, specifically pertaining to judge Perry’s crimes, are based on media coverage (including newspaper reports and television broadcasts), my personal involvement in an aspect of the case, i.e., pattern of discrimination against black males by some Superior Court judges and therefore, the Superior Court itself, parts of the Mehserle court records, e.g., motions, jury instructions, published portions of the trial transcript, etc., my personal legal research, and my personal experience as a civil rights lawyer.
I know at least the following about the crime or crimes by judge Perry in the Mehserle case :
I know that on July 8, 2010, the jury, in the Mehserle criminal involuntary manslaughter case, through verdict, found Johannes Mehserle guilty of the crime of involuntary manslaughter of Oscar Grant; and further, found Mehserle guilty of the allegation of personally using a firearm, namely a handgun “in the commission and attempted commission of” the crime of involuntary manslaughter of Oscar Grant. See Exhibit #2 (Verdict Form). And, I know that on November 5, 2010, through Minute Order, that judge Perry found that “there was insufficient evidence at trial to sustain the jury’s finding on gun allegation enhancement and motion for new trial for insufficient evidence on gun allegation is . . . granted.” See Exh. #1, supra. And, he dismissed “the gun allegation pursuant to Penal Code 1385 for insufficiency of the evidence.” Id.
I know that prior to the jury convicting Mehserle on the gun allegation that it had been instructed by judge Perry that “If you find the defendant guilty of the crime of. . . involuntary manslaughter, you must then decide whether the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant personally used a firearm during the commission of that crime. Someone personally uses a firearm if he intentionally does any of the following: . . . 3. Fires the weapon. The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that the allegation has not been proved.” See Exhibit #3 (Jury Instructions, part). I know that after the jury was so instructed, it found the gun allegation to be true. See Exh.#2, supra. And, I know that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. And, while the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in a criminal case is held and exercised by the accused, once the right is exercised, the guarantee and protection of a jury trial and decision runs to the People (including Oscar Grant, in absentia) as well.
With the above in mind, I know that Oscar Grant was shot in the back while face down on the ground and killed by Johannes Mehserle, a BART police officer, with a handgun. The Alameda County District Attorney’s Office, by complaint, charged Mehserle with one count of murder. The complaint also charged “that during the Commission of the crime defendant personally used a firearm.” The “Defendant pleaded not guilty and denied the allegation.” The D.A.’s Office then filed an information containing the same charge and allegation . Mehserle then moved to dismiss the indictment, and that motion was denied by an Alameda County judge. Subsequently, Mehserle was tried by jury on the murder charge in Los Angeles County, and the jury found Mehserle guilty of involuntary manslaughter and that the gun-use allegation was true. Judge Perry then, pursuant to Mehserle’s motion for a new trial on both the involuntary manslaughter conviction and the gun allegation, purportedly granted Mehserle a new trial on the gun allegation (while denying the motion for the involuntary manslaughter charge). Perry also dismissed the gun allegation for insufficiency of the evidence. Thereafter, he sentenced Mehserle to two years imprisonment for the involuntary manslaughter conviction, but because of mandated custody credits, Perry found that Mehserle had to be released on June 13, 2011, and he (Mehserle) was.
THE SECTION 242 VIOLATIONS
I. JUDGE PERRY WILLFULLY USURPED THE DOMAIN OF THE JURY, SUBSTITUTING HIS JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE JURY, VIOLATING THE PEOPLE’S, INCLUDING OSCAR GRANT’S , CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND A JURY TRIAL.
When judge Perry purportedly granted a new trial and dismissed the gun allegation for insufficient evidence, after the jury had decided otherwise, he willfully substituted his judgment for that of the jury, and , in essence, transformed the jury trial into a bench trial. This action without more violated the People’s and Oscar Grant’s constitutional rights to due process and a jury trial (the rule permitting the grant of a new trial “ensures that the People, like the defendant, have the charges resolved by a jury”, Porter v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 4th 125 (2009))(just recently, in the perjury trial of Roger Clemens, USDC, DC judge Reggie Walton, after declaring a mistrial, informed the jurors “Unfortunately, there are rules we play by and those rules are designed to insure that both parties receive a fair trial”, according to the L.A. Times, “Clemens trial gets quick hook”, July 15, 2011). The fact that Perry based his decision on insufficient evidence does nothing, in this case, to overcome the constitutional violation, because as discussed infra, there was more than sufficient evidence for the gun allegation finding and the involuntary manslaughter charge and conviction.
Further, the judge , in substituting his judgment for the jury’s , violated his own instruction to the jury. In his instruction to the jury, the judge stated, “It is not my role to tell you what your verdict should be.” See Exhibit #4 (Jury Instruction). But that is exactly what he did when he dismissed the gun allegation after the jury had determined the allegation to be true.
II. JUDGE PERRY’S FINDING THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL TO SUSTAIN THE JURY’S FINDING ON THE GUN ALLEGATION ENHANCEMENT IS OUTRAGEOUS.
First of all, Mehserle, himself, through his Motion for a new trial, stated, “There is truly only one meaningful item of evidence in this record that Mehserle intended to draw and shoot his gun at Oscar Grant; and that, of course, is the fact that Mehserle drew and shot his gun at Oscar Grant.” (Emphasis added). Within that statement, Mehserle admits that it is a proven fact that he drew and shot his gun at Oscar Grant, and that this fact was a meaningful item of evidence in the trial record to prove that he intended to draw and shoot his gun at Oscar Grant. Even if one was to accept Mehserle’s position that this was “truly” the only meaningful item of evidence in the record to prove that Mehserle intended to shoot Oscar Grant with his gun, it was evidence, and significant evidence, because it was objective and direct evidence . This was enough evidence alone for the jury to find that Mehserle personally used a firearm or handgun to commit involuntary manslaughter, especially if it did not believe that the shooting was an accident, which it did not. The jury convicted Mehserle of involuntary manslaughter. See the Court’s jury instruction at Exhibit #5 herein, which states in part: The defendant is not guilty of murder or the lesser crimes of voluntary manslaughter or involuntary manslaughter if he killed someone as a result of accident. Such a killing is excused, and therefore not unlawful, if : 1. The defendant was a peace officer and was doing a lawful act in a lawful way; . . . AND 3. The defendant was acting without any unlawful intent. (Emphasis added).
The defendant is not guilty of involuntary manslaughter if he acted accidentally without criminal negligence. You may not find the defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter unless you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with criminal negligence. . . . (Emphasis added)
The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not excused. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of murder and the lesser included crimes of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. (End)
Again, with this instruction in mind, the jury convicted Mehserle of involuntary manslaughter.
In addition to the above-identified evidence, and more specifically :
1. There was videotape evidence of the shooting—objective evidence—showing the gun being removed from the holster, being pointed at Grant, and being fired into Grant’s back. “Video of the shooting shows that at the time of the shot Mehserle was standing directly over Grant pointing the gun straight downward.” Mehserle’s New Trial Motion.
2. There was eyewitness testimony of the shooting—objective evidence. “The angle of the bullet through the body and the positioning of Mehserle standing over Grant comports with the witness testimony and the video.” Id.
3. There was evidence that “the taser is completely different from the firearm in weight and appearance : it is bright yellow, made of plastic, and considerably lighter than the firearm.” People’s Response to Motion for a new trial. This was evidence that Mehserle should have known that he held a handgun and not a taser when he shot Grant.
4. There was evidence that “Defendant wore his taser on the opposite side of his belt from his firearm,” Id., which made it much more difficult for one to “accidentally” reach for the gun rather than the taser; as would be the case when both weapons were on the same side.
5. There was evidence that “the firearm was secured in Defendant’s holster and could not be removed until after defendant specifically released the holster’s two separate retention devices.” Id.
6. There was evidence that “Defendant had withdrawn his Taser, then returned it to its normal spot on his belt only moments before he withdrew his firearm and shot the victim.” Id.
7. There was evidence presented that “defendant’s immediate and often repeated explanation was that he thought the victim was reaching for a gun,” Id., and that fact would account for Mehserle believing he had to act swiftly in meeting deadly force with deadly force, and therefore intentionally reaching for the handgun. Mehserle told a fellow Officer Pirone, “Tony, I thought he was going for a gun.” People’s Sentencing Memorandum. Again, this indicates that Mehserle intended to meet deadly force with deadly force, i.e., a handgun not a taser. An Officer Foreman stated, “Yes, he (Mehserle) said he thought the guy had a gun.” Id.
8. There was evidence that “At no time did defendant ever say anything about intending to pull his taser or that the shooting was an accident.” Id.
9. There was evidence that “It wasn’t until the defendant chose to testify on his own behalf that we heard him say, for the first time, that the shooting was an accident. Prior to that time, defendant continuously tried to justify the shooting by saying that he believed Mr. Grant was ‘going for a gun.’ ” Id.
10. Finally, there was evidence presented at trial that there was no need for Mehserle to use deadly force or even a taser, to restrain Mr. Grant, because Grant was being restrained by two heavy officers with his face being pushed to the ground. “The most critical moments were those just before defendant pulled his gun. During this time, Officer Pirone was holding Mr. Grant down with his hands and his knees. Officer Pirone can be seen in the video with both knees on Mr. Grant’s back and his left hand on the back of Mr. Grant’s head pushing Mr. Grant’s face into the platform.” Id. “Officer Pirone using all of his 250 pounds to push down on the back of 170-pound Mr. Grant who, at the time was laying over the left leg of Carlos Reyes.” Id. Mehserle “maintained that Mr. Grant’s hand was in his pocket and that he refused to remove it, this while two officers, each weighing 250 pounds were on top of him pushing him against the platform.” Id. “Even if Grant resisted arrest, there could be no doubt Mehserle had no right to use lethal force.” Mehserle’s Motion for a New Trial, at p.2.
This was far more than sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the gun allegation was true (as it did); especially after the jury had previously found that the shooting and killing was not an accident.
According to the L.A. Times, “EX –BART COP’S RELEASE DRAWS PROTEST”, Sunday, June 12, 2011, see Exhibit #6 herein, judge Perry stated that “the evidence was insufficient to show that the officer used his firearm deliberately.” (Emphasis added). This finding is equally outrageous. For the only evidence going to prove that Mehserle’s use of the firearm was not deliberate was Mehserle’s subjective testimony (and the evidence in support of that testimony, e.g., evidence of other cases where guns were “accidentally” used instead of tasers). All of the other and remaining objective evidence point to a deliberate use of the handgun by Mehserle. See the evidence cited above. If this statement was in fact made by judge Perry , it should be the central focus and basis for the Justice Department bringing a Section 242 action against the judge. Without Mehserle’s testimony of an “accident” (which the jury rejected), most reasonable people, e.g., the jury, would conclude that the shooting was deliberate.
III. THE ONLY WAY FOR JUDGE PERRY TO FIND INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR THE GUN ALLEGATION WAS FOR HIM TO ACCEPT MEHSERLE’S SUBJECTIVE DEFENSE AND TESTIMONY OF AN ACCIDENT (WHICH THE JURY REJECTED) AND DISREGARD ALL OF THE OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE POINTING TO AN INTENTIONAL AND DELIBERATE SHOOTING AND KILLING.
And this deliberate disregard of the evidence provides a separate and independent
violation and denial of due process under color of law. Moreover, the due process violation is exacerbated by the fact that the judge accepted the subjective theory and evidence of a white police officer claiming an accident in the shooting of an innocent and unarmed black man in the back, while disregarding evidence that a black man’s life was deliberately and unnecessarily taken. This scenario projects the race factor.
IV. JUDGE PERRY, WITHOUT AUTHORITY, AND UNDER THE GUISE OF A NEW TRIAL ORDER, EFFECTIVELY GRANTED MEHSERLE A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL FOR BOTH THE GUN ALLEGATION DIRECTLY, AND THE INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER CONVICTION INDIRECTLY.
This was another separate and independent due process violation under color of law.
