Los Angeles, California
May 12, 2017
(Today's Date)
August 12, 2015
(Original Date)
*Denotes a change in the original blog, either addition or deletion
**UPDATE (Denotes NEW information or material added after publishing of the original blog)
This blog is submitted and contributed as part of the War on Racial Discrimination in California (and the United States).
Last week I, a Black male, filed a criminal Complaint in and with the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office, charging attorney Armen D. Gregorian, who is white, with making a false statement in a report, and thereafter, preparing the report for filing and submission to the court during the undertaking of a hearing regarding a conservatorship matter (surrounding the person and estate of my 93 year-old mother)(my sister and I are both petitioning for control of my mother's affairs), and charging judge David J. Cowan *of the Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County, who is *also white, with aiding and abetting Gregorian in preparing (by implication) and submitting the report to the court with knowledge of the false statement contained therein.
*Gregorian legally and technically was assigned as a court-appointed attorney to represent the interests of my mother. But, in reality, he represented my sister, e.g., he met with her after two court appearances and he supported her during the hearings. And, the false statements attributed to Gregorian evolved from his support of my sister (in addition, in my view, to his own personal discriminatory tendencies). The false statements were directed to disparaging my character and essentially accusing me of stealing money from my mother. This, in turn, would help support my sister's petition being granted and my petititon being denied. But, because the primary false statement (as well as another made during the hearing) was not true and could be proven to be false, Gregorian violated the California Penal Code dealing with preparing false reports or reports including false "matter". Judge Cowan, through his actions in court during the hearings, assisted Gregorian in presenting and submitting the false matter to the court for the court's consideration, and, in fact, relied on the false statement in making his decision to grant my sister's petition and in denying mine, even after he knew or should have known that the statement was false.
Unlike many complaints, my Complaint was suported by documentary and testimonial evidence, i.e., court transcripts and Gregorian's Report, and the applicable law supporting the Complaint. *I will publish the entire Complaint (without exhibits at the end of the blog, when the blog is finally finished).
*Nonetheless, and thusfar, and even though an investigator from the D.A's Office said that I would be contacted (although not offering much encouragement that any substantial action would be taken), I have not been contacted by the D.A.'s Office regarding my Complaint. Therefore, I must assume at this point that the D.A. is refusing to investigate and prosecute my Complaint, including making a probable cause arrest *(there is clearly probable cause evidence for an arrest, and there's no doubt in mind that if I were a white person making the same claims that the matter would at least be investigated).
So, in essence, the D.A.'s Office has refused to investigate a criminal Complaint brought by a Black male against two white Defendants (or accuseds).
*NOTE: I also brought the Complaint against a Court Investigator, Gailyn Spence, who I believe is Black, based on a false statement included in her Report, but, she is not a major player for the purposes of this blog or the racial discrimination or racism that I will discuss here because, in my view, she simply benefitted from the D.A. Office not prosecuting the white Defendants, Gregorian and Cowan. That is, when the D.A. Office refused to prosecute Gregorian and Cowan because they are white, it could not fairly (with any reasoned justification)(and without overtly demonstrating the racism) arrest and prosecute Spence while not prosecuting Gregorian and Cowan. So Spence is just going along for the ride with Gregorian and Cowan.
More next time.
UPDATE--August 14, 2015
It would be interesting to find out how many criminal complaints filed by Black male complainants, in particular, but Black people in general, against white people, law enforcement or the D.A.'s Office have refused to prosecute. That would be telling. It would probably help answer the question as why the jails and prisons are filled with black and other minorites, and not whites. White people certainly can't go to jail or prison if they aren't first arrested and prosecuted. And so, THIS IS ONE OF MY THEORIES AS TO WHY THERE AREN'T THAT MANY WHITE PEOPLE IN JAILS AND PRISONS IN CALIFORNIA : BECAUSE WHEN BLACK PEOPLE BRING CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS AGAINST WHITE PEOPLE, MANY TIMES THE COMPLAINTS (AND THE WHITE PEOPLE) AREN'T PROSECUTED, BASED ON RACISM.
This brings me to the title of this blog, Gregorian and Cowan v. Sen. Wright and Clmn. Alarcon and racial discrimination or racism by the L.A. County Dsitrict Attorney's Office. Last year, both Wright and Alarcon were prosecuted and convicted for, essentially, lying about their address (all of the multiple charges, *including perjury, against the minority men evolved from the central "lie" or false statement regarding their respective addresses).
More next time.
UPDATE--August 15, 2015
Before filing the Complaint with the D.A.'s Office, I spoke with Michelle Gilmer, the Deputy D.A. who prosecuted the Wright case. I informed her that I would be filing the Complaint against an attorney and a judge (without providing names) regarding the making of a false statement, and I identified the Penal Code that I charged was violated. Ms. Gilmer informed me that Wright's prosecution (and the prosecutions that she handles) was based on "a letter" that the D.A. Office received (questioning or asserting that Wright was living at an address outside of his district). I contacted Ms. Gilmer because I was familiar with her based on my attendance at the Wright trial. Ms. Gilmer also stated that she did not handle cases initiated by "Complaint", so she said that she would find out which department I should file my Complaint with. She did so, and she referred me to the "Justice System Intergrity Division" of the D.A.'s office, and she informed me where I should file the Complaint. Thereafter, I filed the Complaint. Thusfar, I haven't heard anything from the D.A.'s Office regarding the Complaint, which is one of the reasons that I'm writing this blog.
SO WHY IS THE D.A. OFFICE NOT PROSECUTING THE COMPLAINT AGAINST GREGORIAN AND COWAN, BUT, NEVERTHELESS, PROSECUTED THE CASES AGAINST WRIGHT AND ALARCON?
1. Could it be because the charges are different? No, it couldn't be that.
Both Wright and Alarcon and Gregorian and Cowan were(are) charged with making false statements or "lying". Wright and Alarcon were charged with "lying" about an address, and Gregorian and Cowan are charged with "lying" about facts in a conservatorship Report. Lying is lying, whether one is lying about an address or lying about facts in a Report.
And, that is why I am perplexed about Ms. Gilmer's assertion that she could not entertain my Complaint. Don't misunderstand me, I believe Ms. Gilmer. I simply don't understand the D.A.'s Office's distribution of assignments. If Ms. Gilmer can prosecute Wright for lying about an address, she can prosecute Gregorian and Cowan for lying about facts in a Report. So, Ms. Gilmer's position (*or the D.A. Office's position,if Gilmer's response is based on Office policy), whether it is dictated by the D.A.'s Office or otherwise, that she cannot prosecute Gregorian and Cowan because the investigation into the misconduct or criminal conduct of Gregorian and Cowan is initiated by Complaint instead of "a letter" is unacceptable. And, under strict scrutiny, it will not pass constitutional muster.
Ms. Gilmer did a superb job in the Wright case; if not brilliant, *she was just below it. So, she would probably do just as good a job in prosecuting Gregorian and Cowan. So, why won't the D.A., Jackie Lacy, let her do it? By the end of this blog, we probably will have the answer.
More next time.
UPDATE--August 17, 2015
Back to the "letter"/ "Complaint" distinction. I suppose the difference is the letter is informal and unofficial (and the D.A.'s office can choose to respond or not, at its discretion); while the Complaint is official and the D.A.'s Office really has a duty (and obligation) to respond, and, of course, in not responding to my Complaint, it has breached its responsibility and duty. I will deal with that breach later with the Attorney General's Office.
So, the charges brought, i.e., filing a false statement in a Report and aiding and abetting in the filing and submission is not the reason why the D.A. is not prosecuting this Complaint. A false statement is a false statement, and a lie is a lie, whether that lie is about an address or about facts in a report.
2. Could it be because of the titles or positions of the individuals? Maybe, because Cowan is a judge, and the D.A.'s Office is providing some special protection for Cowan that the law does not provide. Under the law, Cowan is no different than any other person accused of violating the criminal law, notwithstanding his judgeship. And, because the law does not provide Cowan with any special protection, the final answer to this question is no.
Wright was a Senator and Alarcon, a Councilman, while Cowan is a judge. All three are public officials. Gregorian is an attorney. All are susceptible to and can be prosecuted pursuant to the California Penal Code, and especially for the charges that have been complained about in the Complaint. All citizens, and non-citizens for that matter, can be prosecuted pursuant to the Penal Code(s). So Wright and Alarcon's titles are not the reason that they were prosecuted and Gregorian and Cowan were not.
3. Could it be because there was insufficient evidence to pursue the matter? No, that couldn't be it.
The fact that I have not been contacted at all dispenses with any notion that the decision is based on a lack of evidence. In fact, the fact that the D.A. has not contacted me at all provides support for the fact that there was sufficient evidence, at least for an investigation, otherwise, the D.A.'s office would have been eager to inform me about the lack of evidence which could be supported by the record.
But, there is clearly enough evidence to investigate and prosecute my Complaint. See the Complaint itself for some of the evidence submitted. Not only is there sufficient evidence for an investigation of the Complaint, but, there is sufficient probable cause evidence for an arrest of all individuals. There is evidence of the false statement made by Gregorian, there is evidence that the false statement was inserted into and included in Gregorian's P.V.P. Report, and evidence that the false statement was submitted to and accepted by the court. And, there is evidence that judge Cowan assisted Gregorian with having the false statement submitted to the court and being made a part of the court Record.
If the D.A.'s Office can charge a Black woman with assault for simply raising a police baton with no evidence of anyone being placed in apprehension of immediate harm, then it can certainly charge two white men for submitting a false statement in a Report, where there is prima facie evidence of the preparation, submission, and reliance on a Report containing a material false statement.
There is as much critical evidence for an arrest and indictment of Gregorian and Cowan as there was for the arrest and indictment of senator Wright and Councilman Alarcon. A lack of evidence was not the reason why Gregorian and Cowan have not been investigated and arrested.
4. Could it be because of Gregorian's and Cowan's gender? No, that couldn't be it.
All four individuals are male or men (but, Gregorian and Cowan are white men; so to that extent, the genders are a bit different. Does that create a different kind of male gender in America? It does when it comes to discrimination).
5. Could it be because of Gregorian's and Cowan's race ?
More the next time.
UPDATE--August 18, 2015
NEWS FLASH!!
Yesterday, I received a letter from the D.A.'s Office. It states, in part :
"There is insufficient evidence to warrant a criminal investigation in this matter."
My one word response is : Bullshit! There is clearly sufficient evidence. In fact, as I stated above in addressing the sufficiency of the evidence question, there is prima facie evidence and beyond; that is, probable cause evidence sufficient to make an arrest. If I were a layman, I would probably "fall for this line", but, I am an experienced criminal defense lawyer, knowledgeable of the law and evidence, and being such, I know, based on the evidence that I provided, that the D.A.'s Office's contention that there is insufficient evidence "to warrant a criminal investigation" is bullshit, or, for the offended, nonsense.
This is the same response law enforcement and D.A. offices around the country give to Black families and communities when white police officers are charged by the community with murdering Black males. And, it is here, as it is there, nonsense.
