December 2, 2020
(Today's Date)
August 15, 2018
(Original Date)
*Denotes a change in the original blog, either addition or deletion
**UPDATE (Denotes NEW information or material added after publishing of the original blog)
This blog is submitted and contributed as part of the War on Racial Discrimination in California (and the United States).
About two weeks ago now, I filed another federal civil rights Complaint, actually two Complaints : Complaint #1, an entirely new Complaint with new Defendants (as well as one repeat Defendant)and new charges; and Complaint #2, a re-filed Complaint, based on the new Administration (Trump). The new Complaint focuses on the eviction processes of the Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County, and the constitutional violations evolving therefrom; while the re-filed Complaint focuses on the conservatorship processes of the Superior Court, and the constitutional violations evolving therefrom. I assured you the reader that I would publish the entire Complaint(s), as I have done in the past. So, I will do so here.
Complaint #2 has already been published in #2 of this named blog "Atty Armen D. Gregorian and Judge David J. Cowan (and Commissioner Stephen M. Lowry), et.al. #2 V. . . ." . So I'm only going to publish Complaint #1 here.
EXPLANATION
Below is the criminal/civil rights Complaint that I filed against Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County Judge Joseph Kalin and others on July 30, 2018, minus the exhibits which were attached to the original Complaint, and submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the U.S. Attorney's Office (USAO) via mail. * I still haven't heard from the FBI, and the USAO, through a letter, has indicated that it will not pursue the matter. And these actions are what I am referring to above in the title of this blog when I state that the racial discrimination or racism continues, i.e., claims involving or brought by Black males.
The questions posed, Question #1 and Question #2, in Part II of this Complaint (the actual
Complaint Report), are those produced by and included in the Complaint Report form supplied by the U.S. Attorney's Office in Los Angeles for use by citizens reporting federal crimes, i.e., the Complaint or my Complaint. Therefore, my Complaint responds to the questions posed in the USAO's Complaint Report form. Part I (not a part of the actual Complaint form) is simply my introductory message addressed to the FBI (and the USAO).
COMPLAINT #1 :
VERIFIED COMPLAINT REPORT #1
July 17, 2018 PART I
(Introduction)
TO: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)(and U.S. Attorney, secondarily)
FROM: Laurack D. Bray, Complainant
I am a citizen of California, and a federal attorney (I only practice federal law
here in California). I’ve practiced law for over 30 years (no disciplinary record),
with an AA, BA, MS, MPA, and JD degrees; and I have several published cases
whereby I was counsel of record, including one from the Ninth Circuit, see Jackson v. Giurbino , 364 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2004). This brief background is offered to help demonstrate that, as a Complainant- lawyer, I did not take this Complaint, infra, lightly.
RE: Federal Criminal/Civil Rights Complaint #1
DATE : July 17, 2018 (Completed)
This Complaint is being brought against several individuals and/or officials in the Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County; U.S. District Court, Central District of Los Angeles; and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals court systems, and charges that the individuals knowingly and willfully and/or intentionally acted to, among other things, deprive me of my constitutional rights under color of law, for the specific purpose of causing me harm and depriving me of those rights, e.g., due process (including property rights and liberty), equal protection of the law, and first amendment. And, in fact, harm resulted, including my eviction from my home, and a loss of property and liberty rights and emotional distress, among other things.
As can be ascertained from the above, this Complaint evolves from an
unlawful detainer (U.D.) proceeding in the L.A. County Superior Court (LASC). The U.D. proceeding was initiated by my sister, Dianne Jackson, under the auspices of a conservatorship power or authority, which, in my view, she did not have . The criminal-civil rights violations evolve from the fact that notwithstanding Jackson’s lack of authority to bring the U.D. action, Superior Court officials willfully allowed her to proceed, and, in fact, used her as a vehicle, even if unknowingly to her, or unofficially, to obtain my eviction.
I charge that the named individuals in this Complaint willfully and deliberately acted to deprive me of my Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection of the law (based on my being a Black male) constitutional rights, as well as my First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and to petition the government or the courts, and, in fact, they did so deprive me of those rights.
I charge that the entire eviction process was unconstitutional, from beginning to end, or from start to finish . That is, each act or step in the eviction process was unconstitutional, from the initial state action to the final federal action.
Finally, this Complaint should be viewed or reviewed in the following contexts :
1. The FBI should consider the more particular and specific status of the
primary defendants or accused in this matter. That is, they are all “officers of the court”, not ordinary or regular citizens. An “officer of the court” is “(A)ny person who has an obligation to promote justice and effective operation of the judicial system, including judges, the attorneys who appear in court, bailiffs, clerks, and other personnel.” Legal-Dictionary. The Free Dictionary.com. Most, if not all, have taken an oath the same or similar to the following, to : “support and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California. . .” ; and “bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California”; and to “take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion”; and to “faithfully discharge the duties upon which I am about to enter”.
3. The HOMELESS CRISIS in Los Angeles County.
The FBI and the Justice Department cannot fairly began to review this Complaint Report without reviewing and considering the homeless crisis in Los Angeles city and county. For it is the homeless crisis in Los Angeles County that helps make the defendants’ conduct criminal, and not civil. And, that is especially so since I am Black or African American. See infra.
I will here share just some of the information regarding the homeless, and the Black homeless, that the FBI and the Justice Department must consider in reviewing this Complaint, which is mainly focused on the eviction process in the Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County. Nearly all of the information is based on L.A. Times articles.
First, the homeless population in Los Angeles County in general. “Skid row is—and long has been—a national disgrace, a grim reminder of man’s ability to turn his back on his fellow man. But these days it is only the epicenter of a staggering homelessness problem that radiates outward for more than 100 miles throughout Los Angeles County and beyond. There are now more than 57,000 people who lack a ‘fixed, regular or adequate place to sleep’ on any given night in the county, and fewer than 1 in 10 of them of them are in skid row.” “Editorial, Los Angeles’ Homelessness Crisis is a National Disgrace”, L.A. Times, February 25, 2018.
“Homelessness burst its traditional borders several years ago, spreading first to gloomy underpasses and dim side streets, and then to public parks and library reading rooms and subway platforms. No matter where you live in L.A. County, from Long Beach to Beverly Hills to Lancaster, you cannot credibly claim today to be unaware of the squalid tent cities, the sprawling encampments, or the despair and misery on display there.” Id. (emphasis added). The italic wording should be applied to the Defendants in this Complaint.
“Last year, the annual January count raised the number of unsheltered homeless people to nearly 49,000—almost three-fourths of all homeless people.” “Gap in funds for Crisis widens”, L.A. Times, February 19, 2018. “(Herb) Wesson called homelessness ‘the most important issue in the city of Los Angeles.” “Out in force for homeless,” Times, (date unknown). Finally, “California also has the nation’s highest effective poverty rate, an affordable housing crisis and has seen a rapid increase of homelessness.” “Meet your candidates in the governor’s race”, L.A. Times, June 10, 2018.
Second, the number of homeless that die in Los Angeles County every year. “Now, the county’s homeless population has ballooned to nearly 58,000. More than 800 homeless people died on the streets last year in Los Angeles, which puts into tragic perspective the single death that led to the creation of LAHSA in the 1990s.” “Who’s Taking Charge of the Homeless Crisis?”, L.A. Times, March 2, 2018. And, “(T)he growing number of deaths of the homeless in L.A. County. According to data from the Los Angeles County coroner’s office, 831 homeless people died in 2017, compared with 458 in 2013.” “County seeks to aid mentally ill on the street,” L.A. Times, January 31, 2018.
Third, and of utmost importance for this Complaint, the relationship of evictions to the homeless situation. “When horse-trading and judicial pressure don’t convince the tenant to leave his home, the case goes to trial. If the landlord wins, the tenant is evicted. If the tenant wins, the landlord can wait a few days , sue again and haul the tenant back into court. If the tenant wins a second time, the landlord can again wait a few days and restart the process. In other words, sooner or later, the landlord almost always wins.” Emphasis added. “Eviction laws are pushing families onto the streets”, L.A. Times, March 23, 2018. “Eviction proceedings in California are also frighteningly expedited.” Id. “In sum, California eviction law creates a Kafkaesque process that is driving working Angelenos out of their neighborhoods or worse—onto the streets.” Id.
And now, the gravamen of this Complaint. “A 2007 study showed that in Los Angeles County, eviction was second only to job loss as a cause of homelessness; in a 2013 report from the city of Los Angeles, eviction was the primary reason families were un-housed .”Id. (emphasis added). “Our eviction laws are antiquated, dangerous and inhumane.” Id.(emphasis added). “More than half of the people surveyed by the Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority last year said they were homeless because of an eviction, foreclosure, unemployment or “financial reasons’”. “The Homeless are not who you Think they Are,” Times, February 26, 2018.
Finally, “On skid row, I asked a social worker if numbers are up. Yes, he said. And what’s the biggest reason? ‘Evictions’, he said.” “Blazes on skid row stir call for action”, January 28, 2018.
Fourth, the particular and/or exceptional circumstance of African Americans or Blacks as part of the homeless population. “It will surprise no one to learn that it is the most vulnerable among us who usually end up without a place to live. According to the Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority, more than 5,000 of the county’s nearly 58,000 homeless people are children and more than 4,000 are elderly. (Omitted). Some 40 % are African American. Also heavily represented : Veterans.” “Los Angeles’ Homelessness Crisis Is a National Disgrace, ” Times, February 25, 2018. I am an elderly, African American male, veteran .
“The Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority will address the overrepresentation of black homeless people in the city and will examine ways to improve services for them.” “L.A. Digest”, L.A. Wave, May 17, 2018 (emphasis added). “They talked about the toll of homelessness on daily life in Los Angeles. Why the homeless population seemed to be disproportionately black.” “Food for thought on City’s racial divisions”, Times, April 22, 2018.
Finally, “Early support is particularly important for African American families, whose children are 10 times more likely to be homeless than Latino children, and 13 times more likely than European American children, the report found.” “Speedy aid could ease the homeless crisis in L.A.,” Times, April 25, 2018. “ ‘The ethnically disproportionate burden of homelessness among African American adults begins in childhood.’ ” Id.
Fifth, the effect of homelessness. “All the great social issues of American society play out in homelessness—inequality , racial injustice, poverty, violence, sexism. Naturally, life expectancy for the homeless is short : about 47 years, according to skid row doctor Susan Partovi, compared with 78 in the population as a whole.” See Homelessness Crisis (Times), supra.
4. You should also consider the State of the housing market in L.A. County at this time. The state of the housing market, as well as the homeless problem in Los Angeles County, is also what helps make the actions of the Defendants criminal, as oppose to civil (in addition to the requirements for criminal liability). “L.A., like many cities in California hasn’t built enough homes to keep up with population growth. The result is a housing shortage that has driven rents to record highs, fueling the growth in homelessness and forcing many workers to pay more than they can afford—or pushing them out of the area and into long commutes.” L.A. Times, “A Plan that’s short on housing”, November 9, 2017(emphasis added).
“Los Angeles County is the most unaffordable region in the country for the poorest renters, according to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Department. To understand just how thin the line is between those with a place to live and those without, consider a study by Zillow estimating that a rent increase of 5% in Los Angeles County would push 2,000 people into homelessness.” Times, Homeless Not who you think They Are, supra.
Last, “At the same time, California is experiencing a severe housing shortage. Gentrification is taking more and more once-affordable rental units off the L.A. market, and restrictive zoning laws along with high construction costs and anti-development sentiment make new affordable units hard to build. Over the last six years, the rent for a studio apartment here has climbed 92%, according UCLA law professor emeritus Gary Blasi, so that even people who have jobs can find themselves living on the streets after a rent spike or an unexpected crisis. As Blasi notes : ‘In America, housing is a commodity. If you can afford it, you have it; if you can’t, you don’t.’ ” Times, Homelessness Crisis, supra.
**The Defendants in this Complaint knew or should have known the above information or state of affairs in California, and especially Los Angeles County, when they decided to take the actions that are alleged in this Complaint.
BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE PERTINENT FACTS NECESSARY FOR AN
UNDERSTANDING OF THIS COMPLAINT.
In 2014, my mother, 96 years old presently, suffered a fall, and has been hospitalized or in a board and care ever since. At the time of my mother’s fall, both my sister, Dianne Jackson (70 years of age), and I (68) were living with my mother. My mother did not require either of us to pay rent. For the most part, I took care of my mother (my sister couldn’t because she wasn’t home most of the time—spending most of her time, when not working, upon information and belief, with a boyfriend) prior to my mother’s fall. I believe she lives with the same boyfriend now (only more permanently)(which frees her to want to sell my mother’s home, because she doesn’t need the home as a place of residence).
In 2015, Jackson was appointed conservator of the person and estate of my mother, over my objection and opposition (up to that point, I had taken care of most of my mother’s affairs).
In my opinion, Jackson used the conservatorship as an opportunity to exercise control over my mother’s affairs, control that she did not otherwise have before my mother’s fall (although she influenced my mother to take several actions without my knowledge or input). Jackson and I do not get along.
The conservatorship is the subject of the prior criminal-civil rights Complaint that I have filed (and re-file here) and referred to herein, i.e., Complaint #2, which is now pending as well.
In 2016, Jackson initiated unlawful detainer proceedings against me, without
my mother’s knowledge and consent, and without authorization from the Probate Court. In my opinion, she believes it would be easier for her to exercise control over my mother’s affairs without my presence in the home (and, in fact, it is, and it has been—Jackson has now, in my absence, had much of my mother’s furniture and furnishings in the house removed, I do not know where, in her attempt to sell my mother’s house without my mother’s voluntary or un-influenced consent).
I filed a motion in the probate court challenging her authority to initiate the proceeding. That action apparently stopped her from continuing with the action at that time. But, the Probate Court, through judge David J. Cowan (a Defendant in Complaints #1 and #2), has refused to rule on my motion (even to this day). Thus, Jackson tried again, and this time, again without authorization and consent, was successful, and I was evicted from my home. My eviction rendered me homeless. I remain homeless today.
This Complaint that follows is based on the unlawful detainer proceedings which began in February, 2017, with Jackson’s initial notice.
VERIFIED COMPLAINT REPORT #1
PART II July 17, 2018
LAURACK D. BRAY
P.O. Box 611432
Los Angeles, California 90061
(805) 901-2693
Lawyer
Method of Responding: I will generally respond to this report by addressing questions #1 and #2 (of the Complaint Report form) and responding to them regarding each specifically-named individual. That is, I will name or identify the individuals, and thereafter, address questions #1 and #2 (for each individual named).
1. Name of individual that I believe committed a federal crime : Deborah Christian, Judge , Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County.
Question #1. What federal crime do you believe has been committed? (Hereinafter “Question #1”).
ANS. : 18 U.S.C. secs. 241 and 242 . I believe that judge Deborah Christian committed the crimes of willfully depriving me of my constitutional right of due process of law , as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, while acting under color of the laws of the State of California or other; and thereafter conspiring with others to assign a judge to purportedly conduct a “trial”, knowing that the proceeding would produce an eviction judgment, notwithstanding what happened during the “trial”. I also believe judge Christian deprived me of due process by not entertaining the law that I had available that I believe would have ended or concluded any further processing of the U.D. case at the very beginning of the matter, which, necessarily, would have prevented me from going through all of the following processes that I had to go through, including the actual eviction itself. Therefore, judge Christian’s intentional disregard of the law caused my eviction.
Question #2. Explain in detail what you know about the crime, including when and where it occurred, what you have heard and observed and when you heard and observed it, what others have told you (include their names) and what other evidence may exist. (Hereinafter “Question #2).
First, I know that when Jackson and I made the initial appearance before judge Christian, Jackson’s case probably should have been halted and/or dismissed at this stage, but it wasn’t. And, the major due process violation here was judge Christian’s ignoring or disregarding written or documented law and/or evidence showing that Jackson was required to serve me with two notices in order to initiate unlawful detainer proceedings. Even though I had the actual case law and statutory law with me in the courtroom, and informed the judge of that fact, the judge simply said, “I’d like to see your cases”, laughed, and moved on, without letting me either show her the cases or reading the legal principles to her. “(I)t is not necessary for the defendants to have been ‘thinking in constitutional or legal terms at the time of the incidents, because a reckless disregard for a person’s constitutional rights is evidence of a specific intent to deprive that person of those rights.’ ” Reese v. County of Sacramento , NO. 16-16195 (9th Cir. , April 23, 2018). The law that I offered was (is) : The California Supreme Court case of King v. Connolly , 51 Cal. 181 (1875), and CA Code of Civil Proc., sec. 1161(1). Section 1161(1) simply supports King . King dictates that in order to evict a tenant at will, as oppose to other types of tenancy, the owner or landlord must serve two (2) notices , (1) a notice to terminate, and (2) a notice to quit. Jackson only served me with a notice to terminate. Had judge Christian given regard to King and sec. 1161(1), it would have caused a dismissal of Jackson’s case on that basis alone.
The proceedings were not recorded and there was no court reporter present. This was a further denial of due process because I contend that the proceeding was deliberately not recorded (i.e., there was nothing mentioned regarding having the proceeding recorded at the beginning of the proceeding) to obstruct justice, and deny litigants such as myself, a Record of what took place during the hearing.
Thereafter, judge Christian ordered a “trial” before a judge. And, she assigned the case to a trial judge for “trial”. I randomly selected judge Joseph Kalin, as the first judge with a courtroom available that I could either accept or reject, without knowing anything about him.
When I arrived at judge Kalin’s courtroom, along with Jackson, after introductions, there was no trial. Judge Kalin came out and said that we could introduce some documents into “his” file, see Exhibit #1 (Trial Minutes) and, after I said that I wanted to present some defenses, he said “you have no defenses”. See Reese , supra, “it is not necessary for the defendants to have been ‘thinking in constitutional or legal terms at the time of the incidents, because a reckless disregard for a person’s constitutional rights is evidence of a specific intent to deprive that person of those rights.” Emphasis here and in the original .
I argued that Jackson had no authority to bring the U.D. proceeding. Judge Kalin said that he would postpone the “trial” until the next day to check with the Probate Court. He came back the next day and said the Probate supervisor said that Jackson could file the action, without citing any law or legal basis (in view of the law that I had which stated that Jackson had to receive authority from the Probate Court and my mother (the conservatee)(consent) in order to bring the action. Thereafter, Judge Kalin entered a judgment of possession (or eviction) for Jackson. Again, there was no trial . There was no parts of a trial (and as a lawyer myself, I know what a trial consist of). There was no swearing in of witnesses ; there was no opening or closing arguments or statements; there was no introduction of evidence through witnesses; there was no testimony of witnesses; and there was no court reporter present (which I believe was intentional to coverup the misconduct—I was not told beforehand that there would not be a court reporter in the courtroom of a trial).
I was denied a trial, and clearly a “fair” trial, in violation of my due process rights, under color of law.
As to the conspiracy theory, I believe that when the mediation was not successful, and I wasn’t granted a jury trial, it was agreed among all parties involved, including judge Christian and judge Kalin, that Judge Kalin would enter an eviction judgment, regardless of what went on in the so-called “trial”. I believe it is a systematic thing, i.e., a failed mediation + a denied jury trial (or one was not demanded) = an eviction judgment.
2. Name of individual that I believe committed a federal crime : Elizabeth A. Lippitt, Judge, Superior Court of California, L.A. County.
Question #1. What federal crime do you believe has been committed?
ANS : 18 U.S.C. sec. 242 and 241.
I believe the constitutional right of due process of law was denied me and my mother under color of law. More specifically, the unconstitutional taking of property without “due” process of law.
Question #2.
I know that on June 12, 2018, an ex parte hearing was held at the request of my sister, Dianne Jackson, for the purpose of obtaining authority from the Probate Court for Jackson to sell my mother’s house and home.
I know that I received no notice from Jackson regarding the ex parte proceeding, but I did receive notice from the PVP attorney appointed to represent my mother in this proceeding, Jo Ann Fitzpatrick. But that notice was only regarding the ex parte hearing about the sale of the property. It did not contain Jackson’s petition to sell the home.
I know that prior to this June 12, 2018 proceeding, Jackson had attempted on 2 prior occasions to obtain ex parte relief, see Exhibit #2 (June 30, 2017 Order) and Exhibit #3 (April 20, 2018 Order), and on both occasions, I had not received any notice of the proceedings from Jackson, and therefore, and consequently, I was not present at either one of those proceedings.
At the June 30, 2017 ex parte proceeding, the judge denied the ex parte application, indicating that Jackson had used the wrong form, and, more importantly, directed that Jackson “must file a Probate Code 2540 petition for authority to sell real property.” See Exhibit #2(emphasis added here). Exhibit #2 is part of the Record and the Docket .
Jackson did in fact file a petition. However, I was not served with the Petition, so I knew nothing about it (and so this was one of three(3) ex parte proceedings that Jackson had brought and I had not received notice from her regarding the proceeding). But, pursuant to the notice I received from the PVP attorney regarding the scheduled hearing, I decided to review the Record the day before the hearing in preparation for the hearing. In reviewing the record, and after researching Probate Code 2540 and its requirements, I discovered that Jackson was not in compliance with Probate Code 2540 .