Even though judge Perry purportedly granted Mehserle a new trial on the gun allegation, in response to a new trial motion, he, in essence, and effectively, granted Mehserle a judgment of acquittal, with the specific intent to do so. Further, with the acquittal on the gun charge, Mehserle was effectively acquitted of the involuntary manslaughter charge, because the gun allegation is inextricably intertwined with the manslaughter charge. Since the jury found that the killing of Oscar Grant was not an accident, it had to find the gun allegation to be true (as it did) to convict Mehserle of involuntary manslaughter. Therefore, an acquittal of one or the other is an acquittal of both.
However, “a court has no authority to grant an acquittal in connection with an 1181 motion (motion for a new trial).” Porter, supra. And, the People pointed this out to the judge in its response to Mehserle’s new trial motion. But the judge entered the acquittals nonetheless. Clearly, judge Perry intended to issue Mehserle a judgment of acquittal, because of the language he chose to describe the judgment. If he truly intended to grant Mehserle a “new trial”, and not an acquittal, the ground and language had to be “contrary to the evidence”. Even if he concluded that there was “insufficient evidence” to prove a charge beyond a reasonable doubt, if the motion before him was for a “new trial”, he could only grant the motion based on the jury’s verdict being “contrary to the evidence”. “Insufficient evidence” is the typical language and ground used for an acquittal judgment. “A motion under section 1118.1 seeks a judgment of acquittal for insufficient evidence.” Porter. So, while the judge was entertaining a new trial motion, i.e., an 1181 (6) motion, he issued a judgment of acquittal decision, i.e., an 1118.1 motion. I will explain below why it was intentional and how it aided Mehserle in more ways than one.
V. JUDGE PERRY’S ACQUITTAL DECISION ON THE GUN CHARGE (THROUGH THE NEW TRIAL ORDER AND THE DISMISSAL ORDER) PROVIDED MEHSERLE WITH MULTIPLE BENEFITS , INCLUDING DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROTECTION.
It is clear that when judge Perry issued his “new trial” and dismissal orders based on
insufficient evidence, that he intended to do so, with specific purposes in mind. One of those purposes was double jeopardy protection for Mehserle. Judge Perry’s dismissal Order was a sua sponte order, or without a request from Mehserle for the order.(***I believe this is incorrect or wrong, based on information that I have now ascertained from a news article, I believe Mehserle, through his attorneys, did in fact request, through a motion, the dismissal. I stand corrected--but, my argument against the dismissal remains the same). Mehserle only asked for a new trial, based on a new trial standard, i.e., “Sitting as a thirteenth juror, the Court should find that the prosecution offered inadequate evidence that Mehserle intentionally used his firearm (emphasis in original), and thus grant a new trial on enhancement.” (emphasis added). Mehserle’s Motion for a New Trial. (Even though Mehserle may have “believed” that there was “insufficient evidence” to sustain the enhancement, he didn’t request an “insufficient evidence” finding). But, before I reach the double jeopardy benefit, I will identify some other benefits Mehserle received :
1. For the murder (and even though involuntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder, it is still murder in the generic sense) of an innocent, unarmed, and defenseless black man, Mehserle served less than a year of incarceration.
2. The gun allegation charge is treated as if it never happened, i.e., Mehserle didn’t personally fire a bullet into Oscar Grant’s back, killing him.
3. Although Mehserle was , technically, merely granted a new trial, he will never undergo a new trial. Why? See #5 below.
4. Although Mehserle , technically, is convicted of involuntary manslaughter, he can argue to future employers that in fact he was acquitted, based on Perry’s “insufficient evidence” rulings. So, he probably won’t have a problem getting another job, even as a police officer.
5. Perry provided Mehserle with double jeopardy protection with his (Perry’s) “insufficient evidence” rulings. And, this is the clearest evidence that Perry intended to use acquittal language and purpose in his “new trial” order. While ordinarily a defendant is not protected from re-trial of a sentencing allegation found faulty after conviction, the Supreme Court of California in Porter, supra, found that there is an exception to this double jeopardy rule, and that is when a court, usually a court of appeals, finds the evidence was “insufficient” with respect to the sentence allegation. More specifically, the Court stated, “the double jeopardy prohibition barred retrial of the ‘willful, deliberate, and premeditated’ allegation in an attempted murder case after the Court of Appeal’s determination that evidence was insufficient with respect to ‘premeditation and deliberation’ ” (citing People v. Seel, 34 Cal. 4th 535 (2004). And, since the district attorney’s office did not appeal Perry’s decisions, Perry’s decisions are the last word or in lieu of a court of appeals.
Finally, while this Complaint is not centered on the federal prosecution of Mehserle, there is clearly support under Section 242 in which to prosecute Mehserle in federal court (or, in other words , to bring a federal prosecution). There is enough evidence of an intentional killing involving race or color to try the matter in federal court with hopefully a fair judge (and because of Perry’s post-trial rulings, it is clear that he was not a fair judge, although some of his post-trial rulings gave that appearance) and fair jury, in federal court, in or near Alameda County. Here are a few specific reasons why Mehserle should be prosecuted and tried in federal court pursuant to Section 242:
1. He deprived Oscar Grant of his life without due process of law, by shooting and killing
Grant when there was no need to do so in order to subdue or restrain him; and there was no need to restrain him because he had not broken any laws. Indeed, the government did not have probable cause to arrest him, and there is serious question whether there was reasonable suspicion to stop him at all. Again, “Even if Grant resisted arrest, there could be no doubt Mehserle had no right to use lethal force.” Mehserle’s Motion for a New Trial.
Further, even if Mehserle mistakenly thought the gun was a taser when he pulled it from its holster, since Grant was being subdued by another “250 pound” officer, Mehserle had time to check the weapon before he fired it, to make sure he was firing a taser rather than a gun. There was no circumstance of immediacy to fire a gun or a taser unless Mehserle believed Grant was going for a gun (which would be evidence that Mehserle intended to use the gun rather than the taser, and that he intended to kill or cause great bodily harm to Grant). Therefore, even if Mehserle’s pulling of the gun from the holster was “accidental” (and the jury found it was not), it still was “reckless” because he had time to make sure it was a taser before firing it into the back of Grant. And, a reckless use of the gun is sufficient for a murder conviction and for a violation of due process under color of law conviction.
2. The jury found Grant’s killing was not an accident.
3. Even after the jury only convicted Mehserle of involuntary manslaughter, judge
Perry disqualified that verdict by unlawfully and unconstitutionally finding insufficient evidence of the gun allegation.
4. Because Perry acquitted Mehserle of the gun allegation, Mehserle served less than a
year of incarceration for intentionally taking a life.
5. The Alameda County District Attorney’s Office could have and should have appealed
Perry’s rulings, both the new trial grant and the dismissal order, but did not do so. And,
because the D.A. did not appeal, Perry’s rulings will be the last word, and Mehserle will be protected by double jeopardy from a re-trial of the gun allegation and the involuntary manslaughter charge. That’s a violation of Oscar Grant’s due process rights.
6. Without confirmation, it is my understanding that the Mehserle jury did not include
any African Americans ***(as I stated above, I believe this understanding is incorrect; I now understand that there was one African American male juror on the jury), ***however, with America’s racial history, it was basically an “all white” jury.
Cc : Alameda County District Attorney’s Office/David R. Stein, Dep. District Attorney
Cephus Johnson
John L. Burris (on behalf of Oscar Grant’s family)
End
UPDATE --May 23, 2012
It is my understanding in speaking with Oscar Grant's uncle, C. Johnson, that Merserle has now had oral argument on his appeal of his conviction. Again, it was held in cognito, i.e., without any press coverage, e.g., newspaper or television, or public coverage, so that the public, if they did not continuously contact the Court of Appeals, was not aware of the oral argument hearing time and date. So that if the public wanted to attend, they did not because they did not know about the oral argument. Even Oscar Grant's uncle did not know about the argument, and , according to him, he was only informed by the District Attorney's Office after the argument had taken place. According to Mr. Johnson, the DA's office said that they forgot to tell him. How can the DA's office forget to tell a murdered deceased's family member about an appeal argument going to whether a convicted murderer (or manslaughterer) will be freed from his conviction ? It's preposterous, and likely a continuous perpetuation of the racist treatment of Merserle's case, with the intention of ultimately and legally freeing Merserle of his racially motivated murder.
Now we await the outcome of his appeal, of the minor count he was *convicted of for the murder of a black man.
*Denotes a change in the wording.
UPDATE --June 16, 2012
On Thursday, I discovered that the California Court of Appeals has upheld Mehserle's involuntary manslaughter conviction. The decision was produced on June 8th, or thereabout. So why am I just writing about this now? Because I did not know about the decision before Thursday. And, to my knowledge, the mainstream media, including the L.A. Times and the local television stations did not publish anything about it, which is why I didn't know and probably the rest of the majority public did not know (and still don't know) about it. It's disgraceful(and supportive of the racist handling of the Mehserle case). As for the Court's decision, I am neither surprised nor moved. I am satisfied that the Court did what should have been done, but I'm disappointed that the Court did not take the opportunity to specifically find that there was sufficient evidence to support the gun enhancement allegation, and to reverse Judge Perry's decision regarding the same. With its review of the evidence concerning the gun, it could rightfully have rendered a decision on the gun enhancement decision as well. Once Mehserle decided to exercise his right of appeal, he could not prevent the appellate court from deciding any issues directly evolving from the matter he was appealing. That is, since Mehserle was appealing the jury's decision regarding the manslaughter conviction and the gun (and,necessarily, the gun allegation, which was the basis of the manslaughter conviction)and because the two were directly a part of the jury's decision, the Court of Appeals could have directly commented on and decided the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence for the gun allegation, but it chose not to. The government, in its opposition to the appeal, could also have raised the issue. But, it also chose not to (as it did when it chose not to appeal judge Perry's decision dismissing the gun enhancement finding by the jury). So, Mehserle is being supported by the courts (whether directly or indirectly), the government (through its non-actions), and his own counsel (which is expected). So who is helping Oscar Grant? No one. So, Mehserle will continue to walk for the murder of an unarmed, shot in the back, black man. But, there's still hope. Mehserle's counsel has indicated that he will appeal to the California Supreme Court. If so, that will be a final opportunity for the government and the courts to try and render a fair and just decision in the criminal justice system for the murder of Oscar Grant.
UPDATE--April 18, 2013
This update is specifically done for a spelling error that I noticed.
UPDATE--July 26, 2013
This update is specifically being written on behalf of Trayvon Martin of the George Zimmerman/Trayvon Martin criminal murder trial. In an earlier passage written above, I stated, "Moreover, even after the Justice Department has been made aware of some of this information, it has thusfar, not saw fit to bring a federal prosecution either for (Johannes) Mehserle or Judge Perry, so there is no reason why one wouldn't expect it to happen again".
Well, my forecast has proven true. It has happened again! George Zimmerman and judge Debra Nelson. We are now awaiting another decision by the Justice Department as to whether to prosecute George Zimmerman for a civil rights violation. I believe there is a direct link between the two cases, i.e., Oscar Grant and Trayvon Martin, especially the fact that both Grant and Martin are Black male victims and both were shot and killed without adequate justification. Grant was murdered by an actual policeman and Martin was murdered by a "would be or wanna-be" policeman. In both cases, murder charges were brought (and in both cases there were sufficient evidence to support murder charges being brought) and in both cases, the defendant was white or non-black (I believe Zimmerman would be considered a white Hispanic. So that would make him white too). In both cases, the defendant's escape from a murder charge or a more serious charge was assisted by the rulings of a white judge. And, in both cases, the jury was all white or nearly all white (in both cases, only one juror was non-white). I will discuss more fully what role judge Nelson played in the Trayvon Martin case when I discuss why the Justice Department must prosecute George Zimmerman for a civil rights or hate crime violation, in a separate blog.
But the important thing to note here is that I warned the Justice Department that a similar circumstance, especially with a white judge making rulings that assist a white (or non-black) defendant escape guilt for murder, might occur again without the Justice Department pursuing civil rights charges against both the white defendant (Mehserle), where warranted, and the white judge (Perry), where warranted. I believe charges against both were warranted in the Oscar Grant case and might have prohibited the behavior in the Martin case. Here, again, in the Martin case, I believe the Justice Department has a valid basis for pursuing civil rights charges against both Zimmerman and judge Nelson. While judge Nelson certainly would have a stronger defense against the civil rights charges than Zimmerman because her violations occurred during the course of criminal proceedings and she was exercising judicial authority, there is clearly a colorable case of civil rights violations by her.