In discrimination law, the government's response is known as "pretext". That is, the "stated reason is false, a mere pretext for its true motive, which is discrimination." Nolo.com, Law for All. It is offered as "a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its decision to not investigate and prosecute my Complaint, but, the evidence that I supplied proves it to be "pretext" for not investigating and prosecuting the Complaint, and for discrimination, see infra.
Finally, the D.A.'s Office also states, "The issues you raise are best addressed utilizing the appellate process. You should contact an attorney to discuss any appellate rights you may have." First of all, I am an appellate lawyer, both state and federal (with multiple published opinions where I *was counsel of record), and I know the difference between criminal violations and civil appellate matters. In fact, I have already initiated appellate procedures pursuant to an appeal of the conservatorship matters themselves. But, my Complaint here is directed to criminal violations, and the D.A. Office knows this. It is simply avoiding prosecuting my Complaint based on discriminatory reasons. See infra. Further, and finally, the D.A. Office states that I should contact "an attorney to discuss any appellate rights" that I might have. Again, I am an appellate attorney (and I indicated that in my Complaint), so that's absurd (and simply a part of the white racism).
Moreover, not only did the D.A.'s Office and Jackie Lacy provide a pretexual reason for not prosecuting Gregorian and Cowan, but they also made a false statement themselves. That is, it is simply false that "there is insufficient evidence to warrant a criminal 'investigation' (not "prosecution", mind you) in this matter." There is clearly enough evidence to warrant both an investigation and a prosecution, but, clearly enough for an investigation, by any fair and impartial person or tribunal detached from the District Attorney's Office. So, now, the D.A.'s Office has made a false statement itself, in an effort to protect Gregorian and Cowan from prosecution for making false statements (and aiding and abetting).
Now, back to Question #5 : Could it be because of Gregorian's and Cowan's race ? Yes, absolutely.
Sen. Wright, who is Black, and Councilman Alarcon, who is Hispanic, were prosecuted and convicted for lying about their respective addresses (and there were multiple charges which evolved from the original lie). On the other hand, Gregorian and Cowan, who are white, are avoiding prosecution for lying about facts in Gregorian's Report submitted to the Court. Again, lying is lying, or false statements are false statements. The D.A. Office, and Jackie Lacy, prosecuted Wright and Alarcon for their lies, but they aren't prosecuting Gregorian for his, or Cowan for assisting him in submitting the lies.
Moreover, Gregorian lies are more serious than Wright's or Alarcon's because (1) Gregorian lies had direct victims, while Wright and Alarcon's lies did not (other than the indirect and government-established misnomer of the "people" as victims). I, and my mother were(are) actual victims of Gregorian lies (and Cowan's assistance). We actually suffered harm from Gregorian's lies, e.g., my being denied the conservatorship based on the lies. Yet, Wright and Alarcon were prosecuted and Gregorian and Cowan weren't. (2)Gregorian lies were made to and before a court of law, knowing that the lies would be a part of the court's decisionmaking process; and (3) both Gregorian and Cowan are "officers of the Court", unlike Sen. Wright and Clmn. Alarcon, who are mere government officials. *Therefore, Gregorian and Cowan are held to a higher standard than Wright and Alarcon, which makes their misconduct more egregious than Wright's and Alarcon's.
More next time.
UPDATE--August 25, 2015
There is no other objectionable reason or criterion but race as to why Gregorian and Cowan are not being prosecuted, while Wright and Alarcon were. It's just plain and simple racial discrimination or white racism. See my blogs on Alarcon and Wright to view my comparisons of other white offcials, e.g., Steven Hintz, another former Superior Court judge, who were not prosecuted while black officials were (are).
And, what is more stunningly ironic here is that we have the scenario of a Black District Attorney, Jackie Lacy, having assigned a very good Black deputy D.A., Michele Gilmer, to prosecute and obtain a conviction of a Black senator, Wright; and, thereafter, have the same so-called "Black" District Attorney refusing to investigate and prosecute a white lawyer and a white judge for the same crime or offense, i.e., telling a lie or making a false statement (and assisting in doing so).
In essence, we have a Black District Attorney using a Black deputy D.A. to perpetrate white racism against a Black senator. How ironic, and for Black people, SAD! How can Lacy sleep well at night? And, how does she explain that to Black children? Or, Black people in general? Or, to Black voters in particular? Especially those Black voters that help elect her to office with the belief that, because of her blackness, Black people would have a greater hope of being treated fairly and/or "equally"?
What Lacy's actions demonstrate is that it makes no difference for Black people of Los Angeles' County that she is "Black". She may as well be white, at least in that way, her conduct would be expected.
More next time.
UPDATE--September 2, 2015
THE BOTTOMLINE : Gregorian and Cowan were not "investigated" or "prosecuted" by the D.A. Office or Jackie Lacy because they are white; and, conversely, Wright and Alarcon were prosecuted because they are Black and Hispanic or Latino, respectively.
And, the beat goes on.
GREGORIAN AND COWAN ARE CRIMINALS
Nevertheless, until Gregorian and Cowan are brought within the criminal justice system, and are cloaked with the shield of "innnocent until proven guilty", they are criminals, and will remain so, because there was eyewitness and/or personal knowledge of the crime perpetrated against the victim by the victim himself. For a more in-depth explanation, see my blog entitled "#63 (Round 63) Indictable Criminal Roster (ICR)...", where I describe the 4 stages of criminality.
Further, while the major media, including the L.A. Times, will not publicize the criminal complaint against Gregorian and Cowan, mostly, in my view, to protect Cowan, I believe certain individuals or groups should know about the Complaint, for example, the City Council, the State Senate, the Chief Judge of Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County, and the Chief Judge of the California Supreme Court. I will forward a copy of this blog to certain of these individuals.
The important question is : Should these individuals, Gregorian, Spence, and Cowan, be allowed to continue to participate in the court system?
NEXT STEP : THE CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
The next step on the "journey to justice" regarding the Complaint will be the California Attorney General's office. Here, again, we will find a black Attorney General, or, at least, a person of color. We'll see what her response will be. Will she institute justice, based on the evidence, or will she continue the same trend as Lacy?
THE COMPLAINT (in part) :
#7. Briefly describe the nature of your Complaint.
This Complaint arises from a conservatorship proceeding in Dept. #79 of the Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County. The actions pertaining to my allegations of misconduct took place during the conservatorship proceedings that took place on June 4, 2015 and June 12, 2015. The actual document(s) giving rise to the criminal charges or allegations being made in this Complaint were prepared and submitted to the Court (i.e., filed with the Court) prior to the June, 2015 proceedings.
My general complaints and/or charges are that attorney Armen D. Gregorian prepared, made, and submitted a material false statement in his P.V.P (Probate Volunteer Panel) Report, filed April 6, 2015 in the Superior Court of California, which was submitted to and relied upon by the trial court in the conservatorship proceedings of June 4th and June 12th, 2015; and that judge David J. Cowan aided and abetted attorney Gregorian in having the said false statement submitted to and relied upon by the court in the conservatorship hearings and/or proceedings.
I also charge the Court (Probate) Investigator, Gailyn Spence, with the same conduct as attorney Gregorian in her P.I.P. (Probate Investigator Petition) Report , based on a different statement, arising from a different set of facts, with the same theme as the Gregorian statement, i.e., that I was stealing or attempting to steal from my mother. While the investigator’s statement is not as egregious (because it stops short of saying why I tried to take my mother to the bank—but, the implication is still there), it, nonetheless, contributed to the overall scheme and reliance on the combination of statements to reach the conclusion and results that were arrived at by the hearing judge, i.e., Cowan.
Ordinarily, with the average layman, one would simply state the facts that he or she alleged happened and/or caused the harm that he or she is alleging and allow the district attorney to assign and/or apply the actual criminal law and/or charges that are supported by the facts. However, since I am a lawyer, who is familiar with criminal law, I will identify and state the specific charges that I am asserting or charging. Of course if the district attorney (“D.A.”) believes that the facts would support other charges or different charges, that’s up to her, and she is certainly free to exercise her discretion and decide what charges she believes are most appropriate. Also, I will identify and refer to several principles of law that tend to support my belief that the facts that I identify are sufficient to support the specific charges that I allege, e.g., preparing false evidence or a false report to be used in court.
With the above in mind, the following are my specific Complaints.
SPECIFIC COMPLAINTS:
1. I charge or complain that attorney Armen D. Gregorian, in violation of California Penal Code section 134, prepared a false PVP Report and/or a false statement, i.e., “other matter or thing”, in the PVP Report, with the intent to produce it, or allow it to be produced for a fraudulent or deceitful purpose, as “true”, upon the conservatorship hearing or proceeding, as “authorized by law”. The specific false statement: “Most significantly, he recently went to a care facility and removed the proposed Conservatee and took her to her bank to withdraw money. This led to the proposed Conservatee being taken to the hospital for chest pains.” See Exhibit #1 (PVP Report, April 6, 2015, front page, p.7, see lines 20-23(for the statement), and signature page)) herein. This entire statement (or statements) is false. This scenario simply did not happen. I never “removed the proposed Conservatee (my mother)” from the care facility (“Virgie’s Manor”) and I did not take “her to her bank to withdraw money.” And, because this scenario did not take place, it, necessarily, did not lead “to the proposed Conservatee being taken to the hospital for chest pains.” Although my mother was taken to the hospital, it was not because of this false statement and/or scenario. But, it was related to the false statement (this will appear infra) .
2. I charge or complain that Superior Court of California judge David J. Cowan, aided and abetted attorney Gregorian in submitting a false Report and false statement to the court by knowingly and intentionally refusing to require attorney Gregorian, in court, to address and/or refute the charged false statement attributed to him (Gregorian), on two separate occasions or with two separate opportunities during the same hearing day. See Exhibit #2 (June 4, 2015 Hearing Transcript, pgs. 2, line21 to pg.3, line 6 for first occasion, and pg.4, line 19 to pg. 5, line 9 for the second occasion). California Penal Code 31, in relevant part, provides: All persons concerned in the commission of a crime. . . whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, or, not being present, have advised and encouraged its commission. . . are principals in any crime so committed. “Thus, those persons who are commonly referred to as ‘accessories’ or ‘accomplices’ as well as those who actually perpetrate the offense, are to be prosecuted, tried and punished as principals in California (Penal Code Section 971)” (online research-WKLAW). “As a legal rule, aiding and abetting means providing some kind of assistance in the commission of a crime. In other words, by doing or saying something to further criminal activity.” Id. As a result, the false statement continued to remain and be a part of Gregorian’s PVP Report that the court relied upon for use and resolution of the conservatorship issue.
Further, I charge or complain that judge Cowan aided and abetted attorney Gregorian by allowing him to make another false statement during the conservatorship hearing without explanation or support, after the statement was challenged as being false. I allege that this was part of and contributed to judge Cowan’s support of Gregorian and his original false statement; now, with both false statements remaining
in the record and being treated as true and true evidence.
Finally, I charge or complain that judge Cowan aided and abetted attorney Gregorian’s false statement by relying on the false statement in making his conservatorship decision.