At the convening of the June 12, 2018 ex parte proceeding where both Jackson and I were present, and after getting sworn in, with judge Lippitt presiding, the court, in a conclusory form, without actually calling on Jackson herself, made a presentation, and thereafter turned to me for a response.
My response was that Jackson did not comply with Code 2540 and that her petition had to be denied on that basis alone. See Exhibit #4 (Transcript of June 12, 2018 proceedings)(at p. 2, line 27 to p. 3, line 22). The judge then turned to the PVP attorney for a response (not Jackson), and the PVP attorney provided some type of response regarding in-house care.
I told the judge that I had a right to a hearing, an actual hearing, not an ex parte hearing, to respond to Jackson’s petition. At one point the judge asked me specifically how do I respond to a certain question about funds, and I told her that I would respond to it in a hearing. See Id., at p. 6, lines 9-28. On at least two occasions, I asserted that the judge was denying me due process. One occasion was at the end of the proceeding, I made it clear that she was denying me my due process rights. Exh. #4, at 17(bottom of page)-18(top)(more specifically, without court reporter interpretation, I stated, “ Judge, I’m putting you on notice that you are violating my due process rights”; and she responded “un-hun” or something to that effect) .
I know that judge Lippitt, after asking me to read the section of the Code that I was referring to, gave no regard to the Code or Jackson’s non-compliance with a section of the Code. She did not mention the Code in her responses.
I know that Jackson made no showing of an emergency in her petition or during the hearing.
In the end, the judge granted Jackson’s request to sell my mother’s property based on an un-verified petition, in violation of (or non-compliance) with Probation Code 2540 (which requires a showing of why other alternatives aren’t available), with no verified consent by my mother, without a showing of an emergency , and without adequate notice and an adequate hearing with which to lodge objections to the sale of the property or provide other information, e.g., the funding of my mother’s care.
THE DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS (at least)
1. There was not adequate notice and an adequate hearing to properly address the sale of my mother’s property, either through specific objections to the petition or other information, e.g., funding . See Exh. #4.
2. Judge Lippett disregarded Probate Code 2540 and its requirements. She said nothing about the Code or its requirements or Jackson’s failure to comply with the Code (especially with the provision for a showing of alternatives to selling the property). After I read the omitted requirement, causing non-compliance, judge Lippitt said nothing else about it. “(I)t is not necessary for the defendants to have been ‘thinking in constitutional terms or legal terms at the time of the incidents, because a reckless disregard for a person’s constitutional rights is evidence of a specific intent to deprive that person of those rights.” Reese v. County of Sacramento , No. 16-16195, (9th Cir, April 23, 2018)(emphasis in original).
Jackson’s motion should have been denied based on her failure to comply with the statute’s requirements. Lippitt was required to be aware that a previous judge had denied Jackson’s first ex parte petition because it was not in compliance with the requirements for obtaining authority to sell my mother’s property. Nevertheless, even with Jackson being in non-compliance for the second time, Lippitt granted the Petition, knowingly and willfully.
3. Judge Lippitt granted Jackson’s petition in view of violations of other various state laws or rules which help provide for and/or promote due process :
A. California Rules of Court (CRC), Rule 3.1201(regarding ex parte relief). Required documents : (2) A declaration in support of the application making the factual showing required under rule 3.1202( c); and (3) . Again, there was no declaration.
B. CRC 3. 1202 . Contents of Application : (b) Disclosure of previous applications : If an ex parte application has been refused in whole or in part, any subsequent application of the same character or for the same relief, although made upon an alleged different state of facts, must include a full disclosure of all previous applications and of the court’s actions (emphasis added). That was not done by Jackson . (c) Affirmative factual showing required : An applicant must make an affirmative factual showing in a declaration containing competent testimony based on personal knowledge of irreparable harm, immediate danger, or any other statutory basis for granting relief ex parte (emphasis added). Again, Jackson did not do this. There was no declaration.
4. The PVP Report submitted by attorney Jo Ann Fitzpatrick was not verified .
Ms. Fitzpatrick states in her report that : “Mrs. Davis has no objection to the Conservator selling her real property so that funds are available for Mrs. Davis’ care.” And, although a statement regarding Bar membership and discipline, professional liability insurance coverage, and representation of a party to the proceeding was included in the Report, it was not verified . Superior Court Rule 4.127(a) states, in part, “PVP attorneys appointed by the court must file a written report with a verified statement . . . (of the above cited provisions).
Again, the Report included the required statement, but it ( the statement or the Report as a whole) was not verified.
Yet, judge Lippitt granted Jackson’s petition based on an un-verified PVP Report.
5. There was no presentation of verified consent of my mother to the sale of her home . Neither the PVP attorney nor Jackson presented the Court with any document showing my mother’s verified consent to the sale of her only home.
Jackson’s petition was not submitted under oath or with an attached declaration, and the judge did not inquire of anyone as to my mother’s consent for the sale. “A seizure of property occurs when there is ‘some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property’ ”. Lavan v. City of Los Angeles , 797 F. Supp.2d 1005 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
6. There was no “emergency”. A due process hearing could have been scheduled and heard in a reasonably short time. To my knowledge, my mother was not about to be evicted and there was no showing or demonstration of an emergency. See No. #3 above.
CONSPIRACY
I know that Jackson never spoke to the merits of her Petition, rather judge Lippitt and Ms. Fitzpatrick spoke on her behalf. See, e.g., Exh. #4, at 2. And, Ms. Fitzpatrick is supposed to be my mother’s attorney, not Jackson’s. Jackson said nothing about the Petition or her failure to comply with the Probate statute. I know that Jackson provided no explanation of an emergency in her Petition (although she does request emergency relief in her petition—without explanation) , but Lippitt claim that there was an emergency. I charge that Lippitt and Fitzpatrick conspired on Jackson’s behalf to take property from my mother without due process of law and under color of law. I know that neither Lippitt, nor Jackson, nor Fitzpatrick raised the issue of my mother consenting to the sale of her property.
I believe judge Lippitt’s decision to grant Jackson’s Petition was premeditated, because prior to the actual hearing itself, while I was sitting in the courtroom, I overheard judge Lippitt speak to court personnel in the courtroom, saying “ I have to be done by 11 o’clock (a.m.)” and the ex parte hearings was scheduled to began at 10:30 a.m. (with at least 2 cases for her to decide).
In sum, when judge Lippitt granted Jackson’s un-verified Petition without a hearing on the Petition itself, without a showing of verified consent of my mother for the sale of her only home, and in view of the various violations cited above, she willfully deprived both my mother and I of procedural and substantive due process of law, under color of law.
3. Name of individual that I believe committed a federal crime: Joseph R. Kalin, Judge, Superior Court of California, L.A. County.
Question #1. What federal crime do you believe has been committed?
ANS. : 18 U.S.C. secs. 242 and 241. I believe the crimes of willfully depriving me of due process of law under color of law, and conspiracy to deprive me of my constitutional rights under color of law, by denying me or depriving me of a trial in my unlawful detainer case, and conspiracy to do so with others were committed.
Question #2.
I know that I was assigned a trial and a trial was ordered by judge Christian in my unlawful detainer case. The trial was supposed to have taken place on July 6, 2017.
I know that after I reported to judge Kalin’s courtroom for the trial, that no trial took place. The only thing that took place was an exchange of a few words between judge Kalin and myself (after introduction of the parties), and Jackson attempted to introduce some pictures, but judge Kalin told her it wasn’t necessary because she was going to prevail anyway. At one point, he stated that I didn’t have any defenses to the Plaintiff’s claim.
And, I asserted that the plaintiff didn’t have authority to bring an unlawful detainer action. He said that he would look into that point, and contact the Probate Office. So, he recessed the “hearing” until the next day, so that he could contact the Probate Office.
The next day, July 7, 2017, when court reconvened, judge Kalin informed the parties that the Probate Court supervisor said that the plaintiff could bring the action. He did not offer or provide any law or legal principles to support the supervisor’s position. For some corroboration of this action, see Exhibit # 5 ( a page from Jackson’s Response to my Petition for an emergency stay in the Second District Court of Appeal, No. B283629)(where “Judge Kalin personally contacted the Probate Department and received further confirmation that the Respondent had the power and authority to obtain the Unlawful Detainer and evict Bray ”)(portion of page irrelevant to this point omitted). Thereafter, he verbally entered a judgment for the Plaintiff, and said a written order would follow.
In his judgment, judge Kalin granted Jackson possession of the entire premises, see Exhibit #6 (judgment), when Jackson had only requested or sought possession of the “Dining Room” portion of the premises in her Notice to Terminate, see Exhibit #7 (“The premises of which you are required to surrender possession are: Apartment or Suite No.: Dining Room”). Therefore, I did not receive notice or a hearing regarding the entire premises being subject to dispossession, i.e., basic due process, and it (the entire premises) was in fact taken; and I was not put on notice that the plaintiff was seeking the entire premises, and that deprived me of an opportunity to prepare for a complete dispossession or homelessness. Therefore, judge Kalin provided Plaintiff relief in excess of what she sought, which also violates due process.
There was no parts or elements of a trial on either the first or second day of the purported “trial”. There was no sworn testimony, or any other testimony; there was no opening or closing statements; there was no direct or cross examination; and there no court reporter, or any other recording device to record what was said during the hearing. So, at this point in the eviction process, there was no court reporter provided at the initial hearing where a trial was ordered, and no court reporter at the purported “trial”. This could be deemed a policy of action or inaction. “A policy of action is one in which the government body itself violates someone’s constitutional rights, or instructs its employees to do so (i.e., not provide court reporters in the courtroom for certain proceedings); a policy of inaction is based on a government body’s ‘failure to implement procedural safeguards to prevent constitutional violations.’ (Citation omitted). In inaction cases, the plaintiff must show, first, ‘the policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right.’ (Citations omitted). This requires showing that the defendant ‘was on actual or constructive notice that its omission would likely result in a constitutional violation.’ (Citation omitted). Second, the plaintiff must show ‘that the policy caused the violation in the sense that the municipality could have prevented the violation with an appropriate policy (i.e., here, providing court reporters in the courtroom, especially for trials).” (Citation omitted). Jackson v. Barnes , No. 09-55763, (9th Cir. April 15, 2014). I believe that I can meet these requirements regarding the lack of court reporters (or any other devices) in the courtroom. When judge Kalin took the actions he took and said the things that he said, e.g., “you have no defenses”, he knew that there would be no court reporters in the courtroom, and there weren’t any; even though he could have ordered a court reporter (even if I didn’t—and I wasn’t aware of any requirement for me to order one), and even though a court reporter was required. “Under Code of Civil Procedure, section 269, subdivision (a)(1), an official court reporter or an official court reporter pro tempore of the superior court must be provided to make a verbatim record of all trial court proceedings ‘in a civil case, on the order of the court or at the request of a party.’ ” (Emphasis here and in the original). Jameson v. Desta , NO. S230899, California Supreme Court, 241 Cal.App.4th 491 (July 5, 2018).
And, Kalin knew or should have known that “the absence of a court reporter at trial court proceedings and the resulting lack of a verbatim record of such proceedings will frequently be fatal to a litigant’s ability to have his or claims of trial court error resolved on the merits by an appellate court. This is so because it is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” Id.(emphasis added). But here, again, there was no trial. “The right to (a) fair trial is an essential safeguard of a just society and its importance cannot be overstated. It is an essential guarantee of the rule of law.” Google.com. “The right to a fair trial is absolute and cannot be limited.” Id. “Fair trials are the only way to prevent miscarriages of justice and are an essential part of a just society.” Id. “The aim of the right is to ensure the proper administration of justice.” Wikipedia. So, if I did not receive a true or real trial, I, necessarily, could not have received a “fair” trial. Therefore, I absolutely received a miscarriage of justice, and I absolutely was denied due process of law, under color of law.
Finally, at the end of the “trial”, I requested a stay of the eviction judgment. Judge Kalin mumbled some words and walked away. But, the stay request was denied without a hearing on the stay or stay request. This also was a denial of due process. Again, there was no court reporter or verbatim record of the proceedings; and there was no explanation given for the lack of a court reporter, and there was no explanation given by judge Christian as to the availability of a court reporter when she ordered and referred the “trial” to take place.
And, based on Judge Kalin’s judgment, I was evicted from my home and rendered homeless. I remain homeless today.
THE CONSPIRACY
I believe judge Kalin had agreed with judge Christian and the Superior Court administration to enter a judgment for the Plaintiff, regardless of the evidence or law that would suggest otherwise. And, the issue of Plaintiff’s authority to bring the action simply gave him “pause”, because it probably was an unusual claim.
I believe the entering of the U.D. judgments in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County is systematic. When a defendant, for whatever reason, does not obtain a jury trial (which is the only way he can avoid eviction)(and I was denied a jury trial after requesting one), he or she is almost assured of having a judgment obtained against him or her. It would be an unusual case if he or she does not receive a judgment against him or her. That is, the process is this : (1) mediation, if found to be warranted; and a breakdown in mediation on defendant’s part, i.e., he refuses to agree to the terms offered in mediation; (2) no jury trial (for whatever reason—either one was not sought or the request was denied); equals (3) an unlawful detainer judgment against the Defendant (without a real trial).
4. Name of individual that I believe committed a federal crime : Judge David Cowan, Superior Court of California, L.A. County. NOTE: judge Cowan is named as a Defendant in a previously-filed Complaint, as Complaint #2 filed herewith.
Question #1. What federal crime do you believe has been committed?
ANS. : 18 U.S.C. secs. 242 (and 1503 as part of the due process violation). I believe the crime of willfully depriving me of due process under color of law and obstruction of justice under color of law, either independently or as part of due process, was committed by judge Cowan, whereby he intentionally refused to rule on a motion that would determine whether Jackson had authority to bring an unlawful detainer proceeding. A ruling in my favor would have stopped the unlawful detainer (U.D.) proceeding at the pre-trial stage, and would have prevented my eviction. Therefore, his failure to rule directly contributed to my eviction (and helped make the eviction unlawful). Due process required Cowan to rule on the motion. A ruling would also have precluded the necessity for requesting a stay in federal court. Cowan willfully refused to rule on the motion, with his office declaring that I would have to obtain a writ of mandate in order for him to rule on the motion.
I also believe that Cowan committed the offense of obstruction of justice under color of law by interfering with the due administration of justice by causing or contributing to the requirement of a stay in a federal proceeding, where one would not otherwise be required had he ruled favorably on the motion pending before him.
Question #2. Explain in detail what you know about the crime, including when and where it occurred, what you have heard and observed and when you heard and observed it, what others have told you (include their names) and what other evidence may exist (hereinafter Question #2).
ANS. : I know that I filed a motion in the Probate Court in July, 2017, to get a determination as to whether Dianne Jackson had authority to file an unlawful detainer lawsuit as a conservator. See Exhibit #8 (Motion Re : Jackson’s authority to bring U.D. action). I know that as of the filing of this Complaint, Cowan has refused to rule on the motion. I know that because there has been no ruling, I was required to file a motion for a stay in both state and federal courts of appeal. I know that when I filed the motion for a stay in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, a decision by Cowan could have affected this federal motion. That motion has now been denied.
I know that a supervisor in the Probate Court, Christine Fuentes, contacted Cowan’s courtroom and was told that I would have to obtain a writ of mandate in order to get a ruling from Cowan.
Finally, I know that Cowan was named in a previous (and current) Complaint that I have filed charging him with denying me my constitutional rights under color of law, and his failure to rule could be in retaliation for me filing the original Complaint against him.
5. Name of individuals who I believe committed a federal crime : Shari R. Carter, Clerk of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, and her respective deputy clerks : V. Bailey (writ of possession) (and as John and Jane Does), and/or courtroom clerks (as John and Jane Does).
Question #1. What federal crime do you believe has been committed?
ANS. : 18 U.S.C. secs. 241 and 242. I believe the crime of willfully depriving me of property and/or property interest without due process of law was committed; willfully obstructing justice combined with a denial of due process of law, and conspiring to obstruct justice combined with a denial of due process of law, and bias in favor of Defendant Jackson throughout the proceedings; with all actions being under the color of law, and at least recklessly done.
Question #2.
I know that after the U.D. judgment was entered in this case, that an automatic stay was invoked and enforced against Jackson by the clerk’s office, based on Probate law provisions. See Gold v. Superior Court , 3 Cal. 3d 278 (1970) .
I know that the Clerk’s Office, per clerk Bailey, issued Jackson a writ of possession, in view of the automatic stay, that it, the clerk’s office, had previously been acknowledging and enforcing, without any warning or notice to me that it was no longer going to enforce the automatic stay (or obey the automatic stay law) that it had previously been enforcing and obeying. “The right to a pre-eviction hearing is firmly established in unlawful detainer actions”. Arrieta v. Mahon , 31 Cal.3d 383 (1982). “Notice ‘reasonably calculated. . . to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections’ is, of course, an essential element of the right to a hearing.” Id (emphasis added). “ ‘Even those who know of the action may not know that their own right to possession is in jeopardy’” (if they do not receive proper notice of a writ issued against them). Id.
The refusal and failure to obey the automatic stay together with the issuance of the writ of possession, without providing me with notice of its issuance, directly caused my eviction from my home and the loss of the possessory interest in my home, which was a violation of constitutional law (both California and U.S. Constitutions) and was done under the color of law. The “eviction is manifestly contrary to the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section & of the California Constitution.” Id.
Bailey, the clerk, knew when he or she issued the writ of possession that she had been recognizing the automatic stay. Some proof that an automatic stay was in place and that it was being imposed against Jackson was Jackson’s Response to my request for an emergency stay in the Second District Court of Appeal (App. No. B283629, decided July 13, 2017). See Exhibit #9 (Page from Jackson’s Response)(where Jackson states, “Respondent seeks relief from enforcement of an automatic stay, or, alternatively, for a stay on the Superior Court of California. . .”). And, Bailey knew that when she issued the writ of possession that I did not know that she was issuing the writ. And, she knew when she issued the writ that she did not provide me with notice of any kind. So, she knew that I would be blind-sided or sucker-punched when I was notified by the sheriff that I was being evicted and that I had to leave my home within days, without a prior opportunity to make any plans or arrangements for a place to live. See Exhibits #9 A & B (Notice to Vacate and Writ). Therefore, she knew that she was going to violate my constitutional rights when she was about to issue the writ. But, she went ahead and issued the writ anyway. Therefore, she knowingly, willfully, and with specific intent violated my right to notice and a hearing before I was evicted. And, in fact, I was evicted and remain homeless.
After causing my eviction from my home, the clerk’s office then denied me an appeal of the unlawful detainer judgment. NOTE: Months after the clerk’s office discontinued prosecuting my appeal, it began again the process of producing a Clerk’s Transcript and ordering briefing. Had I filed this Complaint during the interim months, as I had hoped to do, it would have been a clear denial. I still consider it a denial of my appeal, notwithstanding the clerk office’s belatedly (currently) offering briefing and argument. At minimum, it is an intentional denial of a speedy appeal for a homeless person, which is another due process violation, under color of law. Again, I continue to be homeless at this time.
6. Name of individual that I believe committed a federal crime : Judges of the Second District Court of Appeal. Judges Tricia A. Bigelow, Madeleine Flier, and Douglas W. Sortino.
Question#1. What federal crime do you believe has been committed ?
18 U.S.C. secs. 241 and 242. I believe the defendant judges willfully deprived me of due process of law (with bias) under color of law by arbitrarily denying an emergency motion for a stay and retaliating against me for bringing criminal charges against a fellow member of the Second District Court of Appeal (Laurie Zelon), thereby causing my eviction. And, the eviction resulted in my loss of property interest in my home, and in homelessness.
Question #2.
I know that on July 7, 2017, I filed an emergency Petition for a stay and writ of mandate in the Second District Court of Appeal, Division Eight seeking a stay of enforcement of the judgment entered on July 6, 2017 ordering Plaintiff Dianne Jackson to take full possession of the premises in question, thereby ordering my eviction from the premises upon execution of a writ of possession.
I know that the purpose of me filing the Petition was to prevent my eviction from my only home, and to prevent my becoming homeless. I also sought to protect my mother’s property while she was confined in a board and care.
I know that as part of my Petition, I argued that the trial judge, Joseph Kalin, “refused to acknowledge the law that Petitioner presented to him, especially the law regarding the proper notice which was required before a legal unlawful detainer action could proceed to trial against a tenant at will” and that the trial court had issued “an order which is broader than the Plaintiff had sought.” Both assertions are, in essence, assertions that the trial court abused its discretion or, in the case of the notice requirement, committed clear error.
I know that when the herein Defendant Second District judges issued its decision, it was a one line arbitrary and capricious decision, which simply stated, “Petitioner has failed to demonstrate entitlement to extraordinary relief.” See Exhibit #10 (Order). There was no other reasoning or explanation provided for the denial of my petition.
I know that previous to my filing the Petition, I had charged another member of the Second District, Laurie Zelon, with a criminal civil rights charge (under the same federal statute as herein) in a separate criminal complaint. And, I know that there could be a retaliatory factor involved in the Defendant’s arbitrary decision. I believe it is a major factor, and that, in fact one reason for the arbitrary decision is retaliation.