Again, I will discuss judge Nelson's violations more fully in a separate blog. Look for it.
**UPDATE--August 27, 2013
I have now written a separate blog discussing the actions of judge Debra Nelson more fully and also argued why I believe the Justice Department should prosecute both George Zimmerman and Johannes Mehserle. I also discussed white racism and white justice. Finally, I suggested that the Justice Department should make an accelerated decision as to whether it will prosecute either one or both of the men.
See the blog, entitled, "The Murder of Trayvon Martin and Judge Debra Nelson: Another case of white racism and white justice. . . ."
Thursday, March 17, 2011
#63 (Round 63) INDICTABLE CRIMINAL ROSTER *(ICR) FOR THE FIRST *JUDGE INDICTED FOR A CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATION BY THE L. A. U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 'S PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION
Los Angeles, California
LAURACK D. BRAY, ESQ., M.S., M.P.A., J.D.
FEDERAL ATTORNEY
P.O. BOX 611432
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
TEL: (805) 901-2693
October 16, 2014
(Today's date)
March 17, 2011
(Original date)
**UPDATE(Denotes NEW information added to blog after original blog)
*(Denotes change in original blog, either information added to or deleted from original blog)
This updated version of the blog is submitted and contributed as part of the "War on Racial Discrimination" *(WRD) in California *(and the United States), and it is dedicated to Christopher Dorner *and Aaron Alexis especially; but also to Oscar Grant and Trayvon Martin.
****WHO WILL BE THE FIRST *JUDGE CHARGED OR REFERRED TO A GRAND JURY FOR INDICTMENT FOR A CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATION BY THE “NEW” PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE IN LOS ANGELES ?
*****WHEN IS THE LAST TIME A JUDGE, STATE OR FEDERAL, WAS REFERRED TO A GRAND JURY FOR INDICTMENT FOR A CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATION BY THE U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE IN LOS ANGELES?
WILL THE “NEW” PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION HAVE THE COURAGE TO PRESENT A STATE OR FEDERAL JUDGE TO A GRAND JURY FOR INDICTMENT FOR A CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATION, WHERE THERE IS CLEARLY SUFFICIENT AND PROBABLE CAUSE EVIDENCE TO DO SO ?
INDICTABLE CRIMINAL ROSTER (ICR) FOR THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE IN LOS ANGELES
******NOTE : Last year *(2013), the U.S. Attorney's Office in L.A. obtained grand jury indictments against 18 L.A. County Sheriff deputies for various civil rights violations. Among those charged were two lieutenants. It is highly probable that these lieutenants are considered "public officials", so they would have answered the question about the "first" public official referred to a grand jury for indictment, if it wasn't answered before (and I believe it may have been). *Moreover, Senators Ronald Calderon and Leland Yee, who were recently indicted, would also satisy the public official designation. So, I have now *simply reduced the category to "judges".
The Public Integrity Section has now demonstrated that it will go after the "puppies", but how about the big dogs, especially judges? *That's another story.
*Also, the question was also answered as to whether the first public official indicted would be a judge. It wasn't. So, the next time this blog is published, i.e., No. 59, I will remove the question : "Will it be a judge?" And, I will also re-characterize the main question that is asked. Instead of "the first high level official", it will simply be "the first judge".
Round #1 began the start of a new and continuous blog that will monthly *(information here deleted), *and sometimes bi-monthly, address the issue of who will be the first public official, and judges are such officials, to be indicted for a civil rights violation per prosecution by the U.S. Attorneys Office in Los Angeles. Once again, here, as I did with the previous ICR, I offer candidates to the U.S. Attorneys Office who are readily available and should be indicted for civil rights and other crimes. And, as long as they are not prosecuted, they are being held above the law, while other citizens are being prosecuted daily for the same or similar crimes. For example, the perjury trial of baseball star Barry Bonds. While perjury requires the additional element of "under oath", the central crime is "making a false statement", and there are several individuals on the ICR who have been charged with making a false statement in violation of federal law. Yet, none of them have been prosecuted or indicted. So, the question is: Why? Clearly, thusfar, the U.S. Attorney's Office has either chosen not to or not found the courage to prosecute judges for their federal criminal civil rights conduct. Therefore, Los Angeles has created a "haven" for corrupt and/or crooked and/or racist judges ( and here, I define racist as purposeful or intended discrimination against a person of another race, whether it is based on a feeling of superiority or simple malice). California judges can commit any crime they wish knowing that the most that will happpen is that they will be forced to resign or retire from office. And usually that's done in secret. What's the connection?
This passage is not meant to condemn all judges in California or the Los Angeles area, only those who have committed crimes (or have been charged with committing such through a federal criminal complaint). There absolutely are some fair and decent judges in California and Los Angeles(and one that comes to mind immediately has the initials "S.R." and is a member of the Ninth Circuit) and every now and then one can read about the just and fair treatment a judge has implemented, such as the judge who found the confession of a 15 year old boy to be illegal, and (*some information here, in the original blog, has been excluded after I learned later that a judge that I thought was fair, was not fair after all; and the information that I had cited as an example of fairness was likely a biased fairness for specific individuals, rather than a consistent fairness overall as a judge). *Another fair judge whom I am distinctly aware of is Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County judge Kathleen Kennedy. As I have stated before in another blog, judge Kennedy is a "special" judge, especially in L.A. County Courts. When judge Kennedy implements justice, it is "fair" justice, and she is consistent with it. I had the opportunity to observe judge Kennedy preside over an entire criminal trial, People v. Roderick Wright, and I must say, I was both delighted and impressed with her sense of fairness for both sides. Judge Kennedy is truly "special".
But, like there may be bad lawyers and executives, there are bad judges. And when such judges are found to be bad, they should be prosecuted like anyone else. The public often comments that celebrities receive special treatment when it comes to discipline for misconduct, but no one ever raises the issue about the special treatment that judges receive, especially in California, for their misconduct and/or criminal conduct. Part of the reason is because the public doesn't know about the misconduct. It's kept secret by the government and the major print and broadcast (mostly white) media or press. That's one of the first things that should be addressed if there is ever to be an attempt to not hold judges "above the law".
Previously, I renamed the roster of individuals on the "ICR". The listing shall forthwith be called the "Indictable Criminal Roster", rather than the Indictable Candidate Roster (but as can be ascertained, the symbolic letters will remain the same, "ICR"), and this is based on the four stages of criminality affecting the designation of the term "criminal" to an individual or person. In Stage I, when an individual commits a crime, as a matter of fact and law, that individual is a criminal and remains a criminal until caught, that is, arrested or apprehended, or voluntarily submits himself to authorities and otherwise reaches an agreement that substitutes for an arrest or prosecution, e.g., an NPA (a non-prosecution agreement--which requires payment of restitution).
An example that I have used before for clarity is the case of the woman walking down a street who gets her purse snatched by a man with noticeable scars on his face and with his face uncovered. If the woman is able to clearly see and identify the man, through his face and other identifiable characteristics (and here, we assume she is), she knows who her attacker is; and after the man physically takes the woman's purse and frightens her in the process, and thereafter flees with her purse, he has robbed her of her purse and he is a "criminal". And if the woman files a criminal complaint against the man with the respective law enforcement body (and here, we assume she will), the matter then undergoes criminal investigation of the man based on his description and any other evidence the police may possess, and the man remains a "criminal". This is Stage I. In Stage II, if the man is caught and arrested and charged, he then enters the criminal justice system and process. The criminal justice process then cloaks the man with a "presumption of innocent until proven guilty", and during this process, he is not a "criminal". He is an "innocent man", until proven guilty or is otherwise released from the criminal justice system without proof of guilt. This is Stage II. In Stage III, there will either be a dismissal, a trial, a plea agreement of some kind, or some other disposition of the charges. The man will leave Stage III as either a "criminal" (because he was tried and convicted or was found guilty) or innocent (because he was found not guilty after a trial or because his case was otherwise dismissed without a finding of guilt) or completely innocent (because there was insufficient or no evidence of guilt). This is Stage III. Stage IV is the actual exit (from the criminal justice process) designation of an individual. That designation is either "criminal", or "innocent", or "completely innocent". Because everyone on the ICR is in Stage I, I have changed the name of the roster to match the Stage (and designation) in which the complained about individuals are in. Therefore, they are "criminals"(also known as "crooks").
Moreover, if there is any question about the appropriateness of producing the ICR, a Manhattan, New York judge made it clear that it is appropriate. According to the L.A. Times, "N.Y.can release data on teachers", January 11, 2011, Manhattan Judge Cynthia S. Kern, speaking on teachers, stated, "The public has an interest in the job performance of public employees, particularly in the field of education...." "Courts have repeatedly held that release of job-performance related information, even negative information such as that involving misconduct, does not constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy." Further, Judge Kern found that "the reports 'may be released regardless of whether and to what extent they may be unreliable or otherwise flawed." The judges and other officials on the ICR are "public employees" and the information relates to their "job performance" or "negative information such as that involving misconduct". According to the article, "Lawyers representing the media in the case hailed the decision (to "publicly release performance ratings for more than 12,000 teachers based on their students' test scores") as a victory for the public, establishing the public's right to objective performance measures of government employees."
For clarification, whenever the terms "charged" or "charges" are used below, they refer to what complainants complained about in a federal criminal complaint filed with the U.S. Attorney's office in Los Angeles.
It should be noted, to my knowledge, that none of the individuals listed below has been cleared by the U.S. Justice Department or the U.S. Attorney's Office, that is, the Justice Department has not declined to prosecute based upon a lack of evidence. Therefore, the individuals remain under criminal investigation.
Further, and ironically, as long as the current Complaints are pending in the U.S. Attorney's Office in Los Angeles, all accused or "Defendants" in the Complaints are "fugitives" in a sense, as to other jurisdictions or states, in that they are susceptible to and can be arrested and/or indicted and/or arraigned in any other jurisdiction or state that they travel to, based on the California Complaints, at the discretion of the respective U.S. Attorney and/or FBI agent of the state or jurisdiction in question. That is, while the U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles has refused to secure an arrest and indictment of any of the judges and other individuals on the ICR, some U.S. Attorneys in other jurisdictions or states may do otherwise. Although the Defendants would likely be transferred back to California for indictment and/or arraignment and/or trial, they certainly can be arrested in other states, based on the California Complaints. And, if they happen to commit a federal offense (or state offense) while traveling to and in another jurisdiction, they could be indicted, arraigned, and tried in that jurisdiction as well (for both the state and federal offenses, by the separate sovereignties of course). So while the accused in the Los Angeles' Complaints may feel safe or relieved while residing and traveling in California, they will have to "tip-toe" while visiting other states or jurisdictions, based on the California Complaints.
Some differences for future Rounds are that : (1) instead of posting 10 names or more for each posting, I will now post all names for each round ; and (2) if I add some new information for one or more of the candidates, or if the candidate is newly added to the roster, I will place an asterisk (*) by the name of the candidate, or where the new information is being placed.
Further, the ICR will no longer be listed on a more serious to less serious offenses basis. Henceforth, they are simply listed at random, or in no particular order. But, ordinarily, most recent additions will be at the end of the listing.
Finally, another additional feature to the roster is that each month, I will send a copy of the blog to an organization or individual. Sometimes, I will identify the organization or individual, other times I will not, and I will simply designate the organization or person "Mystery" *(and this designation also means that I may or may not be sending a copy out). I will place a particular emphasis on the legal community, since the ICR involves legal principles.
This month's organization /individual is: Mystery
***Denotes individuals that have had a criminal civil rights Complaint filed against them as of July 4, 2012.
#-Denotes newly added members as of *April, 2014.