3. I charge or complain that Probate Investigator Gailyn Spence, in violation of P.C. sec. 134, prepared a false investigator Report and/or a false statement, i.e., “other matter or thing” in the Probate Investigator’s Petition Report (“PIP”), see Exhibit #3 (Spence’s March 23, 2015 Report; cover page, pgs. 4-5, and signature page) with the intent to produce it, or allow it to be produced for a fraudulent or deceitful purpose, as “true”, upon the conservatorship hearing or proceeding, as authorized by law. The specific false statement: “At Bright Days, he has tried to take her out and to the Bank . . . .” At p. 5 of the March 23, 2015 PIP Report. This statement is entirely false. I never tried or attempted to take my mother out of this (Bright Days) facility for any reason.
I charge that Spence made another statement that was repeated in her two separate reports, which may appear insignificant on its face, but , which contributed to the overall scheme of disparaging my character. See Exhibit #4 (Spence,s second PIP Report; cover page, p. 4, and the signature page)(page 4 of the first Report as well). The specific false statement : “Laurack reported he took his mother. . . to. . . medical appointments”(in the first report, Spence misspelled my name “Lorick”). While parts of the statement was true, i.e., shopping and to the bank, the material part (medical appointments) was false. I know that my sister, Dianne Jackson, takes my mother on medical appointments. See infra for the materiality and/or significance of this statement.
3A. Finally, because Spence’s false statement, unlike Gregorian’s, was made under oath, I also charge her with perjury , for the primary false statement (in the March 23, 2015 Report) . See Penal Code 118a, 119, 123, 124, and esp., 125. Moreover, Spence is an “investigator” herself, therefore, there is a greater degree of culpability in making the false statements, esp. the false statement about the “bank”, where she had a “duty” to investigate all factual matters.
4. I charge or complain that judge Cowan aided and abetted investigator Spence by continuing to rely on the investigator’s Report, along with the PVP Report, for his decision, notwithstanding my testimony that I did not commit the said act of trying to take my mother to the bank, i.e., Bright Days, and no other proof that I committed them.
I THE EVIDENCE OF ARMEN GREGORIAN’S FALSE STATEMENT
1. Admission by silence or adopted admission.
I discovered the false statement in Gregorian’s PVP Report prior to the first day of the hearing (June 4, 2015). So, on the first day of the hearing, I raised the issue and identified the false statement in Gregorian’s Report. Gregorian was present in the courtroom standing at counsel’s-petitioner’s table with Dianne Jackson standing between Gregorian and myself. When I pointed out and stated the false statement, both Gregorian and judge Cowan remained silent. After an extended silent pause, the judge shifted to another subject, i.e., “Mr. Gregorian, Ms. Davis is in a home right now?” I assert that since the false statement was brought to Gregorian’s attention, in his presence, and he did not refute or dispute the allegation against him, that it was an admission by silence, or an adopted admission.
“When a person makes a statement in the presence of a party to an action under circumstances that would normally call for a response if the statement were untrue, the statement is admissible for the limited purpose of showing the party’s reaction to it. His silence, evasion, or equivocation may be considered as a tacit admission of the statements made in his presence.” In re Estate of Neilson (1962) 57 Cal.2d 733, 746.
2. Dianne Jackson’s corroboration
Jackson, my sister and cross-petitioner for conservatorship over my mother’s affairs, corroborated the fact that the statement was false when she admitted that (even if it was my intention to take my mother to the bank to “withdraw money”---and it was not my intention and was not true), it did not happen. “His attempt to take her to the bank was intervened by the Carson police department who told him he could not take her out of the facility. . . . He couldn’t take her to the bank.” Id. At p. 3. , That’s the only thing that happened.” Id. Gregorian stated that I “removed” the proposed Conservatee, and “took her to her bank to withdraw money.” Again, per Jackson, this did not happen. Therefore, this is corroboration that the statement is false.
In truth, I did plan to take my mother to the bank , for her to put me on her checking account, so that I could continue paying her bills, since, because of her fall, she was unable to sign checks herself, as she was doing prior to the fall. See Exhibit #2, at p. 5, lines 2 to 9. Jackson could have put me on my mother’s account, but she refused to do so (in my view, because she treats my mother’s account as her own). Jackson, my sister, was put on my mother’s checking account at a time when I was not living with my mother. And, I never asked my mother to put me on her account before her fall because there was no need to; she was signing her checks herself (while I performed the remaining duties of paying her bills).
3. Admission by silence or adopted admission #2.
There was a second admission, see Exhibit #2, at p. 4, lines 19-28, in the same proceeding, i.e., “Let’s not get away from this point about the false statement because I think it was a (sic) egregious statement.” After another silent pause , I stated “Well, I’m going to take some action” . I didn’t say “I think that I am going to take action to file.” (This was court reporter editing). Again, Gregorian and the judge had a second opportunity to address the false statement and they refused to do so.
4. Dianne Jackson’s corroboration #2.
Jackson, on the second day of the hearing (June 12, 2015) , repeated her corroboration (that there was no complete act of taking or removing my mother from the facility—only an attempt, at most), this time under oath. See Exhibit #5 (Transcript of June 12, 2015 hearing, pgs. 22-25, 43, and 46; here, at p. 23, line 28 to p. 24, line13, where :
THE COURT: Even though you may not have been successful, did you take her out of facility to take her to the bank?
MR. BRAY: No.
MR. BRAY: We did not go to the bank. We didn’t get to the bank.
MS. JACKSON: He wasn’t successful in getting her out because I called the police twice.
II THE EVIDENCE OF JUDGE COWAN’S AIDING AND ABETTING GREGORIAN’S SUBMITTING FALSE EVIDENCE TO THE COURT.
1. Aiding and abetting (in violating P.C. 132 and/or 134) through silence
On June 4, 2015 (hearing day 1), when judge Cowan remained silent and refused to address the false statement by Gregorian and refused to require Gregorian, who was present , to respond to the false statement, he aided and abetted Gregorian in submitting the false Report and the false statement to the court, pursuant to either P.C. 132 and/or 134. See Exhibit #2, p. 2, line 21 to p. 3, line 6. Judge Cowan, after the extended silent pause, proceeded to ask Gregorian about my mother being in a care facility, but he never inquired, from Gregorian, about the false statement itself, e.g., “Mr. Gregorian, why is the statement true, after Mr. Bray’s charge that the statement is false?" And, even though Jackson responded in part to the statement, Gregorian, himself, was never queried as to the truth or falsity of the statement and did not respond and/or refute the charge of the statement being a false statement. This contributed to judge Cowan aiding and abetting Gregorian in preparing, offering , and presenting the false statement to the court.
2. Aiding and abetting through silence #2.
When I gave Gregorian and judge Cowan a second opportunity to address the false statement, Id., at p. 4, line 19 to p. 5, line 8, judge Cowan again refused to confront Gregorian and have Gregorian respond to the allegation of making a false statement in his report. While judge Cowan commented regarding Jackson’s comments, he did not require Gregorian to respond to the false statement. Therefore, again, both Gregorian and judge Cowan remained silent for a second time or opportunity to address and/or refute the falsity of the statement. Therefore, the false statement remained a part of the Report, undisturbed. This was aiding and abetting by judge Cowan.
3. Aiding and abetting (either P.C. 132 and/or 134) by treating the false statement as being true.
Even though judge Cowan refused to make Gregorian respond to the false statement at the hearing, he, nevertheless, accepted (and/or presumed) the false statement as being true. See Exhibit #5, p. 25, lines 7-9 : “I’m telling you I want to know why it is that you went and took her out of the facility.”
This was aiding and abetting Gregorian’s use of the false statement in his report by the judge accepting the false statement as being true, notwithstanding my statement that the statement was false, Jackson’s corroborations, and the judge’s refusal to confront Gregorian in court regarding the false statement.
Judge Cowan never declared that he would not rely on the PVP Report because of the false statement, or that he would disregard the statement (since, at minimum, there was controversy or a dispute as to its truth or falsity) or the Report.
4. Aiding and abetting by allowing Gregorian to make another false statement during the hearing and not confronting him about the truth of the statement after I objected.
Gregorian made another false statement during the hearing, this time stating something that I purportedly said, that I did not say; and, rather than have Gregorian explain the truth of the statement, judge Cowan overruled my objection, without further explanation; again, accepting Gregorian’s false statement without explanation from Gregorian as to the truth. See Exhibit #5, p. 43, lines 21-28. This is also aiding and abetting by accepting a pattern of false statements without explanation.
5. Aiding and abetting Gregorian’s false statement by relying on the false statement specifically to deny me relief, or to deny my petition.
Judge Cowan, in his conservatorship decision, relied on the false statement to deny me relief, and, conversely, to grant Jackson relief.
Judge Cowan, in his conservatorship decision, stated, in part, “There’s compelling evidence that it would not be in the proposed conservatee’s best interest for Mr. Bray to be her conservator. . . . That is not in Ms. Davis’s interest, including taking money out of her account. Counsel (Gregorian) indicates that her capacity since last year or earlier has been such that she would not have understood what Mr. Bray was trying to do; and therefore, the Court has grave concern about Mr. Bray being in charge of money that he’s been trying to get in charge of apparently for some time without complete success.” Judge Cowan relied on the false statement, at least in part, in charging that I took money out of my mother’s account (which, when based on the implication that any taking was against my mother’s will or without her authorization or permission, was false). Therefore, judge Cowan aided and abetted Gregorian’s false evidence submitted in his PVP Report and presented to the Court by relying on that statement for his specific decision to deny me relief.
6. Aiding and abetting by relying on the PVP Report, containing the false statement, in making his overall conservatorship decision.
At the beginning of the June 4, 2015 hearing, judge Cowan made it clear that he would be relying on the PVP Report and the Court Investigator’s Report in making his decision. See Exhibit #2, p. 1, line 25 to p. 2, line 13, where “The court’s had an opportunity to review P.V.P. counsel’s further report as well as the court investigator’s report, both of which recommend that on these competing petitions. . . that the court grant Ms. Jackson’s petition. That’s consistent with what Ms. Davis wants and for other reasons. . . in the reports including that. . . contentions that Mr. Bray has been using money of Ms. Davis that perhaps he should not have been doing. . . .” “He knows what the court’s likely to do based on these reports.” Emphasis added.
III EVIDENCE OF THE INVESTIGATOR’S FALSE STATEMENT(S)
1. The Court investigator’s Report #1
A. The investigator’s false statement is as significant for its theme as it is for the statement itself. The statement’s theme, as with Gregorian’s statement and judge Cowan’s aiding and abetting the statements, is that I was stealing or attempting to steal money from my mother. Again, this proposition is entirely false, and because it is false, it cannot be proven to be true.
Judge Cowan specifically referred to Spence’s Report during the hearing, see Exhibit #5, p. 22 , where, “the courtroom assistant has given me the court’s own investigator’s report. It has some fairly disturbing information in this I think is worth discussing here” (this shows the significance of the statement and Report to the judge). The judge states further (purportedly reading from the Report, and he did not use the terms “indicate” and “allegedly”—that’s court reporter editing) “He has tried to take his mother out of the facility and to the bank. . . .” And the judge clearly interpreted this statement as taking her out to the bank to cash checks, Id., p. 23, “Did you take her out of the facility to cash checks?”