I also know that the one line statement is false , as a matter of California Court of Appeal law, in fact, the Second District itself. That is, I did, on the facts stated, “demonstrate entitlement to extraordinary relief.” Basically, the trial court, by refusing to acknowledge the law regarding notice that I presented, prohibited me from presenting the defense of a defective notice, which would have required a judgment in my favor, or an absolute defense to a judgment in favor of Jackson.
In the case of Carter v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App.2d 352 (1956), the Second District found that “petitioner is entitled to a writ of mandate to compel the respondent court to entertain the defense which, by its order, it has stricken.” In Carter , the petitioner had asserted the defenses of election of remedies or res judicata, but the court struck the defenses from petitioner’s answer, finding, regarding a third attempted defense that the defense was a “sham and irrelevant”. Id. As it relates to the case here, the court stated, “As we have pointed out, the facts pleaded, if proven, constitute an absolute defense to the action, unless plaintiff proves facts which would estop petitioner from asserting the defense pleaded or establish a waiver of it.” Id (emphasis added). “These defenses are such that it would be an abuse of discretion by the trial court to deny a motion on behalf of petitioner. . . to first try the issue tendered by the defense.” Id (emphasis added).
“The parties to an action have a right to having all of the issues in that action tried at one time rather than piecemeal. Here the defendant has the right to, at the trial of this action, assert his meritorious defenses. . . .
(A)nd while the court’s error could be reviewed upon appeal from an adverse judgment, this remedy is neither speedy nor adequate; for as we have pointed out, the defense stricken, if sustained by the proof, would terminate the action without any trial of the issues tendered by the complaint; while if he is prevented from making his defense he will have to go through with the trial of the action and then appeal and then go back for a further trial to have his defense, which now exists, determined. The trial court has not determined that defense upon its merits. Its error is one of law.” Id (emphasis added). “Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue, requiring the respondent court to reinstate petitioner’s. . . defense set forth in his amended answer. . . .” Id (emphasis added). “This writ must be issued when ‘there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law’; that the right of appeal is not always a speedy or adequate remedy is well settled.” Sampell v. Superior Court , 32 Cal.2d 765 (1948).
Finally, “(W)e recognize that the foregoing authorities dealt primarily with
refusal of trial courts to accept pleadings offered by one of the litigants. The
effect was to deny one party a full hearing on the merits of his cause . In the instant case, the petitioner was denied a crucial defense by the superior court at the trial rather than at a prior pleading stage, but the result was identical to that which would have followed a pleading rejection : petitioner was deprived of his only opportunity to fully litigate the unlawful detainer action on its merits. This constituted an abuse of discretion . The stay of proceedings heretofore ordered. . . is terminated. Let a preemptory writ of mandate issue.” Schweiger v. Superior Court , 3 Cal.3d 507 (1970).
In fact, at one point, judge Kalin stated that I had no defenses to Jackson’s complaint, therefore, he wouldn’t entertain the law that I offered regarding any of the defenses, in particular, the notice defense and the lack of authority defense.
So, Defendants Bigelow, Flier, and Sortino, denied me due process of law, at least, by arbitrarily and capriciously issuing a one-line order without any explanation of how it arrived at its decision; and by falsely stating that I “failed to demonstrate entitlement to extraordinary relief”, when, in fact, and as a matter of Second District law and the California Supreme Court law, I did demonstrate entitlement to extraordinary relief. And, Defendants made the arbitrary and capricious and false statement, under color of law, and with intention, willfulness, and malice.
Further, I primarily moved for an emergency stay of the eviction order or judgment below, and the Second District’s decision, except for mentioning the relief that I sought, didn’t even mention the stay. I had to conclude that the stay was denied because the petition was denied. This was an absolute abuse of discretion and an absolute denial of due process of law, under color of law. Especially when you consider that the Bigelow panel should have granted the emergency motion for a stay based on enforcement of the automatic stay, which Jackson had informed the Court of Appeal about in her Response to my petition, where she was seeking relief from the automatic stay. See infra, and Exhibit # 9 above. The Court of Appeal simply had to order the Superior Court, including the Clerk, to continue to enforce the automatic stay, which is state law. But, it didn’t. So, the Court of Appeal action in denying me relief was clearly intentional and willful, and a denial of due process of law, under color of law.
The result of the Defendants’ actions was my eviction from my home, and homelessness. And this fact and the State of the homeless crisis in Los Angeles, California exacerbates the harm done by Defendants’ action.
I continue to be homeless now.
7. Name of individual that I believe committed a federal crime : Cormac J. Carney, Judge, United States District Court, Central District of California.
Question #1. What federal crime do you believe has been committed?
ANS. : 18 U.S.C. secs. 242 and 1503. I believe judge Carney committed the crimes of willfully depriving me of my constitutional rights of due process and equal protection of the law, as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, while acting under color of federal or other law; and also, I believe judge Carney obstructed justice, and deprived me of my 7th amendment right to a jury trial regarding the claims in my complaint and lawsuit, under color of law.
Question #2. Explain in detail what you know about the crime, including when and where it occurred, what you have heard and observed and when you heard and observed it, what others have told you (include their names) and what other evidence may exist (hereinafter “Question #2”).
I know that when I filed a federal civil rights Complaint on or about August 25, 2017, joined by a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO), that I was facing an imminent eviction from my home and homelessness, and through the TRO motion, judge Carney knew this.
I know that when I filed the Complaint with the district court clerk’s office, and after it was assigned to judge Carney that I asked for another judge because I had previously had a bad experience with him, in a previous case (I had to file a writ of mandamus in the Ninth Circuit to force Carney to rule on a TRO motion—he had refused to rule before that—and to act on the case), see Bray v. Dept. of Justice, USDC, Cent. Dist. of CA, NO. CV 12-05704-CJC(RZ), where he exercised some of the same conduct as in this case, e.g., denying a TRO based on an erroneous reason, and I believe that he discriminated against me based on my race (Black). Nevertheless, the clerks said that Carney had to be assigned to my case because he was the last judge who had been assigned to a case that I had filed in the district court. So, Carney was assigned to my case, over objection. My case was not randomly assigned.
On the same day that I filed the case and moved for a temporary restraining order (TRO), Carney denied the TRO and sua sponte dismissed the case (which was a civil rights case, whereby I charged several officials and the Superior Court of California with denying me due process and equal protection of the law) . See Exhibit # 11 (Carney’s decision). He dismissed the prior Bray v. Dept. of Justice case, supra, with prejudice.
I know that Carney dismissed the case before any of the Defendants were served with process, thereby protecting the Defendants from liability. I also know that the reason Carney gave for denying the TRO was false.
And, I know that while Carney denied my motion for a TRO based on a false reason, he granted a TRO for immigrants or non-Black people around the same time that he denied my TRO, and both cases involved evictions (federal terminology or usage call the eviction “deportation” or “removal”, but both types of actions, civil evictions and federal deportations, involve being ousted or removed (from home or country).
I know that some evidence of the denial of due process is that Carney’s actions in dismissing the case sua sponte and without service of process on the parties was a violation of 9th Circuit law. See Franklin v. State of Oregon , 662 F.2d 1337(9th Cir. 1981).
I know that Carney, in a previous case, Bray v. Dept. of Justice, supra, and the last case that I filed in the district court, exhibited the same or similar conduct, that is, denying a TRO and dismissing the entire case at the same time, while relying on the same or similar principles, e.g., Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8. And, in neither case, did Rule 8 support his dismissal of the case.
I know that in the prior case, I had to petition the Ninth Circuit for a writ of mandamus in order to get Carney to rule on the TRO and case, supra, and during the time the mandamus was pending, Carney ruled on the TRO and the case. But, since the mandamus petition was pending, he lacked jurisdiction or authority when he made his rulings (and I believe that he so lacked jurisdiction and argued it below).
I know that in the prior case, like this case, there were property interests involved. In the former case, in addition to possessory rights, home ownership for me was involved, and Carney dismissed the case with prejudice without any litigation of the matters.
I know that the sua sponte dismissal of this case was without any service of process on any of the parties, and without providing me with an opportunity to amend my complaint. And, I know that this was a violation of Ninth Circuit law.
See Franklin , supra (“before a summons is issued a district court may not dismiss, sua sponte, for failure to state a claim an action over which it has subject matter jurisdiction” and “the court must give. . . an opportunity to amend. . . .”).
I know that with the denial of the TRO, and dismissal of the case, I was evicted from my home, and rendered homeless, and I remain homeless at this time.
Finally, I know that Carney’s unconstitutional conduct contributed to and caused my eviction and my homelessness , and it was intended to do so.
DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS
1. The right to obtain a determination of the merits of my claims against the Defendants, or to receive compensation for the violation of my civil rights. In essence, I was denied the right to bring a lawsuit against the Defendants.
2. I was denied the right to serve the Defendants with process so that that they
could answer for the violations I charge them with. “The court must permit issuance and service of process as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(a). . . .” This was also obstruction of justice.
3. I was denied a jury trial (also a Seventh Amendment violation).
4. I was wrongfully and intentionally denied a TRO, based on a false reason. There is no judicial immunity for injunctive relief against judicial officers.
EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATION (AND “SANCTUARY STATE” PROTECTION)
I was denied the right to equal protection of the law by judge Carney when he denied my TRO. He granted a TRO for Cambodian nationals about or near the same time that he denied my TRO. See Chhoeun v. Marin , No. SACV 17-01898-CJC(GJSx)(TRO granted on December 14, 2017). My TRO motion was denied by Carney on August 25, 2017.
My equal protection claim will be based on a “class of one”. Under the class-of-one claim, I must allege that I have “ ‘been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.’” ORDE R, U.S.D.C., DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS, Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel, October 31, 2016.
My equal protection claim is based on the plaintiffs in the case of Chhoeun v. Marin , NO. SACV 17-01898-CJC, filed December 14, 2017, supra. These Plaintiffs are the comparative parties. The Chhoeun plaintiffs, Cambodian nationals, sought a TRO to prevent their eviction (Carney, like the federal government, calls it “removal”) from the country. I sought a TRO to prevent my eviction from my home.
Carney granted the Cambodian nationals a TRO while denying mine. In Chhnoeun , “Petitioners filed an application for a temporary restraining order seeking a stay of removal until Petitioners are given an opportunity to reopen and challenge their orders of removal.” Chhnoeun , at 2. “Petitioners claim that they will face irreparable harm absent a stay of the removal proceedings.” Id . I also alleged that I would suffer irreparable harm without the TRO, restraining eviction .
The Chhnoeun Plaintiffs are similarly situated to me because they were seeking a TRO to prevent their eviction, as I was. We both alleged irreparable harm as the primary reason for the TRO.
There was no rational basis for the difference in treatment between us. And, since I am a Black male, a rational basis, even if found, would not be enough. I am a member of a “suspect class”, and I do allege that my race was a factor in judge Carney denying my TRO. Therefore, strict scrutiny is required, and under strict scrutiny, I was denied equal protection of the law.
Finally, I assert I was denied equal protection as to the Cambodian immigrants, because they were given “sanctuary city-state” type of protection as immigrants by judge Carney, while I, as a Black male was not given any protection by him.
8. Name of individual that I believe committed a federal crime : Alex Kozinski (retired), Alfred T. Goodwin, and Marsha S. Berzon, judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Question #1. What federal crime do you believe has been committed?
ANS. : 18 U.S.C. secs. 241, 242, and 1503. I believe the crimes of denial of constitutional rights under color of law, conspiracy to deny constitutional rights under color of law, and conspiracy to obstruct justice under color of law, at least, were committed by judges Kozinski, Goodwin and Berzon. I believe the constitutional rights of due process and equal protection of the law, and freedom of speech and the right to petition the government for redress were denied me under color of law as well.
I believe the obstruction of justice is based, at least, on the panel not deciding the issue of my equal protection claim that was set forth in writing and submitted to the court.
Question #2.
I know that on or about August 25, 2017, I filed an emergency motion for a stay/injunction with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The emergency motion was filed under two pending appeals, nos. 16-50453 and 17-56315.
I know that the purpose of the emergency motion was to stay Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County proceedings involving a judgment for possession of property and eviction proceedings. More specifically, the emergency motion was filed to stay my imminent eviction after an eviction judgment in favor of Dianne V. Jackson in and after unlawful detainer proceedings. The motion was filed to stop my eviction from my only home, without prospects of obtaining another home. In other words, the motion was filed to prevent me from becoming homeless.
I know that pursuant to 9th Cir. Rules, an emergency motion is one that needs to be decided within 21 days. I know that the emergency motion in my case was not acted upon until January 16, 2018 (with an Order and ruling that “Accordingly, the emergency motion. . . is denied as moot”), which is clearly past 21 days. And, I know that I have now been evicted from my home, having had to remove all of my possessions and place them in storage, and leaving my mother’s home unprotected, since no one lives at the home presently. The eviction has also allowed my sister, Jackson, to remove much of my mother’s furniture and furnishings from her home, in, and because of, my absence, with Jackson’s intention to try and sell my mother’s home without, in my view, my mother’s voluntary or un-influenced consent.
I know that no reason have been given for the Defendants not ruling on the emergency motion until January 16, 2018, see Exhibit #12 (Order) and that because of the non-ruling (until 1/16/18), I have been evicted from my home, with a loss of property rights and the deprivation of a home. “(I)n releasing results of the 2018 (homeless) count, officials also warned that the number of people falling into homelessness for the first time increased , holding back potential gains.” “Homelessness declines in L.A. and countywide”, L.A. Times, June 1, 2018 (emphasis added). “(T)he report noted that three out of four homeless people in the county (L.A.) live on the streets, a figure unchanged from last year.” Id (emphasis added). “The most significant demographic change was a 22% increase in the number of (homeless) people 62 and older.” Id. (emphasis added). I am 68 years old. Finally, “ ‘The issue of homelessness has been a problem that we’ve been trying to deal with for many , many years, and we’ve had limited success,’ said Neely, who now sits on the Los Angeles County Commission for Older Adults.” Id. (emphasis added).
DUE PROCESS AND FIRST AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS
The main due process violation was not ruling on the emergency motion until January 16, 2018, after it had been filed on August 31, 2017, over four months later. This was a complete denial of due process, since the motion was required to be decided in 21 days. Pursuant to 9th Cir. Rule 27-3 “(a) Emergency Motions”, “If a movant certifies that to avoid irreparable harm relief is needed in less than 21 days, the motion shall be governed by the following requirements : (ii) Facts showing the existence and nature of the claimed emergency (which was shown in the emergency motion).” Therefore, by not ruling on the motion in 21 days, the Kozinski panel did not treat the motion or matter as an “emergency”, and arbitrarily denied me emergency treatment. The Kozinski panel provided no reasons for its failure to rule in 21 days or any other reasons. And, since this was an arbitrary and capricious decision, it enhances the Due Process violation. “We may only reverse a . . . decision if we find the decision to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; obtained without procedures required by law (here, ruling on the emergency motion within 21 days)’, or unsupported by substantial evidence. (Citation omitted). We must ‘reverse a decision. . . if it. . . is not in accordance with the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or any other constitutional provision.” (Citation omitted). Ward v. US Postal Service , 634 F.3d 1274(Fed. Cir. 2011).
An example of due process treatment of an emergency motion is the case of State of Washington v. Trump , _____ (9th Cir. 2017)(Order), where an emergency motion filed by the Justice Department was decided 2 days after being submitted, and, while the motion was denied, the Ninth Circuit provided reasons for its denial.
And, while the Kozinski panel stated in its Order, Exh.#12, that “Appellant erroneously filed an emergency motion for injunctive relief in this case. That motion was addressed in Appeal No. 17-56315. Accordingly, the emergency motion (Docket Entry No. 14) is denied as moot”. Even if this was true (and I don’t believe it is because I filed the emergency motion under both appeals), why did the Kozinski panel wait four months to tell me that I filed the emergency motion in the wrong case? That, in itself, is a due process violation that equals the due process violation which occurred if the appeal was filed in the correct case. That is, it is a violation of due process to wait four months to tell me that I filed an emergency motion in the wrong case. It should have been done immediately after the motion was filed.
Again, the Kozinski panel’s denial of my due process rights regarding my emergency motion contributed to and caused my eviction from my home, causing me to be homeless. And, it was done under color of law.
Finally, I was denied the right provided to me by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 35, to file a petition for rehearing en banc, and, therefore, I was denied my First Amendment right to petition the government for redress. Instead of granting me the right afforded me by Rule 35, the Kozinski panel somehow converted my Rule 35 petition into a motion for reconsideration, and thereafter, denied that motion. The panel’s Order (dated 1/16/2018), supra, declares “Appellant’s motion for reconsideration is denied and his motion for reconsideration en banc is denied on behalf of the court (citing 9th Cir. Rule and Gen. Order)”. But, I did not file motions for reconsideration. Therefore, the motions for reconsideration assigned to me by the panel are not my motions. But, more importantly, it was the Kozinski panel and not the full court that denied me en banc review. The petition for en banc review is directed to and must be decided by the en banc court, i.e., either to grant review or not. The purpose of requesting full court review is because one is dissatisfied with the panel’s decision, and wants the full court to decide the respective matters. Here, the full court never decided the questions addressed in my Petition.
Rule 35 specifically states : “A party may petition for a hearing or rehearing en banc.” This is the FRAP, Rule 35 right. “(L)itigants should be free to suggest that a particular case is appropriate for consideration by all the judges of a court of appeals.” Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules—1967. “The rule. . . provides that suggestions will be directed to the judges of the court irregular active service.” Id. The rule does not distinguish between orders (from rulings on motions) or judgments, it says “a particular case”. I was denied my FRAP, Rule 35 right, under color of law (and under the color of any 9th Circuit rules or general orders that serves to circumvent or deny that right)(for example, in its order, the panel cites 9th Cir. Rule 27-10, but that’s a rule for motions for reconsideration, not en banc review; and Gen. Ord. 6.11 “Any. . . petition seeking en banc review of an order issued by a motions. . . panel shall be processed as a motion for reconsideration en banc”—this Gen. Order circumvents the Rule and denies the right).
The Supreme Court has just recently spoke to this matter. “(I)t must be underscored that this Court has recognized the ‘right to petition as one of the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.” Lozman v. Riviera , U.S. Supreme Court, NO. 17-21, (June 18, 2018).
I was also denied my First Amendment right of freedom of speech as to retaliation. See the Tashima Defendants, infra, and the retaliation argument.
EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATION AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S “SANCTUARY STATE” LAW
I was denied equal protection of the law under color of law by the Kozinski panel , by the panel denying protections to me that it (9th Circuit) provided for immigrant deportees facing eviction (or “deportation” or “removal” in federal terms, but still eviction). The “under color of law” is a 9th Circuit General order which provides for an automatic stay (“temporary stay”) pending review of an appeal on the merits for an immigrant deportee, i.e., see Gen. Order 6.4( c)(1). This general order is in the nature of a “sanctuary state” law for the specific protection of immigrants. “VII. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMMIGRATION MOTIONS. Under General Order 6.4 ( c), the filing of an initial motion for a stay of removal automatically and temporarily stays removal until the Court can rule on the motion, and so the motion for a stay need not be filed on an emergency basis. However, if a motion for a stay has previously been denied, any subsequent motions for a stay or for reconsideration must be filed as emergency motions if removal is imminent. If it is necessary to file a petition for review and/or for a stay of removal on an emergency basis (i.e., if removal is imminent) counsel should contact the motions unit to request authorization for a facsimile filing.” The Appellate Lawyer Representatives’ Guide, To Practice in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, June 2017 ed. I requested facsimile filing, and my request was denied.
While the Kozinski panel provided automatic stay protection for immigrant deportees facing eviction or about to be evicted, it provided no protection for me as a homeless Black male of Los Angeles County facing eviction or about to be evicted. And, most (nearly all) of the deportees have criminal convictions and are not citizens of this country. While I am an American citizen, with no criminal convictions, and am a Vietnam War Era veteran.
And, the denial of equal protection was knowingly, willfully, and with specific intent to do so.
I am asserting a “class-of-one” equal protection charge. That is, “To state a valid ‘class-of-one’ claim under the Equal Protection Clause, Plaintiffs must allege that they have ‘been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” ORDER, U.S. District Court, Southern District of California, Prime Healthcare v. Harris , No. 3:16-cv-00778-GPC-RBB (filed October 31, 2016), Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel .
I am similarly situated to the immigrant deportees in that we are both facing eviction, the deportees from the country and me from my home in Los Angeles County . Moreover, I assert that the Ninth Circuit and the Kozinski panel have a pattern of granting immigrant deportees an automatic stay, while denying me one. And, I placed the comparison between the immigrant deportees and myself directly before the Kozinski panel, in writing, before the panel’s decision regarding my emergency motion and/or its decision in the case. My written claim was never responded to. Finally, both the deportees and myself suffer irreparable harm as a result of the evictions (and conceivably, the ultimate conceivable harm suffered by myself as a homeless Black man of Los Angeles County, is more serious than the ultimate harm suffered by deportees, i.e., hundreds of deaths of homeless people annually, 851 deaths of skid row and/or other homeless people in 2017).
And, there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment between the deportees and myself. And, here, because I am a Black male, it implicates a “suspect classification” and requires “strict scrutiny”. A rational basis for the difference in treatment is not enough.