The individuals who could and should be indicted for civil rights and/or other violations are:
For the month of October, 2014
1. Steven Hintz*** , ex-judge of the Superior Court of California, Ventura County, who is now running for treasurer-tax collector of Ventura County (Update: Hintz is now the new Ventura County Treasurer-tax collector, according to a Ventura County clerk in that office: Hintz has been charged with intentionally acting to deny the civil and constitutional rights of a black lawyer , based on race (or racial discrimination), and with conspiring with other Superior Court judges to do the same. He is also charged with commiting election and/or voter fraud in the primary and general elections of 2010 . Hintz’s actions caused the unlawful eviction of the Black lawyer from his home-law office and the shutdown of his law practice in Ventura, California. Hintz is a member of theJudicial Seven. Some specific conduct: In a civil unlawful detainer jury trial, Hintz, as presiding judge, intentionally answered an outcome-determinative jury question that was required to be answered by the jury, which caused an eviction judgment against a Black lawyer. Thereafter, without any request for one,*Hintz declared in open court that he would not be granting a stay of the eviction judgment to the same Black lawyer. By the general election ballot remaining the same or unchanged regarding Hintz's ballot designation, he clearly defrauded Ventura County voters in the general election, even if there was some question regarding the primary election. In reference to the general election fraud, an amended complaint has now been filed against Hintz and James Becker, the Assistant County Clerk-Recorder, for conspiracy to violate federal and state voting rights and civil rights laws. As stated above, Hintz is now the new treasurer-tax collector for Ventura County, and most of the Ventura County voters who voted for him likely know nothing about his being forced to retire by the Justice Department and fraudulently misleading Ventura County voters in order to obtain their votes. NOTE: even though the Ventura County Star endorsed Hintz for treasurer-tax collector, I have not discovered a major story by the paper recognizing and celebrating his "victory". Based on my knowledge and belief, the Star has kept Hintz's victory "quiet as kept". I wonder why? If the Star has produced a major celebratory story of Hintz's victory, I welcome someone to point it out to me in the comment section. Otherwise, I maintain my postion that there has not been one, purposely.
2. Barry Klopfer***, ex-judge of the Superior Court of California, Ventura County: Klopfer , while serving as an appellate judge, was charged with obstruction of justice and conspiracy to deny civil and constitutional rights under color of law and based on race (or racial discrimination). He was also charged with making a false statement during a judicial proceeding. Klopfer is a member of the Judicial Seven. Some specific conduct: As an appellate judge, ignored the most significant question raised on appeal,i.e., a jury question, and made several false statements in an appellate opinion directed to the plaintiff's burden of proof in the aforementioned unlawful detainer trial.
3. David Long***, ex-judge of the Superior Court of California, Ventura County: Long, while serving as an appellate judge, was charged with a conspiracy to deny civil and constitutional rights under color of law and based on race (or racial discrimination). He was also charged with making a false statement during a judicial proceeding. Some specific conduct: The same as that for Barry Klopfer above.
4. Ken Riley***, ex-judge of the Superior Court of California, Ventura County: Riley, while serving as an appellate judge, was charged with a conspiracy to deny civil and constitutional rights under color of law and based on race (or racial discrimination). He was also charged with making a false statement during a judicial proceeding. Some specific conduct: The same as that for Barry Klopfer above.
5.Dickran Tevrizian***, ex-judge of the United States District Court for the Central District of California: Tevrizian is charged with obstruction of justice and conspiracy to deny constitutional and statutory rights under color of law, and based on race (or racial discrimination). He committed multiple acts of misconduct. He committed acts against both a white female client and a black lawyer. Tevrizian is a member of the Judicial Seven. Specific conduct: Tevrizian denied a plaintiff bringing a disability discrimination complaint her right to counsel, without a hearing; denied a pro hac vice motion without a hearing; ignored the law dealing with defaults; and acted without jurisdiction to grant a summary judgment motion.
Tevrizian also conspired with judge Harry Pregerson to have Tevrizian retire, likely with benefits, rather than having him face discipline and probably losing those benefits.
6.Terry Hatter, Jr.***, senior (and reired) judge, United States District Court for the Central District of California: Hatter was charged with
obstruction of justice and conspiracy to deny constitutional rights. Hatter is a member of the Judicial Seven. Specific conduct: Hatter ignored specific identified law in order to deny a man social security disability compensation, and conspired with other judges to do the same.
7. Thomas P. O’Brien***, ex-United States Attorney for Los Angeles : O’Brien and his Office are charged with making a false and fraudulent statement during an executive proceeding and with obstruction of justice. He was subsequently charged with committing mail fraud . O’Brien is also a member of the Judicial Seven. Specific conduct: O'Brien, together with some of his assistant USAs, submitted a false statement to victims of a crime in a letter sent from his office, and failed to inform victims of their statutory rights, as required by law.
8. William Schwarzer***, senior (and retired) judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of California : Schwarzer, while already retired and serving as a visiting member of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and on a three-judge panel, was charged with obstruction of justice , conspiring to obstruct justice, violation of civil and constitutional rights under color of law, and for violation of a federal statute providing relief for the denial of relief benefits, e.g., social security disability benefits , based on race (I relied on my race in relation to a white client). Schwarzer is a member of the Judicial Seven. Specific conduct: Schwarzer relied on a false standard in order to deny a man social security disability compensation, and ignored the correct standard to do the same.
9. Cathy Catterson***, ex-Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: Catterson was charged with, among other things, making and using a false and fraudulent document in violation of federal criminal law. Catterson was charged with the same or similar allegations of misconduct as those for Mary Schroeder (when she was Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit). Catterson is a member of the Judicial Seven. Specific conduct: Catterson, among other things, intentionally and fraudulently changed the title of a case and altered the case number, so that the public would not know the actual or true title and parties of the case--the true title named Catterson herself; and, for invidious purposes, she charged a disability discrimination plaintiff two appellate fees for filing the same appeal.
10. Harry Pregerson***, judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit : Pregerson was charged with obstruction of justice and making a false statement in a judicial proceeding. Specific conduct: Pregerson issued an initial questionable order, and, thereafter, issued another order to prevent review of the first one; he also filed a false statement and delayed acting on a judicial misconduct complaint in order to allow a judge, district judge Dickran Tevrizian, to retire and avoid discipline. Further, Pregerson also tampered with a federal file, by removing a docketed document(which tended to evidence the unlawful delay) ,also for the purpose of allowing the same judge to retire and avoid discipline. Thusfar, nothing has been done by the judicial system to have Tevrizian face discipline as he should have.
11. Unnamed Assistant U.S. Attorneys*** of the Citizen Complaint Unit at or about March, 2008, AUSAs of the U.S. Attorney's Office in Los Angeles: the AUSAs were charged, along with the U.S. Attorney's Office, with submitting a false and fraudulent statement during an executive proceeding and for obstruction of justice.
Specific conduct: The ASUAs conspired with other members of the office to send a false and fraudulent letter to victims of crimes falsely stating that the U.S. Attorney's Office does not conduct criminal investigations.
12. Richard Tallman***, judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: Tallman was charged with obstruction of justice, conspiracy to obstruct justice, and the intentional denial of constitutional and civil rights under color of law. Specific conduct: Tallman illegally acted on a petition for en banc review, without authority, and unlawfully denied a preliminary injunction appeal without a hearing.
13. N.Randy Smith***, judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Smith is charged with making or using a false statement or document in violation of federal law and obstruction of justice. Specific conduct: Smith made a false statement in an appellate decision; and, thereafter, issued an invalid and unconstitutional order to prevent review of the false statement order.
14. M.Margaret McKeown***, judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: McKeown is charged with making or using a false or fraudulent statement or writing in violation of federal law and obstruction of justice. Specific conduct: McKeown made a false statement as part of an appellate opinion, and thereafter, attempted to and did prevent review of the false statement.
15. Ronald Gould***, judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: Gould was charged with obstruction of justice, conspiracy to obstruct justice, violation of civil and constitutional rights under color of law, and violation of statute providing for relief benefits (and denial of benefits based on race), and violation of statute prohibiting racial discrimination. Specific conduct: Gould denied a social security disability claimant his constitutional due process rights by ignoring the applicable law for relief; discriminated against litigant's Black counsel, and therefore, the litigant himself, by unlawfully denying oral argument on a case that had been calendared for argument.
16. Richard Paez***, judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: Paez is charged with obstruction of justice, conspiracy to obstruct justice and denial of equal protection of the law. Specific conduct: In a case where two petitioners, one white and one black, relied on the same premise for relief, and sought the same relief, Paez granted relief to the white petitioner, but denied relief to the black petitioner, and provided no reason for the different treatment.
17. James B. Becker, Assistant County Clerk, Ventura County: Becker is charged with with voting rights violations , obstruction of justice, conspiracy to defraud, and conspiracy to deny constitutional and civil rights. Specific conduct: Becker allowed Steven Hintz, a candidate for treasurer-tax collector, to designate and use a misleading title on the general election ballot, in violation of California regulatory and election law and federal election law.
18. Ventura County Election Officials (including Monica Terrones) at the Ventura County Government Center: Specific conduct: Election officials refused to allow a black citizen to copy candidates statements in the originally completed form, in violation of California regulatory law and federal election or voting rights law.
19. Molly C. Dwyer***, current Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: Dwyer is charged with making a material false or fraudulent statement or representation and/or making or using a false writing or document knowing the same to contain a materially false statement or entry in violation of federal law. Specific conduct: Dwyer intentionally entered false information for the title and parties of a case filed in the Court of Appeals.
20. Michael Pastor*** , judge of the Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County : Pastor is charged with conspiring with the Medical Board of California to deny Dr. Conrad Murray his constitutional rights, and under color of law and based on race. Specific conduct: Pastor , at the urging of the MBC, acted to suspend Dr. Murray’s medical license prior to a due process hearing or trial, knowing that such action had the potential of causing harm to Murray's livelihood and his patients before a due process finding of liability or guilt. After Murray's conviction at trial, Pastor acted to deny Murray bail pending sentencing, where, under the circumstances, e.g., Murray was already out on bail, bail ordinarily would have been continued or granted. At sentencing, Pastor sentence Murray to the maximum sentence possible, where, under the circumstances, others in Murray's situation and with Murray's background, e.g., no criminal record, would have been sentenced to a much lesser sentence.
21. Medical Board of California***, medical licensing agency of the State of California : the MBC is charged with conspiring with judge Michael Pastor, during the preliminary hearing for Dr. Conrad Murray, to deny Dr. Murray his constitutional rights, and under color of law and based on his race. Specific conduct : The MBC is charged with urging judge Pastor to suspend the medical license of Dr. Murray prior to a due process hearing or trial, knowing that such action had the potential of causing harm to Murray's livelihood and his patients before a due process finding of liability or guilt.
22. Robert J. Perry***, judge of the Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County:
judge Perry is charged with intentionally usurping the domain of the jury and substituting his judgment for that of the Los Angeles County jury in dismissing a gun allegation and granting a new trial after the jury had found the gun allegation to be true, i.e., that defendant Johannes Mehserle had personally used a firearm in the commission of involuntary manslaughter. Perry also provided Mehserle with double jeopardy protection against a re-trial, notwithstanding that on paper Mehserle was only granted a new trial and not an acquittal. Specific conduct: Perry specifically used "acquittal" language in a new trial motion Order of relief in order to provide Mehserle with greater protection than Mehserle had sought.
23. Superior Court of California*** (and Los Angeles and Ventura Counties): Charged with a pattern of denying Black males, *especially Black male professionals, their constitutional rights, due process and other, while they undergo the judicial process in the Superior Court of California, particularly with jury trials, through conspiring with, either directly or indirectly, various Superior Court judges who perpetrate the denial of rights through their judicial actions, i.e., under color of law.
24. Andre Birotte*** , U.S. Attorney for Los Angeles : Birotte and his office, including the Citizens Complaint Unit, are charged with submitting a false and fraudulent letter to a citizen-victim, by mail, during the course of an executive proceeding, and obstruction of justice.
25. Unnamed Assistant United States Attorneys*** (AUSAs) in the Citizen Complaint Section of the U.S. Attorney's Office currently (or during the Birotte Administration): Charged with formulating and issuing a false and fraudulent letter to a citizen-victim by mail and obstruction of justice.