In the court Investigator’s March 23, 2015 Report, see Exhibit #3, pgs. 4-5, here at p. 5 (the numbering on the pages are mine—the actual Report is not numbered), investigator Gailyn Spence states, in part, “At Bright Days, he (me) has tried to take her (conservatee-my mother) out and to the bank. . . .” This statement is entirely false. I have never tried to take my mother out of this facility (“Bright Days”) at any time for any reason. There was not even an attempt to take her away from this facility. This is the present facility where my mother is being cared for. This is not the same facility that is the subject of Gregorian’s statement. For additional proof that this statement is false, the D.A. would have to question the workers at Bright Days as to whether I have ever attempted to take my mother out of the facility for any reason. If they say that I did, they’re lying.
Further, even if Spence claims the statement is not hers, it still is an adoptive admission pursuant to CA Evidence Code sec. 1221, because of Spence’s conduct in framing the statement as though it is her own . Evidence Code sec. 1221 provides: “Evidence of a statement offered against a party is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is one of which the party, with knowledge of the content thereof, has by words or other conduct manifested his adoption or his belief in its truth.”
Finally, unlike Gregorian’s statement, Spence’s statement is made under oath, therefore, I charge her with perjury as well. See Penal Code 118a, 119, 123, 124, and 125.
B. This Report also states, at p. 4, “Lorick reported he took his mother shopping, to the bank and medical appointments” (emphasis added). I did not tell (i.e., report) the investigator that I took my mother to medical appointments. This was a false statement. While this statement appears to be non-monumental on its face, a later passage in the investigator’s report, infra, reveals the importance of the statement.
On page 5 of the Report, Spence states, “Per Ms. Jackson, he (me) did not take his mother anywhere, including appointments.” So, if I actually stated or reported that I took my mother on medical appointments, I would be lying, and my sister can prove that she took my mother on medical appointments (because she does), while I can’t (because I do not—although I have taken my mother to doctor’s appointments before and I have accompanied my sister in taking my mother to appointments. But, my sister generally take my mother to doctor’s appointments, and I know this ). This would disparage or impeach my character, or make me out to be a liar. The investigator deemed this statement important enough to put it in both (2) of her reports. See infra.
2. Court Investigator’s Report #2.
In Spence’s second report, she repeated the false statement identified above verbatim (but spelling my name correctly this time), “Laurack reported he took his mother shopping, to the bank and medical appointments.” Again, I never told Spence that I took my mother to medical appointments.
3. Court Reliance on the statement
Judge Cowan clearly relied on the investigator’s statement in arriving at his decision. His ultimate decision clearly refers to Jackson taking my mother on doctor appointments. “The evidence is undisputed that . . . it’s Ms. Jackson, not Mr. Bray, who takes her to see the doctor.” See Exhibit #5. And, regarding the statement about me trying to take my mother “out and to the bank”, judge Cowan, in my view, referring to both Gregorian’s and Spence’s referrals to my taking (per Gregorian) or attempting to take (per Spence) my mother to the bank (impliedly to steal money from my mother), states, “the court has grave concern about Mr. Bray being in charge of money that he’s been trying to get in charge of apparently for some time without complete success. Emphasis added. Id. This, together with the judge’s earlier admonition at the outset of the two-day hearings that he would rely on both reports (Gregorian’s and Spence’s), seals the confirmation of his reliance on both reports.
IV EVIDENCE OF JUDGE COWAN’S AIDING AND ABETTING SPENCE’S OFFERING AND/OR PREPARING FALSE EVIDENCE OR A FALSE REPORT
The best evidence that judge Cowan aided and abetted Spence’s false statements being prepared and submitted to the court was the judge’s continued conclusion that I took my mother out of the Bright Days facility after I testified under oath that I did not, and his not requiring proof *from others that I did .
Exhibit #5, p.23, line 22:
THE COURT: Did you take her out of the facility to cash checks ?
MR. BRAY: . . . . No, absolutely not.
P. 24
THE COURT: . . . Did you take her out of the facility to take her to the bank?
MR. BRAY: No
(After this, it’s clear the judge was referring to the Bright Days facility—from Spence’s Report, but Jackson and I thought he was referring to a previous facility (Virgie’s Manor in Carson, CA), but, it’s inconsequential because I did not take my mother from Virgie’s or attempt to take her from Bright Days).
P. 25
THE COURT: I’m telling you, I want to know why it is that you went and took her out of the facility.
V BRIEF BACKGROUND INFORMATION NECESSARY FOR AN EXPLANATION OF THE “MATERIALITY” OF THE STATEMENTS
In September of last year, my 93 year old mother (here, the Conservatee) had a fall at her home. Both my sister, Dianne Jackson, and I, live with my mother at her home in Los Angeles. After my mother’s fall, she became incapacitated, to the extent that she became unable to walk and to use her hands, i.e., to write or feed herself—before the fall, she was able to walk and to feed herself, and to partially write, e.g., she was cryptically signing her checks to pay bills (I did everything else, completing forms, completing checks, balancing the checkbook, and mailing the bills)—therefore, after the fall, someone had to be in charge of my mother’s affairs. Backing up a little, prior to my mother’s fall, as stated previously, I mechanically paid my mother’s bills, but it was her money. I have performed the mechanics of paying my mother’s bills for at least the last 10 years (and my mother would assist me—putting address labels and stamps on the bill letters). After her fall, she was unable to sign her checks. So, on at least two occasions, after she had been placed in a care facility (Virgie’s Manor in Carson, CA) by my sister, rather than returning home, I tried to take her to the bank, so that she could put me on her account, and I could sign the checks myself—rather than my mother, in my own name, and continue paying the bills.
My sister was on my mother’s account (she was put on as backup for my mother when I was not living with my mother—and my sister was), but, my mother, over 10 years ago, had assigned me the duties of paying her bills because my sister (when both she and I were paying my mother’s bills, at different times of course) was not paying the bills on time and was not balancing my mother’s checkbook correctly(my sister could have put me on my mother’s account—a bank official so advised me—but, she refused to—in my view, because she treats my mother’s account as her own). And, besides paying her bills, I primarily took care of my mother, even before the fall. My sister prepared my mother’s medicine and took her to her doctor’s appointments.
Because of hostility or disagreement between my sister and I (which festered over the years—family issues, esp. involving my sister’s daughter), we disagreed over the care of my mother.
This brings us to the conservatorship. My sister and I filed competing petitions for conservatorship over my mother’s affairs. My sister filed first, and I countered with a petition of my own. This brings us to the “materiality” of attorney Gregorian’s and investigator Spence’s statements. On the face of the competing petitions and of the qualification or fitness to be the conservator of my mother’s affairs, both my sister and I would probably be deemed to be equally qualified, e.g., education (we both have post-graduate degrees), experience (my sister has a heath services background and I have a social services and legal background), etc.. So, in order for one child to be granted the conservatorship over the other, some outstanding trait or deficiency would be helpful.
In my view, Gregorian, Spence, and judge Cowan, individually (and I believe based on my sister’s representations *to them), decided that the determinant factor would be my bad character, i.e., stealing money from my mother. They adopted this theme from the outset of the proceeding, and never let go. Gregorian, who technically and legally was supposed to be representing my mother, but, in actuality, was representing my sister, e.g., he met with her after two appearances in court and he supported her in court, apparently decided that the controlling factor (in the conservatorship decision ) would be to disparage my character and charge me with stealing from my mother by taking money from her checking account, impliedly without her permission (again, he likely got this theory from my sister) . And, that is what caused his statement to be “material”. The same thing applies to Spence’s statement. I certainly should not be appointed a conservator of my mother’s affairs if I am stealing from her account .
Another reason why the statement is “material” is because the trial judge, judge Cowan, relied on the statement in denying my petition, and, conversely, in granting my sister’s petition. See Exhibit 5, p. 46, where “There’s compelling evidence that it would not be in the proposed conservatee’s best interest for Mr. Bray to be her conservator. . . . That is not in Ms. Davis’s interest, including taking money out of her account. Counsel (Gregorian) indicates that her capacity since last year or earlier has been such that she would not have understood what Mr. Bray was trying to do; and therefore, the court has grave concern about Mr. Bray being in charge of money that he’s been trying to get in charge of apparently for some time without complete success.” Emphasis added.
VI REASONS WHY ATTORNEY GREGORIAN, INVESTIGATOR SPENCE, AND JUDGE COWAN MUST BE CHARGED .
Gregorian must be charged with violating P.C. 134 because Section 134 dictates as follows: Every person guilty of preparing any false or ante-dated book , paper, record, instrument in writing, or other matter or thing (here, false statements), with the intent to produce it, or allow it to be produced for any fraudulent or deceitful purpose, as genuine or true , upon any trial, proceeding, or inquiry whatever, authorized by law, is guilty of (a) felony.
Gregorian prepared, at least, a false paper or instrument in writing (the PVP Report), see Exhibit #1 (see cover page and signature page, and false statement) or other matter or thing (i.e., the false statements), Id.; with the intent to produce it (the Report was written and filed in court by Gregorian); or allow it to be produced for a fraudulent or deceitful purpose (to have my sister’s petition granted, where it otherwise would not be; and to have my petition denied, where it otherwise would be granted); as “true” (when, in fact, the statement in the Report, and, therefore, the Report itself, was false); upon any. . . proceeding (the conservatorship hearing); authorized by law (the hearing is authorized by probate law). And, it is clear that the “entire” Report need not be false; false statements in the Report are enough. See People v. McKenna , 11 Cal.2d 327 (Cal. 1938), where “It is clear that the effect of the letter with the statements concerning transfer of title to the notes and mortgages is much different than it is without those statements. (Emphasis added). The charge of preparing and offering false evidence in this particular was, therefore, fully sustained. . . .” At p. 335.
Judge Cowan should be charged with aiding and abetting Gregorian’s submission of the false statement and Report to the Court because he refused to require Gregorian to address or refute the false statement (or prove that the statement was true) in court, and thereafter relied on the Report and false statement to deny me relief and grant Jackson relief, thereby assisting Gregorian with presenting the false Report and false statement to the Court. In fact, by not requiring Gregorian to refute the false statement (or prove that the statement was true), judge Cowan actually encouraged Gregorian to continue to rely on the false Report and false statement. Finally, judge Cowan continued to encourage Gregorian to make false statements by overruling my objection to another false statement made by Gregorian during the hearing (and not requiring Gregorian to show that the statement was true, i.e., explain the circumstances of why the statement was true). See a discussion of this statement, supra.
Investigator Spence should be charged under the same provision as Gregorian, i.e., P.C. 134, because like Gregorian, she prepared a false paper or instrument in writing, i.e., Probate Investigator’s Petition Report, or other matter or thing, i.e., the false statement, with the intent to produce it for a fraudulent or deceitful purpose, i.e., to charge me with stealing from my mother or attacking my character with false facts or information and to assist Jackson with having her petition granted (and, conversely, to assist in having my petition denied), as a true statement or Report, at the conservatorship hearing, which is authorized by law.
Again, Spence’s statements, as were Gregorian’s , were for the purpose of supporting the theme of my stealing money from my mother, which is absolutely false. I would never steal from my mother. She has done too much for me, throughout my life.