Finally, had the Kozinski panel applied an automatic stay to my case, as it does cases of immigrant deportees, it would have allowed me to remain in my home at least until the panel issued its decision in January, 2018, approximately 4 months (which would have postponed my homelessness for the same time).
So, the Kozinski panel’s treatment and decision regarding my emergency motion was an arbitrary and capricious one, at least (i.e., I leave open whether it was racially-motivated as well because I am a Black male) which, in turn, denied me due process of law and equal protection of the law, in addition to the other ways which I have stated in which my due process rights were violated under color of law .
The Kozinski panel’s actions directly caused my loss of property rights and my homelessness (which continues at this time) under color of law. “(I)t is not necessary for the defendants to have been thinking in constitutional or legal terms at the time of the incidents, because a reckless disregard for a person’s constitutional rights is evidence of a specific intent to deprive that person of those rights.’ ” Reese v. County of Sacramento , NO. 16-16195, (9th Cir., April 23, 2018).
9. Name of individual that I believe committed a federal crime : A. Wallace Tashima , William A. Fletcher, and Richard C. Tallman.
Question #1. What federal crime do you believe has been committed?
ANS.: 18 U.S.C. secs. 241, 242, and 1503. I believe the crimes of denial of
constitutional rights under color of law, conspiracy to deny constitutional rights under color of law, obstruction of justice and conspiracy to obstruct justice, under color of law, at least, was committed by judges Tashima, W. Fletcher, and Tallman (“Tashima panel”). I believe the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and to petition the government, due process of law and equal protection of the law were denied me under color of law. And, I believe that obstruction of justice was committed by the Tashima panel based on their cover-up of the district judge’s (Cormac Carney’s) actions in his rulings and based on the panel’s cover-up of the issue of racial bias possibly involved with the judge, and the cover-up of actions by the judge in two cases involving myself and the judge. That is, intentionally issuing an arbitrary decision to prevent the examination of the judge’s actions in the two cases involving the judge and myself.
Furthermore, the panel also obstructed justice by not reviewing the claims made in my civil rights complaint filed in the district court, charging Superior Court of California officials with denying me my fundamental constitutional rights under color of law.
Question #2.
THE DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS
I know that I filed an emergency motion on April 10, 2018, in the 9th Circuit, for the purpose of trying to re-take possession of my home. I was, at that time, and am now , homeless (based on what I know were unconstitutional actions by the Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County). I know the emergency motion wasn’t treated as an “emergency” motion because, at least, it was not decided within 21 days (being decided on May 7, 2018, when the motion was filed on April 10, 2018, nearly 30 days later), see Exhibit # 13 (May 7, 2018 Order), and when it was decided, it was arbitrarily and capriciously decided and denied, without comment. I know that claims involved in that emergency motion was not only my personal claims, but a claim regarding the safety of my mother’s home and property (which is my home as well). I know that the Tashima panel’s arbitrary decision showed no concern for the safety or welfare of my mother’s property, in addition to no concern for my individual and personal claims. “(A) reckless disregard for a person’s constitutional rights is evidence of a specific intent to deprive that person of those rights.” Reese , supra.
I know that a review of the emergency motion would demonstrate that it has merit, and objectively, would probably be granted; and, thereby would have eradicated my homelessness.
I know that I was denied due process regarding the judgment that was arrived at by the Tashima panel, and all of them, based on the order-judgment being intentionally arbitrary and capricious, and based on a sua sponte show cause Order (rather than a motion for summary affirmance by a party), and unsupportable in fact or law. And, part of the arbitrariness was a failure to provide a reason for the decision.
Defendants Tashima, et.al., state, in its Order-judgment, “A review of the record and appellant’s response to this court’s September 1, 2017 order to show cause indicates that the questions raised in this appeal are so insubstantial as not to require further argument.” Exhibit # 14 (Initial Judgment-Order, November 15, 2017). There was no reason provided as to why the questions raised are “insubstantial”. Due process, under the circumstances, required a reason. Two examples of a due process Order (regarding summary affirmance) are submitted here (an Order and Opinion) as Exhibit # 15 , where “the court finds that the questions presented in this appeal are so insubstantial as not to require further argument, because they are governed by controlling Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent.” (Emphasis added). (ORDER, NO. 13-57095 (9th Cir. November 18, 2014); and Exhibit # 16 , where “A review of the record indicates that the questions raised in this appeal are so insubstantial as not to require further argument. (Citing U.S. v. Hooten,693 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1982). Appellant’s claims are foreclosed by United States v. Augustine , 712 F.3d 1290 (9th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, Appellee’s motion for summary affirmance is granted.” U.S. v. Orlando Clement, Opinion, NO. 12-50189, (9th Cir. , July 22, 2013).
Moreover, the question regarding the district judge’s sua sponte dismissal of my case below cannot be “insubstantial” as a matter of Ninth Circuit law . That is, the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of my case below is a direct violation of Ninth Circuit law. See Franklin v. State of Oregon State Welfare , 662 F.2d 1337(9th Cir. 1981), where the 9th Cir. stated , “the dismissal of actions on the court’s own motion before issuance of summones is proper only when it is clear that the court lacks jurisdiction.” And, here, judge Carney did not find that he lacked jurisdiction, and the Tashima panel did not find so either. So, the question of judge Carney’s sua sponte dismissal could not be deemed “insubstantial” as a matter of law.
Further, even Tashima himself, in a recent case that he authored, United States v. Walker River Irrigation District , NO. 15-16478 (9th Cir. 2018) demonstrates why the question of a sua sponte dismissal of a case cannot be “insubstantial”. In Walker River , Tashima himself deemed a sua sponte dismissal of counterclaims of the United States by a district judge “unprecedented”, i.e., “coupled with his unprecedented sua sponte dismissal of the United States’ counterclaim”, and “the unprecedented decision to sua sponte dismiss the counterclaims”(emphasis here and in the original). Therefore, if a question is unprecedented, it cannot be “insubstantial”, except for my case. See infra.
Finally, the Tashima Defendants relied upon the case of U.S. v. Hooten , supra, as support for their summary affirmance of the district court’s sua sponte dismissal, but the Hooten standard only demonstrate why the sua sponte dismissal should have been summarily reversed , not summarily affirmed. Hooten requires, for summary affirmance, that : (1) the insubstantiality of the appeal appears from the face of appellant’s brief (here, the Response to the Order to Show Cause), (2) the applicable law (here, Franklin , supra), and (3) a brief review of the district court record. And, based on that standard, summary reversal ,rather than summary affirmance, was required. First, Hooten also stated that “Motions to affirm should be confined to appeals obviously controlled by precedent and cases in which the insubstantiality is manifest from the face of appellant’s brief (here, the Response to the Order to Show Cause)”. Second, based on the first optional requirement (i.e., precedent), the district court judgment was required to be summarily reversed. The appeal was obviously controlled by Franklin (i.e., precedent), which clearly required reversal because the district court’s sua sponte order clearly violated Franklin’s requirements (especially, the opportunity to amend). “We agree that before a summons is issued a district court may not dismiss, sua sponte, for failure to state a claim an action over which it has subject matter jurisdiction.” Franklin, supra.
Therefore, the failure of the Tashima panel to summarily reverse the district court judgment, based on Franklin , and, instead arbitrarily affirm the judgment, aggravates the due process violation. I was denied a due process appeal, and in essence, I was denied the right to appeal the district court’s judgment and to recover relief for the constitutional violations in my civil rights complaint.
Finally, here, as was the case with the Kozinski panel, I was denied the right to petition the en banc court for a rehearing en banc, per FRAP, Rule 35. See Kozinski Defendants’ charges above. The Tashima panel stated, in its Order, “Appellant’s petition for rehearing en banc is construed as a motion for reconsideration en banc and is denied on behalf of the court.” Exhibit # 13 (Tashima panel’s May 7, 2018 Order). Again, there is no provision in Rule 35 providing for such a “construing”. This is under the color of 9th Circuit law. I was denied due process and the right to petition the full court under color of law. And, all rights denied were under the color of law. I will speak on the First Amendment
right to freedom of speech infra, in terms of retaliation, as applied to both the Kozinski panel and the Tashima panel.
EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATION
The Tashima panel also denied me equal protection of the law in regard to its failure to reverse the district court’s judgment based on the district court judge’s sua sponte dismissal of my case. Here, judge Tashima wrote the opinion of the comparative case, and he was a panel member, at least, of my case; and of some significance, the two cases were decided at or about the same time, i.e., during the month of May, 2018. The comparative case is United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist. ,NO. 15-16478, Opinion (9th Cir. ,May 22, 2018)(Tashima, Fisher, and Bybee)(Opinion by Tashima). My case was decided on May 7, 2018.
The facts of the two cases are different, but, they (the facts) are not really important regarding the equal protection claim. The equal protection claim is based on the action or actions taken by judge Tashima more than the facts of the case. Walker River facts involve water rights and my case involve civil rights, fundamental rights, if you will, which I believe require a closer look.
As I did above, I will rely on the class-of-one doctrine for asserting my equal protection charge or claim.
A. THE SIMILARLY SITUATED FACTORS: (1) in both cases, judge Tashima either
authored the decision himself or was a member of the panel authoring the decision; (2) both cases involved a sua sponte action by the presiding district court judge; and (3) both cases involved the district judges issuing sua sponte dismissals of the party’s claims or counterclaims.
B. INTENTIONALLY TREATED DIFFERENTLY : In the Walker River case, “The panel reversed the district court’s order dismissing. . . an action brought by the United States and the Walker River Irrigation District and others concerning water rights in the Walker River basin” ( taken from the “Summary” of the case—which states the view I take of the action in the case, including the passages that follow).
“In May 2015, without briefing or argument on the issue, the district court sua sponte dismissed all of the Tribe’s and the United States’ counterclaims. . . .” (The “Summary”). “The panel further held that the district court erred by dismissing the claims sua sponte on the basis of res judicata without first giving the parties an opportunity to be heard on the issue.” (The “Summary”). More specifically, Tashima wrote, “We hold that the district court had a continuing jurisdiction over the counterclaims and that it erred in dismissing the claims on res judicata or jurisdictional grounds without giving the parties an opportunity to brief the issue. Accordingly, we reverse and remand. On remand, we also order the reassignment of this case to another district judge.” (Emphasis here and in the original). I raised the issue of whether judge Carney should have been assigned to my case below after he had committed conduct or misconduct in a previous case of mine that he had presided over. Again, with the panel’s arbitrary order, it, including Tashima, did not respond to the issue. “(W)e have explained that ‘the purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.’ ” (Citation omitted) Village of Willowbrook v. Olech , 528 U.S. 562 (2000).
Finally, in a case authored by W. Fletcher (who is also a member of this, the Tashima, panel) involving voting rights (or civil rights, like my case), judge Fletcher made the following comments and/or holdings or rulings : “(T)he district judge abused his discretion by dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint . . . without giving Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend”;
“(t)he judge sua sponte sought to limit the effectiveness of representation by insisting unreasonably that only two of Plaintiff’s chosen out-of-state attorneys be given pro hac vice status”; “the judge sua sponte and without notice dismissed Plaintiffs’ case. . . .”; “(t)he judge dismissed the complaint without leave to amend despite Plaintiffs’ explicit request that they be allowed to amend their complaint if the judge found its allegations insufficient”; and, finally, “We reverse the district court’s dismissal of the complaint. . . .”, and “We instruct the Chief Judge of the District of Nevada to assign the case to a different district judge.” National Council of La Raza v. Cegavske , 800 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2015).
But, in my case, the Tashima panel not only did not reverse the district court’s order dismissing the action, or find that “the district court erred by dismissing the claims sua sponte . . . , without first giving (me) an opportunity to be heard on the issue”, it found no error in the district court dismissing my case sua sponte and without an opportunity for me to brief the issue, and, remarkably, it summarily affirmed the district court’s Order (finding the “sua sponte” issue and the district court’s dismissal to be “insubstantial”, see Exhibit #14 (Summary Affirmance Decision, where “the questions raised in this appeal are so insubstantial as not to require further argument”) ), which provides the willful and intentional element of the equal protection claim.
NO RATIONAL BASIS FOR DIFFERENCE IN TREATMENT
Not only is there no rational basis for the panel’s difference in treatment, but, it clearly will not survive “strict scrutiny” (since I am a Black male, and I do believe my race was(is) a factor, particularly since I charged the district judge with bias, informally, and I believe racial bias, based on the combination of both the herein case and a previous case, see Bray v. Dept. of Justice , NO. CV 12-05704-CJC(RZ), whereby he also made rulings that I believe were prejudicial and biased). See Order (Prime v. Healthcare), supra, where “Unless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or implicates a suspect classification (here, a Black male), to meet constitutional challenge the law in question needs only have some rational relation to a legitimate state interest.”
I charge that the panel intentionally denied me equal protection of the law, under color of law, in not reversing my case for judge Carney’s sua sponte dismissal of my case, while reversing the Walker River case based on the district judge’s sua sponte dismissal in that case; and especially, since judge Tashima was involved in deciding both cases.
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
I know that the Tashima panel obstructed justice in at least two ways : (1) by covering up the conduct or misconduct of Superior Court of California officials enacted during my eviction proceedings, and (2) covering up the conduct or misconduct of district court judge Cormac Carney covering two (2) district court cases involving myself.
Because the Tashima panel issued an arbitrary decision without any discussion or reasoning, regarding the civil rights claims raised in my federal complaint, the panel intentionally and effectively covered up and hid from public view, the misconduct of the officials and the effect on the public and particularly those directly affected by the misconduct, who have been deprived of their constitutional rights during the eviction processes.
So, that means the constitutional violations are likely continuing, since they are being ignored, and nothing is being done to stop the misconduct.
I know that the Tashima panel, in its treatment of this appeal, produced its decisions, including the Show Cause Order, in a way that there is no mention of judge Carney’s name, actions, or rulings, which serve to protect him from public scrutiny and judicial scrutiny by a higher court (for lack of a thorough record). In particular, it protects him from a determination of whether he is bias or not. In contrast, in the Walker River case, supra, judge Tashima had no problem discussing the conduct or misconduct of district judge Robert Clive Jones, who is not a member of the Central District of California. So, why is Carney’s conduct covered up?
I know that the arbitrary decision by the Tashima panel protects Carney from scrutiny as to whether he violated Ninth Circuit law in issuing his sua sponte dismissal, and whether he provided a false reason for denying my motion for a temporary restraining order, and whether his actions in this case, together with his actions in a past case, display a pattern of prejudicial conduct directed against me.
RETALIATION
While I am reluctant to set forth the following claim, I believe I must, especially in view of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida , NO. 17-21, (June 18, 2018)(Kennedy, J.). I charge that one of the reasons both the Kozinski panel and the Tashima panel denied my emergency motions for relief was retaliation.
I know that at least one source of evidence that would support willfulness or intentional conduct per retaliation would be my blog regarding a member of the Ninth Circuit Court. See the blog entitled, “Ninth Circuit Judge Mary M. Schroeder v. Barry Bonds : A case of one criminal judging another criminal regarding the same crime. . . .”
The Supreme Court, in Lozman , stated “the First Amendment prohibits government officials from retaliating against individuals for engaging in protected speech”, citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 , 592 (1998). The court went on to state “An official retaliatory policy is a particularly troubling and potent form of retaliation, for a policy can be long term and pervasive, unlike an ad hoc, on-the-spot decision by an individual officer. An official policy also can be difficult to dislodge.” “(T)here may be little practical recourse when the government itself orchestrates the retaliation. For these reasons, when retaliation against protected speech is elevated to the level of official policy, there is a compelling need for adequate avenues of redress (such as the herein Complaint Report).” I contend that the retaliation in both the Kozinski case and the Tashima case represents a pattern and policy of retaliation, or “an official retaliatory policy”.
As Lozman alleged in his case, and I also allege here, the Ninth Circuit deprived me of my First Amendment right and liberty by retaliating against me for my criminal civil rights complaint lodged against Schroeder, and my “criticisms of public officials”. “Thus, (my) speech is high in the hierarchy of First Amendment values.” Id.
**10. Name of individual that I believe committed a federal crime : A. Veronica Sauceda, Commissioner, Compton Branch of Superior Court.
**NOTE : This Commissioner was not directly involved in the eviction proceedings, so she is an exception, like judge Lippitt, supra, to the others name in this Complaint. She presided over a recent restraining order proceeding initiated by Jackson (to renew an expired restraining order).
Question #1. What federal crime do you believe have been committed?
ANS. : 18 U.S.C. sec. 242. I believe that Commissioner Sauceda committed the crime of willfully violating my constitutional rights (or subjected me to the deprivation thereof) under color of law. I believe that she violated my due process rights to liberty and to a fair and impartial hearing and adjudicator under color of law. I believe that a major portion of the due process violation was Commr. Sauceda ignoring or disregarding my evidence, in addition to her blatant bias against me and/or in favor of Jackson.
Question #2.
I know that on July 2, 2018, a hearing was held to determine whether an expired restraining order granted to Jackson should be
renewed.
I know that prior to the hearing, I had stated under oath in a response to Jackson’s request to renew the expired restraining order that several statements made by Jackson, in her request, were lies. See Exhibit # 17 (Attachment to my Response to Request to Renew Restraining Order). And, in particular, I stated that the statement made by Jackson that I had filed a complaint with the City’s Department of Building and Safety (DBS) about “chipped paint on the wall” was a “lie”, or false statement .
I know that at the hearing, after Jackson gave a rambling presentation of allegations or assertions that were a combination of matters which were presented before the original restraining order and a few after, that I asserted (with my opportunity to speak) that most of Jackson’s assertions were lies. And, I particularly pointed to the lie regarding the DBS (because it could possibly be proven to be a lie through independent corroboration or evidence). I know I stated (at least generally) that the court could possibly prove the statement was false by contacting the DBS. Comm. Sauceda replied that it wasn’t her job. See Exhibit # 18 (Transcript of proceedings) at p. 18, lines 1-8. And, Sauceda did not inquire from Jackson (or elicit from Jackson) as to what was the basis for her assertion of the statement or accusation, or what was her proof that I filed the complaint. There was no inquiry of Jackson. See Id.
I know that Sauceda inquired of me regarding certain of Jackson’s assertions, but did not inquire of Jackson of any of my assertions, including the DBS matter. My assertions included that : (1) I did not violate the current restraining order; (2) I did not harass Jackson; and (3) I did not make a complaint against Jackson with DBS. Sauceda did not inquire of Jackson regarding any of these items. She simply ignored or disregarded my assertions or evidence. “(I)t is not necessary for the defendants to have been ‘thinking in constitutional or legal terms at the time of the incidents, because a reckless disregard for a person’s constitutional rights is evidence of a specific intent to deprive that person of those rights.’ ” Reese , supra (emphasis in original).
At one point, while inquiring into Jackson’s assertion that I saw her on the porch of our home, Jackson admitted that I did not try to contact her, which was evidence that I did not harass her. But, this was ignored by Sauceda as well, in her harassment assessment.
Sauceda basically “sentenced” me (in a matter of speaking) to five (5) years of restricted or restrained liberty or freedom based on her finding that I could “see” Jackson’s car (when I appeared near the house and Jackson’s car was parked near the house), and that is “harassment”. See Exhibit # 18 (Transcript) at p.21, lines 10-11 .
I know that pursuant to the California Courts website, “Once the court issues (makes) a restraining order, it goes into a statewide computer system. This means that law enforcement officers across California can see there is a restraining order in place.” And, “Effect of a Restraining Order on the Restrained Person”, “For the person to be restrained, the consequences of having a court order against him or her can be severe.” Emphasis added.
I know that I was completely denied a fair and impartial hearing. I was completely denied a fair and impartial adjudicator, and my evidence, i.e., testimony, was completely disregarded; and the current restraining order, which restricts my liberty, and which had expired, was renewed and extended for 5 years based on false statements and/or evidence. And all of this, under color of law. Incidentally, I followed up on the DBS matter by visiting the DBS in downtown L.A.. I discovered that the letter sent to Jackson was not based on a complaint, but rather was based on an assessment by a DBS official or inspector who randomly had visited the area saw the chipped paint and issued a letter of correction.
Finally, Sauceda, sua sponte ordered that the stay away distance be extended from 2 yards to 100 yards, without any warning and without a request for modification of the restraining order being officially submitted by Jackson (even if she somehow made an unofficial request for a greater distance). See Exh. #14, p.21, line 23, where , “and I am extending the stay away to 100 yards”. Even though, “I know that it was initially issued or limited to two yards.” Id.
SUMMARY OF DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS
1. Denial of a fair and impartial adjudicator and hearing.
There was a complete denial of a fair and impartial adjudicator and hearing.
It wasn’t the case of parts of the hearing being fair and impartial, and parts being partial. The entire hearing was partial and unfair. See Exh. #14, et.seq.
2. Denial of an un-biased proceeding.
The hearing was entirely biased in favor of Jackson. And, I believe the bias was both racial and gender based. That is, because I am a Black male. Even after Jackson gave her rambling allegations which included a combination of pre-restraining order allegations and post allegations (with most being pre-restraining order allegations, which are irrelevant to the request to renew the restraining order), with no corroboration of any of her allegations, and with none found by Sauceda, Sauceda found that “The Petitioner met her burden of proof and the restraining order will be reissued.” Id. at p. 21 . Basically, Sauceda gave full weight to Jackson’s allegations (with no corroboration) and no weight to my allegations, which at least had some corroboration, see infra.