26. #Chris Sawyer, Clerk, U.S. District Court, Central District of Cal. : Crimes or criminal acts are conspriracy, through the clerk's office, to deny constitutional rights and/or denying constitutional rights under color of law with respect to having district judge Christina A. Snyder assigned to a case
for the specific purpose of denying a plaintiff his constitutional rights, under color of law, *and based on race or color. *3/14/2014
27. #Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, USDC, Cent. Dist. of Cal.: Crimes or criminal acts are accepting assignment to a case for the specific purpose of denying a *Black male Plaintiff his right to a fair judge and fair trial; and after being assigned to the case, denying the Plaintiff his constitutional rights under color of law by not acting on his pending TRO motion or other parts of the case. And, Snyder conspired with district judge Dickran Tevrizian to deny the same *Black male Plaintiff his constitutional rights, under color of law, by unlawfully accepting a transfer of a case that she knew was illegally transferred for the specific purpose of denying the Plaintiff his right to a fair judge, fair pre-trial proceedings, and a fair trial. *3/14/2014
28. #Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit : Bybee committed the crimes or criminal acts of the denial of constitutional rights under color of law, based on race or color, especially as it relates to violation of the Crime Victims Rights Act and other aspects of the appeal of a district court case through a review of a petition for a writ of mandamus. In the appeal at issue, Bybee violated multiple provisions of the CVRA, and he also, together with judges Richard Clifton, and William A. Fletcher, conspired to deny a *,Black male appellant his constitutional rights under color of law, and based on race or color, and conspired to file a false and fraudulent statement as his "decision" on appeal; and conspired to and did obstruct justice by impeding the fair administration of justice with the requisite intent to do so. *3/14/2014
29. #Richard Clifton, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit : Clifton, along with Jay S. Bybee and William Fletcher, conspired to deny an appellant his constitutional rights under color of law, based on race or color, in a review of a mandamus petition filed as an appeal, pursuant to the Crime Victims Rights Act(CVRA), where multiple provisions of the
CVRA were violated by Clifton and the others; further, Clifton and the others made a false and fraudulent statement as their "decision" on appeal, in violation of a federal criminal statute, and he also obstructed justice and conspired to do so. *3/14/2014
30. #William A. Fletcher, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit : Fletcher, along with Circuit judges Jay S. Bybee and Richard Clifton, acted to deny an appellant his constituional rights under color of law, based on race or color, and conspired to do so, by violating multiple provisions of the Crime Victim Rights Act (CVRA); by, alone with the others, making a false and fraudulent statement during a judicial proceeding as his "decision" in a case, and by conspiring to, and obstructing justice. *3/14/2014
31. #William K. Suter, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court: Suter committed the crimes or criminal acts of conspiring to and denying an appellant his constitutional rights under color of law, based on race or color, while the appellant was attempting to appeal a judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on a ruling on a petition for a writ of mandamus. Suter usurped the authority of a Supreme Court Justice and acted to refuse to "construe" an Application to a single Justice as a certiorari petition when he did not possess the authority to do so; therefore, he acted without authority. Furthermore, he also refused to submit an Application to a single Justice when all the requirements were met to do so. Finally, he violated the Supreme Court's in forma pauperis statute (IFP)by refusing to docket an Application where required to do so. *Suter has now retired. Another retirement connected with a Complaint (the letter triggering the Complaint against Suter was issued before Suter's purported "announcement" of his retirement). *3/14/2014
32. #Jeffrey Atkins, Deputy Clerk, U.S.Supreme Court : Atkins, together with William Suter, the Clerk, acted to deny an appellant his constitutional rights under color of law, based on race or color, and conspired to do so, by refusing to place a case on the Supreme Court docket in violation of Supreme Court Rules, by not "contruing" an Application for relief as a petition for a writ of certirari when he had no authority to do so or "without authority"; and by not submitting an Application to a single Justice as required by the Rules. *3/14/2014
33. #Jacob Travers, Deputy Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court : Travers, together with William Suter, the Clerk, acted to deny an appellant in the Supreme Court his constitutional rights under of law by refusing to docket a case when it should have been docketed; and by refusing to submit an application to a single Justice although all the requirements were met for the Application to be submitted to a single Justice, and refusing to provide an explanation for not doing so. *3/14/2014
34. #Cormac J. Carney, District Judge, USDC, Central District of California : Carney committed the crimes of denying constitutional rights under color of law, based on race or color and obstruction of justice. In a district court case where he presided, Carney issued two illegal orders, and acted wthout authority in doing so. Carney also purportedly acted on a motion for a temporary restraining order(TRO) without affording the Black male Plaintiff with a hearing and without scheduling a date for a preliminary injunction. Furthermore, Carney delayed acting on the TRO to the extent that the Black plaintiff had to file a Petition for a writ of mandamus in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. *3/18/2014
******NOTE : All titles assigned to individuals on this list are the titles or functions that the individuals had or performed at the time that they committed the offenses or crimes that they committed. Therefore, even if the individuals change positions after they were initially placed on the ICR, their initial title will always remain and will be considered the title for the individuals as long as they are on the ICR, with the exception that sometimes they will be referred to as "ex" judge or other position, e.g., ex-judge instead of judge.
UPDATE--May 9, 2013
I believe there will be new members soon.
UPDATE--June 11, 2013
This update is merely for the purpose of indicating and acknowledging that thusfar, to my knowlege, no judge has been prosecuted by the Public Integrity Section since it declared that it was prosecuting civil rights cases, and those cases pertaining to public officials. Therefore, it *(the Public Integrity Section) has thusfar been a farce. Talking loud and saying and doing nothing. Judges are still being held above the law. *And the reason it continues is because of cowardly lawyers, *who, in denying their clients a defense, refuse to raise selective prosecution and/or equal protection defenses, or in any other way challenge the fact that judges and other public officials are not being prosecuted for crimes that their clients are being prosecuted for.
*Too bad we don't have Pakistanian lawyers as members of the bar (I mean real Pakistanian lawyers from Pakistan, not Pakistanian-American lawyers, for they are likely the same as white American lawyers in terms of any protest activity). In my opinion, Pakistanian lawyers are the bravest or most courageous lawyers in the world. American lawyers are probably among the most cowardly,*if not the most cowardly. When is the last time you've heard of American lawyers as a group protesting about a civil rights issue affecting them or their clients? Or, supporting another lawyer? And especially, protesting against the judiciary? It won't happen. And, I wonder what lies they tell their children about their fight for justice!
UPDATE--July 15, 2013
This update is especially dedicated to Trayvon Martin in the interest and pursuit of justice. George Zimmerman has now been found not guilty of the murder of Trayvon Martin, which in itself is a travesty of justice, and I will write and post a separate blog regarding that decision, and the NAACP has now requested the Justice Department to pursue a civil rights action on behalf of the deceased Trayvon Martin. Good luck with that! One only needs to view what action the Justice Department has taken with respect to this ICR, on behalf of a black male--no action(with the exception of some informal FBI action by the George W. Bush administration that provided no relief to the victim). And review my blog regarding the murder of Oscar Grant. What action did the Justice Department take on behalf of Oscar Grant, where a white jury (with one exception) convicted the white Johanes Merserle of manslaughter rather than second degree murder, *and the manslaughter conviction was virtually wiped out by actions and/or rulings of the trial judge, Robert Perry.
UPDATE--July 25, 2013
Today, the L.A. Times published an article entitled, "Gay man wins bid to stay in U.S.", July 25, 2013. In the article, the Times credits Harry Pregerson, Circuit Judge of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and a member of this ICR, with writing the opinion which resulted in halting the deportation of an immigrant.
I'm not impressed. Harry Pregerson continues to be a crook, and the fact that the Justice Department refuses to prosecute him like they do other non-judge criminals who commit crimes does not prevent him from being a crook. He should not even be making judicial rulings. He shouldn't be on the bench. Richard Nixon made decisions after he was exposed for criminal conduct also. But, he also resigned prior to facing criminal prosecution. And, he never was indicted either. Pregerson, like Nixon, should at least have the decency to resign, even though he's not being prosecuted as he should be.
I'm not surprised at the L.A. Times trying to help Presgerson out by publishing some positive article. It has tried to rehabilitate bad character traits of other public officials who have demonstrated poor character. But, nearly always, once a crook, always a crook.
This is the end of the blog and ends Round 53 of the ICR.
UPDATE--August 9, 2013
Once again, the L.A. Times has published additional articles about cases that several members of the herein ICR have issued written opinions about, either authoring or being a member of the three judge panel deciding the case. Generally, the appellants in the cases have received positive relief from the judges. Therefore, it has a tendency to shade a good light over the judges in the public's eye. Another attempt by the L.A. Times to try and rehabilitate the judges' image and/or character in view of the fact that there are federal criminal complaints filed against them, and in view of the fact that they are still criminals or crooks. One of the articles, involving a teen convicted of rape, was authored by judge Harry Pregerson (and Pregerson apparently wrote that the teenager should have an opportunity to be released early. Another article was authored by judge Ronald Gould, with judge N. Randy Smith on the panel with Gould (apparently the Gould-Smith combination reversed a decision by a district judge, which allowed a lawsuit to be reinstated). But, the fact remains that Pregerson, Gould, and Smith are members of the ICR and all ICR members are criminals or crooks, and will remain so unless they are prosecuted and tried, and are thereafter found not guilty of the charged crime.
Consequently, Pregerson, Gould, and Smith are nothing more than "crooks performing community service".
It is similar to the case of convicted criminals who must perform community service as part of their sentence. Only these crooks *(Pregerson, Gould, and Smith) are performing community service while awaiting prosecution and trial after they have committed criminal acts (see above for some of the criminal acts).
So, Pregerson, Gould, and Smith remain unprosecuted criminals who have avoided prosecution because the U.S. Attorney, who is himself a criminal, has refused to prosecute them. They all are holding themselves above the law, and the public should be outraged, since these people are public and publicly-paid offcials who are impressed with protecting the public's (all of the public) rights.
UPDATE--October 4, 2013
See the new information added in the June 11, 2013 Update.
This is the end of Round 56 of the ICR.
UPDATE--November 14, 2013
It has come to my attention, again, via the news and especially a L.A. Times article, that U.S. Attorney Andre Birotte and District Judge Terry Hatter, Jr. were involved in a case involving purported racial discrimination, as exercised by Hispanics against Blacks. Birotte's office was responsible for prosecuting the Hispanics and Hatter presided over the guilty pleas and will be responsible for sentencing.
Of course any action taken against racial discrimination, towards the eradication of racial discrimination in our society is commendable; however, Birotte and Hatter remain on the ICR, therefore, their acts, though positive in their own rights, are still merely "criminals performing community service". I am a little reluctant to categorize Hatter that way because I believe that he received some "discipline" or "punishment" for *the actions that placed him on the list. Nevertheless, the action (i.e., discipline) was not officially communicated, and there was no restitution required or paid for his acts, therefore, Hatter remains on the ICR. As for Birotte, he's like the other members of the ICR.
This concludes Round 57 of the ICR.
UPDATE--March 14, 2014
New names were added to the list today, as well as some new information added to an original blog.
UPDATE--March 18, 2014
Another name was added to the list.
This concludes Round 60.
UPDATE--June 20, 2014
The L.A. Times has now *produced another article whereby one of the crooks on the ICR has written a decision which tends to have him held in a good light, although he is a crook. Once again, it is Harry Pregerson. In the article, "Court strikes down L.A. ban on living in cars", June 20, 2014, the Times credits Pregerson with finding that the homeless should be allowed to live in their cars without facing criminal prosecution.
Again, Pregerson is a crook, who should be prosecuted, and I don't care how many opinions he writes purportedly supporting the poor or minorities, he violated federal criminal law and should be prosecuted. He's a criminal. So, once again, his opinion supporting the homeless is simply "a criminal performing community service".
*This concludes Round #61
**UPDATE--August 4, 2014
Again, the L.A. Times has produced another article attempting to cleanse or rehabilitate the bad character of one of the people on this ICR. This time its District Judge Cormac J. Carney of the USDC, Los Angeles/Santa Ana. The Times, after my publication of the blog, "The 1st Annual List of Racist judges and Other Public Officials in California", which includes judge Carney, published an article noting that Carney ruled that "California's death penalty violates the U.S. Constitution's ban on cruel and unusual punishment." Carney's ruling like the rulings or acts of other defendants on this ICR is merely a criminal "performing community service."
*This concludes round #62.