VII PROBABLE CAUSE FOR AN IMMEDIATE ARREST
There is sufficient probable cause evidence for an immediate arrest for all three individuals, and I request that they be arrested. There are the written reports, containing the false statements, prepared by and signed by both Gregorian and Spence; there are the admissions by silence or adopted admissions of Gregorian; there are my statements, both unsworn and sworn, declaring that the statements are false; and there are the court (reporter) transcripts revealing my testimony that the statements are false. Further, the court transcripts reveal the assistance judge Cowan provides to both Gregorian and Spence in having false statements presented to and relied upon by the court (himself), whether that assistance is considered pursuant to offering false evidence, P.C. 132 or preparing false evidence, P.C. 134. Finally, in terms of probable cause for an arrest, if the above evidence is not sufficient alone, then the corroboration by Jackson, particularly regarding Gregorian and judge Cowan, seals the deal.
I have suffered harm and my mother has suffered harm by the accused’s actions. I have suffered direct harm, by having my petition for conservatorship denied based on false facts and/or evidence, and by having my character smeared, especially since I am a lawyer, and by suffering emotional harm having to worry about my mother’s affairs knowing that my sister is not properly taking care of some of my mother’s affairs, e.g., her mortgage payments, see infra. Moreover, my sister and I take different positions regarding the care of my mother, e.g., keeping her in a nursing home versus returning her to her home, and those two positions should have been fairly adjudicated, but wasn’t.
My mother is being harmed because her affairs, in particular, her bills, especially her mortgage bill, are not being timely paid, placing her property in jeopardy. When I last paid my mother’s bills, near the end of last year, the mortgage bill was ahead by 3 months, that is, the next payment (and each monthly payment) wasn’t due for three months (I arranged this to protect my mother, in the event something happened and she was unable to make a payment the following month—she would not miss making a payment). Now, with my sister paying the bills (by default—because she’s on my mother’s checking account, and I’m not, and can write checks, and she refused to put me on the account), with the most recent mortgage bill, the payment is due the next month, i.e., August 1, 2015.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, attorney Armen D. Gregorian, investigator Gailyn Spence, and judge David J. Cowan should be arrested and prosecuted for violating California’s Penal Code during the course of my conservatorship proceedings. I have filed the herein Complaint to initiate and support the prosecution.
Recently, in a Los Angeles’ Times article, “Case sharpens focus on mentally ill, courts”, July 24, 2015, which discussed the prosecution of a mentally ill woman for picking up and raising a police baton at the scene of an arrest, the Times quoted District Attorney Jackie Lacey as saying two important things: (1) “Lacey said her job is to balance public safety and victims’ rights” and (2) “There are times where people commit crimes. . . where they’re just going to have to be punished.” I hope Ms. Lacey’s positions continue to hold true for my case.
*THE L.A. TIMES ARTICLE (these words are not included in original Complaint)
Finally, to place this Complaint in an associated context, I would refer the D.A.’s office to another L.A. Times’ article, “Disability complaint targets Superior Court”, June 27, 2015, where “The class-action complaint, filed with the U.S. Department of Justice in Los Angeles, alleges that court-appointed attorneys routinely violate the Americans with Disabilities Act during limited-conservatorship proceedings” and “The court requires attorneys to advocate for the client while assisting the court in resolving the matter, violating the client’s right to due process, the complaint alleges”. Attorney Gregorian, in my case, is a court-appointed attorney, purportedly representing my elderly mother, in a conservatorship case in the Superior Court of California.
This concludes my Complaint.
UPDATE--September 5, 2015
NEWS FLASH!
Now, after publishing this blog, I've received a JURY SUMMONS, although my last county of voter registration was Ventura County, and usually, the jury pool is selected from the voter registration pool. But, I would love to serve on a jury. At least the parties on trial, be they criminal or civil, will know that at least one juror will be fair and impartial, *and will provide them with a fair and impartial decision.
UPDATE--September 8, 2015
*But, the question is : Is it just a coincidence that I received the Jury Summons at this time (right after the conservatorship proceedings, filing the criminal complaint, and publishing this blog) or is there something else ?
UPDATE--September 30, 2015
NEWS FLASH!!
I have now received a letter from Attorney General Kamala Harris. While I thank her for her generally prompt response, her letter is generally the same as Lacy's; therefore, I have the same one-word response : BULLSHIT! (and it really does stink). And Harris's letter is more bullshit than Lacy's, because at least Lacy's response addressed and treated the Complaint as a criminal Complaint (which it is). Harris, on the other hand, attempts to avoid the criminal and racial discrimination issues altogether (in fact, she does avoid them; I say "attempt" because I will not allow her to avoid them without the revelation that she is doing so).
In avoiding the criminal and racial discrimination issues altogether, Harris, through some assistant letter-writing person, Casey Hallinan, (who I believe is either white or white-oriented) attempts to treat the criminal Complaint and the racial discrimination issues as a simple, and civil, "conservatorship" matter : "Thank you for your correspondence to the Office of the Attorney General regarding a conservator, guardian, or trustee. We regret that we are unable to assist you, as this matter falls outside of our jurisdiction. Conservators, guardians and trustees are appointed by the Superior Court of the county where the person or estate is located. The court may remove a conservator, guardian, or trustee who is not doing the job properly, and then appoint a new conservator, guardian, or trustee. The ward or conservatee, or any of his or her relatives or friends, may petition the court to remove and replace the conservator. The petition must state facts showing cause for removal."
This response is just dispicable. Nowhere in my letter did I request any assistance with the conservatorship matter, and Harris knows this (from the letter itself). It is simply, and intentionally (there is no mistake or misunderstanding of what matters I was seeking relief for--as a matter of fact, this would be a good place to submit and reveal the actual letter that I sent to Harris; upon completion of this paragraph of writing)an avoidance of the real and serious issues that I asked her, as a victim of a crime, to address. Before going any further, here's my letter to Harris :
LAURACK D. BRAY, ESQ.
FEDERAL ATTORNEY
P.O. BOX 611432
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
TEL: (805) 901-2693
September 16, 2015
Kamala D. Harris
California Attorney General
California Department of Justice
P.O. Box 944255
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550
Dear A. G. Harris :
Enclosed is a copy of a criminal Complaint that I filed with the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office. The Complaint is filed against attorney Armen Gregorian, Court Investigator Gailyn Spence, and Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County Judge David J. Cowan, for preparing a false report or a report containing false statements or information, and/or aiding and abetting the same .
The Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office (D.A.’s Office) refused to investigate and/or prosecute the Complaint, stating , in part, “There is insufficient evidence to warrant a criminal investigation in this matter”. See D.A.’s Letter enclosed.
Because I believe there is clearly sufficient evidence for my Complaint to be “investigated”, at minimum, and that I am being denied due process regarding the prosecution of my Complaint, as a victim of a crime, I am now submitting the same Complaint to you as Attorney General of California. Moreover, because I believe the decision to not investigate and/or prosecute the Complaint is racially-motivated, I am also submitting a copy of a blog that I published and posted which relates to the failure of the D.A.’s Office to investigate and/or prosecute the Complaint or the individuals named and/or identified in the Complaint for what I believe are racially-motivated reasons. See infra.
Finally, I believe that you and the Attorney General’s Office should investigate and/or prosecute the Complaint for the following reasons :
1.Pursuant to the applicable facts identified in the Complaint and the California Penal Code, a crime, or crimes, has been committed, and those committing the crimes should be required to partake in the criminal justice process to determine their guilt or innocence. As I stated above, there is clearly enough evidence for an investigation (and an arrest), so the D.A.’s office has clearly abused its discretion in not protecting the rights of a victim of a crime, and in not making criminals submit to the criminal justice process, or , in essence, in allowing criminals to get away with crimes. Clearly, if the D.A.’s Office can arrest and prosecute a Black woman for assault for raising a baton, with (in my opinion) no evidence of anyone being placed in apprehension of immediate harm from her raising the baton, it can and should arrest and prosecute those individuals in question here for making false statements to and before a court of law, where there is documentary and/or testimonial evidence of a false statement being made. See infra.
2. Notwithstanding any evidentiary decision regarding the aiding and abetting by Cowan, there is clearly sufficient evidence for the investigation and arrest of Gregorian, as a matter of fact and law. And, the same holds true for Spence. The Penal Code prohibits making a false statement in a report submitted to the Court, and Gregorian and Spence made and submitted false statements to the court. And, Spence’s false statement was made under oath, and therefore, is perjury.
3. In her zest to protect the named individuals, District Attorney Jackie Lacy, through a one James Garrison, Head Deputy of the Justice System Integrity Division , has herself made a false statement, that is, “there is insufficient evidence to warrant a criminal investigation in this matter.” Again, by any objective standards instituted by any experienced criminal and/or criminal defense lawyers detached from the D.A.’s Office, one would find that there is at least sufficient evidence for a criminal “investigation”. Therefore, Lacy makes herself susceptible for an obstruction of justice charge in a federal criminal Complaint.
4. The allegations of false statements made by Gregorian and Spence are substantially more significant than false statements made by others in other contexts. These false statements were made by “officers of the court” , and the false statements were made “to the court”. As “officers of the court”, a higher standard of conduct is expected of Gregorian, Spence, and Cowan than would be expected of others. “As officers of the court, lawyers have an absolute ethical duty to tell judges the truth. . . .” The Free Dictionary.com. And, “In the United States, the generic term officer of the court . . . is applied to all those who, in some degree in function of their professional or similar qualifications, have a legal part—and hence legal and deontological obligations—in the complex functioning of the judicial system as a whole, in order to forge justice out of the application of the law and the simultaneous pursuit of the legitimate interests of all parties and the general good of society.” Wikipedia (emphasis in original).
Because the concept is so significant, I will offer a few more general principles regarding officer of the court from the law review article Lawyers as Officers of the Court, Eugene R. Gateke, 42 Vand.L.Rev, 39 (1989) :
a. The characterization inherently suggests that lawyers owe a special duty to the judicial system or, perhaps, to the public that other participants in the legal process do not owe. At least implicitly, this special duty elevates the interests of the judicial system or of the general public above those of the client or lawyer (emphasis added).
b. The primary distinguishing characteristic of the duties making up the officer of the court obligation, therefore, must be their subordination of the interests of the client and the lawyer to those of the judicial system and the public. An attorney at law is an officer of the court. The nature of his obligation is both public and private. His public duty consists in his obligation to aid the administration of justice; his private duty, to faithfully, honestly, and conscientiously represent the interests of his client (emphasis added).
c. Finally, “most conduct considered prejudicial to the administration of justice already is prohibited by the criminal law (citing Model Penal Code, secs. 240, bribery and corrupt influence; 241, perjury and other falsification in official matters; and 242, obstructing governmental operations (Proposed Official Draft 1962)) or by the rules of civil procedure. . . .” Emphasis added.
So you and the Office of the Attorney General must prosecute my Complaint to determine whether, in fact, false statements were made as I allege, in order to determine whether or not the Defendants (or suspects) in my Complaint should continue to participate in the court system, whether momentarily or permanently.