3. Disregard of my evidence and/or defenses.
Even though I repeatedly stated that I did not violate the current restraining order or harass Jackson, Id. at 13, 16, and 18, which would provide the basis to renew the current restraining order, Sauceda ignored this testimonial evidence, even where there was at least some corroboration.
For example, regarding violating the restraining order: Exh. #18, p.16:
THE COURT: The court limited the stay away to two yards away from her.
THE RESPONDENT (Me): Right.
THE COURT: You’re correct it is not two yards from the home. It is just …stay away from the Respondent (sic).
THE RESPONDENT: Absolutely.
And, p. 21
THE COURT : . . . . She doesn’t have to show that you’ve violated the temporary restraining order. Yes, technically it is two-yard stay away.
And, regarding me harassing Jackson:
At p. 5
THE COURT: And on June 19th did you see him.
THE PETITIONER: Yes.
THE COURT: Where were you?
THE PETITIONER : I was on the porch of the house.
THE COURT : Were you outside?
THE PETITIONER : I was on the porch, yeah.
THE COURT : How long was he out there for?
THE COURT: How long was the respondent outside the home?
THE PETITIONER: About 20, 30 minutes. He wiped his car off and I think he took the battery out or something.
THE COURT : Did he say anything to you while on the porch?
THE PETITIONER : No. I don’t think he saw me.
End of transcript segments.
I saw her. But, Saucedo never asked me about it or included it in her harassment assessment. It was some evidence that I did not harass Jackson.
The evidence was ignored. Due process required Saucedo to consider this evidence. “(I)t is not necessary for the defendants to have been ‘thinking in constitutional or legal terms at the time of the incidents, because a reckless disregard for a person’s constitutional rights is evidence of a specific intent to deprive that person of those rights.”
**4. DENIAL OF FUNDAMENTAL NOTICE AND A HEARING : BASED ON A SUA SPONTE ORDER.
When Saucedo , sua sponte, ordered the extension of the stay away order from 2 yards to 100 yards, she denied me fundamental due process notice and a hearing regarding the 100 yard extension, and she exacted a greater restriction on my liberty and freedom without due process of law.
Besides being arbitrary and capricious, and without a factual or legal basis, the 100 yard extension was a direct violation of fundamental constitutional principles.
Jackson’s petition only sought a renewal of the current restraining order, which only demanded a stay away of 2 yards. Jackson did not request, nor could she request, a formal modification of the current restraining order in the request to renew. She would have been required to submit an entirely different request or form based on an entirely different standard and set of circumstances for a modification, as opposed to a renewal of the same order.
Therefore, I did not receive notice of Saucedo’s intent to expand the stay away order to 100 yards and the hearing did not cover an expanded 100 yards (nor could it because Saucedo made the ruling at the end of the hearing) stay order. Therefore, I also did not receive a hearing on the 100 yard restriction before I was deprived of my liberty for five more years. “The Fifth (and Fourteenth) Amendment of the Constitution prohibits the Government from depriving individuals of their ‘life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’ U.S. Const. amend. V. The Government may not deprive a person of one of these protected interests without providing ‘notice and an opportunity to respond,’ or, in other words, the opportunity to present reasons not to proceed with the deprivation and have them considered.” State of Washington v. Trump , ORDER, NO. 17-35105, 9th Cir., February 9, 2017.
I was not provided with “the opportunity to present reasons not to proceed with” the 100 yard extension stay away order issued by Saucedo. And, the denial of notice and a hearing was performed willfully and under color of law. Saucedo knew, when she issued the 100 yard order, that I did not receive notice or a hearing regarding the order.
I was willfully subjected to the deprivation of my constitutional rights to liberty and a fair and impartial adjudicator and hearing, under color of law.
RELIEF REQUESTED
I request the following types of general relief:
1. The arrest and prosecution of the Defendants in my Complaint. The Defendants should not be allowed to simply retire or resign, or be transferred to a different court; rather, they should be treated the same as other defendants where probable cause has been found for arrest. Moreover, as a victim of the Defendants’ misconduct, I cannot receive any relief unless the
Defendants are arrested and prosecuted.
And, as a victim, it would be unfair not to receive relief for criminal and unconstitutional conduct. Further, even when I attempted to pursue some claims civilly, without pursuing a criminal remedy, it’s the Defendants’ criminal conduct which have prevented that.
2. I seek all remedies which are available upon prosecution of individuals, e.g., restitution, injunctive relief, or other.
3. I believe, at minimum, if the defendant judicial officers are prosecuted and convicted that their respective orders or judgments arising from the unconstitutional conduct should be vacated.
4. Any other relief that is deemed just and fair under the circumstances.
Dated: July 17, 2018 __________________________
VERIFICATION
I, Laurack D. Bray, declare :
I have read the foregoing Complaint Report and know the contents thereof.
The same is true of my own knowledge, except as to those matters which are therein stated on information and belief, and , as to those matters, I believe it to be true, and as to those matters that I believe (to be true).
Executed on July 17, 2018 at Los Angeles, CA
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
_________________________
LAURACK D. BRAY
End of Complaint #1
UPDATE--September 22, 2018
I HAVE NOW ACCOMPLISHED BOTH MISSIONS THAT I HAD SET OUT TO ACCOMPLISH BEFORE I WOULD HIT SKID ROW : (1)FILING FEDERAL CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS WITH THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT (SEE ABOVE) AND (2) WRITING A LETTER TO CONGRESS REGARDING BLACK MALES AND THE HOMELESS PROBLEM IN CALIFORNIA AND LOS ANGELES COUNTY.
The letter I wrote to Congress was not in the form or specific content that I had previously envisioned, but it still represents and meets the mission or, at least the partial, objective that I had in mind for the original letter to Congress that I suggested in blog #2 of this blog title. Therefore, I HAVE KEPT MY WORD when I said that both matters or missions would be accomplished.
The following is the letter that I sent to Senator Dianne Feinstein (with a copy to Senator Kamala Harris, my other California representative. At the end of the letter, I will suggest how I will react to a response ( or non-response) to the letter by Senator Feinstein, or Senator Harris.
The letter :
LAURACK D. BRAY, ESQ.
FEDERAL ATTORNEY
P.O. BOX 611432
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90061
TEL. : (805) 901-2693
September 18, 2018
Senator Dianne Feinstein
Ranking Member
Senate Judiciary Committee
331 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510
RE : REFUSAL OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT TO INVESTIGATE/PROSECUTE FEDERAL CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS FILED AGAINST L.A. PUBLIC OFFICIALS
Dear Senator Feinstein:
As noted above, my name is Laurack D. Bray, and I’m writing to you as a Black man and Black lawyer, who is a citizen of Los Angeles City and County, California. I’m also writing to you as a constituent of yours, a Black male veteran constituent in particular. And, I’m writing to you as the Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee.
I’m writing to request that you request that the Senate Judiciary Committee call upon or make to appear certain members of the Justice Department in Los Angeles to explain why two criminal-civil rights Complaints that I recently filed were neither investigated nor prosecuted by the FBI or the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Los Angeles.
I’m requesting that you and the Senate Judiciary Committee make or require the Justice Department do what I, as a citizen, cannot require it to do : Appear and testify under oath why it (they) refused to investigate and prosecute my Complaints (two Complaints, Complaints #1 and #2). Briefly, on or about July 31, 2018, I filed two federal criminal civil rights Complaints, mostly pursuant to 18 U.S.C. secs. 241 and 242, with the FBI and U.S. Attorney’s Office, charging multiple public officials, both state and federal, with civil rights violations. But, both the FBI and the U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO) in Los Angeles have refused to investigate the Complaints. The FBI with an outright refusal to respond in any way, and the USAO with a letter of refusal.
I charge here that their decisions to refuse to investigate and/or prosecute my Complaints are racially-motivated. I charge here that their decisions had nothing to do with the merits of my Complaints or with any exercise of discretion. Rather, their decisions had everything to do with my race or color and gender. That is, their decisions to refuse to investigate and/or prosecute the officials-Defendants in my Complaints were because I am a Black male (bringing criminal charges against white officials).
Therefore, I charge the Justice Department officials in L.A., or whomever made the final decision to not investigate my Complaints with racial discrimination in not investigating and/or prosecuting my Complaints.
I will here establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, and I believe the ultimate claim of racial discrimination will be proven, through circumstantial evidence, by a combination of the prima facie case and the Committee’s disbelief of the reasons set forth by the Justice Department for not investigating and/or prosecuting my Complaints.
Moreover, I hereby complain and charge the specific Justice Department officials making the decisions to not investigate and prosecute my Complaints with obstruction of justice regarding resolution of the underlining individual complaints alleged in the Complaints (#1 and #2) themselves.
And, let’s be clear, Sen. Feinstein, while I brought my Complaints as a single or individual Complainant, in reality, both my Complaints and this letter are truly class action matters, representing the class of Black males in the County of Los Angeles, the class of homeless Black males in L.A. County, the class of homeless Black males on Skid Row in Los Angeles, in particular, and the class of homeless people (of all races and creeds, religion, and other backgrounds, e.g., veterans) in L.A. County, in general.
As I stated to the Justice Department in my Complaints, and equally applicable here, “I believe the entering of the U.D. (unlawful detainer) judgments (in favor of evictions) in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County is systematic ”(emphasis added here)(see Complaint Report, at p. 24 for the further explanation).
As grave as the homeless crisis in the Los Angeles area is, see Complaint Report attached, particularly on Skid Row, the Justice Department chose to ignore the Complaints, and Complaint #1 focused on the eviction process in the Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County (and most of the homeless on Skid Row are there based on evictions)(based on an L.A. Times investigatory article, cited in the Report).
Now, the prima facie case.
I THE PRIMA FACIE CASE OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (ADAPTED FROM THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS/BURDINE MODEL AND REVISED)
A. COMPLAINANT IS A MEMBER OF A MINORITY GROUP OR PROTECTED
CLASS
I am a Black male (race and gender classes).
B. COMPLAINANT FILED THE COMPLAINTS, SEEKING INVESTIGATION
AND/OR PROSECUTION, AND THE COMPLAINTS QUALIFIED FOR
INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION
I filed two Complaints, #1 and #2, with the FBI and the USAO. See attached hereto. The Complaints alleged and/or charged violations of federal criminal-civil rights-constitutional law arising from and pursuant to federal criminal statutes, 18 U.S.C. secs. 241 and 242. Moreover, the Complaints were supported by probable cause and/or probable cause evidence, sufficient for an arrest, at least, and/ or indictment of most, if not all, of the accuseds/Defendants in the Complaint.
C. THERE WAS AN ADVERSE ACTION TAKEN
Despite the qualified Complaints, supported by probable cause, the
Justice Department refused to investigate the Complaints. Therefore, put another way, the Complaints were not investigated. Instead, they were ignored.
NOTE : I was not required to produce any evidence in order for the duty to investigate by the Justice Department arose or ripened. But, I did (through verified Complaints supported by documentation, e.g., transcripts). All that was required for the duty to investigate was colorable allegations.
D. AFTER REFUSING TO INVESTIGATE COMPLAINANT’S COMPLAINTS,
THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT CONTINUED TO INVESTIGATE OTHER
COMPLAINTS OR CASES IN THE LOS ANGELES AREA
One example is the case of Supervisor Mark Ridley-Thomas, see infra.
Or, alternatively,
E. THE REFUSAL OR FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE (OR PROSECUTE) THE
COMPLAINTS OCCURRED “UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES THAT GIVE RISE
TO AN INFERENCE OF DISCRIMINATION” (BURDINE)
CIRCUMSTANCE #1
There were two Complaints filed, #1 and #2. Both Complaints were verified. This was unusual, most Complaints, I believe, are not verified. Further, the Complaints were filed and verified by an attorney, as opposed to an ordinary citizen. This was unusual as well. Most Complaints, I believe, are made by ordinary citizens or referred by local police on behalf of citizens, but, they are not made by private attorneys and they are not verified. In fact, the form issued by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the reporting of federal crimes by citizens specifically asked, “Have you reported the crime to a private attorney?” Further, since I am a private civil rights attorney, I cited to specific federal criminal statutes that I was bringing the Complaints under or pursuant thereto in the Complaints. And, in some instances in the Complaint Reports, I cited to Ninth Circuit and other case law in support of my claims. This, likely, is also unusual . Yet, there still was not even an investigation.
CIRCUMSTANCE #2
While the Justice Department refused to investigate my Complaints (which presented the scenario of a Black man complaining about actions of white public officials), it (Justice Dept.—U.S. Attorney’s Office ) entertained and “referred” for investigation a matter involving a Black public official, i.e., Supervisor Mark Ridley-Thomas, brought to the Justice Department’s attention by, presumably, a white USC (University of Southern California) official. “USC. . . has asked the U.S. Attorney’s Office to conduct a criminal investigation linked to a recent $100,000 donation from a campaign fund controlled by. . . Mark Ridley-Thomas.” Los Angeles Wave, “U.S. Attorney investigates Ridley-Thomas donation to USC”, August 9, 2018. “A former state legislator and city councilman, Mark Ridley-Thomas is one of the most influential politicians in Los Angeles, and his connections and donor base repeatedly helped his son at the ballot box.” L.A. Times, “Former legislator target of Capitol inquiry”, August 16, 2018. “USC approached the U.S. Attorney’s office in Los Angeles and told federal prosecutor’s (sic) it had concerns about a recent $100,000 donation from a campaign fund controlled by Mark Ridley-Thomas, The Times reported.” Wave, supra. Finally, “Mack Jenkins, head of the public corruption and civil rights section at the U.S. Attorney’s office, confirmed that a lawyer for USC briefed him on the Ridley-Thomas matter and (he) referred it ‘for criminal investigation’, The Times reported.” Id. This was a briefing by a lawyer (that I presume was a white lawyer) regarding a $100,000 donation to USC made by a Black politician, and it was “referred” for criminal investigation. “A lawyer for Mark Ridley-Thomas told The Times the supervisor was ‘surprised to learn that his donation to USC has become an issue.’ ”. Id.
Again, my Complaints (two—involving multiple white Defendant public officials) , brought by a Black civil rights lawyer, were ignored . They weren’t investigated by either the U.S. Attorney’s Office or the FBI.
CIRCUMSTANCE #3
In the Ninth Circuit case of Lanuza v. Love , NO. 15-35408, August 14, 2018, Wardlaw, J., a government immigration attorney-employee (Jonathan M. Love) submitted false evidence (i.e., a forged document) in the immigration case “in order to deprive Lanuza of his right to apply for lawful permanent residence.” The Ninth Circuit found, “The conduct at issue—the falsification of evidence—has been regularly considered by the courts in actions against prosecutors who commit similar constitutional violations by falsifying evidence and suborning perjury. The Supreme Court has long recognized that ‘the principle that a State may not knowingly use false evidence. . . to obtain a tainted conviction is implicit in any concept of ordered liberty’ and a violation of due process ” (emphasis added).” (Citations omitted).
Most importantly, “Love was ultimately prosecuted and pleaded guilty to deprivation of rights under color of law pursuant to 18 U.S.C. (sec.) 242, which ICE characterized as a ‘deprivation of constitutional rights’ in a press release. Love was sentenced to a thirty-day term of imprisonment, one year of supervised release, and 100 hours of community service. (Citation omitted). He was barred from practicing law for ten years and was required to pay restitution to Lanuza in the amount of $12,000, a figure the government proposed based on its approximation of the legal fees Lanuza paid related to his removal proceedings as a result of Love’s submission of the forged I-826 form.” Id. (Emphasis added).
Finally, in Lanuza , the Ninth Circuit stated, “The consequences of allowing the submission of false evidence by government attorneys without repercussion extends beyond its effect on Lanuza. The magnitude of its societal injury was addressed in the government’s press release about Love’s conviction: ‘Defendants in immigration court have a “right to proceedings free from false and fabricated evidence knowingly presented against them. When that right is denied, a real harm is inflicted both on society, which loses faith that its government plays fair, and the individual who suffers directly.” ’” Id. (Emphasis added).
In my Complaints, I charged at least 3 Defendants with submitting false evidence, which I concluded resulted in a denial of due process to me. One was Los Angeles attorney Armen Gregorian , a second was Superior Court of California judge David J. Cowan, by way of a conspiracy with Gregorian, and the third was California Second District Court of Appeal judge Laurie Zelon. The specific allegations or charges are set forth in the Complaints themselves, which I will attach here. But, basically, I charged Gregorian with submitting a false statement in order to deprive me of my right to a conservatorship over the person and estate of my mother; and I charged Cowan with conspiring with Gregorian to submit, accept, and rely upon false evidence to deny me the conservatorship (and the conservatorship was in fact denied). I charged Zelon with submitting false evidence in her appellate opinion regarding the same conservatorship, again, in order to deny me the conservatorship (and, again, the conservatorship was denied, through affirmance on appeal) . And, I submitted evidence to support my assertions.
Yet, the U.S. Attorney for Los Angeles and the FBI both refused to investigate my Complaints regarding the submission of false evidence, or the other charges in my Complaints. Again, the Complaints were ignored.
NOTE : Even though I have filed and re-filed a criminal Complaint against judge Zelon for submitting false evidence in her appellate decision, the Second District Court of Appeal has now assigned judge Zelon to a new appeal of mine, involving the attempted sale of my mother’s home without her consent. I have filed an objection.
CIRCUMSTANCE #4
In 2007, during the George W. Bush administration, I filed similar civil rights Complaints as the Complaints at issue here, based on 18 U.S.C. secs. 241 and 242, and the FBI, I assert, took action on my Complaints, albeit informally ( or unofficially) . And, as here, I was a Black man and lawyer bringing charges against white officials. Not only did the FBI investigate my complaints, it (FBI)(I assert) caused several Defendants to either retire or resign from office. The most glaring “retirements” were two Ventura County state judges named in the Complaint, Steven Hintz and Barry Klopfer. Hintz retired the same day I filed the Complaint. I filed the Complaint in the morning and Hintz retired by the end of the day. Klopfer retired within a week or so thereafter. Essentially, both were removed from the bench. But, it was informal action and I derived no remedies or benefits as a victim of the criminal conduct. Nevertheless, it was action on my Complaint. Immediate action. This was a time when the FBI had an agent stationed inside the U.S. Attorney’s office, so that when a complaint was filed in the U.S. Attorney’s Office, it went straight to the FBI agent, if the FBI was the investigative agency assigned for the particular Complaint.
Yet, here, with this FBI and this U.S. Attorney, no action was taken. Neither an investigation nor a prosecution (or, “retirement”). Indeed, there was no response at all from the FBI to my two Complaints (#1 and #2 filed in July, 2018). The USAO sent a letter indicating no investigation or prosecution.
CIRCUMSTANCE #5
In the state of West Virginia, the Justice Department brought federal indictments against at least two state judges, Allen Loughry and Menis Ketchum, for crimes that, facially, appear to be state money crimes, e.g., fraud or fraudulent use of money or economic services, e.g., the illegal use of a government vehicle and credit card for personal use. Apparently, the West Virginia District Attorney did not find the actions to be crimes (likely finding the actions to be civil matters) and didn’t see fit to prosecute the judges. But the Justice Department decided that the judges should be prosecuted for their actions, so it brought mail and wire fraud actions against the judges. “Loughry is under a 25-count federal indictment accusing him of making false statements and tampering with witnesses. . . . He is also accused of taking a state car to signings he conducted for his book. . . . Federal prosecutors are preparing a case against Loughry to say he violated federal law. The FBI monitored the now-suspended judge after suspicions arose that he was defrauding the state. The alleged fraud included misuse of official cars and credit cards for nonwork business and lying to other judges about the matter, knowingly making false mileage claims when he was using a state car, and the illegal conversion ‘to his own personal use of a valuable and historic desk that belonged to the Supreme Court.’ ” L.A. Times, “West Virginia impeaches its entire Supreme Court”, August 16, 2018. “Justice Menis Ketchum ()resigned last month and admitted to charges of wire fraud.” Id.
But, other than the State of West Virginia, the crimes are victimless crimes.
On the other hand, here, in my case, where the charges are clearly federal crimes involving state judges, with a clear citizen victim (but a Black male victim), the Justice Department refuses to even investigate the Complaint.
Moreover, instead of doing what the Bush Era FBI did in my case, i.e., informal or unofficial “retirements”, rather than prosecutions, the Justice Department went all the way and sought and obtained “indictments” against the judges (for facially state crimes). But, in my case, with clear federal criminal charges, supported by evidence , in addition to a verified Complaint against the state judges , the Justice Department ignored the Complaints.
That is the prima facie case of racial discrimination, which provides an inference of racial discrimination by the Justice Department. Next, the Justice Department must present its legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for its decisions to refuse to investigate and/or prosecute my Complaints or the individual Defendants identified in the Complaints.
Here, Senator Feinstein, I request that you request the Senate Judiciary Committee to require the appropriate Justice Department officials, esp. the L.A. USA and the FBI Director, to appear before the Committee and provide their legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for refusing to either investigate and/or prosecute any of the individuals in my Complaints. And, the officials should be required to offer legitimate and non-discriminatory reasons for not investigating the Complaints for each individual Defendant in the two Complaints.