**UPDATE--October 16, 2014
The L.A. Times has done it again, i.e., published a story about a judge on this list, indirectly trying to rehabilitate the judge's charcter (my interpretation). This time it's judge Robert Perry of the Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County. The Times published a story about Perry sentencing an individual (white) to prison for the murder of a Black woman. That's supposed to mean that Perry is not racist. Please! The case was likely assigned to Perry for the purpose of providing him with an opportunity to try and cleanse his character, or otherwise indicate that he is not racist. It didn't do it.
This concludes Round #63.
LAURACK D. BRAY, ESQ., M.S., M.P.A., J.D.
FEDERAL ATTORNEY
P.O. BOX 611432
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
TEL: (805) 901-2693
October 16, 2014
(Today's date)
March 17, 2011
(Original date)
**UPDATE(Denotes NEW information added to blog after original blog)
*(Denotes change in original blog, either information added to or deleted from original blog)
This updated version of the blog is submitted and contributed as part of the "War on Racial Discrimination" *(WRD) in California *(and the United States), and it is dedicated to Christopher Dorner *and Aaron Alexis especially; but also to Oscar Grant and Trayvon Martin.
****WHO WILL BE THE FIRST *JUDGE CHARGED OR REFERRED TO A GRAND JURY FOR INDICTMENT FOR A CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATION BY THE “NEW” PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE IN LOS ANGELES ?
*****WHEN IS THE LAST TIME A JUDGE, STATE OR FEDERAL, WAS REFERRED TO A GRAND JURY FOR INDICTMENT FOR A CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATION BY THE U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE IN LOS ANGELES?
WILL THE “NEW” PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION HAVE THE COURAGE TO PRESENT A STATE OR FEDERAL JUDGE TO A GRAND JURY FOR INDICTMENT FOR A CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATION, WHERE THERE IS CLEARLY SUFFICIENT AND PROBABLE CAUSE EVIDENCE TO DO SO ?
INDICTABLE CRIMINAL ROSTER (ICR) FOR THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE IN LOS ANGELES
******NOTE : Last year *(2013), the U.S. Attorney's Office in L.A. obtained grand jury indictments against 18 L.A. County Sheriff deputies for various civil rights violations. Among those charged were two lieutenants. It is highly probable that these lieutenants are considered "public officials", so they would have answered the question about the "first" public official referred to a grand jury for indictment, if it wasn't answered before (and I believe it may have been). *Moreover, Senators Ronald Calderon and Leland Yee, who were recently indicted, would also satisy the public official designation. So, I have now *simply reduced the category to "judges".
The Public Integrity Section has now demonstrated that it will go after the "puppies", but how about the big dogs, especially judges? *That's another story.
*Also, the question was also answered as to whether the first public official indicted would be a judge. It wasn't. So, the next time this blog is published, i.e., No. 59, I will remove the question : "Will it be a judge?" And, I will also re-characterize the main question that is asked. Instead of "the first high level official", it will simply be "the first judge".
Round #1 began the start of a new and continuous blog that will monthly *(information here deleted), *and sometimes bi-monthly, address the issue of who will be the first public official, and judges are such officials, to be indicted for a civil rights violation per prosecution by the U.S. Attorneys Office in Los Angeles. Once again, here, as I did with the previous ICR, I offer candidates to the U.S. Attorneys Office who are readily available and should be indicted for civil rights and other crimes. And, as long as they are not prosecuted, they are being held above the law, while other citizens are being prosecuted daily for the same or similar crimes. For example, the perjury trial of baseball star Barry Bonds. While perjury requires the additional element of "under oath", the central crime is "making a false statement", and there are several individuals on the ICR who have been charged with making a false statement in violation of federal law. Yet, none of them have been prosecuted or indicted. So, the question is: Why? Clearly, thusfar, the U.S. Attorney's Office has either chosen not to or not found the courage to prosecute judges for their federal criminal civil rights conduct. Therefore, Los Angeles has created a "haven" for corrupt and/or crooked and/or racist judges ( and here, I define racist as purposeful or intended discrimination against a person of another race, whether it is based on a feeling of superiority or simple malice). California judges can commit any crime they wish knowing that the most that will happpen is that they will be forced to resign or retire from office. And usually that's done in secret. What's the connection?
This passage is not meant to condemn all judges in California or the Los Angeles area, only those who have committed crimes (or have been charged with committing such through a federal criminal complaint). There absolutely are some fair and decent judges in California and Los Angeles(and one that comes to mind immediately has the initials "S.R." and is a member of the Ninth Circuit) and every now and then one can read about the just and fair treatment a judge has implemented, such as the judge who found the confession of a 15 year old boy to be illegal, and (*some information here, in the original blog, has been excluded after I learned later that a judge that I thought was fair, was not fair after all; and the information that I had cited as an example of fairness was likely a biased fairness for specific individuals, rather than a consistent fairness overall as a judge). *Another fair judge whom I am distinctly aware of is Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County judge Kathleen Kennedy. As I have stated before in another blog, judge Kennedy is a "special" judge, especially in L.A. County Courts. When judge Kennedy implements justice, it is "fair" justice, and she is consistent with it. I had the opportunity to observe judge Kennedy preside over an entire criminal trial, People v. Roderick Wright, and I must say, I was both delighted and impressed with her sense of fairness for both sides. Judge Kennedy is truly "special".
But, like there may be bad lawyers and executives, there are bad judges. And when such judges are found to be bad, they should be prosecuted like anyone else. The public often comments that celebrities receive special treatment when it comes to discipline for misconduct, but no one ever raises the issue about the special treatment that judges receive, especially in California, for their misconduct and/or criminal conduct. Part of the reason is because the public doesn't know about the misconduct. It's kept secret by the government and the major print and broadcast (mostly white) media or press. That's one of the first things that should be addressed if there is ever to be an attempt to not hold judges "above the law".
Previously, I renamed the roster of individuals on the "ICR". The listing shall forthwith be called the "Indictable Criminal Roster", rather than the Indictable Candidate Roster (but as can be ascertained, the symbolic letters will remain the same, "ICR"), and this is based on the four stages of criminality affecting the designation of the term "criminal" to an individual or person. In Stage I, when an individual commits a crime, as a matter of fact and law, that individual is a criminal and remains a criminal until caught, that is, arrested or apprehended, or voluntarily submits himself to authorities and otherwise reaches an agreement that substitutes for an arrest or prosecution, e.g., an NPA (a non-prosecution agreement--which requires payment of restitution).
An example that I have used before for clarity is the case of the woman walking down a street who gets her purse snatched by a man with noticeable scars on his face and with his face uncovered. If the woman is able to clearly see and identify the man, through his face and other identifiable characteristics (and here, we assume she is), she knows who her attacker is; and after the man physically takes the woman's purse and frightens her in the process, and thereafter flees with her purse, he has robbed her of her purse and he is a "criminal". And if the woman files a criminal complaint against the man with the respective law enforcement body (and here, we assume she will), the matter then undergoes criminal investigation of the man based on his description and any other evidence the police may possess, and the man remains a "criminal". This is Stage I. In Stage II, if the man is caught and arrested and charged, he then enters the criminal justice system and process. The criminal justice process then cloaks the man with a "presumption of innocent until proven guilty", and during this process, he is not a "criminal". He is an "innocent man", until proven guilty or is otherwise released from the criminal justice system without proof of guilt. This is Stage II. In Stage III, there will either be a dismissal, a trial, a plea agreement of some kind, or some other disposition of the charges. The man will leave Stage III as either a "criminal" (because he was tried and convicted or was found guilty) or innocent (because he was found not guilty after a trial or because his case was otherwise dismissed without a finding of guilt) or completely innocent (because there was insufficient or no evidence of guilt). This is Stage III. Stage IV is the actual exit (from the criminal justice process) designation of an individual. That designation is either "criminal", or "innocent", or "completely innocent". Because everyone on the ICR is in Stage I, I have changed the name of the roster to match the Stage (and designation) in which the complained about individuals are in. Therefore, they are "criminals"(also known as "crooks").
Moreover, if there is any question about the appropriateness of producing the ICR, a Manhattan, New York judge made it clear that it is appropriate. According to the L.A. Times, "N.Y.can release data on teachers", January 11, 2011, Manhattan Judge Cynthia S. Kern, speaking on teachers, stated, "The public has an interest in the job performance of public employees, particularly in the field of education...." "Courts have repeatedly held that release of job-performance related information, even negative information such as that involving misconduct, does not constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy." Further, Judge Kern found that "the reports 'may be released regardless of whether and to what extent they may be unreliable or otherwise flawed." The judges and other officials on the ICR are "public employees" and the information relates to their "job performance" or "negative information such as that involving misconduct". According to the article, "Lawyers representing the media in the case hailed the decision (to "publicly release performance ratings for more than 12,000 teachers based on their students' test scores") as a victory for the public, establishing the public's right to objective performance measures of government employees."
For clarification, whenever the terms "charged" or "charges" are used below, they refer to what complainants complained about in a federal criminal complaint filed with the U.S. Attorney's office in Los Angeles.
It should be noted, to my knowledge, that none of the individuals listed below has been cleared by the U.S. Justice Department or the U.S. Attorney's Office, that is, the Justice Department has not declined to prosecute based upon a lack of evidence. Therefore, the individuals remain under criminal investigation.
Further, and ironically, as long as the current Complaints are pending in the U.S. Attorney's Office in Los Angeles, all accused or "Defendants" in the Complaints are "fugitives" in a sense, as to other jurisdictions or states, in that they are susceptible to and can be arrested and/or indicted and/or arraigned in any other jurisdiction or state that they travel to, based on the California Complaints, at the discretion of the respective U.S. Attorney and/or FBI agent of the state or jurisdiction in question. That is, while the U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles has refused to secure an arrest and indictment of any of the judges and other individuals on the ICR, some U.S. Attorneys in other jurisdictions or states may do otherwise. Although the Defendants would likely be transferred back to California for indictment and/or arraignment and/or trial, they certainly can be arrested in other states, based on the California Complaints. And, if they happen to commit a federal offense (or state offense) while traveling to and in another jurisdiction, they could be indicted, arraigned, and tried in that jurisdiction as well (for both the state and federal offenses, by the separate sovereignties of course). So while the accused in the Los Angeles' Complaints may feel safe or relieved while residing and traveling in California, they will have to "tip-toe" while visiting other states or jurisdictions, based on the California Complaints.
Some differences for future Rounds are that : (1) instead of posting 10 names or more for each posting, I will now post all names for each round ; and (2) if I add some new information for one or more of the candidates, or if the candidate is newly added to the roster, I will place an asterisk (*) by the name of the candidate, or where the new information is being placed.
Further, the ICR will no longer be listed on a more serious to less serious offenses basis. Henceforth, they are simply listed at random, or in no particular order. But, ordinarily, most recent additions will be at the end of the listing.
Finally, another additional feature to the roster is that each month, I will send a copy of the blog to an organization or individual. Sometimes, I will identify the organization or individual, other times I will not, and I will simply designate the organization or person "Mystery" *(and this designation also means that I may or may not be sending a copy out). I will place a particular emphasis on the legal community, since the ICR involves legal principles.
This month's organization /individual is: Mystery
***Denotes individuals that have had a criminal civil rights Complaint filed against them as of July 4, 2012.
#-Denotes newly added members as of *April, 2014.