5. I assert and charge that the refusal of the D.A.’s Office to prosecute my Complaint stems from racial bias and/or discrimination, and therefore, was racially-motivated. While some statistics would be helpful or useful, they are not necessary for me, as a Black man and lawyer (to the extent that my complaint is lodged against a white lawyer) in America, to conclude that I was discriminated against in regard to my Complaint. But, for your benefit, since I am asking you to overrule the D.A.’s decision in refusing to prosecute my complaint, I will rely on the McDonnell-Douglas v. Green formula for determining discrimination based on circumstantial evidence. And, without going through the entire analysis here (because I’m sure your Office has the expertise to undergo the analysis), I will simply state that the government’s proposed legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its refusal to prosecute my Complaint, and make arrests, i.e., insufficient evidence, is nothing more than “pretext”, and the evidence of pretext, which would be an expansion of the same evidence supporting my prima facie case, that is, circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination, would be the evidence that I supplied in support of my complaint. It is simply preposterous for the D.A. to state that there is insufficient evidence to support an “investigation”. That reason is simply a given reason to substitute for the real reason or motive for refusing to prosecute the Complaint, which is racial discrimination.
Other support for my charge of racial discrimination is the cases of Sen. Roderick Wright and Councilman Richard Alarcon, who were both charged and convicted of “lying”(basically), regarding their addresses, which evolved into perjury charges. My Complaint also charges individuals with “lying” (regarding information in a Report submitted to the Court). As I state in my blog, lying is lying, and there is no other legitimate, objective, and sustainable reason for the D.A. Office prosecuting Sen. Wright and Clmn. Alarcon and not prosecuting Gregorian and Cowan other than race or color. The D.A.’s reason, insufficient evidence to investigate, simply is not sustainable; and I believe that you, as a former D.A. yourself (but now an advocate for all Californians) will find this as well. I believe a proper investigation and determination by your Office will require you to require the L.A. D.A. to explain why she investigated and prosecuted the Wright-Alarcon “lying” cases and refused to even investigate the Gregorian-Cowan cases.
Finally, my charges of racial discrimination lodged against the L.A. D.A.’s Office is two-fold : (1) I charge that the D.A. Office exercised racial discrimination against me as a Black male and a Black lawyer (since my complaint is against a white lawyer) by refusing to investigate and prosecute my Complaint against Gregorian, Spence, and Cowan because Gregorian and Cowan are white, and I am Black, or to put it another way, the D.A. Office refused to prosecute my Complaint because I, as a Black man, was bringing a criminal complaint against two white men, one of which is a judge; and (2) I charge that, in this specific case, I was discriminated against by the D.A. Office by the Office refusing to prosecute my Complaint because the Defendants (or accused) are white, rather than Black or other minority, and/or because I am a black male. The difference between the two charges are the first is what I believe is a policy or custom issue, while the second is a case-by-case or individual case issue. For the first charge, statistics (regarding the number of black males who have brought criminal complaints against white people, either telephonically, written, verbal, or otherwise, and have had the D.A. Office refused to investigate the complaints) certainly would be invaluable. For the second, statistics are not necessary.
I believe you and your office must resolve these issues as well, especially if you decide not to investigate and prosecute my complaint. Again, my position is that my Complaint must be investigated and prosecuted, as a matter of fact, evidence, and law.
This concludes this letter.
I would appreciate a prompt reply regarding the status of my Complaint.
Sincerely yours,
Laurack D. Bray, Esq.
Enclosures
END OF LETTER
Now, with the above letter in mind, it should be clear to you, the reader, that Harris intentionally did not address the issues I raised, and requested that she address, in the letter. And, again, Harris's refusal to address the issues are more deplorable than Lacy's, because the issue of racial discrimination was not placed before Lacy at all. The only issue placed before Lacy was the criminal Complaint.
So, now Harris has shown how she as a minority leader will address serious issues of racial discrimination. From my knowledge, this is the first time a racial discrimination issue of this type has been brought before her. And, this is how she handles it. And, she will be seeking the Black, and other minority, vote in her pursuance of the U.S. Senate position. Well, guess what?
More next time.
UPDATE--October 4, 2015
Harris will not be getting my vote in the upcoming election for U.S. Senator.
I voted for her for attorney general, but now that I have a clearer picture of where she's coming from with regards to subtle (if not direct--I consider the discrimination I described in my letter direct), but damaging, racial discrimination, I could not, in good conscience, vote for her.
Harris's letter is disrespectful, degrading, disgusting, and (at least partially because I believe Harris's letter-writer, Casey Hallinan, is white or white-oriented) racist. Notwithstanding that she refuses to take any action regarding the criminal charges or the charges of racial discrimination described in the letter, the letter itself is simply disrespectful and disgusting. More on this matter later.
NEWS FLASH!!
Last week there was a demonstration by black activists in the community calling for the resignation of District Attorney Jackie Lacy, mainly for her refusal to prosecute any of the police officers who have been accused of killing and/or murdering black people in Los Angeles. I completely support the demonstration (and had I known about it, I would have been out there with them), and the demonstration supports my position taken against Lacy in my blog (because most, if not all, of the officers killing these black people (both male and female) were non-black, which reaches the racial discrimination claim that I brought against Lacy in my blog. *According to the Los Angeles Wave newspaper (Thursday, October 1, 2015): "The National Action Network and a coalition of South L.A. civil rights organizations conducted a press conference Sept.30 in front of the downtown office of Los Angeles County District Attorney Jackie Lacy, demanding her immediate resignation because of a failure to prosecute police officers in connection with several deaths of blacks. 'Her tenure as D.A. has been a failure marked with cowardice and a disaster for the African-American community," said activist Najee Ali, who headed the protest.'"
MY CIVIL APPEAL OF THE CONSERVATORSHIP MATTER
*My sister's Petition for conservatorship was granted by Judge Cowan, and my Petition was denied, with prejudice. I appealed (and filed a Notice of Appeal). Next came the designation of record.
After filing a designation of record document (whereby I pointed out all documents I wanted included in the record that is to be forwarded to the Court of appeals), it was discovered that nearly all of the documents I wanted sent to the appeals court was not included in the record that was prepared by the assigned clerk. That mean the appeals court would not have the essential documents showing the misconduct of Gregorian and Cowan. Apparently, someone had removed several pages of the request for designation of documents before the file was handed over to the clerk that actually prepared the designated record, so many documents were omitted. So, I had to bring this to the attention of the civil appeals Clerk's office and the Court of Appeals. And, now, a supplemental record must be prepared, and the appeals process is prolonged.
More next time.
UPDATE--October 11, 2015
There is new material added to the original blog at * above under the October 4, 2015 update regarding Jackie Lacy.
UPDATE--March 31, 2016
THE APPEAL
The "unusual" and prejudicial occurrences continue. After I had ordered and paid for the transcripts (the original and a copy for me) for the Superior Court hearings in this case, through the court reporters, the Appeals Clerk's Office, after already having the original, eventually requested me to submit my copy as well. Then, when it was time to transfer the transcripts to the Court of Appeals, the Clerk's Office sent my copy to the Appeals Court, instead of to me, as it was supposed to do. So, I didn't have a copy of the transcripts that were sent to the appeals court, and, more importantly, I didn't know whether the transcript sent to the appeals court had been altered or not. And the Clerk's Office refused to make another copy for me. A supervisor from the clerk's office informed me that normally the Appellant's copy is sent to the Appellant (me), but, in this case, since I ordered the transcripts from the reporter myself, rather than having the Clerk's Office order the transcripts, my copy was not sent to me (as is usual); rather, they were sent to the Court of Appeals. Go figure that!
Anyway, with the assistance of a fair and decent clerk at the Court of Appeals, I received a copy of the same transcripts that would be relied upon by the Court.
Next, briefs were ordered to be filed. When I filed my brief, I had to include still other missing matter that I had requested be included in the Superior Court record, which was omitted by the Superior Court's Clerk's office (after having made an initial request earlier). My sister defaulted initially in filing her brief, that is, her brief was not filed within the time to do so. So, the Court of Appeals, as is normally the case, gave her more time to file her brief. This time she filed a brief, but the brief was defective in several ways. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals granted her "permission" to file the brief (late).
Moving on, I found the need to file a motion with the Court of Appeals regarding the enforcement of an automatic stay, that is, by law, once an appeal is filed in the Superior Court regarding a conservatorship matter there is an automatic stay imposed (which means no other actions can be taken until the matter is decided on appeal). My sister had taken actions in violation of the automatic stay. Yet, the Court of Appeals motions panel (the next time I update this blog, I will identify the panel) *(Perluss, P.J., Zelon, and Segal) denied the motion without explanation or reasoning (or arbitrarily).
Next, I found the need to file another motion, this time to expedite the appeal and for other immediate relief, e.g., regarding recovering the contents of a safe deposit box (from a bank) of my deceased stepfather before they would be turned over to the state, because they weren't retrieved. The motions panel have yet to rule on the motion(s)(my sister, in turn, filed a motion--which included a response to my motion, and other false and/or misleading matter, and asked the motions panel to expedite the appeal as well). And, because of the false and misleading statements made in my sister's "motion", I filed a response contradicting and explaining the falsity (or mislead) of the statements. The motions panel denied me "permission" to file the response. Can you see where this is going?
However, without acting or ruling on either my or my sister's motion, the Court of Appeals has ordered an accelerated date of April 13, 2016 for the appeal to be argued and heard.
And NOTE : The same motions panel, *Perluss, P.J., Zelon, and Segal, is scheduled to hear and decide the merits of the appeal itself. *Apparently, the California Courts of Appeal assign a case to a division of the Court and that division ordinarily decides both motions and the merits of the appeal itself. But this practice can be prejudicial in that it deprives the litigant of an independent panel to hear and decide the merits of the appeal, especially where the rulings (motions and merits) may prove to be contradictory. My past experiences with courts, state (or D.C.) and federal, generally, are that motions panels and merits panels are separate.
Remember that date : April 13, 2016, 9:00 A.M., CA Second District Court of Appeals, downtown L.A., on Spring Street.
More next time.
UPDATE--April 7, 2016
This update is primarily to insert the names of the judges assigned to the case, for both the motions and the oral argument and merits of the appeal (the same panel will decide both--Judges Perluss, P.J., Zelon, and Segal--from Division Seven). See * portions above.
Again, the argument date is : April 13, 2016, 9:00 A.M., CA Court of Appeals, Second District where the major issues will be : (1) criminal conduct contributing to a civil judgment; (2) racial and gender bias exercised by the trial judge in arriving at his decision; and (3)the conservatorship decision (re: a 94 year-old mother) as between a sister and brother.
UPDATE--April 8, 2016
This case, while starting out as a simple conservatorship case, has added importance because of at least the following :
1. One of the central characters in this case and appeal is a court-appointed attorney in a conservatorship proceeding representing a partially disabled person.
In June of last year, the L.A. Times published an article dealing with court-appointed attorneys in the Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County, and disability persons in limited conservatorship proceedings in the Court. It was stated in the article, "Disability Complaint Targets Superior Court", that "The class action complaint, filed with the U.S. Department of Justice in Los Angeles, alleges that court-appointed attorneys routinely violate the Americans with Disabilities Act during limited conservatorship proceedings" and "The court requires attorneys to advocate for the client while assisting the court in resolving the matter, violating the client's right to due process, the complaint alleges." Therefore, this case provides some support for the notion that there is a serious problem with the relationship between court-appointed attorneys and the judges that appoint them in conservatorship proceedings in the Superior Court, be the conservatorship proceedings *limited or otherwise.