Nonetheless, any reasons the Justice Department provides will “lack credibility”. Their responses will either be unbelievable, false, or “unworthy of credence”. Therefore, the Committee will be permitted to infer the ultimate fact of racial discrimination at the hearing. And, I believe that it will. The United States Supreme Court in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. , 530 U.S. 133 (2000), citing St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks , 509 U.S. 502 (1993), stated, “ ‘The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination.’ ” Id. (Emphasis in original).
“Proof that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive.” Id. “In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the (government) is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose. Such an inference is consistent with the general principle of evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a party’s dishonesty about a material fact as ‘affirmative evidence of guilt.’ ” (Citation omitted). Id. “Thus, a plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the (government’s) asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the (government) unlawfully discriminated.” Id.
II OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE (AND CONSPIRACY TO OBSTRUCT JUSTICE)
Official Complaint : I HEREBY COMPLAIN AND CHARGE that, in addition to my complaint of racial discrimination lodged against the Justice Department, the Justice Department officials (FBI and U.S. Attorney) obstructed justice by not investigating or prosecuting my two Complaints filed with both the L.A. FBI and USAO. Particularly, under the circumstances of this case, the Justice Department obstructed justice by not at least investigating the Complaints. Briefly, one Complaint, Complaint #1, centered on unconstitutional evictions, and especially the unconstitutional eviction of a Black male (myself). The result of the eviction rendered me homeless. Therefore, when I filed the Complaint with the Justice Department, it was filed as a homeless Black male of Los Angeles County. The main point here is that I argued in my Complaint, at p. 24, that “I believe the entering of U.D. judgments in the Superior Court of Los Angles is “systematic”. (Emphasis added). If that, in fact, is true, it would mean that that circumstance is likely or probably the cause of a substantial portion of the homeless, and especially the homeless Black males, in Los Angeles and on Skid Row.
Therefore, an investigation by the Justice Department, either the FBI or the U.S. Attorney’s Office, could have answered the question regarding a systematic process of evictions, and thereafter, if true, take steps to eradicate the process and eliminate the homelessness evolving from that process.
When the L.A. Justice Department intentionally decided to ignore the Complaints, it also purposely prevented anything from being done about the severe homeless crisis of Los Angeles County, esp. affecting Black males (the majority of the homeless on Skid Row). And, as I stated in my Complaint Report (#1)(at p. 4, quoting from a L.A. Times article), as applied to the Complaint Defendants, and equally applicable here as applied to the Justice Department officials making the decision to not investigate the Complaints, “No matter where you live in L.A. County, from Long Beach to Beverly Hills to Lancaster, you cannot credibly claim today to be unaware of the squalid tent cities, the sprawling encampments, or the despair and misery on display there.” Editorial, “Los Angeles’ Homelessness Crisis is a National Disgrace”, February 25, 2018 (emphasis added). And, Skid Row is not far from the U.S. Attorney’s Office in downtown Los Angeles. “ ‘Skid row is the result of years of neglect and legal decisions (e.g., unconstitutional evictions)’, said City Councilman Jose Huizar.’ ” L.A. Times, “Sites evaluated to house homeless from skid row”, August 1, 2018. There are “2,100 people who live in skid row’s block after block of encampments.” Id. And, “358 homeless people per square mile live in skid row, by far the densest massing in the city. An additional 1,500 homeless people are scattered throughout downtown.” Id. Finally, “ ‘Every day we see more and more people living homeless around City Hall.’ ” City Hall is right across the street from the U.S. Attorney’s office in Los Angeles. Therefore, the Justice Department officials in Los Angeles, or whomever, who were charged with making the decision to not investigate and/or prosecute the Complaints obstructed justice and should be held accountable for doing so.
Furthermore, because the homeless situation in L.A. County involves mostly minorities, the Justice Department’s obstruction is not just obstruction but a combination of both racism and obstruction. Again, while I brought the Complaints individually, I represented a class of homeless Black males who have undergone or experienced similar circumstances as mine in and with the Los Angeles Superior Court and its unconstitutional eviction processes, especially those living on Skid Row (since a L.A. Times investigative article found that most homeless people living on Skid Row are there because of evictions).
While I am not required to cite to any particular law or statute in making this Complaint against the Justice Department officials, I will do so. But, certainly the Committee may decide upon any other law it assesses as being more appropriate for the obstruction of justice charge. I charge that Justice Department officials violated 18 U.S.C. sec. 1505, which states, in pertinent part, “Whomever corruptly. . . influences, obstructs, or impede or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United States (here, the Department of Justice and/or more specifically, the L.A. USAO and the L.A. FBI). . . ---- Shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years. . . .” And, from the Department of Justice website, “Generally, a defendant may be found guilty under section 1505 if the government establishes that : (1) there was a proceeding pending before a department or agency of the United States (here a submitted/filed Complaint requesting investigation/prosecution, and a discussion with an FBI agent and a USAO representative(s) prior to filing the Complaint(s); (2) the defendant knew of or had a reasonably founded belief that the proceeding was pending (here, Justice Department officials, and especially those officials making the decision to not investigate the Complaints knew the request for the investigation/prosecution was pending); and (3) the defendant corruptly endeavored to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which the proceeding was pending (here, the Justice Department officials endeavored to “obstruct” the due and proper administration of the law under which the proceeding was pending, i.e., 18 USC secs. 241 and 242 or other applicable law). Therefore, the requirements for finding the Justice Department officials guilty of violating sec. 1505 have been met here.
This concludes the letter.
Senator Feinstein, I would appreciate a prompt response as to what action, if any, that you will take regarding this letter and its contents. I certainly believe some type of action should be taken. Thank you very much.
I am attaching a copy of both Complaints, #1 (with Exhibits) and #2 (without).
Sincerely yours,
LAURACK D. BRAY, ESQ.
Enclosures
cc : Senator Kamala Harris
End of Letter
At this time, the Senate Judiciary Committee is going through confirmation proceedings regarding the confirmation of Judge Brett Kavanaugh for the United States Supreme Court. And, I know that both sen. Feinstein and sen. Harris are members of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Therefore, I will respect their positions and priorities regarding a response to my letter, and I will wait until after the confirmation proceedings before I will expect a response to my letter from senator Feinstein, UNLESS the confirmation proceedings go through elections. In that case, I will expect a response to my letter before the November elections, in time to give me time to choose who I will vote for in the elections, because a response or non-response to my letter may make a difference in who I vote for.
So, at this time, I await the decision regarding Kavanaugh's confirmation.
UPDATE--September 25, 2018
As of yet, I haven't received an acknowledgement letter from Senator Feinstein as to receipt of my letter or an e-mail response. We'll see what happens.
THE NOMINATION OF EILEEN DECKER FOR THE LOS ANGELES POLICE COMMISSION
DECKER SHOULD NOT BE CONFIRMED FOR APPOINTMENT AS A MEMBER OF THE POLICE COMMISSION. Decker oversaw a racist U.S. Attorney's office, and I hereby accuse Decker of racial discrimination with the handling of my Complaints filed with the U.S. Attorney's office while she was the U.S. Attorney. And, I DO NOT wish to remain anonymous. In fact, I believe that there should be a hearing held by the City Council regarding Decker's confirmation, whereby she is made to demonstrate why her office did not conduct business in a discriminatory manner, and why she did not discriminate against me, as a Black man bringing criminal Complaints against white officials, when she was the U.S. Attorney.
With the many accusations of sexual harassment and/or abuse brought against various officials of various professions, which have caused those officials to be fired, or to resign, or to otherwise leave their positions, WITHOUT ANY EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE ACCUSATIONS, I believe that I should be allowed to testify as to my accusation against Decker, where I can support my accusation with at least circumstantial EVIDENCE.
I will submit a letter to the City Council making the accusation against Decker, and inform the City Council that I do not wish to remain anonymous, and am open to testify, if necessary, regarding my accusation.
I have not had any occasion to comment about any actions by Mayor Eric Garcetti, and I've voted for him in the past. And, while I believe that his various actions enacted to assist the homeless have been piecemeal actions, they have nevertheless, been some actions taken to assist the homeless. So, I commend him for that.
But, as to his nomination of Decker as a police commissioner, I believe it was a terrible and misguided decision, and I think it was a slap in the face to the Black and minority community. And, I believe it shows a disregard for the welfare and treatment of the minority community of Los Angeles, both city and county. Therefore, I believe the mayor should withdraw the nomination, or, if not, the City Council should not confirm Decker's appointment to the Commission.
UPDATE--October 6, 2018
I have now written and submitted a letter to the L.A. City Council regarding the confirmation of Eileen Decker as a police commissioner. I hand delivered the letter this week to the offices of each council member personally. So, I now await a response.
Here's the letter :
LAURACK D. BRAY, ESQ.
FEDERAL ATTORNEY
P.O. BOX 611432
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90061
TEL. : (805) 901-2693
October 1, 2018
TO: Herb Wesson, President, and
Los Angeles City Council Members
FROM: Laurack D. Bray
Citizen of Los Angeles City and County
DATE: October 1, 2018
RE: The Confirmation of Eileen Decker as a
Member of the Los Angeles Police Commission
EILEEN DECKER SHOULD NOT BE APPOINTED AS A MEMBER OF THE POLICE
COMMISSION
My specific reasons for arguing that Ms. Decker should not be confirmed or appointed to the Commission are as follows:
1. FAILURE TO RESOLVE CONSERVATORSHIP PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS BY SUPERIOR COURT OFFICIALS
In 2015, a class action civil rights complaint was filed with the U.S. Attorney’s Office, or Justice Department, alleging that “court-appointed attorneys routinely violate the Americans with Disabilities Act during limited-conservatorship proceedings.” L.A. Times, “Disability complaint targets Superior Court,” June 27, 2015. “The court-appointed attorneys represent the conservatees during the process.” Id. “The court also places a conflict of interest on these attorneys, the Complaint alleges.” Id. “The court requires attorneys to advocate for the client while assisting the court in resolving the matter, violating the client’s rights to due process, the complaint alleges.” Id. (emphasis added).
I inquired at the Justice Department at the time to get a clarity and copy of the Complaint, but I was unable to obtain either. All the personnel I spoke with claim to be unaware of the Complaint and I didn’t know the specific name of the case (and I didn’t have the Times article with me). I did not bring this Complaint. “Thomas F. Coleman, an attorney and Executive director of the Disability and Guardianship Project who filed the complaint, called on federal authorities to investigate and force court officials to ‘clean up their act.’ ” Id
Apparently, the matter was not sufficiently resolved to prevent conservatorship officials, including Superior Court judges, from continuing to violate the constitutional rights of parties. See, infra, No. 3.
2. DIVERSITY AND PROPER REPRESENTATION ON THE COMMISSION
Ms. Decker, if appointed, will replace one of two black male commissioners on the Commission at this time. One, Matt Johnson, is leaving the Commission for his own personal reasons, which leaves Dale Bonner, as the other, according to news reports.
That means if Ms. Decker is appointed, the five-member Commission will have 2 minorities, a Black male and a Latino female, Sandra Figueroa-Villa, and three white members (Steve Soboroff and Shane Murphy), including Decker, if appointed, according to news reports. Which means white membership will be in the majority and will have the last word on final decisions by the Commission.
In an ideal world, this composition (three whites, one black, and one brown) shouldn’t matter. But, as we all know, this is not an ideal world (by no stretch of the imagination) . Far from it. This is Los Angeles, California, where the majority population in the city is minority, with the largest group being Latino or Hispanic. And, the makeup of the Commission, notwithstanding Mr. Johnson’s and Ms. Cynthia McClain-Hill’s (also Black) departure, should remain minority majority as well. Not simply because of the population demographics (which also should be a factor for consideration), but because of the type of matters that will generally come before the Commission for resolution.
Most of the matters that will come before the Commission will involve minorities. And, invariably, those matters will be very serious matters, such as police shootings and killings. And, even though Latinos are the majority population in the city, a significant portion of the police shootings and killings likely, from my knowledge (only), involve black people, and usually Black males. And, because many times, if not most times, black people and white people view things differently when it comes to police shootings and killings of minorities, it is essential that black people or other minority people be in the majority on the Commission to help assure a fair representation of the minority view for what usually are minority committed crimes resulting in minority injuries or deaths.
Eileen Decker’s appointment would not meet the proper representation requirement. It should be a minority, and ideally, it should be another African American male replacing an African American male.
3. DECKER’S SELECTIVE PROSECUTION BEHAVIOR
Ms. Decker successfully prosecuted Leroy “Lee” Baca and Paul Tanaka, both minorities, for federal crimes. And, I do not here question the propriety of her doing so. In fact, apparently, she rightfully did so (based on the convictions). And, I’m sure the affected inmates of the respective jails are grateful for her actions.
However, Ms. Decker, in her prosecution of Lee Baca and Paul Tanaka, both minorities, exercised selective prosecution of minority high level officials, while refusing to prosecute white high level officials for the same or similar crimes or felonies, e.g., conspiracies. At least two of the white officials she refused to prosecute were Superior Court judge David Cowan and Second District Court of Appeal judge Laurie Zelon, both of whom I charged with violating my constitutional rights under color of law by submitting false evidence to deny me relief. Cowan is a judge in the Probate Division, which handles conservatorships. I have already discussed above, in No. 1, the problem some attorneys were having with conservatorship court officials, and, the fact that the problem, apparently, has not been resolved. My Complaint, filed in the U.S. Attorney’s Office, demonstrates that the violation of parties’ constitutional rights by the conservatorship section has not been resolved. And, Decker refused to investigate my Complaint. See, infra.
I won’t attempt to provide specifics here, in this letter, regarding the selective prosecution allegation, but, I certainly can and will if called upon to do so.
Actually, Baca could have proved the selective prosecution in a court of law had he chosen to do so. But, despite my urging him to raise the defense, he refused to do so. But, the city council can require Ms. Decker to show that she did not demonstrate selective prosecution in prosecuting Baca and Tanaka, during the undertaking of the confirmation process. And, I believe it should do so before confirming her for the appointment on the Police Commission.
Because, if she, in fact, engaged in selective prosecution (which is a form of discrimination; in this case, race or racial), I believe that would be grounds for non-selection for the Commissioner position.
4. DECKER’S RACIAL DISCRIMINATION EXERCISED AGAINST ME
I charge (or accuse) Ms. Decker, as U.S. Attorney, of discriminating against me as a Black male in refusing to investigate or prosecute my criminal Complaint or the individuals who I charged with violating my constitutional rights under color of law in the Complaint.
There was probable cause or probable cause evidence sufficient for the arrest
of most, if not all, of the individuals named in the Complaint. Yet, none were arrested.
The Complaint involved a black man charging high level (as opposed to entry level or subordinate level) white public officials with criminal and unconstitutional conduct.
No, Ms. Decker did not state “I’m not investigating your Complaint because you are a black man”. But, a statement of that nature is not necessary to prove that she discriminated against me based on my race or color. That statement would just be direct evidence of the discrimination. I can prove through circumstantial evidence that she did, in fact, discriminate against me.
But, the question for the City Council is : If Ms. Decker exercised racial discrimination against me, should she be confirmed and appointed as a police commissioner?
I believe the issues I have raised in this letter should be addressed before Ms. Decker is appointed (if she is) as police commissioner.
Sincerely yours,
Laurack D. Bray
As citizen-attorney of Los Angeles
End of Letter
How many of you believe the L.A. Times will publish or report about this letter to the public?
I, for one, don't believe it will. Let's see what happens!
UPDATE--October 27, 2018
Well, there are several things I need to inform you about. If I don't get to all of them during this update, I'll followup at the next one.
*LETTER TO SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN
First, the letter to Senator Dianne Feinstein. Kavanaugh has now been confirmed to an appointment on the United States Supreme Court. And, I have now received a response from Sen. Feinstein, in the form of an invitation to apply for casework assistance. I certainly will take her up on that invitation (otherwise, there was no need to send her the letter that I sent). But, first, I will thank her through e-mail and I am thanking her here for at least responding to my letter, as a citizen and constituent, in some way. Thank you, Senator Feinstein.
Now, for the real deal. Will Senator Feinstein provide me with some real assistance with respect to my letter and charge of racial discrimination and obstruction of justice by the Justice Department in Los Angeles ? Or was her response connected in some way to the upcoming election, and therefore an appeasement to get my vote ? I hope Sen. Feinstein's initial response will be followed up by a sincere and significant response to my charges against the Los Angeles Justice Department, because it is a very serious matter, not just for me, but for all Black males in the City and County of Los Angeles, in particular, but Black males in California in general. At this point, only Sen. Feinstein and Sen. Harris, followed by the full Senate Judiciary Committee can get to the bottom of this matter, or flush it out. Otherwise, the L.A. Justice Department and its officials will continue to get away with its discrimination without recourse or without answering to anyone.
And, I have absolutely NO CONFIDENCE in the federal courts meting out any justice WITHOUT the intervention of Sens. Feinstein and/or Harris and the Senate Judiciary Committee, i.e., with a referral from the Senate Judiciary Committee, there might be some fairness in the courts, but attempted action by me alone (in suing the Justice Department), absolutely not.
So, I will respond to Sen. Feinstein's invitation, suggestion, or directive (I interpret it as a directive step in furtherance of a final resolution of my claim) this week, and hopefully, I will receive another acknowledgement from the Senator as to the next step in the process BEFORE the election, so that I will feel the matter is being earnestly pursued, and not election-related. I have voted for Senator Feinstein each time she has been up for re-election and I was here in California. But, this will be the first time that I am aware of that she has been faced with taking a position SPECIFICALLY on behalf of Black males since being in office as a U.S. Senator, and the first time the scenario will be an issue at election time. So, its important for me (and other Black males) as a Black man to know what her position is or will be in voting for her in the upcoming election. Because whether my vote will be impactful or not, I certainly would not vote for someone who has demonstrated that he or she does not intend to represent or protect my interests or rights as a Black man in Los Angeles City and County.
Other matters will have to wait until next time.
UPDATE--October 29, 2018
LETTER TO DIANNE FEINSTEIN
I have now mailed the casework assistance application/form to Sen. Feinstein through her San Francisco Office. I now await a response.
THE CONFIRMATION OF EILEEN DECKER AS A MEMBER OF THE POLICE COMMISSION
What's up with that? The L.A. Times published an article announcing the nomination of Decker as a Police Commissioner, so why aren't they (the editor or staff members) publishing any updates on the status of her confirmation? I will inquire from the City Council.
That's it for now. More next time.
UPDATE--October 31, 2018 (Boo!)*(Halloween)
GUESS WHAT? DECKER'S NOMINATION HAS NOW BEEN CONFIRMED BY THE CITY COUNCIL!
All but two absent City Council members, Jose Huizar and Nury Martinez, voted in favor of her
confirmation and appointment to the Board of Police Commissioners. If Huizar and Martinez absences were intentional, I give credit and respect to them and their positions, for at least not voting in favor of Decker's appointment.
For the remaining council members who voted in favor of Decker's appointment, their vote displays an ABSOLUTE CONFIRMATION that they DO NOT CARE about BLACK CITIZENS AND OTHER MINORITY CITIZENS, nor do they care about the welfare and interest of Black citizens and other minority citizens associated therewith. In other words, NO RESPECT!
As a Black male and citizen of Los Angeles City and County, I believe the council's vote to appoint Decker is SHAMEFUL, OFFENSIVE, DISPICABLE, AND PITIFUL.
And, particularly for the Black and other minority members of the City Council who voted for Decker's appointment, in view of the information that I provided them about her, their vote is an INSULT to THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT and to DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. It's a step backward in the achievement of civil rights for young Black boys and men whom I know will have cases come before the Police Commission and require a vote from Decker as to the resolution of their claims or situations. The Black members of the council are at least, I believe, Marqueece Harris-Dawson, Curren D. Price, and Herb Wesson. I believe their votes were simply go-along-to-get-along votes without any consideration for the actual effect that Decker's appointment might have on the lives of young black boys and men and young brown boys and men, especially when it comes to police shootings and killings of black and brown boys and men.
I think black and brown people of Los Angeles City and County should not vote for *any of the black and other minority members who voted for the appointment of Decker when their time come around for election. Remember them. *I will. I'm not concerned about any white members who voted for Decker, because I expect that of them. Why have minority members in office if they are not going to represent and fight for the rights and protection of other minorities? It's sad.
* The other members voting for Decker's confirmation are : Bob Blumenfield; Mike Bonin; Joe Buscaino; Gilbert A. Cedillo; Mitchell Englander; Paul Koretz; Paul Krekorian; Mitch O'Farrell; Monica Rodriguez; and David Ryu.
MEGYN KELLY AND BLACKFACE V. L.A. CITY COUNCIL OFFICIALS
Much ado has been made about Megyn Kelly's comments or statements regarding blackface, "Truly, you do get in trouble if you are a white person who puts on blackface for Halloween, or a black person who put on whiteface for Halloween? When I was a kid, it was OK as long as you were dressing up as, like, a character." (L.A. Times, October 30, 2018).