The individuals who could and should be indicted for civil rights and/or other violations are:
For the month of October, 2014
1. Steven Hintz*** , ex-judge of the Superior Court of California, Ventura County, who is now running for treasurer-tax collector of Ventura County (Update: Hintz is now the new Ventura County Treasurer-tax collector, according to a Ventura County clerk in that office: Hintz has been charged with intentionally acting to deny the civil and constitutional rights of a black lawyer , based on race (or racial discrimination), and with conspiring with other Superior Court judges to do the same. He is also charged with commiting election and/or voter fraud in the primary and general elections of 2010 . Hintz’s actions caused the unlawful eviction of the Black lawyer from his home-law office and the shutdown of his law practice in Ventura, California. Hintz is a member of theJudicial Seven. Some specific conduct: In a civil unlawful detainer jury trial, Hintz, as presiding judge, intentionally answered an outcome-determinative jury question that was required to be answered by the jury, which caused an eviction judgment against a Black lawyer. Thereafter, without any request for one,*Hintz declared in open court that he would not be granting a stay of the eviction judgment to the same Black lawyer. By the general election ballot remaining the same or unchanged regarding Hintz's ballot designation, he clearly defrauded Ventura County voters in the general election, even if there was some question regarding the primary election. In reference to the general election fraud, an amended complaint has now been filed against Hintz and James Becker, the Assistant County Clerk-Recorder, for conspiracy to violate federal and state voting rights and civil rights laws. As stated above, Hintz is now the new treasurer-tax collector for Ventura County, and most of the Ventura County voters who voted for him likely know nothing about his being forced to retire by the Justice Department and fraudulently misleading Ventura County voters in order to obtain their votes. NOTE: even though the Ventura County Star endorsed Hintz for treasurer-tax collector, I have not discovered a major story by the paper recognizing and celebrating his "victory". Based on my knowledge and belief, the Star has kept Hintz's victory "quiet as kept". I wonder why? If the Star has produced a major celebratory story of Hintz's victory, I welcome someone to point it out to me in the comment section. Otherwise, I maintain my postion that there has not been one, purposely.
2. Barry Klopfer***, ex-judge of the Superior Court of California, Ventura County: Klopfer , while serving as an appellate judge, was charged with obstruction of justice and conspiracy to deny civil and constitutional rights under color of law and based on race (or racial discrimination). He was also charged with making a false statement during a judicial proceeding. Klopfer is a member of the Judicial Seven. Some specific conduct: As an appellate judge, ignored the most significant question raised on appeal,i.e., a jury question, and made several false statements in an appellate opinion directed to the plaintiff's burden of proof in the aforementioned unlawful detainer trial.
3. David Long***, ex-judge of the Superior Court of California, Ventura County: Long, while serving as an appellate judge, was charged with a conspiracy to deny civil and constitutional rights under color of law and based on race (or racial discrimination). He was also charged with making a false statement during a judicial proceeding. Some specific conduct: The same as that for Barry Klopfer above.
4. Ken Riley***, ex-judge of the Superior Court of California, Ventura County: Riley, while serving as an appellate judge, was charged with a conspiracy to deny civil and constitutional rights under color of law and based on race (or racial discrimination). He was also charged with making a false statement during a judicial proceeding. Some specific conduct: The same as that for Barry Klopfer above.
5.Dickran Tevrizian***, ex-judge of the United States District Court for the Central District of California: Tevrizian is charged with obstruction of justice and conspiracy to deny constitutional and statutory rights under color of law, and based on race (or racial discrimination). He committed multiple acts of misconduct. He committed acts against both a white female client and a black lawyer. Tevrizian is a member of the Judicial Seven. Specific conduct: Tevrizian denied a plaintiff bringing a disability discrimination complaint her right to counsel, without a hearing; denied a pro hac vice motion without a hearing; ignored the law dealing with defaults; and acted without jurisdiction to grant a summary judgment motion.
Tevrizian also conspired with judge Harry Pregerson to have Tevrizian retire, likely with benefits, rather than having him face discipline and probably losing those benefits.
6.Terry Hatter, Jr.***, senior (and reired) judge, United States District Court for the Central District of California: Hatter was charged with
obstruction of justice and conspiracy to deny constitutional rights. Hatter is a member of the Judicial Seven. Specific conduct: Hatter ignored specific identified law in order to deny a man social security disability compensation, and conspired with other judges to do the same.
7. Thomas P. O’Brien***, ex-United States Attorney for Los Angeles : O’Brien and his Office are charged with making a false and fraudulent statement during an executive proceeding and with obstruction of justice. He was subsequently charged with committing mail fraud . O’Brien is also a member of the Judicial Seven. Specific conduct: O'Brien, together with some of his assistant USAs, submitted a false statement to victims of a crime in a letter sent from his office, and failed to inform victims of their statutory rights, as required by law.
8. William Schwarzer***, senior (and retired) judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of California : Schwarzer, while already retired and serving as a visiting member of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and on a three-judge panel, was charged with obstruction of justice , conspiring to obstruct justice, violation of civil and constitutional rights under color of law, and for violation of a federal statute providing relief for the denial of relief benefits, e.g., social security disability benefits , based on race (I relied on my race in relation to a white client). Schwarzer is a member of the Judicial Seven. Specific conduct: Schwarzer relied on a false standard in order to deny a man social security disability compensation, and ignored the correct standard to do the same.
9. Cathy Catterson***, ex-Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: Catterson was charged with, among other things, making and using a false and fraudulent document in violation of federal criminal law. Catterson was charged with the same or similar allegations of misconduct as those for Mary Schroeder (when she was Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit). Catterson is a member of the Judicial Seven. Specific conduct: Catterson, among other things, intentionally and fraudulently changed the title of a case and altered the case number, so that the public would not know the actual or true title and parties of the case--the true title named Catterson herself; and, for invidious purposes, she charged a disability discrimination plaintiff two appellate fees for filing the same appeal.
10. Harry Pregerson***, judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit : Pregerson was charged with obstruction of justice and making a false statement in a judicial proceeding. Specific conduct: Pregerson issued an initial questionable order, and, thereafter, issued another order to prevent review of the first one; he also filed a false statement and delayed acting on a judicial misconduct complaint in order to allow a judge, district judge Dickran Tevrizian, to retire and avoid discipline. Further, Pregerson also tampered with a federal file, by removing a docketed document(which tended to evidence the unlawful delay) ,also for the purpose of allowing the same judge to retire and avoid discipline. Thusfar, nothing has been done by the judicial system to have Tevrizian face discipline as he should have.
11. Unnamed Assistant U.S. Attorneys*** of the Citizen Complaint Unit at or about March, 2008, AUSAs of the U.S. Attorney's Office in Los Angeles: the AUSAs were charged, along with the U.S. Attorney's Office, with submitting a false and fraudulent statement during an executive proceeding and for obstruction of justice.
Specific conduct: The ASUAs conspired with other members of the office to send a false and fraudulent letter to victims of crimes falsely stating that the U.S. Attorney's Office does not conduct criminal investigations.
12. Richard Tallman***, judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: Tallman was charged with obstruction of justice, conspiracy to obstruct justice, and the intentional denial of constitutional and civil rights under color of law. Specific conduct: Tallman illegally acted on a petition for en banc review, without authority, and unlawfully denied a preliminary injunction appeal without a hearing.
13. N.Randy Smith***, judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Smith is charged with making or using a false statement or document in violation of federal law and obstruction of justice. Specific conduct: Smith made a false statement in an appellate decision; and, thereafter, issued an invalid and unconstitutional order to prevent review of the false statement order.
14. M.Margaret McKeown***, judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: McKeown is charged with making or using a false or fraudulent statement or writing in violation of federal law and obstruction of justice. Specific conduct: McKeown made a false statement as part of an appellate opinion, and thereafter, attempted to and did prevent review of the false statement.
15. Ronald Gould***, judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: Gould was charged with obstruction of justice, conspiracy to obstruct justice, violation of civil and constitutional rights under color of law, and violation of statute providing for relief benefits (and denial of benefits based on race), and violation of statute prohibiting racial discrimination. Specific conduct: Gould denied a social security disability claimant his constitutional due process rights by ignoring the applicable law for relief; discriminated against litigant's Black counsel, and therefore, the litigant himself, by unlawfully denying oral argument on a case that had been calendared for argument.
16. Richard Paez***, judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: Paez is charged with obstruction of justice, conspiracy to obstruct justice and denial of equal protection of the law. Specific conduct: In a case where two petitioners, one white and one black, relied on the same premise for relief, and sought the same relief, Paez granted relief to the white petitioner, but denied relief to the black petitioner, and provided no reason for the different treatment.
17. James B. Becker, Assistant County Clerk, Ventura County: Becker is charged with with voting rights violations , obstruction of justice, conspiracy to defraud, and conspiracy to deny constitutional and civil rights. Specific conduct: Becker allowed Steven Hintz, a candidate for treasurer-tax collector, to designate and use a misleading title on the general election ballot, in violation of California regulatory and election law and federal election law.
18. Ventura County Election Officials (including Monica Terrones) at the Ventura County Government Center: Specific conduct: Election officials refused to allow a black citizen to copy candidates statements in the originally completed form, in violation of California regulatory law and federal election or voting rights law.
19. Molly C. Dwyer***, current Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: Dwyer is charged with making a material false or fraudulent statement or representation and/or making or using a false writing or document knowing the same to contain a materially false statement or entry in violation of federal law. Specific conduct: Dwyer intentionally entered false information for the title and parties of a case filed in the Court of Appeals.
20. Michael Pastor*** , judge of the Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County : Pastor is charged with conspiring with the Medical Board of California to deny Dr. Conrad Murray his constitutional rights, and under color of law and based on race. Specific conduct: Pastor , at the urging of the MBC, acted to suspend Dr. Murray’s medical license prior to a due process hearing or trial, knowing that such action had the potential of causing harm to Murray's livelihood and his patients before a due process finding of liability or guilt. After Murray's conviction at trial, Pastor acted to deny Murray bail pending sentencing, where, under the circumstances, e.g., Murray was already out on bail, bail ordinarily would have been continued or granted. At sentencing, Pastor sentence Murray to the maximum sentence possible, where, under the circumstances, others in Murray's situation and with Murray's background, e.g., no criminal record, would have been sentenced to a much lesser sentence.
21. Medical Board of California***, medical licensing agency of the State of California : the MBC is charged with conspiring with judge Michael Pastor, during the preliminary hearing for Dr. Conrad Murray, to deny Dr. Murray his constitutional rights, and under color of law and based on his race. Specific conduct : The MBC is charged with urging judge Pastor to suspend the medical license of Dr. Murray prior to a due process hearing or trial, knowing that such action had the potential of causing harm to Murray's livelihood and his patients before a due process finding of liability or guilt.
22. Robert J. Perry***, judge of the Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County:
judge Perry is charged with intentionally usurping the domain of the jury and substituting his judgment for that of the Los Angeles County jury in dismissing a gun allegation and granting a new trial after the jury had found the gun allegation to be true, i.e., that defendant Johannes Mehserle had personally used a firearm in the commission of involuntary manslaughter. Perry also provided Mehserle with double jeopardy protection against a re-trial, notwithstanding that on paper Mehserle was only granted a new trial and not an acquittal. Specific conduct: Perry specifically used "acquittal" language in a new trial motion Order of relief in order to provide Mehserle with greater protection than Mehserle had sought.
23. Superior Court of California*** (and Los Angeles and Ventura Counties): Charged with a pattern of denying Black males, *especially Black male professionals, their constitutional rights, due process and other, while they undergo the judicial process in the Superior Court of California, particularly with jury trials, through conspiring with, either directly or indirectly, various Superior Court judges who perpetrate the denial of rights through their judicial actions, i.e., under color of law.
24. Andre Birotte*** , U.S. Attorney for Los Angeles : Birotte and his office, including the Citizens Complaint Unit, are charged with submitting a false and fraudulent letter to a citizen-victim, by mail, during the course of an executive proceeding, and obstruction of justice.
25. Unnamed Assistant United States Attorneys*** (AUSAs) in the Citizen Complaint Section of the U.S. Attorney's Office currently (or during the Birotte Administration): Charged with formulating and issuing a false and fraudulent letter to a citizen-victim by mail and obstruction of justice.