2. The court-appointed attorney and judge in this case have been charged with criminal conduct, or otherwise misconduct, and the conduct charged would tend to support a working or supportive relationship between the two, which would tend to support the above-identified Complaint filed with the Justice Department.
3. Finally, there is also a charge of racial and gender bias by a judge in the case. The resolution of this matter is also significant as it pertains to the continued participation of the judge in the court system, and as it pertains to the treatment of Black males in the Superior Court of California, especially those Black males proceeding pro se, that is, when they are not represented by a white lawyer, *particularly (which might provide them with somewhat of a shield from overt discrimination), or otherwise, i.e., a non-white lawyer.
UPDATE--April 12, 2016
The appellate argument is tomorrow, April 13, 2016, at 9:00 A.M. at the CA Second District Court of Appeals on Spring Street, downtown, L.A..
UPDATE--April 28, 2016
Oral argument was performed and the Court of Appeals has now issued a decision : Judge Cowan's decision is affirmed. That is, the Court left judge Cowan's decision intact. But, see above, under the March 31st UPDATE in this blog where I posed the question, "Can you see where this is going?" Well, that is where it went! To an unfair decision. More on the appeal decision , but first : Richard Alarcon.
RICHARD ALARCON
The main focus of this blog began as a revelation of the adverse discriminating treatment of the L.A. District Attorney's Office of minority officials, as compared to that of white officials. Richard Alarcon was one of the minority officials identified and named in the herein blog. This is an update regarding Alarcon.
Second District Court of Appeals Decision
In January of this year, the Court of appeals reversed the trial court decision in Alarcon's case, and therefore, reversed Alarcon's convictions on four counts of voter fraud and perjury.
The L.A. District Attorney's Office
Well, according to the L.A. Times, "Los Angeles County Dist. Atty. Jackie Lacy announced she would retry Alarcon on the same four charges the appellate court overturned." "Retry Richard Alarcon", April 27, 2016.
The Racism Continues
So, Jackie Lacy is going to spend more taxpayer money and government time on retrying Alarcon, a Hispanic, but she won't try and convict Gregorian and Cowan, who are white, even though the evidence against Gregorian and Cowan is stronger than that against Alarcon. In order to convict Alarcon, the D.A.'s office, based on the last trial, will have to put on numerous witnesses, produce numerous documents and photographs, and compare two different homes and locations, in order to convict Alarcon of four felony Counts of voter fraud and perjury. Even though there are only four Counts now, most of the same evidence offered for the 16 charges (at trial, I believe it began as 24 charges) will have to be produced for the four charges. Contrarily, the trial of Gregorian and Cowan would only require a few witnesses for the prosecution and defense, and a few documents. At most, the actual trial of Gregorian and Cowan would only require 2-3 days (a week at most). But, the D.A.'s office would rather spend (and waste) resources on prosecuting Alarcon (again) who lied (if, in fact he did, and I'm not saying that he did) to represent constituents, but not spend resources on prosecuting Gregorian and Cowan, who lied (or aided and abetted a lie)(and I am saying that they did) to deny a person relief. Is it really worth it to retry Alarcon again? Would Lacy re-try Alarcon if he was white?
THE APPEAL
Back to the appeal decision in my case, Bray v. Jackson.
The decision, written by Judge Zelon, was nearly as biased (favoring Jackson, my sister), if not the same, as Cowan's decision. *And Zelon exercised the same type of bias as Cowan did, i.e., racial and gender. Therefore, *her decision lacks integrity. Consequently, I will not waste my time critiquing the decision the same as I would a fair and impartial decision which had been decided against me. However, I will point out a few things that will provide you, *the reader, with the flavor of the decision :
1. Regarding trial court bias. The question posed was whether the trial court (or judge)had exercised bias (against me) during the hearing below? Judge Zelon, although she concluded in bold letters "3. Appellant Has Not Demonstrated Bias", she never addressed the actual bias issued. That is, there was absolutely no discussion of the actual "bias" issue itself at all. In fact, after her concluding statement noted above, she began to address the "type" of bias, i.e., racial bias (without ever addressing or answering the question of whether Cowan has exercised any "bias" itself at all). So, her total discussion of the actual bias issue was her conclusory statement "Appellant has not demonstrated Bias". In essence and fact, she never made a factual "determination", after a factual analysis and discussion, that Cowan did not exercise bias. *So, you know what that means? Cowan exercised bias as I argued , urged, and stated; and as the hearing transcript reveals.
More next time.
UPDATE--May 3, 2016
2. Regarding the type of bias, race and gender. I argued in my brief and at oral argument that Cowan exercised racial and gender bias. Zelon , in her decision, never answered the question as to whether Cowan did or didn't. She simply acknowledged the Supreme Court case that I submitted for proving racial and gender bias through circumstantial evidence, McDonnell Douglas v. Green, and concluded that it "cannot be applied here", and thereafter, reached no conclusions whatsoever regarding the racial and gender bias issue. And, along the way, she makes false statements of her own, but, I will not address them here; I'll save them for another day and another context.
3. Regarding the issue of the civil judgment being supported by *criminal conduct, requiring reversal per se; again, Zelon *or the Court never answered the question.
More next time.
UPDATE--May 4, 2016
#3. Continued
Again, the Court never answers the question. It never addresses whether Gregorian and Cowan violated the California Penal Code (as a matter of fact, the Penal Code was never mentioned in the "discussion"), and whether that conduct supported the judgment, and whether that total action required reversal of the judgment per se. Zelon offered a discombobulated discussion of my "attempt" to take my mother to the bank, which only provided further proof that there was no "completed" act (which the false statement was based on), and she somehow concluded that the trial judge based his decision on the "attempted" act (which the evidence, i.e., transcript, contradicts) rather than the completed act. But, the entire paragragh of the discussion is confusing, and nothing more than an attempt to explain the unexplainable (that the court did not rely on the false statement of the completed act in reaching his decision; because it did).
4. Finally, the Court gave little regard to the welfare of the conservatee, my mother. I asserted that my sister had on occasions taken advantage of or exercised undue influence on my mother, for my sister's benefit. The Court never addressed these concerns. The Court's main concern was exercising bias against me, notwithstanding the welfare of my mother.
BOTTOMLINE : In my opinion, there were two primary purposes for the Court's decision in this case (1) to protect Gregorian and Cowan from a finding of guilt, or other liability, and (2) to retaliate against me for criticizing the Superior Court of California for denying minority litigants their constitutional rights, and for bringing criminal charges against Gregorian and Cowan.
But, whatever the reasons for the Court's decision in this case, the decision lacks integrity and is disgraceful (especially for an appellate court). There were serious issues which were not addressed, or which were not properly addressed. Furthermore, my constitutional rights were violated here, and will be raised. They were also violated in the Superior Court, but I chose not to raise them on appeal (but, even if I had, what do you think would have happened with this panel?).
NEXT STEPS: The California Supreme Court and A Federal Criminal/Civil Rights Complaint
The California Supreme Court--I will file something with the California Supreme Court for no other reason than to inform them (or it) of the overall conduct of the parties and proceedings involved in this case, so that the Supreme Court cannot say that it did not know about it. But, there will be valid reasons as well. I know that usually the Supreme Court gives little attention to "unpublished" decisions (as is the case here) or opinions (and the Court of Appeals knows this too), but, I believe the magnitude of this case may cause the Supreme Court to give pause (notwithstanding the "unpublished" opinion or decision). In any event, it will know about the criminality perpetrated by court "officers" and it can make up its own mind how it wants to deal with it.
A Federal Criminal/Civil Rights Complaint--I had the basis for filing a civil rights complaint based on the occurrences in the Superior Court, but I chose not. But, I will now. I have not seen the current civil rights Complaint filed by some litigants with conservatorship proceedings (I believe mostly limited conservatorships in the Superior Court), so I do not know the specific nature of their Complaint. But, my Complaint will be directed towards federal criminality and civil rights violations, encompassing both the Superior Court of California and the Second District Court of Appeals.
THE BUCK WILL STOP (I.E., "THE BUCK STOPS HERE") WITH THE ASSERTION OF THE INTEGRITY AND/OR DIGNITY OF THE RESPECTIVE *REMAINING BODIES
UPDATE--June 18, 2016
I've now taken the next step : I've filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandate in the California Supreme Court on Monday, June 13th. In the Petition, I'm requesting the Supreme Court to order the Second District Court of Appeal to rule on a motion that it failed to rule on in issuing its decision in the case. Moreover, I've requested the Supreme Court to order the Court of Appeal to provide me with a fair and impartial appeal, which it didn't do below.
Moreover, included in the Petition is a request for an "emergency and immediate stay" of a "move-out" order issued by the Compton Superior Court pursuant to a request by my sister, Dianne Jackson, in conjunction with a restraining order that she sought and obtained from the Compton Court on June 1, 2016, based on lies or false statements. Nevertheless, the Court accepted and relied on those lies in issuing the "move-out" order, so as of June 3, 2016, I've had to move out of my home, pending a scheduled June 22, 2016 hearing on the restraining order. So, I requested an emergency stay of the so-called move-out order from the Supreme Court, in conjunction with the Petition. Thusfar, I've received no response (since June 13th) regarding the stay request. Therefore, it's the same as a denial; and I remain removed from my home, and the Supreme Court has no idea of the conditions I may or may not be suffering. If I am suffering, then I would continue to suffer until the scheduled hearing. Even if that suffering would prevent me from attending the hearing. The Court's position at this point is, that's my problem. But, notwithstanding any suffering (whether there is or not), clearly I've suffered irreparable harm by the displacement.
The move-out order was and is unconstitutional, at least, and likely illegal, as a matter of state law. It is unconstitutional as a matter of due process, especially under the facts and circumstances of this case. But, apparently, I must suffer through any unlawfulness until Wednesday, June 22, 2016. That is the day and date of the hearing on my sister's restraining order (which the move-out order is a part of), at the Compton Courthouse, 8:30 a.m., Dept. N.
This is not the first time my sister has done this, but the previous "ex parte" (by her testimony alone) restraining order did not include a "move-out" order (so the harm done was minimal). But, because of this move-out order which is being implemented, it may cause more serious consequences for my sister, if falsely brought. And, it was. Moreover, I brought a restraining order of my own, charging my sister with harassment for bringing her current one (and the previous one). My restraining order request, which, not surprisingly, was denied, is scheduled for hearing two days after hers, on June 24, 2016, Dept. M, before a different judge, I believe.
So, this is the state of the record at this time as far as "the next step" is concerned regarding Gregorian and Cowan. By the way, I also requested a stay of Cowan's conservatorship decision, but it was not requested on an emergency basis.
UPDATE--June 30, 2016
The California Supreme Court has now acted. It denied both the Petition and stay requests through one-line decisions. No written opinions or decisions, just simple denials. In any event, now they (the entire court) know about the criminality and constitutional misconduct in some California Courts. So they cannot say that they didn't know. Now I can see why the federal Complainants identified in the Times article noted above likely had to turn to the federal government for relief. It seems likely that the Complainants proceeded through state courts as I did, and received no relief. Therefore, they turned to the federal government for relief. But, in all honesty, I have not reviewed the procedural posture of any of the class action Plaintiffs in the case, so I am engaging in pure speculation. But, based on my case, it is reasonable speculation.