When the comment first went by me, I thought nothing of it. Especially, because she said "When I was a kid". But, even after discussion, once Kelly apologized, that should have been it, even for those who were highly offended by the comments. But for Kelly to lose her show and be fired over the comment, I think its outrageous, and nothing more than a product of hypocritical white people. They can fire a white person for making a blackface comment, but, white people who actually, by their actions, cause Black people harm and/or deny Black people their constitutional rights, including causing many to be homeless, i.e., in Los Angeles, nothing is said or done about it. Nobody is fired, and no apologies are either sought or obtained.
I don't give a damn about Megyn Kelly's blackface comments, other than a brief pause (NOW, if Kelly had refused to apologize, my reaction might be different--it would be). But, I do give a damn about white officials denying Black people and other minorities their constitutional rights and causing them DIRECT HARM.
I am MUCH MORE OFFENDED, as a Black male living in Los Angeles County, by the votes of the Los Angeles City Council members to appoint Decker as a Police Commissioner than I am by Kelly's blackface words. "ACTION SPEAKS LOUDER THAN WORDS".
More next time.
UPDATE--November 27, 2018
THE LETTER TO DIANNE FEINSTEIN
Well, I've now sent the casework assistance form to Feinstein's San Francisco office. But, I haven't received a response of any kind; in terms of the next step in the process or whatever. So, was Feinstein's initial response election or vote-related ? At this point, it's looking that way. I did vote for Feinstein, primarily because neither she nor Kevin de' Leon mentioned anything regarding their position on the rights of Black people in California or what they intend to do to improve the lives of Black people, so I went with Feinstein, as the established senator, and because she had responded to my letter (had she not responded to the letter, I would not have voted for her).
But, I will follow-up on my letter this week by contacting her S.F. office and finding out the status of the casework application. According to her website, an individual is supposed to be assigned to the application in terms of its processing.
THE UNLAWFUL DETAINER (U.D.) APPEAL (THE APPELLATE DIVISION/SUPERIOR COURT)
Sometime ago now the Appellate Division of the Superior Court issued a decision in the U.D. matter/appeal. It wasn't consequential or surprising, because I had already considered the appeal denied because of the panel's deliberate and /or intentional delay in processing the appeal. It likely delayed the decision waiting to see what would happen to the criminal Complaint that I filed against the Superior Court officials, including judges, processing the U.D. action, for violating my constitutional rights. If the officials would have been prosecuted as they should have, the appeals panel probably would have granted me relief and reversed the trial judge's decision, in hopes of mitigating the judges' conduct in the criminal case. But, since it concluded or discovered that the Justice Dep't. was not going to prosecute the individuals, it decided it was free to affirm the trial judge and deny me relief.
Because I should have prevailed based on the law, the Appellate Division adopted the ludicrous rationale set forth by my sister's white pro bono lawyer in her (the lawyer's) opposition to my brief in order to deny me relief. Basically, after impliedly accepting the principle that my sister, Dianne Jackson (Jackson) had to obtain permission or authority from the Probate Court to file the U.D. action, the App. Div. concluded that it was only "permissible" that she obtain the authority, it was not required or mandatory that she obtain this authority. Sounds ridiculous? It is. In my reply brief, I explained why through an example. In any event, Jackson never received that authority, which is why the U.D. trial action should have been reversed. But, it wasn't.
Moreover, regarding another reversible error, the App. Div. tried to explain away, in a confusing and unclear or perplexing manner, a California Supreme Court case which holds that in order to evict a tenant at will, an owner or landlord must issue the tenant two notices. I was only issued one notice. The Court's confusing explanation did nothing to alter the two notice requirement determined by the Supreme Court (and supported by the unlawful detainer statute).
In any event, the App. Div. lacked jurisdiction to determine or decide the U.D. appeal. See, infra.
THE ATTEMPTED SALE OF MY MOTHER'S HOME WITHOUT HER CONSENT/THE APPEAL
After I had filed a federal criminal Complaint against one judge, Elizabeth Lippett, regarding the attempted sale of my mother's home by Jackson, without my mother's consent (certainly not verified consent), without a hearing on Jackson's petition to sell the house, and in violation of an applicable statute which helps to assure that a sale of the home is a last resort after other options have been exhausted, I filed a civil appeal.
Jackson, through her pro bono counsel, filed a motion to expedite calendaring of the appeal. I did not oppose the motion (because I would like the matter expedited as well). Guess who rules on the motion? Judge Laurie Zelon, of Division 7. And guess how she rules? She denies the motion.
Because I have filed a criminal Complaint against judge Zelon for submitting false evidence in her appellate decision regarding the conservatorship of my mother's person and estate, I filed an OBJECTION to judge Zelon ruling on or presiding over the "sale of the house" appeal.
After the record was forwarded to the Second District Court of Appeal, I received a "letter" from the clerk, indicating that the matter was still to be decided by Division 7. The "letter" directed that I file a brief in 40 days. The letter was copied to Jackson's appellate counsel, i.e., "cc". There was no briefing order or schedule requiring that a brief be filed by Jackson. So, I wrote a letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court explaining the basis of the objection to division 7 ruling on the appeal and requesting some relief. The Chief Justice's office, not the Justice herself, responded that the Chief Justice only determines or decides cases. So, I submitted a brief by the deadline.
In the brief, I raised the issues of judicial bias with regard to Division 7 deciding the appeal, of the Appellate Division's lack of jurisdiction to decide the U.D. appeal, of the denial of due process, and of violation of the Probate statute, at least.
I'm now awaiting a decision.
THE ABUSE OF PROCESS CLAIM
In my abuse of process case against Jackson, she has now acquired a third pro bono counsel, this time from Public Counsel. This counsel has now filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Ordinarily, it would be too late to file a motion of this nature , but for the judgment on the pleadings motion, there's an exception. There's been a hearing on the motion, where the court issued a preliminary decision favorable to Jackson, but, after oral argument, the matter is pending a decision. I cited a case which, apparently, gave the court reason to pause.
Regarding Jackson's 3 lawyers, I don't concern myself with other counsel, I'll hold my own with any of them. My only concern when I enter a courtroom with a case, whether as counsel or pro bono, is with the judges that I get. And, my concern is whether I will get a racist, or biased, or prejudiced judge. That's my only concern.
More next time.
UPDATE--December 6, 2018
THE LETTER TO DIANNE FEINSTEIN
Thusfar, I haven't heard from Sen. Feinstein's San Francisco's Office regarding the casework application that I filed with the Office. So, I'm left to conclude, at this point, that Feinstein's original response to my letter was election-connected and now that the election is over, Feinstein finds no need to respond to the letter or the casework application. That being the case, it may affect my getting the issue addressed promptly, but it also reflects on her integrity. There now has been a Black issue placed directly before Feinstein, and I now see her position as to addressing it. It's likely that she will not run for the office again, but, if she does, at least Black people in California will have some indication of her position as to Black matters on which to evaluate her in deciding whether to vote for her or not.
But, as far as the subject of the letter, Feinstein's failure to respond will not be the end. As a matter of respect and proper procedure, I wrote the letter to her first, as my California federal senator, copying Senator Kamala Harris as well, so the notice regarding a Black issue will apply to her (Harris) as well (Harris has taken some actions regarding "immigrants", but I'm not aware of any issues directly affecting Black people that she has taken. So, the next step will be to determine whether any other senators will find the issues in the letter a matter of concern.
THE ABUSE OF PROCESS MATTER
The trial judge, Gregory Alarcon, has now ruled on Jackson's judgment on the pleadings motion, and he has granted it. So, was the decision fair? No. Why not? Because it was arbitrary and capricious. Initially, prior to oral argument on the matter, the judge had issued a preliminary decision whereby he held in Jackson's favor and cited to one case in particular which purportedly supported his decision. In my previously submitted opposition, I had identified language in a case which tended to distinguish or cause to be inapplicable the case cited by the judge. At oral argument, I identified another case, which was more on point and more controlling. In the judge's final decision, he made no reference to the case I cited or the language which would cause, or might cause, his case to be inapplicable. He simply issued the same decision he had previously issued without any further explanation. So, I'm left with appealing his decision.
But, did he deny me any constitutional rights ? No *(unless one considers unfair decision-making one). There was a hearing, he purported to entertain my arguments (although I don't believe that he "seriously" entertained them, notwithstanding the pause for the new case offered at oral argument), and he rendered a decision, purportedly based on the papers and argument.
JACKSON'S 3 LAWYERS
As I stated above, Jackson has now acquired 3 white pro bono lawyers to represent her, but I'm not concerned about them (and one of the lawyers is a partner in a law firm I believe--I'll identify them later). *I believe that I've already named her first pro bono lawyer, but the last two are Susan Allison of the firm Jeffer Mangels Butler & Mitchell and Heather Shook of Public Counsel. My only concern is what type of judge that I receive to preside over the case (fair, or racist, or biased, or prejudiced ?).
Thusfar, however, Jackson hasn't needed any outside lawyers, the courts have been her lawyer. She almost literally has not had to speak (even while proceeding pro se), even though its her case.
And guess what? I haven't had any lawyers offering to represent me, as a Black male, pro bono.
Any connection? You decide.
More next time.
UPDATE--December 27, 2018
THE HOMELESS -- THE JOSHUA TREE PARENTS
Well, the Joshua Tree parents, Daniel Panico and Mona Kirk, who had been charged with child abuse, and later, child cruelty, have now had the charges against them DISMISSED. It was the right, fair, and decent thing to do. I was one of the first, if not THE first, to declare that the government did not have probable cause to arrest them in the first place for child abuse, based on the facts that were available to the police at the time of the arrest. And, apparently, the prosecution never obtained probable cause evidence later, thus, the dismissal. But, I applause the Joshua Tree prosecutors and the judge, Joel Agron, for doing the right thing, and putting an end to the matter. They acted in good faith. And, it was the proper ending. Good luck to Mr. Panico and Ms. Kirk.
THE LEE BACA APPEAL
This is late news, but Baca has now had oral argument of his appeal. So we must now await a decision from the Ninth Circuit as to whether he must finally serve his three year sentence in prison or have his case reversed with an opportunity for the government to try him again.
We'll see what happens.
More next time.
UPDATE--February 20, 2019
APOLOGY TO INCARCERATED INDIVIDUAL ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT ME BY PHONE
An individual was apparently attempting to contact me from a correctional institution, but I did not respond to the calls because I received the calls on voicemail and I couldn't tell where the calls were coming from. And with each voicemail, except for one (the one that I was finally able to recognize where the call was coming from) the message would end before I could tell where the call was coming from. And after I finally recognized the call and would have been prepared to take the call, the caller quit calling. So, I am here apologizing to the individual who attempted to make the call. I did not ignore the call or refused to take it because it came from a correctional institution, I simply could not determine where the call was coming from. So, I apologize to the individual attempting to make the call, and, if the person should read this blog or get the message otherwise, I suggest you try again.
But, in all honesty, without advance notice from a relative or friend, I likely would not respond to calls from correctional institution. But, I did speak to one particular incarcerated individual once before (and I spoke to a relative of his after that), and the caller this time may have been him.
THE LEE BACA APPEAL
The Ninth Circuit has now upheld Baca's conviction. Therefore, unless Baca exercises other remaining options, such as asking for a full 9th Cir. court (as opposed to the three judge panel that upheld the conviction) or going to and prevailing at the U.S. Supreme Court, he will likely serve three years in prison. Baca's trial lawyer has indicated that Baca will seek a full court 9th Cir. review of his case.
As I have stated previously, I have no respect for Baca or his trial lawyer, Nathan Hochman, for not asserting his selective prosecution defense, which would have helped other minorities besides himself. Consequently, I have no sympathy for Baca, notwithstanding his diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease. He got what he deserves. I hope he feels it was worth it : to give up a likely viable defense which might have freed him from prosecution and to protect the people he has protected from prosecution themselves.
THE SALE OF MY MOTHER'S HOME
After filing the Objection to judge Laurie Zelon presiding over my appeal, see supra, Division 7 issued an Order directed to me indicating that if I wanted the appeal transferred to another division that I would need to file a motion to transfer (the case to another division). But, guess what? I never received the Order. Either it wasn't mailed to me or if it was mailed, it never reached me. So, I didn't know about the Order. And, after not receiving a response to my objection (it's likely the filed Order was the response to my Objection, but, again, I didn't receive the Order, and I filed a Notice stating so), I briefed the issue of judicial bias (to support a transfer--I had suggested in my Notice that the briefed issue could be treated as the motion, but I received no response to that suggestion).
As to the merits of the sale of the home, I filed a motion for summary reversal, based on undisputed facts in the case.
In the meantime, I received a briefing order for a restraining order appeal (my sister is attempting to renew an expired restraining order, which should not have been granted in the first place), and I have now briefed that appeal.
Now, the Court of Appeal has issued an Order for oral argument *(information deleted) for the sale of home appeal *(information deleted) for March 7, 2019, 1:30 pm, WITHOUT a determination of the issue of bias by judge Zelon, and of the transfer of the appeal to another Division other than Divisions 7 and 8.
In response to the Court's oral argument order, naming or identifying Division 7 as the panel hearing the appeals, I have filed a motion to transfer, filed in person at the Court of Appeal, and copied to the Supreme Court of California, because it has concurrent jurisdiction to grant a transfer. We'll see what happens.
A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT FILED AGAINST ME
I have now received a letter from the City Attorney's Office informing me that a criminal complaint has been filed charging me with a violation of a Penal Code that is noted with a "/restraining order". Therefore, I gather one of the charges at least will be violation of a restraining order. And, "There may be other charges included in the complaint, which are not listed here." I have a scheduled hearing for arraignment on February 27th. I'll provide the specific details of the arraignment in terms of time, location, etc., at the end of this blog.
I contacted the City Attorney's Office to get a confirmation. It was confirmed. So, I'll be there.
But, this is purely a retaliatory prosecution, with a mixture of racial animus. If it's not an absolute retaliatory prosecution, it's the closest to one, one will get. You file a criminal complaint against us and we'll file one against you. READERS : if you have been following my blogs over the years, you know what this is all about. The government probably have been waiting for this opportunity it believes it has to criminally prosecute me. You know,"we've been waiting a long time for this", now "we got-cha". But, the government don't even have probable cause to charge or prosecute me for violating a restraining order. But, knowing the courts as I do, it may have to be proven post-arraignment, but, it will be proven. I'll see about the other charges, if any.
But, this is just another case of the government using my sister, and her emotional state, to get at me.
But, hear this : I have NOT violated any restraining orders. Why would I? And, in addition to the fact that I haven't violated any restraining order, it is the principles of the criminal law that will protect me from prosecution.
But READERS: if any of you have the time, I urge you to attend the proceedings, not only to support me, if you choose to, and certainly, I would appreciate your support and presence, but also to get some insight as to why there are so many Black boys and men, along with other minorities, in California prisons and the kind and/or amount of evidence used to get them there.
Also, I invite and urge members of Black Lives Matter, who have the time, to attend the proceedings in this case, not only for your support, if you wish to give it, but also, so that you can observe another aspect of the discrimination against Black males in the criminal "justice" process in California, i.e., from charging to conclusion. Pay attention to the evidence and the rulings regarding that evidence. I know there was recently an arrest and subsequent dismissal of charges of Melina Abdullah, a Cal State L.A. professor and organizer of Black Lives Matter. Another case where the City Attorney's Office, Mike Feuer, began with one charge and ended with multiple charges at arraignment. And, I believe the government has less evidence in my case than in Ms. Abdullah's case. But, we'll see.
You should pay attention to what I am supposed to have done to violate the restraining order(a restraining order that should not have been granted in the first place), and prompt the government to bring this prosecution.
***READERS : you should also come to the hearing to note the outcome of the right to counsel.
So, here's the info on the arraignment hearing:
PLACE : Los Angeles Superior Court, Criminal Court Building
ADDRESS : 210 West Temple Street, Los Angeles, CA, 90012
COURTROOM : Department 48
DATE : FEBRUARY 27, 2019
TIME : 8: 30 A.M.
More next time.
UPDATE--February 25, 2019
ARCO GAS AND THE LAPD
Last Friday night, around 10:00 p.m., I stopped at my usual Arco gas station to get gas (originally, I was going to identify the location of the gas station, but, the matter has been resolved, and I do not wish to place the station in a bad light--management handled the matter well, and the issue has been resolved). I went to the clerk's window to pay for the gas (the main door entrance to the inside windows was closed--apparently because of the hour of the night) , and deposited $40.00, informing the female clerk of my pump number. I proceeded to my car and pumped my gas. As it turned out, I only needed $30 to fill the tank. So, I returned to the clerk's window to recover my overpaid "change" owed me. As it turned out, a strange man (who appeared to be homeless) apparently had observed me pumping gas and had obtained my pump number, and thereafter, observed me proceeding to the clerk's window, and proceeded to arrive at the clerk's window before I did. This strange man then had a conversation with the clerk, apparently telling her my pump number and asking for change (although I was immediately behind him, I didn't pay any attention to his conversation with the clerk, although I did hear "#3"--but, I still didn't know the context). The clerk then paid the man $10, and the man left. So, when I approached the clerk and requested my overpaid "change" for pump #3, she refused to pay me my overpaid $10 dollars due. She said she had already paid my money to the other man. I told her that that was not my fault or my problem, and that she owed me $10 dollars. Basically, she got duped by the strange man. The clerk continued to maintain her position, and at one point, stated "so, what are you going to do about it?". So, I told her that I would call the police and have them resolve it.
This is the type of matter that the police could resolve easily, saving possibly more serious actions between the parties, such as harm based on emotional actions or reactions, future actions or crimes such as assault and battery or future litigation, such as discrimination lawsuits (the clerk was a Hispanic or Latin woman, and the strange man was Hispanic or Latin, and I am Black or African American).
Anyway, I called the police, through 911, and after a hour of waiting for them in the cold, I left. They never came. Even if they came after I left, they never came for me. Twice during that hour an LAPD officer ask for my name and telephone number and a description of my car (I called back when they hadn't arrived in about 30 min. or so, and an officer asked again about my name, telephone number, and car). But, they never came. There were other interesting facts, but I'll save them for another forum.
As I alluded to previously, the matter regarding payment of my $10 was resolved amicably between the Arco manager and myself. The next day, I visited the Arco station in the evening and was able to speak with the manager, whom I was familiar with because he is the person I usually pay when getting gas, which is usually in the morning hours. Also, coincidentally, another young lady employee who had been present when the incident took place was also present here. So when I explained to the manager what had taken place, the young lady corroborated my explanation. The manager paid me the $10 dollars and that was it. Case closed.
As for the LAPD, I wonder if they believe their actions would help the city attorney's case in the retaliation matter? I know that it will help fuel my defense if the matter has to go to trial. But, I don't believe that it will.
More next time.
UPDATE--March 6, 2019
THE ATEMPTED SALE OF MY MOTHER'S HOME *(information here deleted)
My motion to transfer the appeal was denied, purportedly by the administrative presiding judge, but the heading of the Order was still identified as from Division 7. So, an independent evaluation or not? You be the judge. So, am I expecting fairness at the upcoming hearing? Based on the past actions, NO. But, the hearing, oral argument, is scheduled for tomorrow : MARCH 7, 2019, AT 1:30 P.M., COURT OF APPEAL, 200 South Spring Street, Second Floor, North Tower, Los Angeles, CA 90013.
*I misstated that the argument involves 2 appeals. That's incorrect, the argument just involve the attempted sale of my mother's home appeal.
THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
I appeared at court for the arraignment. I pled NOT GUILTY, and was released on personal recognizance. The next hearing, for pretrial matters, is scheduled for March 20, 2019. I was represented at the arraignment by the Public Defender, but that will likely change. I intend to go pro se, for various reasons.
My first impression of the trial judge, Timothy M. Weiner, is that he is a fair judge. I come to this conclusion based on several matters that took place during arraignment which offered me an opportunity to make an initial impression assessment. Sometimes, perhaps most times, there simply is not enough taking place to make an assessment of a judge as to fairness at the first meeting(i.e., simple mundane matters that all judges perform). Here there was. But, I will not provide those matters here, because it would be unfair to judge Weiner. I do not know judge Weiner, or of him, and this is my first encounter with him. I will provide the reasons I believe he is fair later, at a more appropriate time. But, again, this is just a first impression, and that can change. We'll see.
UPDATE--March 18, 2019
THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
First, Judge Weiner. Since it appears that I will not appear before him soon anyway, one of the other reasons I believe that he was fair, besides releasing me without bail, i.e, OR, was that at one point when I told him that I would likely have to enter the restricted 100 yard area of the imposed protective order by the court, he offered or suggested that he could reduce the yardage to 50 yards if it would help or accommodate me in my need to avoid violating the protective order. But, I told him that it wouldn't be necessary. He also ordered the public defender to draft an order allowing me to enter the restricted area.
Post-arraignment. I am now scheduled to appear before a different judge for pretrial matters, where I have a motion to proceed pro se, with the assistance of counsel.
***Soon, I will be starting another blog dealing with my criminal case, so you will have to view that blog to follow the criminal matter.
THE SALE OF MY MOTHER'S HOME
Oral argument took place on March 7th. I was surprised at the assignment of my panel for argument. Apparently, judge Zelon recused herself from the case, as she was not named (I asked twice to make sure she was not assigned). I was so surprised that I decided to forgo spending time arguing the issue of bias, as I would have if judge Zelon would have been on the panel, and to spend the majority of the time arguing the merits of the sale of the property and other matters. The recusal offers some semblance of hope for fairness in the process.