26. #Chris Sawyer, Clerk, U.S. District Court, Central District of Cal. : Crimes or criminal acts are conspriracy, through the clerk's office, to deny constitutional rights and/or denying constitutional rights under color of law with respect to having district judge Christina A. Snyder assigned to a case
for the specific purpose of denying a plaintiff his constitutional rights, under color of law, *and based on race or color. *3/14/2014
27. #Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, USDC, Cent. Dist. of Cal.: Crimes or criminal acts are accepting assignment to a case for the specific purpose of denying a *Black male Plaintiff his right to a fair judge and fair trial; and after being assigned to the case, denying the Plaintiff his constitutional rights under color of law by not acting on his pending TRO motion or other parts of the case. And, Snyder conspired with district judge Dickran Tevrizian to deny the same *Black male Plaintiff his constitutional rights, under color of law, by unlawfully accepting a transfer of a case that she knew was illegally transferred for the specific purpose of denying the Plaintiff his right to a fair judge, fair pre-trial proceedings, and a fair trial. *3/14/2014
28. #Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit : Bybee committed the crimes or criminal acts of the denial of constitutional rights under color of law, based on race or color, especially as it relates to violation of the Crime Victims Rights Act and other aspects of the appeal of a district court case through a review of a petition for a writ of mandamus. In the appeal at issue, Bybee violated multiple provisions of the CVRA, and he also, together with judges Richard Clifton, and William A. Fletcher, conspired to deny a *,Black male appellant his constitutional rights under color of law, and based on race or color, and conspired to file a false and fraudulent statement as his "decision" on appeal; and conspired to and did obstruct justice by impeding the fair administration of justice with the requisite intent to do so. *3/14/2014
29. #Richard Clifton, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit : Clifton, along with Jay S. Bybee and William Fletcher, conspired to deny an appellant his constitutional rights under color of law, based on race or color, in a review of a mandamus petition filed as an appeal, pursuant to the Crime Victims Rights Act(CVRA), where multiple provisions of the
CVRA were violated by Clifton and the others; further, Clifton and the others made a false and fraudulent statement as their "decision" on appeal, in violation of a federal criminal statute, and he also obstructed justice and conspired to do so. *3/14/2014
30. #William A. Fletcher, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit : Fletcher, along with Circuit judges Jay S. Bybee and Richard Clifton, acted to deny an appellant his constituional rights under color of law, based on race or color, and conspired to do so, by violating multiple provisions of the Crime Victim Rights Act (CVRA); by, alone with the others, making a false and fraudulent statement during a judicial proceeding as his "decision" in a case, and by conspiring to, and obstructing justice. *3/14/2014
31. #William K. Suter, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court: Suter committed the crimes or criminal acts of conspiring to and denying an appellant his constitutional rights under color of law, based on race or color, while the appellant was attempting to appeal a judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on a ruling on a petition for a writ of mandamus. Suter usurped the authority of a Supreme Court Justice and acted to refuse to "construe" an Application to a single Justice as a certiorari petition when he did not possess the authority to do so; therefore, he acted without authority. Furthermore, he also refused to submit an Application to a single Justice when all the requirements were met to do so. Finally, he violated the Supreme Court's in forma pauperis statute (IFP)by refusing to docket an Application where required to do so. *Suter has now retired. Another retirement connected with a Complaint (the letter triggering the Complaint against Suter was issued before Suter's purported "announcement" of his retirement). *3/14/2014
32. #Jeffrey Atkins, Deputy Clerk, U.S.Supreme Court : Atkins, together with William Suter, the Clerk, acted to deny an appellant his constitutional rights under color of law, based on race or color, and conspired to do so, by refusing to place a case on the Supreme Court docket in violation of Supreme Court Rules, by not "contruing" an Application for relief as a petition for a writ of certirari when he had no authority to do so or "without authority"; and by not submitting an Application to a single Justice as required by the Rules. *3/14/2014
33. #Jacob Travers, Deputy Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court : Travers, together with William Suter, the Clerk, acted to deny an appellant in the Supreme Court his constitutional rights under of law by refusing to docket a case when it should have been docketed; and by refusing to submit an application to a single Justice although all the requirements were met for the Application to be submitted to a single Justice, and refusing to provide an explanation for not doing so. *3/14/2014
34. #Cormac J. Carney, District Judge, USDC, Central District of California : Carney committed the crimes of denying constitutional rights under color of law, based on race or color and obstruction of justice. In a district court case where he presided, Carney issued two illegal orders, and acted wthout authority in doing so. Carney also purportedly acted on a motion for a temporary restraining order(TRO) without affording the Black male Plaintiff with a hearing and without scheduling a date for a preliminary injunction. Furthermore, Carney delayed acting on the TRO to the extent that the Black plaintiff had to file a Petition for a writ of mandamus in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. *3/18/2014
******NOTE : All titles assigned to individuals on this list are the titles or functions that the individuals had or performed at the time that they committed the offenses or crimes that they committed. Therefore, even if the individuals change positions after they were initially placed on the ICR, their initial title will always remain and will be considered the title for the individuals as long as they are on the ICR, with the exception that sometimes they will be referred to as "ex" judge or other position, e.g., ex-judge instead of judge.
UPDATE--May 9, 2013
I believe there will be new members soon.
UPDATE--June 11, 2013
This update is merely for the purpose of indicating and acknowledging that thusfar, to my knowlege, no judge has been prosecuted by the Public Integrity Section since it declared that it was prosecuting civil rights cases, and those cases pertaining to public officials. Therefore, it *(the Public Integrity Section) has thusfar been a farce. Talking loud and saying and doing nothing. Judges are still being held above the law. *And the reason it continues is because of cowardly lawyers, *who, in denying their clients a defense, refuse to raise selective prosecution and/or equal protection defenses, or in any other way challenge the fact that judges and other public officials are not being prosecuted for crimes that their clients are being prosecuted for.
*Too bad we don't have Pakistanian lawyers as members of the bar (I mean real Pakistanian lawyers from Pakistan, not Pakistanian-American lawyers, for they are likely the same as white American lawyers in terms of any protest activity). In my opinion, Pakistanian lawyers are the bravest or most courageous lawyers in the world. American lawyers are probably among the most cowardly,*if not the most cowardly. When is the last time you've heard of American lawyers as a group protesting about a civil rights issue affecting them or their clients? Or, supporting another lawyer? And especially, protesting against the judiciary? It won't happen. And, I wonder what lies they tell their children about their fight for justice!
UPDATE--July 15, 2013
This update is especially dedicated to Trayvon Martin in the interest and pursuit of justice. George Zimmerman has now been found not guilty of the murder of Trayvon Martin, which in itself is a travesty of justice, and I will write and post a separate blog regarding that decision, and the NAACP has now requested the Justice Department to pursue a civil rights action on behalf of the deceased Trayvon Martin. Good luck with that! One only needs to view what action the Justice Department has taken with respect to this ICR, on behalf of a black male--no action(with the exception of some informal FBI action by the George W. Bush administration that provided no relief to the victim). And review my blog regarding the murder of Oscar Grant. What action did the Justice Department take on behalf of Oscar Grant, where a white jury (with one exception) convicted the white Johanes Merserle of manslaughter rather than second degree murder, *and the manslaughter conviction was virtually wiped out by actions and/or rulings of the trial judge, Robert Perry.
UPDATE--July 25, 2013
Today, the L.A. Times published an article entitled, "Gay man wins bid to stay in U.S.", July 25, 2013. In the article, the Times credits Harry Pregerson, Circuit Judge of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and a member of this ICR, with writing the opinion which resulted in halting the deportation of an immigrant.
I'm not impressed. Harry Pregerson continues to be a crook, and the fact that the Justice Department refuses to prosecute him like they do other non-judge criminals who commit crimes does not prevent him from being a crook. He should not even be making judicial rulings. He shouldn't be on the bench. Richard Nixon made decisions after he was exposed for criminal conduct also. But, he also resigned prior to facing criminal prosecution. And, he never was indicted either. Pregerson, like Nixon, should at least have the decency to resign, even though he's not being prosecuted as he should be.
I'm not surprised at the L.A. Times trying to help Presgerson out by publishing some positive article. It has tried to rehabilitate bad character traits of other public officials who have demonstrated poor character. But, nearly always, once a crook, always a crook.
This is the end of the blog and ends Round 53 of the ICR.
UPDATE--August 9, 2013
Once again, the L.A. Times has published additional articles about cases that several members of the herein ICR have issued written opinions about, either authoring or being a member of the three judge panel deciding the case. Generally, the appellants in the cases have received positive relief from the judges. Therefore, it has a tendency to shade a good light over the judges in the public's eye. Another attempt by the L.A. Times to try and rehabilitate the judges' image and/or character in view of the fact that there are federal criminal complaints filed against them, and in view of the fact that they are still criminals or crooks. One of the articles, involving a teen convicted of rape, was authored by judge Harry Pregerson (and Pregerson apparently wrote that the teenager should have an opportunity to be released early. Another article was authored by judge Ronald Gould, with judge N. Randy Smith on the panel with Gould (apparently the Gould-Smith combination reversed a decision by a district judge, which allowed a lawsuit to be reinstated). But, the fact remains that Pregerson, Gould, and Smith are members of the ICR and all ICR members are criminals or crooks, and will remain so unless they are prosecuted and tried, and are thereafter found not guilty of the charged crime.
Consequently, Pregerson, Gould, and Smith are nothing more than "crooks performing community service".
It is similar to the case of convicted criminals who must perform community service as part of their sentence. Only these crooks *(Pregerson, Gould, and Smith) are performing community service while awaiting prosecution and trial after they have committed criminal acts (see above for some of the criminal acts).
So, Pregerson, Gould, and Smith remain unprosecuted criminals who have avoided prosecution because the U.S. Attorney, who is himself a criminal, has refused to prosecute them. They all are holding themselves above the law, and the public should be outraged, since these people are public and publicly-paid offcials who are impressed with protecting the public's (all of the public) rights.
UPDATE--October 4, 2013
See the new information added in the June 11, 2013 Update.
This is the end of Round 56 of the ICR.
UPDATE--November 14, 2013
It has come to my attention, again, via the news and especially a L.A. Times article, that U.S. Attorney Andre Birotte and District Judge Terry Hatter, Jr. were involved in a case involving purported racial discrimination, as exercised by Hispanics against Blacks. Birotte's office was responsible for prosecuting the Hispanics and Hatter presided over the guilty pleas and will be responsible for sentencing.
Of course any action taken against racial discrimination, towards the eradication of racial discrimination in our society is commendable; however, Birotte and Hatter remain on the ICR, therefore, their acts, though positive in their own rights, are still merely "criminals performing community service". I am a little reluctant to categorize Hatter that way because I believe that he received some "discipline" or "punishment" for *the actions that placed him on the list. Nevertheless, the action (i.e., discipline) was not officially communicated, and there was no restitution required or paid for his acts, therefore, Hatter remains on the ICR. As for Birotte, he's like the other members of the ICR.
This concludes Round 57 of the ICR.
UPDATE--March 14, 2014
New names were added to the list today, as well as some new information added to an original blog.
UPDATE--March 18, 2014
Another name was added to the list.
This concludes Round 60.
UPDATE--June 20, 2014
The L.A. Times has now *produced another article whereby one of the crooks on the ICR has written a decision which tends to have him held in a good light, although he is a crook. Once again, it is Harry Pregerson. In the article, "Court strikes down L.A. ban on living in cars", June 20, 2014, the Times credits Pregerson with finding that the homeless should be allowed to live in their cars without facing criminal prosecution.
Again, Pregerson is a crook, who should be prosecuted, and I don't care how many opinions he writes purportedly supporting the poor or minorities, he violated federal criminal law and should be prosecuted. He's a criminal. So, once again, his opinion supporting the homeless is simply "a criminal performing community service".
*This concludes Round #61
**UPDATE--August 4, 2014
Again, the L.A. Times has produced another article attempting to cleanse or rehabilitate the bad character of one of the people on this ICR. This time its District Judge Cormac J. Carney of the USDC, Los Angeles/Santa Ana. The Times, after my publication of the blog, "The 1st Annual List of Racist judges and Other Public Officials in California", which includes judge Carney, published an article noting that Carney ruled that "California's death penalty violates the U.S. Constitution's ban on cruel and unusual punishment." Carney's ruling like the rulings or acts of other defendants on this ICR is merely a criminal "performing community service."
*This concludes round #62.
**UPDATE--October 16, 2014
The L.A. Times has done it again, i.e., published a story about a judge on this list, indirectly trying to rehabilitate the judge's charcter (my interpretation). This time it's judge Robert Perry of the Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County. The Times published a story about Perry sentencing an individual (white) to prison for the murder of a Black woman. That's supposed to mean that Perry is not racist. Please! The case was likely assigned to Perry for the purpose of providing him with an opportunity to try and cleanse his character, or otherwise indicate that he is not racist. It didn't do it.
This concludes Round #63.
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