Next, the restraining order hearings. I will only comment on the first one (my sister's) at this time, and leave the other for later. At and during the Dept. N hearing, my sister persisted in lying and saying I "pushed" her (and this was the primary and "necessary" basis for her "elder abuse" complaint. And because she has repeatedly stated this, under oath, it's perjury. We both know that I didn't push her or put my hands on her. And, there is enough circumstantial evidence, together with my direct evidence (my testimony that this push never occurred) for a finding of guilt.
However, and nonetheless, the trial judge, Dianne Gould-*Saltman, issued a restraining order (against me). From my view, it was a "limited" and "sympathetic" restraining order. That is, it is limited in that it was not based on my sister's lie about me pushing her (it is clear from the judge's order that she didn't believe that I pushed my sister, so she issued a restraining order for other reasons). The restraining order was "sympathetic" because my sister cried and sobbed while testifying, and I believe the judge felt compelled to issue some type of relief for her. Nevertheless, it is a restraining order, and I must suffer the consequences of it (the overall effect) until it is challenged in some way, and it will be.
The next question is: was judge Gould-*Saltman, who is white,
fair? I will answer the question by first posing two sub-questions : (1) Was judge Gould-*Saltman completely fair ? No (and she could have been). I will discuss this point more, infra. (2) Was the judge partially fair? Yes. Absolutely. Her partial fairness was significant to me. It allowed me to see and visit with my mother (where the TRO had prevented me from doing so) and it allowed me to remain in my home or residence (where the TRO had required me to "move-out"--and judge Gould-*Saltman could have continued the "move-out" order had she chose to--again, I believe she didn't because she did not believe that I "pushed" my sister). There were also two other provisions that the judge ordered which benefitted me and helped provide some sense of fairness, but I need not mention them here, because they, while material, are less significant than the two items previously discussed. And so, I must thank judge Gould-*Saltman for her partial fairness, and I am going on record doing so here. Thanks, judge Gould-*Saltman.
It's ironic, because this is the same judge that I wrote a letter about charging her with denying me my due process right to speak, after she had dissolved my sister's previous restraining order. I still believe the letter was warranted, based on the circumstances. But, I'm glad I didn't challenge her through a so-called 170 motion (to have another judge assigned) as I had started to do (I decided to take a chance based on her action in dissolving the first restraining order), because it probably would have been assigned to a totally biased judge.
So, why wasn't judge Gould-*Saltman completely fair? First of all, there was no legitimate basis for a restraining order, of any kind. None of my sister's claims were supported by a preponderance of the evidence, therefore, on that basis alone, the restraining order should have been denied (or dissolved, as she did the first one). For instance, in the court's restraining order, she ordered that I not interfere with my sister performing her conservatorship duties. But, there was no evidence offered that I had interfered with her duties, and if there were some, it was rebutted by my testimony that I had not done so. Secondly, the judge ordered that I not open my mother's (or her deceased's husband's mail). But, this order was completely and totally unfair to both my mother and me, but mostly to my mother, because my mother had requested that I open her mail for years while she was at home. And, she would ask my advice as to what to do with the mail. Moreover, the ruling was unfair to my mother because I opened her mail for her protection. *And, it was a denial *and violation of mother's rights as a conservatee (pursuant to conservatorship or probate law, a conservator must respect the wishes of the conservatee, and here, the conservatee, my mother, wished for me to open her mail). As a matter of fact there are two explicit examples why I should open my mother's and/or the deceased husband's mail : one time the water and power bill, which is in the deceased husband's name, was overdue and the water and power was about to be shutoff, and I had to take steps to get the bill paid to prevent the shutoff (my sister, who is now in charge of paying the bills, was late paying the bill). Were it not for me opening the mail, the water and power would have been shutoff. The other reason is one letter from the bank disclosed that my sister might have taken an inappropriate action with regard to my mother's credit card *(she attempted to get her name put on the credit card, based on her conservator status, but the bank refused to it). I would not have known about that were it not for me opening my mother's mail. So, these are examples of why the judge wasn't completely fair in overseeing the hearing, and she could have been. *She also exhibited some bias in suggesting to my sister that she could evict me.
But, again, she was partially fair, and based on my experiences from the inception of the conservatorship proceedings, she stands alone for fairness in the proceedings.
More next time.
UPDATE--July 24, 2016
I will now get to my restraining order hearing. It was conducted by one Stephen M. Lowry, a white male *Commissioner(I incorrectly upgraded him to a judge before). My request for a restraining order(for my sister's unwarranted actions in needlessly calling the police, seeking restraining orders based on lies, and seeking a move-out order based on lies and omitting essential facts, all harassing and causing me a breach of my peace of mind) was denied, with prejudice(which means I cannot make another request)(and it certainly was "with prejudice"). But, the most important thing is not that it was denied, but how it was denied. This *commissioner and this hearing was the epitome of racial and gender bias and discrimination, and racial animus; all resulting in a denial of my constitutional rights. This *commissioner not only engaged in racial and gender bias*(which was not just a little bias, or some bias, but complete or absolute bias), but he went further, to sheer discrimination, supported by animus. He resorted to name-calling, threats, and, of course,*a false statement, all in open court (with citizen litigants, attorneys, and court personnel present). And, remember, in case you've forgotten in the midst of this unusually long blog, I am a Black male.
So, I need not pose the question of whether or not it was a fair hearing. But, for the record, I will. Was Commr. Lowry completely fair? No. Absolutely not. Was he partially fair? No. Absolutely not. There was no fairness whatsoever to this proceeding, from its inception to the very end. It was a hostile hearing from beginning (after introductory matter)to end, brought on by Lowry's animus or hostility.
Lowry called me a name that I consider to be just one step below calling me a nigger. And, by coincidence, the name also ends with the same two letters as nigger, "er". I was offended; highly offended. I won't mention the word here, but, I will inform you, the reader, at a later time. He also made unwarranted threats, one of which was to sanction me $250 for interrupting my sister's response(I said "That's incorrect"). The other threat I will save for another day and another context. But, I will inform you later; after I have taken the *next step in this process : filing the federal civil rights complaint.
More next time.
UPGRADE--July 27, 2016.
As with judge Gould-*Saltman, there's an irony here with Lowry as well. I was before Lowry briefly in relations to my sister's first TRO. At that time, my sister had hid my mother from me after she had had her(my mother) transferred to another care facility. It was Lowry, after my request, who ordered my sister to provide me with the address of the facility where my mother was. But, on the two occasions that I have come before him since that order, he has been hostile and biased (and discriminatory) in his conduct or attitude towards me. That is, Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. Nevertheless, there's no excuse or justification for his conduct or misconduct. And, his misconduct was not only inappropriate and invidious, but, more importantly, it also was a denial of my constitutional rights, including a due process liberty right not be harassed (by my sister or him).
As a result of Lowry's behavior or misconduct, there has now been a pattern of racial and gender bias and false statements perpetrated by judges Cowan and Zelon, and commissioner Lowry during the entire course of the conservatorship proceedings. But, clearly, Lowry's conduct/misconduct was the worst. However, the misconduct of all of them reached constitutional dimensions, and they all should be dealt with appropriately.
NEXT STEP: A FEDERAL CRIMINAL CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT
UPDATE--July 28, 2016
See * for changes in latest blog.
UPDATE--August 17, 2016
The Complaint is now completed. The completion was delayed because of a distraction that I had to give priority to, and, because of the nature of the Complaint, it required some time to compile the evidentiary support for the Complaint. But, now, it's done.
So now, what's going to happen? Well, here's what I know: I know that my constitutional rights were violated by the individuals that I have named in my Complaint. And, I know this not just as an ordinary citizen and victim, but as an experienced federal lawyer with a background and success in dealing with the same type of issues and individuals involved with the current Complaint.
I know that all of the individuals named are "officers of the court", and therefore, are held to a higher standard than an ordinary citizen when committing the same act.
I know that at least some of the individuals are considered "high level public officials". And, I know that just recently, at least two high level public officials
were prosecuted and convicted by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the same or similar crimes, offenses, or actions as the individuals named in my Complaint. Those individuals are former Sheriff Lee Baca and Undersheriff Paul Tanaka. Baca was convicted of making a false statement to a federal official. And, I know that several officials in my Complaint have made false statements to violate constitutional rights. Tanaka was tried and convicted of several offenses and was sentenced to 5 years in prison. Baca, in refusing to accept a plea sentence (at the discretion of the trial judge--which the judge indicated would be beyond a six month offer by the government) is now proceeding to trial.
Other officials, at whatever level, are charged with obstruction of justice.
But, I know that Baca and Tanaka are minorities, while most of the individuals named in my Complaint are white. So, the question is : Will the individuals named in my Complaint, who are mostly white, be treated the same as Baca and Tanaka, who are minorities (Hispanic and Asian heritage, respectively), by the FBI and the U.S. Attorney's Office ?
Or, will they go unpunished because they're white ?
I will not name all the individuals here, although you already know some of them, in order to allow the FBI, initially, to do its job. But, I will, at a later time, publish the entire Complaint (minus the exhibits) for your review.
I will file the Complaint within the next five days.
UPDATE--August 23, 2016
I filed the Complaint yesterday at the U.S. Attorney's Office downtown. However, the Complaint was addressed to and directed to the FBI, i.e., "TO: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)", "FROM : Laurack D. Bray, *Complainant". So, the Complaint was submitted at the U.S. Attorney's office for the F.B.I. I know in the past, the FBI has had a FBI Officer in Charge located in the U.S. Attorney's Office, but when I asked the receptionist about it, i.e., the OIC, she looked and acted perplexed. She asked if I had the name of a particular person. I said no.
In any event, I got the Complaint dated and stamped, and it is addressed to and for the FBI, initially; therefore, the U.S. Attorney's Office has a duty to turn the document over to the FBI, the addressee first, even if they review it subsequently.
But, I will also submit another copy to the FBI (minus the exhibits--which they can get in their initial copy) by mail.
Let's see what happens now. I am the main witness and victim in the Complaint.
**UPDATE--August 25, 2016
See * in title of the blog to #1. With the filing of the federal criminal Complaint, I will now be starting a #2 blog, continuing with the examination of the treatment of Gregorian-Cowan by the executive branches of government, first, the L.A. District Attorney's office, and now the FBI and the U.S. Attorney's office, with respect to discrimination and/or racism as it pertains to Black (particularly Black males) and other minorities in the Los Angeles area. This blog has become too long.
Therefore, in order to continue to follow this matter, you should refer to #2 of this blog. Bye for now.
Wednesday, August 12, 2015
ATTORNEY ARMEN D. GREGORIAN AND JUDGE DAVID J. COWAN * #1 V. SEN. RODERICK WRIGHT AND CLMN. RICHARD ALARCON : Further Evidence of the Entrenched Racial Discrimination or Racism Exercised by the L.A. District Attorney's Office Against Black (particularly Black males) and Other Minority Citizens and/or Officials
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