More next time.
UPDATE--May 19, 2019
Well, it's been awhile, but I'm back. I want to first state that much of the information that you get from this blog regarding the legal system and other matters, you won't get from the L.A. Times or other news outlets, because in protecting public officials, or SOME public officials (mostly white officials) from scrutiny, especially regarding race discrimination, but other matters of competency as well, they CHOOSE not to publish much of the type of information that you are getting from me. I am reporting to you the real goings-on in the California court systems, not just what the ordinary media would consider proper proceedings that progress as they should "on paper". The things that you get from me are the true and actual proceedings that are going on in the courtroom, and the true and actual conduct of court officials (that you will not read about in the regular news media). When I speak about the attempted sale of my mother's home, you will get some idea of what I'm speaking about in terms of the differences in reporting between the mainstream media in the L.A. area and my blog.
THE HOMELESS
News reports have stated that the homeless problem has increased rather than decreased, even with the piecemeal measures enacted by the mayor. There apparently has been much money spent on the homeless, which is a good thing, but it's not doing any good in terms of eradicating the homeless problem. Why? Because nothing significant will occur, in terms of eliminating the homeless problem, until there is a concerted effort by a working together of all of the various governmental agencies toward a common goal of eradicating homelessness. I suggested a model in terms of a committee that should be established as a starting point in trying to find a solution. Thusfar, nothing resembling that model has been proposed or attempted. And, that's because the County or State of California has no intention of getting rid of the homeless problem, with one of the reasons being just old fashion racism. Compare the Orange County homeless, which are mostly white, to the L.A. County homeless, which are mostly minority, with a large Black segment. The Orange County homeless got a federal judge to oversee handling of the homeless problem. I don't know of a federal judge assigned to handle the L.A. homeless problem. Finally, other evidence that L.A. city and county, and state officials are not seriously trying to get rid of homelessness among L.A. citizens is the governments' refusal to mention anything about the illegal and unconstitutional evictions by the County and state of California, through the court systems.
Look at my case, instead of correcting the unlawfulness causing my eviction, it perpetuates it, through more unlawfulness (including racial discrimination). And, I am just one person, one black male. And, do you think this has only happened to me? And, look at what's happening in my case. So, the L.A. Times and a couple of TV stations can continue to do reporting on the homeless situation, but those in the know, recognize that its all for naught. Until the L.A. Times and the other news media begin to report on all aspects of the homeless problem, such as the unlawful and unconstitutional evictions perpetuated by county officials, based in part, at least, on racism, it is doing an incomplete job of reporting on the problem of homelessness, while purporting to find solutions. **Most of the homeless are homeless because of EVICTIONS. And I submit that if a real and thorough investigation was done, it would show that many of the evictions are ILLEGAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Yet, there are no reports on this. Why, because it would expose the misconduct of public officials, including judges. And, until the city, county, and state governments get with the feds and together formulate a "real" plan for tackling the homeless problem, the piecemeal measures and money spent on the homeless problem is nothing more than symbolic BULLSHIT.
THE LEE BACA CASE
It's old news now , but Lee Baca has lost his appeal for a full court review by the Ninth Circuit. His last option now is the U.S. Supreme Court. I've already expressed my views regarding Baca, so I'll let it be.
THE ATTEMPTED SALE OF MY MOTHER'S HOME AND JUDGE LAURIE ZELON AND DIVISION 7 OF THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
When I last discussed judge Laurie Zelon and Division 7, which was in my March 18, 2019 Update, I indicated that Zelon was not named, by judge Perluss, as a member of the panel for my appeal. As I indicated above, I asked judge Perluss to repeat the names of the panel members for my case and Zelon was not named. Now, guess who wrote the decision in my case? Zelon. So, what does that mean? At minimum, the action or representation by Perluss at oral argument was misleading, and at most it was false and misleading. At oral argument, Perluss pointed to two female judges, not Zelon, and named them as being on my panel (there was no writing passed out naming the panel members). There was one on each end of the panel with Zelon, Perluss, and Segal in the middle. Perluss pointed to the two women, naming them as being the panel members ( I didn't get their names, because my main concern was that Zelon wasn't named). Now, Zelon, who wasn't named, writes the decision, and Segal, who also wasn't named, is a member of the panel writing the decision, i.e., concurrence. This is no longer about bias or discrimination, it's now about integrity and dignity.
And, of course, with Zelon writing the decision, and her cohorts in agreement, you know what the outcome is : she affirmed the lower court's decision. And, like her previous decision, it contains at least one lie or false allegation or statement (and I believe two). And, again, the "decision" is totally one-sided, favoring my sister, and with the end result of affirming the illegal, unconstitutional, and racist attempted sale of my mother's home without her consent. Because Division 7's decision is not only discriminatory or bias, and involves other misconduct, I will take another step that I didn't take with the prior decision. See, infra.
So, after receiving the decision, I have now filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court. And, while I'm not highly confident of this action, especially because of, and on behalf of, my mother and her home, I have no other choice.
BREAKING NEWS: The California Supreme Court has now, *without opinion or explanation, denied the petition and the stay. So now, I must explore other avenues to get relief, especially regarding my mother's home.
This action by the state, in illegally and unconstitutionally attempting to take my mother's property and home without her consent harkens back to the days of post-slavery and Jim Crow when white folks stole black people's property and land under the auspices of the law and so- called legal proceedings.
In the meantime, while the petition for review was pending, before the decision, I attempted to file a motion in the California Supreme Court to have my cases transferred from Division 7 to another division. However, after the Court received the motion, I received a telephone call from a court clerk, I assume, notifying me that the Court only receives transfer recommendations from the Court of Appeal, and that I would have to apply to the (Second District) Court of Appeal for a transfer. After discovering that I had already applied to the court of appeal, she said that I would have to apply for a writ of mandate directed to the court of appeal. And she said that she would have to send the motions back to me. I responded that according to the transfer Rule (that is, on the face the rule, the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over some motions to transfer), I could file the motion with the Supreme Court. The clerk then said she would transfer me to the Court Administrator (but she said that he had told her that). When the call went to the Court Administrator's Office a woman answered the phone, and I asked to speak with the administrator. She said that he was busy (after which I insisted that I wanted to speak with the administrator and not her), but that she would call me back. I never received a call back (which was discourteous at least), and subsequently, I received my motions back in the mail, with no written document enclosed indicating why they were sent back.
Again, on the face of the Rule, the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to hear transfer cases *or motions or petitions. So, I had to do a little research to confirm this. The "little" research that I did confirmed or indicated that a party could file a motion or petition in the Supreme Court, without having to file it in the court of appeal. So now, I will return the motions to the Supreme Court and address a letter to the Chief Justice identifying legal sources which support the position that the court must receive and rule on my transfer motions, and I will seek a decision on my motion to transfer (because there are other pending appeals that could go to Division 7). Let's see what happens.
As I said above, at this point, the central issue is the integrity and dignity of California courts, especially as it relates to Black people, and more specifically, Black males. The discrimination and/or bias issues in my case are are clear (even without a determination by the courts--which the courts have had an opportunity to respond to and provide a determination of). It now comes down to how the courts will handle the issue(s), with or without integrity or dignity.
FUTURE ACTION AGAINST DIVISION 7 : THE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE
I will now turn to the Judicial Performance Commission for relief against Division 7. In the near future, I will be filing a Complaint charging misconduct by Division 7 with the Commission on Judicial Performance. More specifically, I will charge Division 7 with racial discrimination and retaliation. Ordinarily, I wouldn't expect much in terms of actual and warranted relief based on my knowledge and experience with judicial misconduct commissions, which is why I didn't file a complaint with the Commission after Division 7's first decision. But now, the Complaints, which will include more than Division 7, must be viewed in an entirely different context. They must be viewed in light of the complaint and now charges filed against the black male judge Jeffrey Johnson of the Second District *Court of Appeal by the Commission for sexual harassment, with one of the complainers being a judicial member of the Second District (I will name her in a new blog). The Commission must at least scrutinize the Complaints against Zelon and others with the same scrutiny that it has with judge Johnson's case, and charge them as it has with judge Johnson's case or be able to justify not doing so, or judge Johnson will have an equal protection or selective prosecution claim.
While judge Johnson might have been charged with nine counts of misconduct, only one count needs to be actionable for disciplinary action, and the nature of the conduct may be enough for one count to require removal. My complaints will contain several charges (or "counts"). Racial discrimination is at least as serious as sexual harassment or misconduct. I believe it is more serious, especially when perpetrated by a judge or other individual who are supposedly officers of the court and are charged with protecting the rights of citizens. So when the Commission makes its decision to charge or not charge the individuals that I will charge, it must do so in the context of judge Johnson's charges and final discipline. The Commission will have to determine if the harm caused by judge Johnson's conduct is more serious than the harmed caused by Zelon's conduct (and the others). If judge Zelon's conduct caused more harm, and more serious harm, than judge Johnson's, than, if the Commission discipline judge Johnson, it MUST discipline judge Zelon, otherwise it will deny judge Johnson equal protection of the law.
I will see that judge Johnson is made aware that judge Zelon and others are having complaints filed against them with the Commission.
Finally, I am likely going to be publishing two new blogs to cover Division 7 and the comparison between judge Zelon and judge Johnson before the Commission (the comparison will be based on information already made public).
Also, let's see if the L.A. Times is going to publish anything about my complaints against Zelon and the others, like it did with judge Johnson's charges by the Commission. If it doesn't, then you will know that what I've been saying about the racist side of the L.A. Times has support. I will get a copy of this blog to the L.A. Times so the Times can't say : "we didn't know". And, if the Times publish a story about judge Johnson, which it did (which is where I first learned about the matter), it should publish one about Zelon and her crew. Otherwise, it's racial favoritism on the part of the Times.
For an update on the criminal matter go to the Bray v. City Attorney's office blog.
More next time.
UPDATE--May 28, 2019
THE HOMELESS
The L.A. Times today published another article on the homeless and homelessness, which I believe is worth noting and quoting.
1. "In a few weeks, Los Angeles is expected to report a dramatic INCREASE in homelessness--- the latest in a string of similarly dire reports from cities and counties across California". Emphasis added.
COMMENT : It shows that whatever the city, county, and state are doing isn't working. Should we try something new and/or different ?
2. "The pressure is on to find ways to get more people indoors quickly and to PREVENT others from becoming homeless IN THE FIRST PLACE." Emphasis added.
COMMENT : See my suggestions at the end of this section of the blog.
3. "To that end, Gov. Gavin Newsom last week announced the leaders of new statewide homelessness task force." See leadership infra. "Newsom also recently sent California lawmakers a revised budget that would provide cities and counties with a one-time infusion of $650 million to open emergency shelters, provide rental assistance to struggling tenants and underwrite the construction of permanent housing, among other uses. Of that funding, $275 million would go directly to 13 of California's largest cities, MOST OF IT TO LOS ANGELES." Emphasis added.
COMMENT: (From LA Times) "But if the past is any indication of the future, the millions of dollars -- even with a task force to coordinate solutions -- probably wouldn't make much of an immediate DENT in the STATUS QUO of HOMELESSNESS." Should we try something new and/or different ?
4. "Yet, homelessness IS STILL ON THE RISE". Emphasis added.
5. "(E)very year, about 1,500 people enter permanent housing in the county, while nearly 3,000 people also FALL INTO HOMELESSNESS FOR THE FIRST TIME."
COMMENT : And of the 3,000 people who fall into homelessness for the FIRST TIME, how many get there because of EVICTIONS ? It MUST be MOST of them because MOST of the homeless are homeless because of EVICTIONS. And, I suggest that a large portion, if not MOST, of evictions are illegal and /or unconstitutional.
6. "The lack of a coordinated plan has frustrated some advocates for the homeless, though. They would've liked the state to tie the money to programs and ideas that have a proven track record of working."
7. "We don't know what that money went for, and that's really concerning because we're giving money to jurisdictions and just trusting they're doing the right thing."
COMMENT : Should we try something new or different ?
8. "In April 2018, Garcetti committed to building temporary homeless shelters in each of L.A.'s 15 council districts. At the time, $30 million was committed from the city's coffers to his A Bridge Home program and L.A. was able to augment that with about $50 million from the STATE, SO FAR. But through March of this year, just $2.8 million -- or about 2.7% -- has been spent, according to city documents."
COMMENT : Why? Should we try something new or different?
9. "Sacramento Mayor Darrell Steinberg, who chairs Newsom's task force with Los Angeles County Supervisor Mark Ridley-Thomas, said most experts agree that more housing coupled with intensive outreach is the ONLY solution to homelessness." *Emphasis added.
COMMENT : I vehemently DISAGREE. Those two options are NOT the ONLY solution to homelessness. Here are two other solutions :
(1) FORM A MULTI-GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE (i.e., city, county, state, and federal governments (yes, the federal government MUST be part of any viable and SERIOUS solution to the homeless problem--and homelessness IS also a federal problem--IF FOR NO OTHER REASON, THE VIOLATION OF HOMELESS PEOPLES' FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS). This Committee could solve some of the problems of numbers #2, #3, #6, #7, and #8 above.
(2) TAKE ACTION TOWARDS THE ERADICATION OF ILLEGAL AND/OR UNLAWFUL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL EVICTIONS (especially by GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS). It certainly makes COMMON SENSE. If most homeless people in LA County are homeless because of evictions (and I got this statistic from the LA Times ), then , it is common sense that if nothing is done to eliminate evictions, especially unlawful and unconstitutional evictions, the state of California will NOT solve the homelessness problem. Because for each home you build, another home will be needed because of evictions. So that if you prevent evictions, then when a new home is built, it will truly be an additional home, NOT a replacement home.
Those are my suggestions for solving the homelessness problem in California, but especially, in Los Angeles County. But I know that my suggestions will only be accepted and utilized if the STATE of CALIFORNIA is SERIOUS about eradicating homelessness in the State. So, if they are not utilized, the public will know that the State is not REALLY interested in getting rid of homelessness.
More next time.
UPDATE--May 29, 2019
LETTER TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT
I have now written a letter to the Chief Justice and returned my motion for a transfer materials to the California Supreme Court. I identified
certain examples of legal authorities which dictate that the CA Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over my motion for a transfer, including a California Supreme Court case which is similar to mine, in that the Appellant made a "request" for the CA Supreme Court to transfer his case to another Court of Appeal DIVISION based on his charge of BIAS by a certain Division of the Court of Appeal, and in that the Appellant made the request for transfer while his PETITION FOR REVIEW was pending (as in my case). Although the Court denied the Appellant's motion or "request", it, in fact, accepted original jurisdiction and entertained the motion or "request", without requiring the Appellant to first request the relief in the Court of Appeal. By the way, the Court denied the motion or "request" because it found the reasons set forth by the Appellant for charging the Division with bias were insufficient (finding basically that the reasons were that the Division had ruled against him regarding legal findings (however, the Supreme Court granted his petition for review and reversed a dismissal of his appeal--requiring reinstatement of his appeal). In my case, I provided a specific reason, other than the Division ruling against me, for my charge of bias and request for a transfer.
So, we'll see what happens.
UPDATE--July 29, 2019
Briefly, I have not heard back from the Chief Justice regarding my motion to transfer.
Next, I am now prepared to submit the names of the individuals who I will be submitting Complaints about with the Commission on Judicial Performance. But, before I do, I will repeat a message I noted before in this blog : It has been found that the State of California has the most HATE GROUPS in the country. So-called "liberal" California. Therefore, if that's true, there must be a substantial number of racist people in California; and those racist people likely have relatives, friends, or acquaintances who also are racist or have racist inclinations. Or, even if individuals are not racist per se or have racist inclinations, they may simply choose to discriminate on the basis of race or color. And, necessarily, some of those individuals must become involved in or a part of various organizations, including governmental organizations in California. And, the judicial systems of California are not immune from receiving their share.
With the above in mind, here are the individuals that I will be submitting Complaints about with the Commission on Judicial Performance :
1. David Cowan (L.A. Superior Court) : The primary charge : Racial and gender discrimination and denial of constitutional rights.
2. Laurie Zelon, and Dennis Perluss and John Segal (or Division 7 of the Second District Court of Appeal): The primary charge : For Zelon, racial and gender discrimination, and denial of constitutional rights under color of law. Perluss and Segal are joined for their concurrence of Zelon's conduct. Perluss will have a separate claim.
3. T. Bigelow, M. Flier, D. Sortino, Grimes, and Wiley (or Division 8 of the Second District Court of Appeal) : The primary charge : racial discrimination and denial of constitutional rights under color of law.
4. A. Ricciardulli, S. Kumar, and T. Richardson (or the Appellate Division of the L.A. Superior Court); The primary charge : racial discrimination, and the denial of constitutional rights under color of law.
5. Francis Bennett (L.A. Superior Court): The primary charge : Denial of constitutional rights under color of law .
6. Kimberly Baker Guillemet (L.A. Superior Court) : The primary charge : Gender and racial discrimination, and the denial of constitutional rights under color of law.
7. Elwood Lui (Second District Court of Appeal) : The primary charge : racial discrimination, denial of constitutional rights under color of law.
8. "Mystery Judge" : Denial of constitutional rights under color of law. I will keep the name of this judge confidential until the matter is decided by the Commission.
***9. A. Veronica Sauceda , Commissioner (L.A. Superior Court-Compton Courthouse) : The primary charge : Gender and racial discrimination, and denial of constitutional rights under color of law.
***Since Sauceda is a Commissioner, the Complaint against her must be submitted to or with the L.A. Superior Court of California.
I will submit the Complaints to the Commission by July 31, 2019.
I also expect to start a new blog where I will compare the cases of judges Cowan and Zelon to judge Johnson.
More next time.
UPDATE--November 18, 2019
THE HOMELESS
The non-racist side of the L.A. Times has once again published several articles on the homeless, similar to previous publications, and again, on behalf of the homeless, and especially the black homeless, and most especially the Black male homeless, I thank the L.A. times. Because without the Times continued coverage and bringing the homelessness issue to the forefront, clearly NOTHING would EVER be done. The little that is being done is largely due to the Times reporting and coverage of homelessness in L.A. County.
However, I will continue to say as I have said in the past : The citizens of the State of California, and especially, Los Angeles County, should know that as long as the city, county, and State of California refuse to form and implement the type of Commission that I have identified above at the MAY 28, 2019 entry, which I will hereby name the "Homeless Resolution Committee", those entities, i.e., city, county, and state, will demonstrate to the citizens of the State of California that THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND ESPECIALLY LOS ANGELES CITY AND COUNTY HAVE NO INTENTION OF ERADICATING HOMELESSNESS IN THE CITY AND COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES.
Whatever is being done on behalf of the homeless by California officials now is simply appeasement for the public, in an effort to show that something is being done to resolve the homeless situation, especially "tent city" or Skid Row".
But, the city, county, and State of California cannot SERIOUSLY attempt to eradicate the homelessness problem without the HRC. With the HRC, together with the allocated taxpayer's funds, AND a directed and concerted effort to eliminate unlawful and/or unconstitutional EVICTIONS; and a commitment to ACT with "ALL DELIBERATE SPEED", the State of California could see a significant DENT in the homeless problem within three years, AND a substantial impact within a year, WITHOUT attempting to CRIMINALIZE the homeless and undo Jones v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2006).
Out of all the discussion included in the Times' articles, the closest the articles come to a discussion of the above is the "assistance" with evictions. But assistance with evictions does nothing to stop unlawful or unconstitutional evictions. That will require real action, not just assistance.
More next time.
**UPDATE—December 2, 2020
See my blog entitled “The homelessness Crisis...”, where I continue to assert that the City and County of Los Angeles, and the State of California , have no intention of solving the homeless problem , updated on this date, December 2, 2020.
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I am 29 years old and have been diagnosed with breast cancer, ease of treatment and a similar story, except for my first acceptance as a rejection of herbal medicine. I was not part of the Perseid movement and did not really build relationships with any of them, I just believed in their operation. I say this because it was during the use of Dr. Itua herbal medicine that I now attest that herbal medicine is real, the phytotherapy Dr. Itua heal my breast cancer which I suffered for 2 years. Dr. Itua herbal medicine is made of natural herbs, with no side effects, and easy to drink. If you have the same breast cancer or any type of human illness, including HIV / AIDS, herpes cancer,Ovarian Cancer,Pancratics cancers, bladder cancer, bladder cancer, prostate cancer, Glaucoma., Cataracts,Macular degeneration,Cardiovascular disease,Autism,Lung disease.Enlarged prostate,Osteoporosis.Alzheimer's disease,psoriasis ,Tach Diseases,
Dementia.kidney cancer, lung cancer, skin cancer, skin cancer and skin cancer.testicular Cancer, , LEUKEMIA, VIRUSES, HEPATITIS, INFERTILITY WOMEN / MAN, LOT OF LOVE, LOTTERY. ITS CONTACT EMAIL / WHATSAPP: info@drituaherbalcenter.com Or drituaherbalcenter@gmail.com/ +2348149277967
Here is my contact phone number. +1-913-9518-145 if you would need some advise from me.
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